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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
"We have class justice in South Africa, running at times 
on racial lines, but not at all entirely. 11 1 
This thesis is an attempt at an analysis of labour legislation in 
South Africa between the years 1924 and 1945. The legislation will 
be analysed in terms of the motives of the legislature, the forces 
in favour of and against the particular measures, the form the measures 
todt, the way in which they were implemented, and their effects. The 
aim of this thesis is to add to an understandin~ of the South African 
social formation durin~ these crucial years, as well as to ~nin an 
appreciation of ·the role of legislation in determining the fo1:;n of. 
capitalist society and South African society in particular. 
Legislation can obviously not be viewed apart from the situation in 
which it operates. Before etTVarking on the study proper, tht~ first 
introductory chapter wi 11 thus sketch in, in very genera 1 terms, the 
background necessary, both in general and in specifically South African 
terms, for an appreciation of the material which follows. 
Section I of the chapter will deal with the main approaches and paradigms 
in which analyses of South Africa have up to now been conducted. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches will be mentioned, 
and the outline of the approach to be adopted in this thesis will be 
briefly set out. Section II will then look at the chief classes, 
strata and sectors in the South African social formation of 1924 to 1945, 
utilising the analysis outlined previously. The description will 
concentrate on those groups, and wit~in the groups, on those aspects, 
which are important in terms of the legislation to be analysed. 
With this background Section III will indicate the importance of the 
period 1924 to 1945, insofar as the development of these groups was 
concerned • . The major events on the political and economic levels will 
be described so as to situate the timing of the various legislative 
measures looked at later. Finally, Section IV will look very briefly 
at the role of the state and law in capitalist society in general 
(a subject to be further elaborated in Chapter Two), and in the light 
of this, as well as the preceding description of the South African 
social' formation, postulate some general hypotheses ·as ·to -the form 
1. Barend van Niekerk in SOtrrH AFRICAN OtrrLOOK, SeptetTVer 1975, page 141. 
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and function one can expect of labour legislation in South African 
between 1924 and 1945. 
I 
The Choice of Aeproach 
The legislative framework of colour discrimination in South Africa has 
often been described .and explained from an empirical perspective. 1 
Work has also been carried out on the legislation affecting workers, 
the latter .. naturalty ·· including the differential provisions for black 
and white workers. 2•3 Up until 1970, however, this body of work 
for the most part either utlised a liberal/dualistic/pluralist approach, 
or, if in a Marxist tradition, combined a class analysis with one 
1. Examples of this type of work are too numerous to list here. The 
hibliography contains many representative works. 
2. Again the examples are too numerous to mention, but the South 
African Institute of Race Relations has published many of the more 
empirical works in this respect. 
3. Throughout the thesis the word "black" will be taken to refer to 
African, "coloured" and Indian members of the population. The 
term "coloured" itself, will be used iri spite of the many difficulties, 
because of the absence of a short and workable alternative. For the 
present, despite its drawbacks, it does have a commonly understood 
meaning, and one which has an objective bases, albeit largely ideolo-
gical and political, in the South African context. 
Throughout the study I have also mosHy ... rieglected the "coloured" and 
Indian workers; These groups fall between the white and African groups. 
Whereas there was no true black bourgeoisie in the period 1924 to 1945, 
there was a significant petty bourgeoisie, especially among the Indian 
population, and one which formed a far more important proportion of th 
particular group than the African petty bourgeoisie among Africans as 
a whole. Whereas most blacks were workers or peasants, in the case of 
the "coloured" workers· there was a significant number of skilled artisans 
among them. "Coloured" and Indian ·workers were also politically and 
economically "freer" than African workers in respect of such indices 
as the franchise, residence restrictions, and general freedoms. All 
these differences had important political and ideological consequences. 
Workers found it more difficult to unite in view of the prevailing 
divisive racist ideology. Capital contributed to this division by 
differential treatment of the various black groups, with differential 
access to skills, the definition of "employee" in the Industrial Concilia-
tion Act, and the application of the "civilised labour" policY to 
11C'oloureds" on occasions, being only a few examples of this policy. I 
have concentrated on the white and African groups in that here the dis-
tinction was clearest and thus the exposition simpler. A full analysis 
would have to take account of the different positions of all these 
groups, both politically and in the labour process, and in the 
different geographical areas of South Africa. 
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which was basically liberal. The same two general approaches underlay 
the scanty and often anecdotal historical works about class and colour 
struggle in South Africa. Both approaches had serious defects which 
prevented a clear understanding of the interplay of class and colour 
in the form and development of the society. 
In general the .liberal writers conceived of the "political" and 
"economic" spheres as being basically separate from each other. Colour 
discrimination was .a dysfunctional and irrational intrustion of the 
"political" .and ideological into the economic • . In the words of one of 
the chief exponents, there was un "unresolved contradict ion between 
1 economics and politics. 11 The solution to the "problem" was seen in 
the removal of this interfering factor. The economic level could then 
operate on the basis of purely "objective" factors, and a colour blind 
economy would develop, a solution seen as being more fair, more rational, 
and more efficient. As these .. writers accepted capitalism, the "problem", 
which was only a colour one, would then be removed. 
The Marxist approach acknowledged the contradiction that existed between 
capital and labour, and theoretically also accepted this contradiction 
as being more fundamental than any white-black one within labour. 
At times it was also acknowledged that colour prejudice had not impeded 
capitalist development. Nevertheless, two leading mem,ers of the 
Communist Party claim in their book that "Colour bars ••• are being 
eroded and undermined by industrial expansion and urbanisation. 112 
Once again it was hoped that economic development would remove colour 
3 discrimination, if not all types of oppression. In the light of 
subsequent history, however, both the liberal and Marxist analyses have 
been found to .be inadequate, with the continued development of the 
South Africa economy, together with the retention (and strengthening?) 
of colour discrimination. 
Around 1970 a new current emerged , spearheaded by the writings of 
4 Legassick, Wolpe, Bundy, Trapido and Johnstone. This "neo-Marxist" 
1. Monica Wilson, quoted in M. Harrison Wright, THE BURDEN OF THE 
P~ESENT, 1977, page 12. 
2. H.J. and R.E. Simons, CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOUTII AFRICA, 1969, page 34. 
3. F.A. Johnstone, CLASS, RACE AND GOLD, 1976, Conclusion, for an 
elaboration of this critique. 
4. Taffy Adler (ed), A COLLECTICN OF WORKING PAPERS, 1977, provides an 
extensive bibliography of this writing. 
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current attempted to show that class and colour were inextricably, 
if 11 assymetrically~' linked in the development of South Africa, and that 
colour discrimination, far from being dysfunctional, formed the basis · 
of the development of capitalism here. As Johnstone has said, they at-
tempted to produce work with a "Marxist structuralist approach, which 
sees and explains the system of racial domination as a product of the 
system of product ton of which it formed a part, and as determined in 
its specific form, functions and nature by this system. 111 
These same writers, together with a younger groups of South African 
scholars, among whom were Kaplan, Davies, Morris, Fransman and Lewis, 
later further refined this neo-Marxist analysis. 2 The earlier work 
had concentrated on the analysis of the creation and reproduction of 
cheap labour power - a capital-labour contradiction. The newer writing 
extended the sphere of investigation to conflicts within the capital 
and labour groupings, utilising a periodisation of the state based on 
3 Poulantzas 1 theoretical work, as well as other aspects of his approach. 
They tried, in effect, to avoid a dogmatic capital/labour antagonism, 
by allowing for contradictions and differences within these two groups, 
in order to explain more adequately,and come to grips with, phenomena 
which could not be reconciled with a .docu:inaire and simplistic Marxist 
analysis. Their reliance on Poulantzas' work provided the theoretical 
framework with which to conceptualise the articulation of the economic, 
political and ideological levels of the social formation. An attempt 
could thus be made to develop a more satisfactory analysis of the 
inter-relation between class and colour, both of which operated and 
interreacted on all three of these levels. 4 
t. Johnstone, 1976, ,page 2. 
2. Adler, 1977, again provides a bibliography. Johnstone's later work, 
exemplified by the article in AFRICA PERSPECTIVE, October, 1978, 
implicitly recants, and seems to call for a liberal-Marxist amalgam. 
3. The approach cannot be gleaned from only 1 of Poulantzas' works, al-
though POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES (1973) does provide the basic 
framework. Since then, however, the framework has been corrected and 
developed in each of his succeeding books. (See bibliography). 
4. Hafrison Wright I s book (1976) is an attempt, by an avowedly neutral 
outsider, to compare the two approaches - the liberal and the neo-Marxist. 
While the book provides a useful summary of some of the arguments, and 
a .. comprehensive reading list, it is inadequate in that it conflates the 
two "neo-Marxist" currents, and thus ignored the developments within 
the second. It also fails to show how the two major tr~nds operate 
within completely different paradigms. While perhaps neutral in relation 
to South Africa, the. author is not neutral when it comes to choice of 
paradigm. Clark, Innes and Plaut all criticise the South African Poulantzian 
approach from within a Marxist perspective. (See bibliography). 
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This work has be no means been completed, as all the scholars concerned 
would readily admit. The reliance on Poulantzas provides many diffi-
culties at the purely theoretical level. Marxist analysis of any 
sort is difficult for most Western students, trained as they are in 
the dominant neo-classical economic and pluralist political paradigms. 
Old concepts have to be unlearned and new ones absorbed if the analysis . 
is not to suffer from the contradictions and weaknesses of eclecticism 
or a mixture of different paradigms. Poulantzas' work provides added 
difficulties, in that it is a developed subsystem of Marxism. Although 
Poulantzas claims that his concepts are for the most part implicit 
in the writings of Marx and Engels themselves, in developing them he 
invents a whole new range of concepts, as well as assigning very 
specific meanings to a lot of formerly loosely conceived Marxian 
concepts. In ·order to grasp these it is necessary not only to have a 
thorough Marxist grounding, but also to be able to deal with the thought 
of Freud, Althusser and Balibar, to all of whom his theory is also 
heavily indebted. 
In applying Poulantzas to South Africa, the difficulties are multiplied. 
His work is based on the metropolitan countries - the development of 
capitalism in the United .. State s and Europe. While he would claim that 
that .his basic concepts would be applicable in all capitalist formations, 
and while developments in the centre would be reflected in developments 
in the periphery, an elaboration of the exact interrelations in a peri-
pheral country like South Africa still present many difficulties. The 
outcome is that Poulantzian theory is not only difficult to deal with, 
but that, if strictly adhered to, it is only other initiates who can 
understand the work. 
Besides this source of theoretical difficulties in the new writings 
on South Africa,, much of which is still unresolved, there are many 
other difficulcies, both practical and theoretical. The study involves 
much primary research, which is time-consumllg and difficult. For the 
post-19 26 period, and especially .. for the post -1948 period, much mat er ia 1 
1 
is not available as yet. But even were this problem to be solved, 
difficulties would remain. Research in this paradigm tends to be con-
centrated on the political scene, 2 on what happens in Parliament and 
the · institutions of the state proper, where, as Poulantzas himself 
1. Various difficulties such as the fifty year rule on aepartmental 
archives restrict a~cess to the material. 
2. Poulantzas, 1973, page 246. 
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acknowledges, 
"the contradictions most directly and acutely reflected ••• 
are those among the dominant classes and fractions and 
between these and the supporting classes, far more than 
the contradictions between the power bloc and the working 
class. The latter contradictions are bayically expressed 
in the bourgeois state I at a distance.'" 
The principal sources are government publications or the organs of 
established bodies such as political parties, employers associations, 
or registered trade unions and federations, all of which are considered 
to be part of the state apparatus. In South Africa, however, the 
majority of the population, unlike the workers in the metropoles, are 
for the most part excluded from the state and a study of the principal 
contradiction is thus absent from official documents to an even 
greater extent. Written sources are few, especially for Africans, and 
those that exist were often controlled by organisations or individuals 
which did not represent either the unskilled workers or peasants, i.e. 
the majority of the Africans. 2 The majority of the population, 
illiterate and inarticulate, although not without political standpoints, 
experience and knowledge, has left no written sources. 3 The present 
political situation militates against free access to oral evidence, 
especially for white intellectuals. Thus, although the pre-eminence 
of class struggle is stressed in all the latest work, and indeed in 
this thesis, evidence of this struggle is often obtained only by means 
of its effects, of when its gravity is such that it merits attention 
in the publications of other organisations. A full and detailed develop-
ment of a theory of the interrelationship of colour and class in the 
historical development of South Africa will thus depend on m.Jch further 
research in the future, when, hopefully, access to both official and 
other sources becomes easier. 
Despite these difficulties, some preliminary groundwork has been laid 
in the Poulantzian tradition. The approach adopted in this thesis will 
be firmly based in the Marxian framework, with much borrowing from the 
l. Nicos Poulantzas, CLASSES IN CCNTEMPORARY CAil TALISM, 1976, page 104. 
2. The African National Congress, for example, was to a large extent 
representative of or dominated by ·an emergent black petty bourgeoisie. 
The Communist Party often advocated a liberal democratic standpoint 
more typical of a petty bourgeois movement, rather than a more socialist 
worker one. 
3. E.P. Thompson, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS, 1968, for 
the difficulties of studying the history of the "masses". See particularly 
the Introduction. 
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Poulantzian writers. The requirements of the system will at all times 
be relited to the economic base of the society. This base was, 
throughout the period 1924 to 1945, dominated by the capitalist mode 
of production, the production of conunodities for profit under a system 
of individual ownership of the means of production. Arising out 
of this form of organisation were classes and fractions of classes, 
defined by their relation to the means of production. 
A!. major debt to Poulantzas lies in the conception of class struggle 
arising out of the contradictory relations between classes and fractions, 
a .. conception adapted for South Africa by Davies et al. The relation 
between the economic level on the one hand and the political and 
ideological on the other, is not a simple one between base and super-
structure. "The type of unity which characterised a mode of product ion 
1 is that of a com,2lex who le riominated in the last instance by the economic." 
Within this unity each instance retains a certain relative autonomy. 
This interrelated autonomy of the levels is reflected in both social 
relations and the class struggle through which classes come into being. 
It is these cross-cutting factors which account for the variety of 
classes beyong the simple capital/labour dichotomy, and which also 
allow for a society dominated by the capitalist mode to retain large 
areas where a pre-capitalist mode is operative, albeit in a distorted 
form. 2 
In South Africa this conception of cross-cutting factors helps to explain 
how class and colour interact on all these levels (political, economic 
and ideological), so that although most capitalists are white, and 
most urban blacks are workers, it is not true that all whites are 
capitalist and all blacks workers. The interaction of the precapitalist 
African mode of product ion in the "reserves" with the capita list mode 
of production, and the splitting effects operative on all three levels 
on the proletariat help to explain how colour could also be used to 
maintain and develop these divisions. On the economic level, for example, 
there were differences in the roles assigned to different members of 
the working class--- supervisory jobs, for example, usually went to 
whites, as did clerical jobs. White workers were often allocated jobs 
which placed them closer to a petty bourgeoisie than a proletariat. 
1. Poulantzas, 1973, page 14. 
2. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa", 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1,(4), 1972, for an elaboration. 
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Differential access to education increased the disparities. On the 
political level, whites were .. privileged. All whites were enfranchised 
after 1930, while black workers had no say in the government of the 
so-called "white" areas, and very little even in the "reserves". On 
the ideological level, there was, of course, the dominant belief that 
yhites were different from, and superior to, blacks. This ideology 
was backed up by the effects of the eoo nomic and political factors 
mentioned .above, which encouraged the belief that the system worked in 
the interest of the white workers. 
A second reason for the reliance on Poulantzas is his elaboration of 
the capitalist state and how this . state is related to the economic in 
its very form and function. While other writers, such as Miliband, 1 
have shown how the capitalist state is biased, such bias was seen 
primarily in terms of the bias of the various agents occupying important 
political roles. Poulantzas' novelty, now followed and elaborated 
by others, 2 lies in his explicit formulation of the inherent bias in 
the institution itself, a bias dictated by the role of the state. An 
adequate analysis of legislation, which forms a substantial part of 
the state's role, would appear to be dependent upon such a conception. 
II . 
Race and Class in South Africa:1924 - 19 45 
a) Capital and its Internal Divisions 
One of the basic innovations of the Poulantzian approach, both as under-
taken by Poulantzas himself, and by his followers, is the conscious 
attention given to the different fractions of capital, with their 
different needs at different times, altho~gh all have a stake in the 
3 social system as a whole. Kaplan sees mainly a "congruence of 
interests" between these fractions in .South Africa with regard to labour, 
in that they all desire a labour force as cheaply as possibly, especially 
prior to 1948. He concentrates his analysis on other matters, such 
as reallocation of surplus, in specifying the inter-capital differences. 
1. Robin Blackburn (ed), IDEOL<X;Y IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1972, pages 238 ff, 
contains the main body of the Poulantzas-Miliband debate on the subject. 
2. Other writers, of slightly differing approaches, are Miliband, 
l'icciotto, Picciotto and Holloway, Plaut, etc. (See bibliography.) ._ 
3. D, Kaplan "Capita list Development in South Afr tea", in Adler ( ed), 
1977, page 96. 
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Davies1, however, postulates very real differences between~ 
these fractions in regard to labour as well, and throughout this 
study a system of differentiation of capital into its different 
fractions will be employed. 
The actual lines of delimitation present certain difficulties, .. and 
Clark, in particular, has criticised the multiplicity and looseness in 
2 definition of the overlapping fractions utilised within this approach. 
The use of · fractiona has been widely adopted, at times by writers without 
a firm grounding in Poulantzian theory, and this has added to the 
confusion. Proponents of the approach acknowledge the difficulty, 
but stress also that for different problems different divisions and 
fractions might become significant, and that this in no way invalidates 
the concept. 
For the purpose of this study, capital is chiefly divided along sectoral 
3 lines, a division employed by many non-Marxist writers as well , and one 
corresponding with major differences in the method of production, as 
well as the nature of the product, the labour process, and the labour 
force, and thus in the needs of capital. lt was along these lines 
that division was usually made when legislation was applied differentially 
to certain sectors of the economy·. 
The following fractions of capital are seen as important for the 
purposes of this thesis: 
i) Manufacturing or industrial capital: As a relatively under-
researched area, and one in which the main development occurred in the 
period, this constitutes the main object of study in this thesis. This 
fraction, characterisable as a chiefly national industrial bourgeoisie, 
was emerging during the period, with the contribution to the national 
income increasing from 11,9% in 1920 to 19,9% in 1945. 4 Firstly, this 
development was reflected in an increased concentration and centralisation 
of industry. The nuut>er of workers per establishment doubled from 19,l 
1. R. Davies, "The Political Economy of White Labour in South Africa 11 , 
in Adler (ed), 1977, page 132 ff. 
2. Simon Clarke, "Capital, Fractions of Capital and the State", CAPITAL 
AND CLASS, V, Summer, 1978~ pages 32-77. 
3. This division follows, for example, the· classification usually 
employed in official statistics of the govern~ent. 
4. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page S-3. 
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in 1924/5 to 38,8 in 1944/5. 1 Cross output per establishment more 
than trebled, increasing from £9 500 to £32 600 in the same period 
(or £7 800 to £21 400 if expressed at 1938 price levels. 2 (Both of 
these indices do not take account of any increase in overlapping 
ownerships and increased centralisation at that level.) 
Secondly, these developments had an effect on the production process 
itself. Manufacture increasingly gave way to machinofacture, a trend 
illustrated by the relative growth in importance of machine-based 
sectors such as engineering. In the former the individual worker 
(or craftsman) had still to a large extent retained control of pro- .. 
duction. He worked with tools to create a single, recognisable object, 
and worked at his own speed. In the latter the workers were a mere 
appendage to the machine. The individual tools were fused together 
in one machine, and the whole work process was controlled by the 
ma:hine, or by capital, rather than by the worker. 3 This change 
was reflected in the changing composition and nature of the labour 
force and a corresponding change in attitude of both capital and labour. 
These developments were neither smooth nor continuous however. At any 
specific time there were important divisions and differences between 
4 the different individual capitals. The chief division for the purposes 
of this study, is that between what is rather loosely referred to here 
5 
as "big" capital, or an emergent monopoly capital, and "small" capital, 
a division not always easily distinguished in research. "Big" capital 
was the result of the concentration and centralisation of industry, and 
often occurred as a result of the switch to machinofacture rather than 
manufacture. The small firms, utilising little fixed capital, could 
invest and disinvest fairly easily, and were indeed often forced to do 
so. This made this sub-fraction a very competitive one,in which the 
1. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS,page L-3, own calculations 
2. ibid., pages L-3, H-14, own calculations •. 
3. Karl Marx, CAPITAL, Vol. I, 1974, pages 352-54; 363-65; H. Braverman, 
LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL, 1974, pages 187-195; 195-57. 
4. "Capital" is used here in two senses. The first refers to it as a 
relation, for example in talking of variable or fixed capital, or capita 1 
·investment. The second way is to refer to a single capitalist, or the class 
as a whole. The context should make it clear which one of the two 
is being employed at a certain point. 
5. Poulantzas (1976) uses the same concepts. He, however, uses the terms 
"big" and"medium". reserving "small" to refer to the petty bourgeoisie. 
"Big" and "small" are used here for the sake of simplicity. 
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pruning of costs was of prime importance. Big capital, with large 
fixed capital investment, tended to be more efficient and also more 
monopolistic, and often advanced demands sul:stant ia lly different to 
those of their smaller competitors. The division between big and 
small runs at times on geographical lines, the Rand industries, for 
example, often being more advanced than those of the coastal areas, and 
this difference probably accounts for the often conflicting viewpoints 
of the Federated Chamber of Industries, the national body, and the 
Cape Chamber of Industries, the local one at the Cape. At other times 
the division was inter-industrial - steel and engineering., for 
example, were much more capitalised sectors, and grew at a much faster 
1 rate than the furniture industry. In most cases, the division was 
duplicated within one geographical area and industry - some big firms 
grew fast and employed advanced methods, whereas smaller firms lacked 
the capital necessary for such development. It is generally true, 
h~ever, that it was big capital which most displayed the characteristics 
of concentration, centralisation and the employment of heavy machinery. 
A detailed analysis of the breakdown into small and big capital awaits 
further research, but allusions to and evidence of the difference are 
plentiful. 2 The forms and effectiveness of the different legislative 
measures depended upon, and was affected by, this uneven development 
of industry. Big capital had different demands from small capital. 
The difference in the size of establishment and the nature of the 
workforce resulted in differing attitudes towards labour. In some 
cases the demands of the two subfractions were diametrically opposed 
to each other. All this is reflected in both the framing and operation 
of the various measures. 
ii) Commercial Capital: The second major fraction affected by the 
legislation was commercial and financial capital. This fraction exhibits 
contradictory features. While it was a well-established sector, it 
displayed characteristics of an undeveloped one. It consisted for the 
most part of small establishments, in the form of small retail outlets, 
and in fact included some strictly petty bourgeois establishments, 
where the owner and his family constituted the chief, or even sole, 
workforce. The average number of workers per establishment in those 
1. Table 1.1 provides comparative data for the major sectors of the economy. 
2. Martin Nicol has interesting evidence in the case of the garment 
industry. (Ph. D thesis forthcoming). 
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areas affected _by Wage Determination 38 (i.e. only .the larger urban 
centres) in 1934 was .. only 4,09, as opposed to the 23,8 for manufacturing 
1 
establishments in 1934/5. The output of commerce nevertheless still 
contributed between 15,4% (1925) and 14,1% (1945) to the national 
income throughout the period. 2 
The extended, yet widely dispersed, nature of commerce meant that it 
was difficult to organise, from the point of view of both capital and 
workers. Workers, in particular, also suffered additional disabilities 
in comparison with production workers in industry •. The nature of 
their jobs was such that they did not so easily experience the worker 
solidarity of those more dependent on each other in the production 
process. Comnerclal workers were individual workers rather than 
forming part of a collective worker. Clerical workers in financial 
institutions constituted a relatively privileged and educated section 
of the workforce and were thus often loth, on an ideological level , 
to ally themselves with ordinary workers. The nuut>er of white females 
to 1 000 white males employed in commerce increased from 382 in 1936 to 
586 in· 1946, as opposed to a drop from 438 to 329 in the same period 
in manufacturing, 3 and this increase in female labour also tended to 
militate against strong worker organisation, and to encourage severe 
exploitation. Because of these factors, in reaction to labour legis-
lation commercial capital often appeared to side with small industrial 
capital in its needs and demands, advocating a legal system conducive 
to , an earlier period of competitive capitalism with its accompanying 
ideology of more complete freedom of the individual ( at least in his 
activities as capitalist). 
Even within this fraction, however, there were contradictions. The 
development of department stores and large bureaucratised financial 
insitutions in the period brought workers together in larger groupings 
and thus facilitated organisation. LargeJscale organisation, bureau-
cratisation and mechanisation simplified tasks in this sector as well 
4 and necessitated a less skilled/educated type _of worker than before. 
l. URION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page L-,; Dept Labour Annual Reports. 
2. UNION STAT.ISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page S-3. 
J. M.J.M. Prinsloo, BLANKE VROUE-ARBEID IN DIE UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA, 
1957, page 358. 
4. Braverman, 1974. 
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The changes in concentration and centralisation, together with this 
disqualification of labour, both facilitated and encouraged organisation. 
The unity and. involvement of workers with each other was still not the 
same as that within the "collective labourer" of industry. Educ at ionai 
differences and white collar work still presented blocks to effective 
and militant organisation. 
iii). Mining capital: This is perhaps the capital .in the South African 
l 
social formation to which most study has been devoted. F·rom its 
early beginnings in the late 1880 1 s, this sector was dominated by 
overseas or indigenous monopoly capital. This capital intervened in 
a markedly undeveloped economy and set up a system of production which 
was characteristic of, and peculiar to, the industry, yet also in some 
ways a grotesque caricature of later inequalities in the rest of the 
economy. The particular commodity produced, gold, by its nature as 
2 money capital, necessitated an ultra-cheap labour force. The existence 
of a vast reservoir of untapped black labour in rapidly degenerating 
reserves, and the relative absence of any alternative spJlere of employ-
ment besides farming, facilitated the attainment of these conditions. 
The hegemonic mining capital tried to establish a system of production 
based on a grossly exploited and .. predominantly black labour force, 
with a minimum of white skilled workers. In 1935, the middle of the 
period, for example, this strict white/black dichotomy was expressed in 
. 3 
a black:white employment ratio of 89,4:10,6 , as opposed to the 58:42 
4 in manufacturing. The average wage in mining was £341,l for whites 
and £30, 5 for b lacks .. per annum,. while in manufacturing the white salary 
5 was £335,4, the white wage £202,9 and the African wage £41,0. The 
establishment of such a pattern was not without problems, however, and 
many workers, particularly the whites, who were chiefly of illllligrant 
origin in the early period, strongly resisted capital. By various 
means, including legislation, the relations between capital and white 
labour were more or less established after the 1922 Rand Revolt, however, 
with white labour corning to be increasingly restricted to a supervisory --role rather than a productive one on the mines. 
l. Johnstone,1976, is an excellent example of such a study. 
2. M. Williams, "An analysis of South African Capitalism - Neo-Ricardianism 
gr Marxism? BULLETIN OF THE CONFERENCE OF SOCIALIST ECONOMISTS, 1975, IV, l. 
J. UNION STATISTICS FOR .FIFTY YE~s. page G-4. 
4. ibid., pages Gl0-12. 
5. Industrial Legiilation Commission, UG 62-1951, Table 37. 
.. 
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The strength of mining capital, and its economic dominance, ensured 
that, while no longer politically hegemonic after 1924, its interests 
were not neglected. Mining for the most part had its own specific · 
legislation, to suit its own peculiar needs (e.g. Mines and Works 
Acts, Native Labour Regulation Act), and could, under .the Mines and 
Works .. Act, make further internal regulations .of its own "for the 
maintenance of order · and discipline, the prevention of accidents in 
1 any mines." As a sector which did not directly compete with the 
rest of the economy, and because of its independent strength and 
importance as a basis of the economy, this capital was excluded from 
much of the "ordinary" industrial legislation. 
iv) Agricultural capital: Agricultural capital was, like industrial 
capital, a "national" capital, and the second partner in the PACT 
govern~nt by means of its representation through the National Party. 
The sector was undeveloped economically in terms of production. 
Methods were relatively primitive and labour-intensive, and the 
capital/labour relation was not the "normal" fully-developed 
2 
capitalist one, but retained features of an earlier, precapitalist mode. 
Agricultural capital thus needed a particular type of labour legislation, 
and was able to obtain it because of its economic and political importance. 
Despite its backwardness and the relative decline in its importance 
through the period, agriculture still contributed between 21,6% (1925) 
and 12,3% (1945) 3 to the national income and retained political power 
disproportionate to this contribution. This political power was re-
flected in the various measures passed to protect the interests of the 
sector - tariff protection, import duties, railway tariffs and subsi-
disation. With regard to labour legislation, agriculture was excluded 
from much of the common legislation. Instead they made use of many of 
the older laws passed at an earlier stage of development, such as the 
1. Section 5( 1) of Act 12 of 1911. One example of the "special rules" 
made under this section are those of the New Jagersfontein CompS1y, 
reported in the Dept Mines Annual Report for 1929 "(page 79), viz., 
(1) 11No native shall pollute the surface working with faeces or urine, 
nor wantonly misuse or foul the latrines", (2) "No natives shall fight 
or disturb the peace or good order in the Mining area", and (3) "No 
natives shall gamble or be in possession of playing cards in the Mining 
area." These are reminiscent of Van Onselen' s description of the total 
control in Southern Rhodesia. (CHIBARO, 1976). 
2 • M. Morris, "Apartheid, ... Agriculture and the State", SALDRU Conference 
o.n Farm Labour, 1976. 
J. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page S-3. 
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Masters and Servin.ts.. .Acts, as well as new laws designed to tie the 
labour to the land and control it there, such as the "Nat lve" laws. 
v) State Capital The final area of production is that owned and 
controlled by the state, where the latter, in its role of maintenance 
of the conditions of reproduction of the total social capital, took 
over the capital function. .ESCOM was established in 1922 and !SCOR 
in l92R, and these two bodies played an important role in supplying 
the increased demand for power and iron and steel connected with the 
growth of a developed industry. The South African Railways and Harbours 
operated throughout the period, and employed 92 372 workers in 1925 
and 149 880 in 1945. 1 .. This vast organisation supplied the transport 
network necessary for effective distribution of the raw materials and 
products of mining, industry and agriculture. Local authorities, 
meanwhile, provided other infrastructural facilities in the way of 
water , sanitation, power and transport networks and services. 
This section of capital does not feature to any marked de~ree in this 
thesis. Firstly, it is excluded completely from much of the conunon 
legislatio~, having rules and regulations of its own, by which it was 
ab le to regulate conditions of work and .also t .o regulate conflict. 2 Se-
condly, this capital was to a large extent free of the constraints and -
compulsions of private capital, for example in its relative freedom 
from reliance on internal financing and thus the profit motive. It 
thus requires analysis different from that based on mere production 
of conwnodities for profit, one whic~ takes account of the state functions 
it fulfils. While this fraction does not form a central area of concern 
of this these, it was able, nevertheless, to influence the class struggle 
in important ways. 
The state departments employed poor whites, sometimes even as manual 
workes, and by thus incorporating them in the hierarchy gave them prospects 
1. UNI~ STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page G-15. 
2~· For example, the various Railways and Harbours Acts, the Public 
Services , Acts ; etc. Act 23 of 1925, pertaining to the Railways and 
Harbours, stated that the Administration could make regulations as to 
examinations, conditions of employment, such as grade, overtime, medical 
examinations. misconduct, sick fund, appeals and procedures, etc (section 
31 (1)) . and that different regulations could be made for different 
classes of employees. (section 31(2)). By this means the need for wage 
determinations and agreements was obviated, with total control and full 
decision-making power being put in the hands of the employer. 
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of advancement. In this way their class position and views were 
l altered in important ways. The percentage of white employment in 
South African Railways and Harbours serv.ice was much higher than in 
industry - 51% in 1925,. as compared to 36% in industry, and rising to 
a phenomenal 60% in 1935 to cope with the poor white problem. 2 While 
the average black (African wage for manufacturing) wage as a percentage 
of the average white wage was consistently higher in manufacturing 
than on the . railways from the thirties onwards (20,2% compared to 
16,9% in 1934/5), the average white wage as a percentage of the average 
white salary was higher in the poor-white supporting South African 
Railways and Harbours than in industry .. (61,8% compared to 60,8% in 
3 1929/30, rising to 87,0% compared to 63,1% in 1944/5. ). The tariffs-
and government-sponsored !SCOR also created a new series of skilled 
4 and semi-skilled . jobs for whites after 1924. All these differences 
and opportunities had their effect on the formation of classes. 
Capital was thus divided in its needs and demands, as seen above, and 
did not always present a united front in its views on labour legislation. 
The particular form and needs of the individual fractions, and their 
political, economic and/or ideological power, enabled them to influence 
the form of particular measures. The analysis of labour leg is lat ion 
which follows wi 11 reflect this different power, the differing lahour 
forces employed in each sector, as well as the differing needs resulting 
from the uneven development and differing form of the production process 
in each sector. 
a) Divisions within the Working Class 
Labour was divided, not only along the lines of which capital it was 
employed by, but also along the important lines of skill, colour, age 
and sex. While skill, age and sex divisions are a universal phenomenon 
in the working class, the colour element in South Africa, while present 
to some extent in many other social formations, here presented a highly 
1. R. navies, CAPITAL, THE STATE AND WHITE WAGE-EARNERS, 1977, pages 238. 
See also Poulantzas, 1965, page . 14, for . the difference between class 
position and class determination. 
2. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, pages Gl0-12, G-15. 
3.. Industrial Leg is lat ion Commission, UG62-1951, Tab le 37. 
4 • . Gwendolen M. Carter, THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY: SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 
1948, 1958. page 30. 
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developed and peculiarly South African phenomenon, which fundamentally 
affected the shape of the labour force. An understanding of the role 
colou.1.· plays is dependent on seeing the way in which the colour aspect 
is linked ot, and reflects, the other divisions among the workforce. 
The new writings on the working class are ·based in the economic field 
on the productive/unproductive labour debate, and the mental-manual 
l division which goes with it. Productive workers, or manual workers, 
are defined as those involved in the chief contradiction of the mode 
2 of production, those who produce surplus value. Non-productive 
workers, while performing jobs necessary for capitalist production,do 
not produce surplus. Tiius workers in commerce and finance, for example, 
assist in the circulation, rather than in the production, of value. 
Within industrial capital also some wage-earners are not productive. 
These people are employed rather as the subalterns or NCOs of capital, 
performing functions which capital itself performed in earlier 
period. They supervise the production process and .. provide the coordi-
nation, organisation and authoritarian command necessary for socialised 
production under relations eni>odying non-socialised ownership of the 
means of product.ion. The new writing classifies .all these non-
productive workers --as menters of the petty bourgeoisie, rather than the 
proletariat, and expects of them the class characteristics consistent 
with this position. 
3 4 Wright and Braverman, on the other hand, assert that the productive/ 
unproductive question cannot be used as a class boundary, and even 
I. The arguments in this debate are by no means agreed upon. Marx's 
writings on this subject were incomplete, and have been completed by 
different writers in different ways, with differing interpretations. 
Useful reading on the subject is found in Carchedi, Braverman, Poulant-
zas, and, for the South Africa debate, Simson, Wolpe and Davies. (See 
bibliography). 
2. The term "non-productive" is not to be taken as a pejorative one. 
The writers do not deny that these workers are exploited. What they 
do deny is that they produce surplus, or indeed value. The term is 
held to have important theoretical and practical implications in the 
face of differing labour processes and different experiences. 
3. E.O. Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societiesi1 
in NEW LEFT REVIEW,. 107, page 92. 
4. Braverman, 1974. For the sake of ·simplicity, I have chosen to use 
the word "worker" to ref er to all wage-earners, whether worker or 
petty bourgeoisie,· while not, however, ignoring the differences between 
these two categories. 
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Poulantzas admits .that different groups of non-productive workers 
display varying tendencies to ally themselves with the working class 
1 proper. The determining factors are to be found not only in the 
economic role played by the agents and in the different levels in the 
manual/mental division. Political and ideological fac t ors affect 
class position and outlook, and for the period 1924 to .1945 in South 
Africa these fact.ors were such as to make Simson• s later categorisation 
2 of all white wage-earners as 11non-workers" highly questionable. The 
productive/unproductive division was still, nevertheless, an im-
portant one in shaping the colour situation. 
In the early mining industry the skilled whites were the obvious candi-
. dates for recruitment for supervisory jobs, and the pattern was soon 
established that only whites could supervise on the mines. By 1906, 
Gcey Coetzee notes, it was already "established practice" to engage 
3 unskilled whites for all supervisory occupations. In the 1924 to 
1945 period, with the development of a machinofacture-based industry, 
and the resultant increasing socialisation of labour, the need for 
workers playing a supervisory and coordinating role increased 
apace in .industry as well. It was white workers. who were almost 
exclusively recruited to fill these petty bourgeois positions, a trend 
indicated by an increase in the percentage of "economically active" 
white population which fell into unproductive categories in the censL 
This percentage increased from 31,8~ in 1921 to 38,5% in 1936 and 
4 42,9% in 1946. 
Other economic divisions tended to aggravate the colour divisions among 
the workers and militate against large sections of the white force 
allying themselves with the masses of the workers. A "labour aristo-
cracy" is defined as a "particular upper stratum of the working class 
detached from the rest of the working class by its receipt of certain 
5 privileges." In South Africa the highly skilled artisan class, mainly 
l. Poulantzas, 1976, passim. 
2. H. Simson, "The_ Myth of the White Working Class in South Africa" , 
AFRICAN REVIEW, IV, (2), 1974, pages 189-202. 
3. J.A. Grey Coetzee, INDUSTRIAL RELAT100S IN SOOTH AFRICA, 1976, page 25. 
4~- This rose to 64°1.. in 1970. The Marxist concept differs from the 
census definition, and this discrepancy is aggravated by the effectsrof 
a movement into services, rather than productive spheres. Davies, 
(in Adler (ed). 1977. page 189) however, following Poulantzas' use of 
INSEE statistics. feels that the figures do provide some indication. 
5. Davies, in Adler (ed), 1977, page 136. 
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of overseas origin, and almost exclusively white, displays charac-
ter.istics typical of such a stratum, whether in the South African con-
t ext or not. 1 Change for them constitutes a potential threat rather 
than a promise of better things. With their privileged position they 
were more apt to regard other. workers as competitors than as "comrades', 
and their organisations, while exceptionally strong, were also excep-
tionally conservative and reformist. It was these workers, for example, 
who were the first to get involved in the machinery of the Industrinl 
Conciliation Act (!CA) • . As the backbone of the Labour Party, it was 
these .. workers who in 1924 joined the PACT government and agreed to give 
up their "social democratic" demands for concessions offered them by 
national capital. 2 With the development of machinofacture the demand 
for such skilled artisans declined in some industries, and instead 
there arose a need for a limited nuni>er of skilled operatives, tech-
nicians, etc. Here also whites were chiefly employed. By 1932 90% of 
these operatives were white. 3 
While the top jobs for workers were<: thus allocated to whites, a more 
important role in shaping the colour division was perhaps played b.y those 
measures taken to ensure that black workers coccupied the lowest 
positions. African workers, in particular, were confronted by a whole 
system of laws which sought to dominate, control and disorganise them 
to such an extent that they were significantly less "free", even in the 
limited sense of free to sell their labour power, than their fellow 
workers in other western countries. By keeping them thus politically 
and economically dominated and disorganised, the rift between the 
relatively privileged white workers and the blacks was further promoted 
by the state, and competitibn between white and black was limited, even 
where the workers were of the same skill level and occupied the same 
positions in the labour process. 
The policy of domination and control had been implemented long before 
the -1924-1945 period, and even before the advent · of direct capitalist 
intervention in the . form of snining. As in .. other .peripheral formations, 
1. E.J. Hobsbawm, LABOURING MEN, 1964, pages 316-343 for suggestive work 
on the British labour aristocracy. 
2. B. Bozzoli, "The Origins, Development and Ideology of Local Manufacturing 
in South Africa~' JOURNAL .OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES, 1 (2), April 1975. 
3. CCI Annual Report, 1932, page 23. 
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l 
"the land wars ••• were also labour wars." The colonial, and later 
the indigenous, rulers used land appropriation and restrictions and 
regressive and discriminatory taxes to deprive Africans of the means of 
production especially land ; and thus force them to sell their labour 
power to white landowners for wages in order to survive. 2 With the 
advent of mining, cheap labour became even more important, as it was 
on this basis that the mines were develop~d, and on the basis of the 
3 latter that the rest of the economy grew. The land, labour and tax 
acts were developed and amplified to meet the changing needs of the 
developing economy, so that in the period 1924 to 1945 a host of new 
laws had been added to the earlier ones, and black workers in every 
4 sector of the economy were controlled. The Land Acts and Taxation 
Acts5 applied to all Africans and served to deprive them of the 
means of production and force them to sell their labour power. As 
ll<AKA LABASEBENZI so graphically expressed it, 
"Its (the Tax and Development Act I s) chief purpose is 
to drive us to work for the whites at any payment 
they may --give us. It is like a whip in tle hands of 
the slavedrivers. 116 
The 1939 amendment to the Act -made this even more explicit when failure 
to pay the tax could lead to detention of the off ender in a labour 
camp, from "where his ser-qices will be hired out and a portion of the 
7 
money which he earns wi 11 be allocated to the payment of the tax." 
This amendment clearly was not a means of reducing the number of 
convictions, as claimed by the government spokesmen, but rather "in 
8 reality an instrument for increasing the supply of native workers." 
Mining capital, monopolistic and highly organised, and very dependent 
on ultra-cheap labour, utilised the Native Labour Regulation Act to 
9 obtain this labour. This well-organised recruitment system provided 
1. M. Wilson and L. Thompson, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA, Vol II, 
l 97.l, page 435. 
2. Bundy, Beinart and Rich are all sources for the South African debate 
on the land question. (See bibliography). 
3. Johnstone, Kaplan, Houghton, De Kiewiet are a few examples of such 
a claim.from different ideologi~al perspectives~ (See bibliography). 
4. Act?.7 of 1913; Act 18 .. of 1936;_ Act 17 of 1939. 
5. Act 41 of 1925; Act 25 of 1939. 
6. IKAKA LABASEBENZI, July 1937. 
7. Minister of Finance, quoted by Reedrnan and Guenault, "Taxation", in 
~ . Hellman, HANDBOOK OF RACE RELATloNS IN SClJTH AFRICA, 1949, pages 293 ff. 
8. GUARDIAN, 24 February 1939. 
9. Act 15 of 1911. 
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workers at minimum cost. It cut intra-capital competition in this 
already highly monopolistic area to a minimum, but controlled the work 
force in terms of both quality and quantity, and facilitated ~he 
ease .with which capital could dispense with hurt or sick or old workers, 
by sending them back to the "reserves" where they would no longer be 
a drain on capital's resources. 
In manufacturing, laws were needed both to deal with the workers already 
in the urban areas and to retard the influx of further Africans. 
1 One of .the initial aims .of the Urban Ax"eas Act was probably to en-
courage permanent sett led labour, in preference to the more expeesive 
2 and less dependable "togt" labour, in Natal at any rate. "The more 
general aim was that. based on the proposition that " the native shall 
only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the whtte 
man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs 
of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to 
minister. 113 __ The percentage of the African population resident in the 
towns nevertheless still increased from 14% in 1921 to 23, 7% in 19464, 
The Act attempted to limit this influx to that required by industry and 
to control it once in the towns, thus minimising competition for labour 
with agricultural capital, minimising labour's freedom of movement, and 
thus competition between industrial capitalists and with unskilled 
white labour, and also averting social disruption and mass organisation 
in the towns. By 1937, this law, conunonly ref erred to as the "pass law" , 
had been so far amended and refined that the Governor-General had an 
11 almost unlimited" discretion to remove an Afr lean from an area, for 
reasons which included-the fact that he was "sur.plus to the labour 
requirements of the area. '' 5 Courts of law were "not entitled to 
interfere with such an order solely on the ground of unreasonableness 
or of hardship occasioned thereby to the Native concerned, such as 
would be caused by lack of accommodation, a lack of water at the place 
i. Act:Hof 1923. 
2. T.R.H. Davenport, "The beginnings of urban _segregation in South Africa" 
Occasional Paper 15, 1971, _ . 
3. Transvaal Conmission, 1922, quoted in Davenport, 1977, page 13. 
4. It is interesting to note that according to Davenport (1971, page 13) 
it was only with the amendment of 1930 that the Act was effective in 
cont~olling the urban influx. This coincides with the beginning of the 
depression and increasing white unemployment~ UNION STATISTICS, page A- 10. 
5 • - A.R.F; Hoernle, SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVE POLICY AND THE LIBERAL SPIRIT, 
1939, page 9. 
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1 to.which he is sent, or failure to pay him compensation." By· 1944 
the Act had been so amended that the Governor-General could regulate 
ccnditions of work, conduct of African servants and masters in 
relation to each other, restriction of the period of contract, etc. 
, 
2 The Act was thus not, as claimed by the Native Affairs Department , 
passed purely to introduce colour segregation, although this was 
important in view of the · danger .. of cross colour social intimacy perhaps 
destroying the colour ideology. 3 It has specific aims with regard 
to labour and labour organisers, and non-workers - chiefs, headmen, 
certain teachers and students, clergyment ~nd interpreters - the 
nascent African pett.Y bourgeoisie -were excluded from the requirements 
of the. Act. This Act controlled the nuni>ers, living and working 
conditions of those African workers in the towns and industries and was 
thus the one which most affected the workers in this study • .. II<AKA 
described it as "one of the worst laws against black person ever made 
in South Africa," claiming it treated Africans 1'like a farmer treats 
4 his ox team." 
For the rural workers there was yet another system of control, imple-
mented mainly through the Native Service Contract Act 5 and the Masters 
6 and Servants Act. (The latter did not apply solely to Africans, but 
was used chiefly for these workers, 17 502 of the 1944 convictions being 
- 7 
in respect of Africans, out of a total of 19 643 convictions. ) While 
the Urban Areas Act prevented too great a flow from the farms to the 
towns, the Trust and Land Act and Native Service Contract Act attempted 
to regulate the flow and supply of African workers both within and out 
of the "white" .rural areas, by controlling squatting and tenant farming, 
restricting the "hoarding"of Africans by farmers and restricting 
movement of workers out of the rural areas, and preventing the 
l. Rex v Mahi and Others, TPD 27 Septeni>er 1935 in SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
JOURNAL> .LII, 1936, .. page 125. 
2. Native Affairs Dept Annual Report, 1936 •. 
3. Welsh in Wilson and Thompson, 197.1, page 435. 
4. IKAKA LABASEijENZI, June/July 1937. 
5. Act 24 of 1932. 
6. Buckland and Wilmot, Bundy, Tredgold, and RACE RELATIONS JOURNAL, IV, p.138, 
all give information on the scope and aims of these Acts. 




uncontrolled settlement of natives on European farms." ' 
The Masters and Servants Act, a law designed to regulate employer-
employee relations in a precapitalist situation, had been passed 
early in South African history, but in the 1924 to 1945 period it was 
still useful in the less fully developed and less 11 free" relations of 
production in the countryside, where the .capitalist mode of production 
was not yet fully established. Often viewed as outmoded, the Act 
3 was still very much used in the period, although its use declined. 
By converting the breach of contract between master and servant 
4 into a crime, the Act served to tie the worker to his employment. 
Finally, besides all these specific acts was one not direcdy relating 
to labour,yet regulating the way in which the other laws were adminis-
tered. The Native Administration Act 5 set up a system based on a 
frightening amount of administrative and arbitrary power placed in 
the hands of a few individuals whose actions were usually not review-
6 able by a court of law. In addition to setting up a legal structure 
and procedure, it also added to already mentioned methods of control 
by allowing for control by the Governor-General, in his role as 
"Supreme Chief" of all Africans, of movement, residence, meetings, and 
7 generally for "peace, order and good government II among Africans. 
1. Official Year Book, 1941,. page 427. Emphasis added. 
2. See Morris, 1976, for the effects of the Act. 
3. 43 000 prosecutions in 1928, 28 500 in 1936 according to C. Rund~, 
"The Abo lit ion of the Masters and Servants Act 11 , SOUTH AFRICAN IAROUR 
BULLETIN, II (1), 1975, and Reinaullt Jones in RACE RELATIONS JOURNAL,V, 
respectively. There were 19 643 convictions in 1944. (Simons, in 
Hellman, 1949). 
4. SAIRR, SURVEY OF RACE RELATIOIS IN S<lJTH AFRIC.A, 1974, page 336, 
contains .a full list of all the Masters and Servants Acts. 
5. Act 38 of 1927. 
6 • . Chapter Two contains an elaboration on the nature of administrative 
law. Hoernle, 1939, contains an analysis of this law. For the purposes 
of ·research this type of legislation poses specific problems. Qualitative 
changes can usually be detected only if one painstakingly corrbs the full 
government gazettes of the pe'riod, as was necessary for the war period. 
Qu·arititative changes are more difficult, if not impossible, to detect, 
except in their effects, as no official notice, besides perhaps depart-
mental directives or memorandums, are necessary to implement them. Thus, 
for example, Davies'(l977) contention that the late thirties, rather 
than witnessing the slackening of restriction ori African labour, whfch 
is how most previous historians interpret the relative paucity of legis-
lation in this area in the period, actually witnessed an administrative 
tightening up in the interests of white labour, is very hard either to 
verify' or refute. The importance of this legislation is also related 
to the uneven development of capitalism in South Africa. Law by regulation 
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The above out line of the "Nat ive1' acts is of necessity sketchy• It 
i rt nt C lauses, with far-reaching skims over and often ignores many mpo a 
1 i The "Native" laws constitute a subject worthy of a imp icat ons. 
complete and separate - although not unrelated - study of their own. 
Nevertheless, the overview does given some idea of the many laws and 
their ambit. 
By these means African workers were confined almost exclusively to 
unskilled and semi-skilled positions. It was in these positions that 
they competed with the white workers who had not been recruited into 
supervisory or .skilled positions. It is this group of workers 
who are in some ways the most. interesting for an analysis of labour 
legislation, in that objectively they had the most to gain from 
colour blind organisation, and in that this fact prompted the passing 
of a host of measures psecifically desiened to prevent such a develop-
ment, to favour the white workers, and yet not, in so doing, to 
endanger the appropriation of profit. 
The "poor white" problem was one of the chief concerns of the Wag~s 
and Economics Commission of 1925. 1 These people had been forced off 
the land and proletarianised in the process common in the development 
of all capitalist countries, with the changeover from an agriculture-
based economy to one based in the towns. It was not only the blacks 
who migrated townwards. The percentage of the white population which 
was urbanised increased from 59,6% in 1921 to 68% in 1936 and 74,5% in 
1946, 2 and in the early years at least these migrants were on the 
3 . 
whole the "failures of agriculture", unskilled and completely dis-
possessed of the means of production. 
In order to help these people, £1 748 000 from the Revenue Account and 
allowed, to use an example of this law, for "similar but by no means 
identical" (Davenport, 1977, page 6) solutions to be found in different 
towns, sectors and industries. 
7. The . quotes are from the Ac.t itself. 
l. Wages and Economics Conunission, 1925, 
2. UNIOI STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page A-10. 
3. Wages and Economics Conunission, 1925, page 180. 
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£ l 038 000 fl;'.om the Loan Account of the central government were spent 
in the 1929-30 financial year lone, to provide schemes, employment 
1 and social welfare for them. Work was provided in the police, in 
the defence force, and on the -Iailways, areas where outright ·colour 
discrimination rather than the more subtle discrimination of industry 
was utilised. White . . workers in these areas received wages which bore 
a· significantly higher relation to those of black workers, compared 
to that prevailing in industry, i.e. the white black wage ratio in 
these sectors was significantly greater than that for industry. Tariff 
schemes,. fair wage .clauses, and the "civilised labour" policy in general 
were used to further "uplift II this class. 
The latter policy was described by Cresswell, when addressing the 
Native Conference of 1924, 2 as "the desire of the Government to open 
up every avenue of employment in which a man can earn a wage that a 
European and a man who desires to live like a European can live on. " 
lt was largely as a result of this policy that the percentageo of 
whites in the private manufacturing .labour force was at a level varying 
between 36% in 1924/5 and 31% in 1944/5.3 The semi-skilled category 
provided an additional outlet for a part of this problem. While affording 
less control over the labour process than the artisan jobs, the new 
semi-skilled positions which .emerged with machinofacture did afford 
better wages .and conditions than the unskilled jobs. By attempting to 
channel whites into these jobs, and in some cases even creating extra 
4 5 jobs of this sort to meet the "civilised labour" policy requirements, 
the state and capital promoted the pre-existing colour-class dichotomy 
among the workers. 
Nevertheless, despite all these .measures, a recent estimate puts the 
percentage of employed whites defined as unskilled at 21,8% in 1936. 
Davies notes that by 1933 the similarity between the positions of these 
workers and that of the blacks had the effect that many lower paid 
manual workers in, for example, the leather and garment industries, 
were advocating left-wing politics and a coDDllon struggle with black 
1. Carnegie Commission, 
2. T. Karis and G.M. Carter (ed), FROM PROfEST TO CHALLENGE, Vol I, 
1972, page 169. 
J. ln 1934/5, at the height of the policy, the percentage reached 42%. 
(UNION STATlSTir.s FOR FIFTY YEARS, pages G.10-12). 
4. H.J • . Laite, THEY BUILT A SYSTEM,. c. 1946, page 167. 
5. Sadie 1 quoted in H. Wolpe. 11The White Working Class in South Africa," 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY,V. (2), 1976. 
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1 
workers. In the interests of these workers further discrimination 
was needed in the form of more regular labour legislation. 
* * * * * * 
The above outline gives some idea of the background against which 
labour legislation was enacted. A dominant theme to emerge is that of 
control and restriction, and the organised disorganisation of the .. 
Africa!l..Yorkers, accompanied by systemat.ic promotion of the interests 
of white workers wherever possible. The African population was controlled 
in the home and in the workplace, while freedom of movement, residence, 
employment, association and assembly were severely restricted. By 
this means they were maintained in the subordinate, dispossessed, and 
politically and economically dominated position where the majority were 
unskilled and low-paid workers, while their bargaining and organisatiom 
power was reduced to even lower levels than that normal in this position. 
Meanwhile the"state's policies towards white wage-earners over this period 
have to be seen as intervention which served in the last analysis to 
advance capitalist interests ••• to further divide white from black 
wage-earners and to ensure that the whites incr~asingly saw their future 
within the confines of capitalist society. 112 
It is important to remember, however, that the laws were not imposed on 
a docile and passive population. An awareness of the struggles and 
organisation of both black and white is necessary for a full understanding, 
as this affected both the type of legislation passed and its effectiveness. 
Among white workers the beginning of the period coincides with the 
formation of the first national trade union organisation, the South African 
Trade Union Council, in 1925, an organisation largely dominated by Labour 
Party supporters. During the rest of the period the South African Trades 
and Labour Council on the Rand, and the Cape Federation of Labour Unions 
in the Cape, were the main centres. While these two organisations had 
different policies in relation to black workers, both can be explained 
in terms of a desire to safeguard the interests of the more privileged 
whites, or that of the white and "coloured" workers. 3 
1. Davies, 1977, page 142. 
2. R. D11vies & D. Le1i•ts, "Industrial Relations Legislation: One of Capi-
t,il • s Defences", in REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL EC~OMY, VII, 1Q76, page 130. 
3. K.H. Williams, "The Resolution of the Cape;,.'rransvaal conflict in the 
Trade Union Movement of South Africa", Septeni>er . 1974. 
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The thirites saw the introduction of another trend among white workers. 
The Nationalist-influenced, Christian National unions represented one 
possible solution to the question of the unskilled whites. During the 
later thirties and early forties, these .. unions exercised a growing 
influence,. attempting to draw wcrkers away from the Labour Party ·and 
1 
substitute a cultural identity to that of class. 
The period was also one of black organisation, both independently of, 
and allied with, whites. In the twenties large numbers of workers and 
peasants were organised in the semi-political, semi-industrial mass 
organisation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), a 
strong movement which called .. f orth ·the full and brutal power of the 
state under Pirow in the late twenties. By the end of the decade the 
ICU was a more or less spent force, but black organisation continued. 
In , 1927 the Communists had been expelled from the ICU, but the same 
year saw the establishment of the first "Communist-inspired African 
Trade Union 11 • 2 The accelerated development of industrial unionism 
among Africans in the thirties, as secondary industry developed, and 
they themselves came to occupy more industrial positions, necessitated 
a changing pattern of legislature. This developed even further during 
the Second World War, when, in the absence of a large nurrber of white 
male workers, Africans took over key positions in industry, and realised 
their strength in correspondingly militant organisation. The influence 
of the general black organisation, the African National Congress (ANC), 
also became more important during this period, with the formation of 
the Youth League and a growing involvement in mass campaigns. 
Both the white and black worker organisations must be seen against the 
more general developments in the society. The importance of these deve-
lopments forms the subject matter of the following section. 
III 
The Importance of the Period 1924 to 1945 
The period of study was not chosen arbitrarily. The twenty odd years 
chosen present a period with marked ebacacteristics which distinguish 
1. D. O'Meara, "White Trade Unionism,Political Power and Afrikaner 
Nationalism, SOtrrH AFRICAN LABOUR .. BULLETIN, I (10), April 1975. 
2. Karis and Carter, 1972, page 353. 
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them from earlier and later periods, and constitute it as a viable and 
worthwhile object of study. 
Poulantzas' classification of the international capitalist system 
denotes the interwar years as the period of the consolidation of 
1 monopoly capital in the metropolitan centres. Every social formation, 
as a part of the world system, was affected by this international phe-
nomenon, and in South Africa at this stage, due to both internal 
and external factors, a strong manufacturing sector emerged, .after 
a long period when mining capital, a foreign-dominated capital, had 
been hegemonic and dominant, and had constituted the major economic 
sector. The war years are included because of their importance in 
relation to the development of a relatively independent and balanced 
economy. The enforced cutting of ties with previous main suppliers 
of imports placed a strain on the economy, which forced the establish-
ment and development of several sectors previously neglected. The 
war period is especially important in any analysis of the state, if one 
accepts Blackburn's contention that the "function of the state (as 
arbiter and guarantor of the social formation as a whole) is only 
2 fully revealed in a period of war or counter-revolution ••• " 
The period as a whole witnessed the development of private manufacturing 
from a position where it contributed 10, 7% of the National Income 
to one where it contributed 19,9%, while mining's share dropped from 
21,3% to 14,4% and agriculture's the .~revious basis ·of domestically 
. 3 
controlled production, dropped from 20,9% to 12,3%. The number of 
4 manufacturing establishments meanwhile increased from 6 009 to 9 316. 
It was not, however, only in terms of output that industry developed. 
The term "manufacturing" is in fact misleading. The period was one 
in which industry changed from a manufacture-based process to one 
in which there was a much greater reliance on machines. Factor pro-
duction, rather than workshop production, became the norm, particularly 
in the larger establishments, and this development itself promoted the 
creation of these bigger establishments. Employment per establishment 
1. Poulantzas, 1976, page 45. 
2. R. Blackburn (ea), REVOLUTICN AND CLASS STRUGGLE, 1977, page 43. 
J. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page S-3. 
4. ibid., page L-3. 
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in industry increased in the period from 19,l workers per factory to 
l 
38.8, while real output increased from £7 800 to £21 400. This 
change affected in important ways both the labour process and organisa-
tion of industry, and these, in turn, altered the composition and nature 
of the labour force with consequent changes in the law which governed 
the workers. 
These developments on the economic level, while distinctive in 
themselves, were connected with po~itical and ideological factors 
which distinguish the period 1924 to 1945. As a start, 1924 was chosen 
as it corresponds with the formation of the PACT ~overnrnent - a pact 
of national capital within agriculture and industry, in alliance with 
white. workers in the Labour Party. In the early twenties the labour 
movement had been particularly strong and militant, among both white 
and black workers, althou~h organised separately in the main. 1924 
saw the determined implementation of a policy aimed at taming the 
controlling this movement, a policy which reached a climax when the 
National Party, supported by white workers, eventually gained the 
electoral victory of 1948, at the end of the period. The period 
begins with the coming to power on the political scene of the Labour 
Party and with the establishment of a Department of Labour and Social 
Welfare. The latter, in its own words, "accepted responsibility only for 
'races which subscribe to a civlised standard of life' and made its 
first aim .the relief of unemployment among whites. ,.2 The intervening 
years were characterised by struggle - a struggle between those forces -
economic political and ideological - which served to divide the 
workforce along skill and colour lines and thus weaken the strength 
of the worker onslaught as a whole - and between those forces which 
served to unite workers against capital • .. Before the period began 
division was not unknown. Workers in the 1922 strike fought for a 
"White South Africa, and the development of the struggle fran the 
very beginning of mining production had been coloured by the skilled 
white workers' fear of competition by blacks. However, the following 
two decades were different. Firstly, a significant black proletariat 
emerged in industry, and became more and more involved alongside white 
workers, in the same labour process. A growing "poor ·white" problem 
and consequent increase in unskilled whites aggravated the "problems'' 
1. UNI~ STATISTICS FOR FIT\' YEARS, page L-3, H-14. Calculations of · 
nominal output would gi\e an even greater increase - from £9 500 to £32 600. 
2. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 378. 
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this created. Secondly, in this period the state embarked on a 
policy,at the political level at least, of allying itself with the 
white workers against the black. In neither period did colour 
divisions militate against capitalist development, but the way in 
which they manifested themselves and were utilised differred signi-
ficantly in the two periods. 
A third factor which adds to the . interest of the period is the wide 
range of changes, economic and political, which it incorporated: 
several industrial booms, the Great Depression, the Second World War, 
the presence of the "social democratic" labour party in several 
governments - all these occurred then. 
There were also significant changes on the political scene. 1924 saw 
the Labour Party and National Party united in order to defeat the 
ruling South African Party. In bhe 1929 elections the National Party 
managed to obtain a majority on its own, without the Labour Party. 
1 The Labour Party, seriously weakened, and with only one Meni>er of 
Parliament, also moved to the right. Madeley had been expelled the 
year before after meeting with an ICU delegation. Cresswell, one of 
the more conservative leaders, increasingly dominated policy. 
The weakened organisation of white workers, combined with the devastating 
effects of the Depression, affected the course of legislation. 1924 
to .1926 .. had been years of intmse legislative activity in the labour 
field, with the passing of the ICA, the Wage Act, Mines and Works 
2 Amendment Act, and the introduction of the "civilised labour" policy. 
The following years were quieter. Several laws were amended in 1930 
and 1931, but these involved minor changes. At the same time, as a 
reponse to the increased militancy of blacks in the ICU and ANC (especially 
in the Western Cape), the repressive and ~estrictive powers of the state 
were increased by laws such as the Native Administration Act (1929), 
the ·Riotous AssembHes Amendment Act (1930),· and the Entertainments Act 
(1931). Other repressive and restrictive ·legislation for Africans, 
meanwhile, was added to every year between 1925 and 1932, culminating 
in the . Native Service Contract Act in 1932. 
1. Carter, 1958, pages 448-49. T.R.H. Davenport (SOUTH AFRICA: A 
MODERN HISTORY, 1977~ Table 2) puts the figure at three. 
2. See time table in Appendix I. 
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In 1933 a further change took place on the political scene. To cope 
with the coni>ined effects of the Depression and the gold standard 
crisis, a white party coalition of the National Party and South African 
Party was formed. In 1934 these came together as the United Party, 
in the Fusion government. The government party now represented mining, 
industrial and agricultural capital, while the opposition was formed 
by the breakaway National Party .meni>ers under Malan and a badly 
weakened Labour Party, the latter with two Members of Parliament. 
After the abandonment of the gold standard the economy once again ex-
perienced growth. The growth of industry, in particular, and the 
changes in the labour force, necessitated changes in leg is lat ion.. An 
Industrial Legislation C0DU11ission was established .. in 1934 to investi-
gate the problem and make recommendations. In 1937 the Wage Act and 
ICA underwent major restructuring as a result of the findings. 
In 1939, with the outbreak of war, the government alignments changed 
once again. A coaliLion government, from which only the Purified 
National Party was excluded, was formed, in an attempt to create the 
necessary support for the war. The early years of the war also wit-
nessed an increase in many of the more welfare oriented laws, in an 
apparent concession for the support of the Labour Party. 1941, in 
particular, was a busy year, .. with fairly subst.antial amendments to the 
Miners Phthisis ~t, Factories Act, and Workmens•Compensation Act. 
The differing effects of all these factors on labour .law thus provide 
useful indications both as to the role of law in an ever-changing 
society, and to a better understanding of these different periods and 
phenomena themselves. . The importance of understanding the period 
1924 to 1945 is also related to our understanding of the present. The 
period, coming prior to the Nationalist electoral victory of 1948, is 
important as one in which the basis of present-day South Africa was 
laid. By analysing both the differences and the continuities between this 
period and the post-1948 one, as well as the developments through the 
period, a clearer understanding of the present position in South Africa 
can be obtained. 
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IV 
The State and Law 
No study of the law would be comprehensible without a prior conception 
of the state in capitalist society. 
"The state and its legal mechanism and "ideology cannot be · · 
treated as •neutral' structures, whose class nature derives 
only from their content and from the character of the class 
~h~~~ - ha~p~ns . ~~ - ~~y_o~~ - ~~~-~~ - ~~~~~~~ - ~h~ _ ~e~~~nism. ~ 
class ·character of the. state is expressed in the very forms 
0£ t6e state, wh!cfi themselves der!ve from the nature of the 
class relationships which they embody and reinforce. nl 
Marxist theory perceives the state as . forming part of the "super-
structure" of the society. While the exact forms of linkage and 
dependence are by no means agreed upon, this superstructural institution 
is seen by a 11 Marxist analysts as a reflection .of the pro duct ive fore es 
and relations forming the economic base of society. 
Miliband, one df the chief writers, sees this linkage predominantly 
from an instrumentalist viewpoint. The state is seen as a tool, which 
those in power utilise so as to serve their own interests. His analysis 
thus concentrates for the most part on illustrating the role and nature 
of the various elites who admiriister the structures. Poulantzas, Hirsch 
et al .. , Picciotto and Holloway2, while displaying significant differences 
between themselves, all agree that the role and bias .. of the state go 
further than this merely personal level of .. analysis would imply. 
Although Miliband's analysis is often borne out by facts, this is not 
seen as a necessary condition by the others, who conceive of the 
capitalist state as defined .. both by its forms, and more importantl_y, 
its function, rather than merely .. by the individuals who control it. This 
function of the state defines the form in such .a way that the question 
of the individual occupying. a particular office or position becomes 
unimportant. The form itself places limits on what can be achieved 
and tends to favour .certain classes within the society. This view also 
multiplies the number of .. institutions seen as forming part .. of .. the state. 
The latter is not confined to purely political insti_tut ions, such a. 
Parliament and the other governmental bodies. Rather all those institutions 
fulfilling functions of the state form part of it. 
1. Picciotto, ?1977, page 1. 
2. See bibliography for full references. 
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The main function of the state is that of cohesion of the social 
formation and all that entails. Capitalist society is by its nature 
ridden by conflict and contradiction. The system of private ownership 
of the means of production tends to divide the citizens into two classes 
of owners and non-owners. The production of conunodtties and the 
necessity to sell these befor.e prof.it is realised, introduces competition 
between the owners and creates a secondary source of conflict. The 
state's role is to keep the society together by regulating or lessening 
these conflicts. The law is one means through which this is achieved. 
Firstly, in laying down rules of behaviour, the law provides a predictable 
milieu, controlled to some extent, within which capitalist production 
can operate. By legitimising the idea of the legal .individual, the 
indiv.idual commodity, and the for.mer as .. owner of the Ja.tter and initiator 
of exchange, the law provides the framework for a system of expanded 
reproduction of commodities and capital. By concentrating on the level 
of distribution.- rather than on production,. the unequal nature of the 
system is cloaked by an exterior which makes everything appear fair and 
equal. By .this same positing of individuals the law serves to isolate 
the workers from each other and discourage canrnon organisation and 
1 struggle. 
The second major function of the law, related to the last point above, 
is that with which this thesis is chiefly concerned - the role of the 
state and law in regulating the class struggle. The state acts to 
encourage and support the organisation and unity of the bourgeoisie 
while discouraging such organisation and unity among the workers. At 
the same time the state takes over certain private spheres in an attempt 
to minimise areas of struggle. By itself regulating and administering 
certain areas of conflict, both between capital and labour, and within 
these two groups,.. the state decreases the areas in which labour itself 
can act, keeps regulation within acceptable bounds, and discourages 
organisation. In this way it safeguards the domination of the bourgeoisie. 
The laws analysed in this thesis will be seen to fall squarely within 
this conception of the state and law. The !CA, the Wage Act, and the 
Riotous Assetri:>lies Act, for example, control the organisation of the 
workers and keep it within acceptable bounds and operating along approved 
channels. Other features of the !CA and Wage Act, as well as the Factories 
1. This point is elaborated in Chapter Two. 
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Act, discourage fierce competition among capitalists. In laying down 
minimum cond.itions they minimise cut-throat competition by small capi-
tal and enforce a fair amount of standardisation, usually at the level 
achieved by the more efficient and "progressive" capitalists. In 
acting thus the state safeguards and strengthens social capital - the 
sum of capitals, rather than the .individual capitalist - and at the 
same time promotes capital's development. 
At .the same time that the state encourages unity among capitalists by 
lessening conflict and competition among them, the law acts to dis-
. courage organisation and unity among workers. In the first instance, 
_by positing the individual as subject of the law, it militates against 
group or class organisation. Specific laws further weaken worker 
organisation. While the ICA provided for .. the--organisation of workers · 
in trade unions, this will be seen to have been a response to already 
existing organisation, and an attempt to control it, .rather than the 
introduction of such organisation. In ~ther instances ~egislation 
promoted division rather than unity. .With the increasing proletariani-
sation of the population and the inc~eaaing competition for jobs among 
workers, the feelings of solidarity .. engendered by: the .. experience of 
socialised labour in production were offset .. to some extent. The state 
encouraged this lack of unity by its differential treatment of workers 
on the bases of sex, age, skill, and particularly colour. 
navies asserts that "the history of South African labour leg is lat ion is 
a history of the enactment of laws specifically designed to benefit 
1 white labour at the expense of black. " This study wi 11 attempt to 
show, as Davies has done, that any benefit derived by white labour was 
not in contradiction with the general functions of the capitalist state. 
Such benefits as white labour received can be shown to be consistentt 
with the domination by capital of labour, whether black or white. Such 
discrimination discouraged labour unity. At the same time it encouraged 
white workers to see .. the state as their champion and protector. Capital, 
in order to rule, needed supporters. Preferential treatment of white 
workers secured an important support for capital, and ideoloSic.al and 
political support for the state. South African capitalist development 
was based .. on the availability of a cheap labour force • . lt was thus 
impossible to make concessions to the whole labour force, as this would 
1. Davies, in Adler (ed), 1977, page 133. 
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have entailed an unacceptable rise in costs. The white labour force 
was, however, small enough to be won over without . jeopardising 
production, had an earlier militant history which warranted this paci-
fiction, and had already the political and economic advantages over 
the black wc:rkers which facilitated differentiation and further favours. 
A wide range of instruments were used to effect this maintenance of 
the split among workers and the lessening of the split within the 
white group - capitalist and worker - as a whole. A full analysis 
would necessitate looking, among other things, at the "civilised 
labour !~ policy, employment schemes, work colonies, employment policies 
in government departments, the Railways and industry, the fair labour 
policy, and customs and tariffs in general. All of these ensured work 
for whites in times of depression, .. and .. ensured that when there was 
sufficient work for all it was the whites who got the better jobs. Also 
important, however, were the laws which affected the opportunities 
open to .individuals from different groups. The "native" acts were 
discussed . insofar as .. they acted to control Africans, in terms of oppo -
tunity and .freedom, within their position as workers. For the whites, 
on the other hand, .differential educati9nal advantages.,. the Farmers 
Assistance Act,. the Land Bank, and the Pensions Acts were instituted, 
all of which helped either to avoid the proletarianisation of otherwise 
threatened whites, or to better the position of those who were workers. 
The second function of the state, that of regulation of formerly 
private spheres, is illustrated by other laws analysed in this thesis. 
Worker organisation, agitation and militancy nec~ssitated the laying down 
of minimum conditions by means of laws such as the ICA, Wage Act, Miners 
Phthisis Act, Workmens Compensation and Factories Act. The first of 
these then provided restricted channels for further organisation in the 
event of further demands arising, while the other acts all attempted 
to obviate, or minimise, further worker involvement in the setting of 
standards by handing this job over to state bodies. In this way both the 
demands of the workers and their solution were controlled~ 
This thesis, t.hen, will exumine industrial legislation in South Africa 
of 1924 to .. 1945. against the backgl:'ound sketched in above, in order to 
examine how the law and the state, in .this specific cas·e, fulfilled 
their functions of reproduction of the system, maintenance of .the 
hegemony of the ruling class, and disorganisation of the workers. 
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The study proper commences with a further examination of the law itself. 
The .. institutions of the. law will be examined with a view to establishing 
in what way the law itself, its framing and administration, function 
in the development of capitalism and in the struggle between capital 
and .. labour. The bias and inequalities inherent in the legal. system, 
as well as the people who occupy the various positions, will be de-
scribed and analysed. 
The following five chapters .will then look at particular statutes 
enacted and in operation through the period - the ICA (Chapter Three), 
the Wage .-Act (Chapter. Four), the Factories Act (Chapter Five), Ribtous 
Asseni>lies and related laws (Chapter Six), Workmens Compensation and 
Miners Phthisis Acts (Chapter Seven). After a brie! outline of the 
ambit of the relevant act, the clauses and provisions relevant in 
terms of the study will be examined. The forces advocating and 
opposing the act, the reasons for their attitudes and the effects of 
the act once promulgated, will all be examined, as will the way in 
which the act was administered. 
The penultimate chapter (Chapter Eight), rather than concentrating on 
one statute, as the previous chapters will, will focus attention on a 
period - that of the Second World War. At a time of crisis for the 
state itself, and one in which law of a significantly different nature 
was introduced, the period warrants separate and specific attention. 
War-time developments of the acts analysed earlier will be included 
in the relevant chapters. This last chapter will focus rather on the 
additional and extraordinary legislation passed specifically to meet 
needs generated by the war effort, and briefly, at the effects on 
labour legislation and administration in general during a period of 
crisis. 
The thesis will not cover the whole gamut of labour legisl~ ion in 
South Africa during the period. Several obvious labour laws will 
be omitted (for example, the Apprenticeship Act, Work Colonies Act, 
and Unemployment Benefit Act). Many other laws having a bearing 
on labour will also be neglected. As production is the basis of 
human society, most, if not all, .law will to some extent affect labour, 
and it is t.hus impossible to cover all 11 labour law" in a study of 
this nature. 
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It is hoped, however, that the laws chosen, and the insights they 
afford, will be adequate in demonstrating the form and function of 
labour law in South Africau between 1924 and 1945. The final 
chapter will summarise the findings of the preceding chapter and attempt 
to draw some conclusions and general trends from these. These, 
hopefully, will aid the formulation of an analysis of both the historical 
development and contemporary laws and situation in South Africa. 
TABLE 1.11 
A: AVERAGE WAGES AND SALARIES FOR THE DIFFERENT COLOUR GROUPS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS 1924 - 1945 (£ts) 
Year I 
! 
Manufacturing S.A. Railways & Harbours Mining ! 
i Salary Wage Salary Wage Earnings 
' White White African Indian "Coloured" White White Black White Black 
I - -
1924/5 I 3.56,5 220, 1 41,8 46,7 68,9 372,4 - - 299,1 30,4 
I 
1929/30 l 363,7 221,0 44,3 62,0 88,0 357,2 220,6 45,8 300,6 29, 1 
1934/5 335,4 202,9 41,0 56,4 78,7 329,8 202,8 34,2 341,1 30,5 
1935/40 380,8 47 ,3 69,7 87 ,4 356,8 I 238,7 ' 40,5 391,6 33,4 234,8 I 
1944/ 5 540,l 340, 7 91, 0 144,6 149,5 378,4 329,2 I 91,3 478,6 42,5 
B: AVERAGE WAGES OF CERTAIN GROUPS AS PERCENTAGES OF THOSE OF OTHER GROUPS 1924 - 1945 (%) 
Year Average white wage as% of average salary Average black wage as% of white wage 
Manufacturing S.A.R and H African Indian "Coloured" S.A.R.& H. 
1924/5 61.7 - 19,0 21,2 31,3 --
1929/30 I 60,8 61,8 20,0 28,l 
I 40,2 20,7 '. 
1934/5 
I 
61, 5 I 38,8 16,9 I 60, 5 20,2 27, 8 
I 
1939/40 61,7 66,9 20,1 29,7 37, 2 17 ,o 
1944/5 63,1 87 ,o 26,7 42,4 i 43,9 I 27, 7 I 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, u:; 62-1951, Table 37. Any lowering of the white black ratio in the 
war years is due largely to the impact of the many lower paid white women rather than a structural change 






CHAPTER TWO LAW AND sourH AFRICAN SOCIETY 1924 - 1945 
"Law is the warp and woof of social life, and so far from 
being concerned with narrowly circumscribed areas, is 
all pervasive. It is not only concerned with the fatho-
logy of society, but with its physiology as well." 
"Law in the sense of rules enforced by the State, extends 
very nearly over the whole range of human activity, and 
reflects the structure of the society and the rebtions 
between the members. An adequate sociological survey 
of South Africa's legal institutions would therefore 
include an examination of the way in which they arti-
culate and reinforce the interests of the social classes, 
or maintain the cultural differences and inequalities in 
status of the various racial groups, or demonstrate the 
effects of industrialisation and of a growing urban 
society, or express changes in the form of government 
such as appear in the establishment of administrative 
courts and the delegation of legislative authority to the 
executive. 11 2 ' 
This thesis is a study of labour legislation in South Africa between 
1924 and 1945. One method of approaching this topic would be to 
enumerate all the laws passed ~n this period and examine them clause 
by clause. While this would give a detailed and accurate empirical 
picture of the legal structure affecting workers, it would not consti-
tue any great advance in understanding the law and the functions it 
serves. What is more apposite and useful is a general understanding 
of what "law" is, where it originates, and how it in turn affects the 
society from which it is derived. This is a subject which, until 
very recently, had been badly neglected both in general western 
Marxist theories, and in South African studies in particular. This 
study will go a little way in attempting to redress this ini>alance, and 
' for this reason this chapter will be devoted to general remarks about 
law, its form, function and procedure. The actual structure and 
functioning of the whole legal system, the very concepts of legal 
theory themselves, are related to the form of society and give capitalist · 
law its specific nature. As part of the totality of social relations 
of the society, the law cannot fail to reflect the class nature of 
~hat . society. 
1. R. Hahlo and Ellison Kahn, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS 
BACKGROUND, 1968. page 1. 
2. H.J. Simons, "The Law and its Administration", in-·Hellman (ed), 
HANDBOOK OF RACE RELATioNS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1949, page 41. 
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Labour law is only one subdivision of the total law of the society. 
The legal system as a whole, and not only labour law, however, has 
inherent bias which prejudices the case of the workers, even when the 
law does not appear to be directed at the work situation or working 
people in particular. The forms, functions, and institutions of 
the law, reflecting their societal base, might give a superficial 
appearance of upholding freedom, equality and justice, but in doing 
this they merely hide and true bias, and this concealment is in fact 
part of the function of the law. In this chapter the bias underlying 
this free and equal exterior will be examined. 
Section I of the chapter will examine the fundamental concepts of the 
legal system to see in what way these reflect the principles and bases 
of capitalist society, in the economic, political and ideological 
spheres. Section II will describe what the law is, how it arises, and 
relate these two factors more specifically to the South African 
situation. The various divisions of the law, the nature of the 
legislature, and the administrative apparatus will be described insofar 
as they reflect class and colour biases additional to those in Section 
I. These two sections will form the most substantial critique of the 
legal system by describing those biases inherent in the form of the 
system itself. 
The following · sections will examine the more conjunctural biases, such 
as those in the nature of the individuals occupying important positions 
and fulfilling important functions, and that of the institutions 
themselves. While these are in many cases of a minor nature, when added 
together they can be seen to have the effect of significantly altering 
the extent of "justice" in impartiality in the law. The first discussion 
centres on the incognoscibility of the law - the difficulty for the 
average person to ascertain just what the law prescribes and proscribes. 
The discussion which follows then examines, in turn, the different 
branches of the law with which the alleged offender comes into contact -
police, and the magistrate, jury and judge in the courts. 
Finally, Section IV repeats the main points to be drawn out from the 
preceding analysis, an analysis which provides the basis upon which 
to place further analysis of specific laws and the struggles waged 
for and against them. 
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I 
Creation of the conditions of capitalist production 
"As long as society is founded upon injustice, the function 
of laws will be to defend and maintain that i~justice. ·11 1 
It is the form of production and the needs of capital which form the 
structural basis of state and the law. Production occurs in a 
situation where the majority are dispossessed of ownership of the 
means of production, while the few gain every more concentrated control 
and ownership over these same means. The labour power of the many 
is exchanged in the market for its equivalent in money, and this labour 
power is then exploited so as to produce value above its own value. 
This surplus value, etrbodied in commodities, is then sold on the 
market by the capitalist, the owner of the means of production, who 
by this means increases his capital, and can reintroduce the process, 
expanding it, and increasing his profit in every ensuing cycle. 
a) Freedom of contract the e;ivate law 
Private law is the system behind which t~is process operates. Personal 
law, business law, and contract law in South Africa are all based on 
the Roman Dutch system2, a system first developed as a world law in 
3 Rome, during an earlier period of commodity production, and based on 
the regulation of things (commodities) rather than people or society. 
The basis of this bourgeois law is the individual, but the individua lP 
in his capacity as owner of commodities. The fundamental tenets are f 
the mutual recognition of all these individuals as owners of private 
property, and thus private property as a fundamental human right, and 
a recognition of the freedom of contract, the right to dispose of one's 
property as one wishes.
4 
The law proclaims all, worker and capitalist, 
as equal before the law. The only difference within this identical 
and formal social equality is that which each owns, but this, labour 
power for the former and means of production for the latter - whatever 
its size or nature - is guaranteed by the law. What remains hidden is the 
1. Anatole France, quoted in TEACHERS JOURNAL, L, I, July-August 1978, 
page 4. 
2. J.D. van der Vyver and F.J. van Zyl, INLE1DING TOT DIE REGSWETENSKAP, 
1.972, page 244. 
3. F. Engels, cited in Maureen Cain, 11The Main Themes of Marx's and 
Engels I Sociology of Law11 , BRITISH JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, I (2), 
1974, page 142. 
4. B. Blanke et al, "On the Current Marxist Discussion on the Analysis 
of the Bourgeois State", in s. Picciotto and J. Holloway, STATE AND 
CAPITAL, 1978, page 123. 
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unequal nature of the exchanges and contracts guaranteed. In legal 
terms it appears that the capitalist gives the worker the full value 
of his labour power, and then,in turn, gives him in return for his 
wages, consumption goods equal to the full value of these wages. 
The law regulates the distribution process and here all appears free 
and equal. From the point of view of production, however, this can 
be seen to be a mere screen. "· ••• what really takes place is this --
the capitalist again and again appropriates without equivalent, a portion 
of the previously materialised labour of others, and exchanges it for 
1 a greater quantity of living labour." The worker receives nothing 
in return for this surplus labour. 
Equality before the law and freedom of contract did not ensure true 
equality where the weaker party desperately needed something - access 
to the means of production in order to produce and earn a living - which 
the other had the power to give or withhold. The law did not guard 
that which was "just" or "fair", but left it to economic force in the 
first place, and the contracting parties in the second, to determine 
the agreement, enforcing any contract as long as there was not external 
and overt pressure. Once the contract was agreed upon, whether with 
the help of outright force, or merely by economic pressure, the "right 
to appropriate is once and for all conferred on the owner of the 
material ••••• (O)wnership ••• while remaining in legal form an institution 
of private law implying the total power of doing with the thing w~at 
one likes, has in fact become an institution of public law (power of 
2 comnand)," thus allowing the capitalist to extract more value from 
the labour than that of the labour power for which he had contracted 
so openly on the market. In South Africa, with diminished freedom of 
contract for the African workers, with restrictions on movement, employ-
ment, residence and association, the contract became even less free, 
limits being placed both in terms of restrictions on bargaining power 
and the role played by the "reserves" in depressing the value of labour 
3 power below its "normal" level. 
1. Karl Marx, CAPITAL, . Vol. I, 1974, page 583. 
2. W. Friedmann, LEGAL THEORY, 1967, page 370. 
J. See Frank Molteno, THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVES, Honours Thesis, 
1975, for an elaboration of this point. 
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Hobsbawm compares the twentieth century South African system to that of 
early nineteenth century Britain. He notes the similar complaints of 
the employers about the laziness of labour, and the tendency of the 
workers to work only until a traditional week's living wage has been 
l earned. 11Draconic labour discipline" in the form of Masters and 
Servants Acts, fines, etc,,were used in both cases to force the workers 
to labour longer. The South African system did, thus, still to an 
unusually large extent display the use of outright force. The law 
helped, however, to make classs domination and exploitation opaque 
to the extent that direct force was not used. While force was important 
in the case of African workers, in the case of both black and white 
workers exploitation depended "primarily on the dull compulsion of 
uncomprehended laws of reproduction. 112 The method used above all, 
even in the case of African workers, was that of paying labour "so 
little that it would have to work steadily all through the week in 
order to make a minimum income. 113 
b) Regulation of capital - public law and administration 
Private law does not encompass the whole legal system. Public law 
relates to the competence of the state to "interfere" within the 
private sphere, and to its operations as the state, or highest 
authority. "Safeguarding the rule which expresses the blind operation 
of economic relations of force goes hand in hand with the direct 
exercise of the means of force and power of the state for the specific 
and particular purposes of ensuring the reproduction and self-expansion 
4 of capital and the domination of the bourgeoisie." Under simple 
conmodity production, generality, specificity and the non-retroactive 
nature of the law5 should be the necessary and sufficient conditions 
to provide a predictable and manageable framework within which producers 
can plan and conduct transactions and production. The private law 
functions here to prevent disruption and breakdown in the system. As 
production develops, however, so do the complexities and contradictions 
with the process. The role .of private law becomes supplemented by 
l. E.J. Hobsbawm, THE AGE OF REVOWTIOO, 1962, page 70. 
2. S. Picciotto and J. Holloway, 1978, page 24. 
3. Hobsbawm, 1962, page 70. 
4. Joachim Hirsch, "The State Apparatus and Social Reproduction", in 
Picciotto and Holloway, 1978, page 65. 
5. Franz Neumann, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHQRITARIAN STATE. 1957, 
explains the significance of these various characteristics. 
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public law. 
This second type of law, which comprises the bulk of formal legislation, 
regulates and controls the competition caused by the form of production 
and enhanced by the isolation induced by the individual nature of 
private law, between capitalist and capitalist, and between capitalist 
and workers. Picciotto sees this second category arising as a direct 
result of the increasing concentration and centralisation of 
1 capital, and the fact that in South Africa procedural, witness and 
administrative law, all parts of public law, are based on English 
law2, appears to bear this out. English law presented itself in the 
form of a law more adapted to a further development of the productive 
system than the Roman Dutch law, the production of conunodities under 
capital rather than simple commodity production and exchange. The 
increasing contradictiom in the system meant that conflict could no 
longer be resolved by the maintenance of mere exchange. State inter-
vention was needed to regulate the unplanned struggle between 
capitals and ensure the continued dominance of capital as whole, 
but at such a pace that while capital survives and growns stronger, 
it does not kill the workers. Conversely, laws had to be made to 
control the workers in situations where they organised to try to 
overthrow the system. It is in this form that the law functions in 
its role as the representative of the general social (total) capital 
(as opposed to the individual capitalist), in the interests of the 
exploitative system as a whole, rather than the exploitation by the 
individual. 
In later stages these contradictions became so intense that even this 
legislation was ~ot sufficient. Direct planning of production was 
required to avert the tendencies of breakdown generated by the contra-
3 diet ion, and to control the inherent anarchy of the system. "The 
general codes of the liberal form of law become the overblown regulatory 
systems of the bureaucratic apparatus, which take the form of 
'delegated legislation•, but in practice become no more than a validation 
1. Sol Picciotto, MYTHS OF BOURGEOIS LEGALITY, unpublished typescript,?1977. 
2. Van der Vyver and Van Zyl, 1972, page 244. 
3 • "Anarchy"" is used here to denote the unplanned nature of production 
undertaken by a whole lot of separate and individual entrepreneurs • 
• 
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1 for discretionary administrative decision -making." Leg is lat ion 
provides for ever more bureaucratic and administrative control by 
individual officials and ministers. 
Thus far the law has been examined insofar as it relates to the 
capitalist system as a whole, and to the maintenance of the more 
economic conditions of that system and the reproduction of capital. 
Related to this, yet separate enough to form another distinctive 
function, is the role of maintenance of the political and ideological 
hegemony of the ruling class, and the disorganisation, or the 
disruption of the organisation, of the working class. 
The law establishes the identical formal equality of worker and 
capitalist. Both have equal rights and duties before the law. A 
closer investigation dicloses a discrepancy in this position, however 
even taking into account the fiction of employer and worker as equal 
individuals. Hahlo and Kahn define a 11persona", the legal individual, 
as "any being or object or aggregate of beings or objects which the 
law endows with the ·capacity of acquiring rights and incurring duties. 112 
3 This allows for non-human 'persons'. As Wedderburn points out, the 
employer is usually, under developed capitalism, a registered company 
or corpo~ation, a separate persona from the shareholders or directors 
of the company. Thus already at this level the .individual worker is 
pitted against a legal fiction and the employer as individual is 
protected. The fact that the company, rather than the capitalist, is 
the legal persona, does not either mean that the workers, who after all 
are objectively and materially part of the company, will benefit, or that 
their interests will even be considered, in matters affecting the 
company, and in litigation in particular. 11 •••• The duty of directors 
is to consult the best interests of the company, and that, in English 
law (and in South African - DB) means the interests of the shareholders 
They may take account of the interests of employees not directly, but 
only indirectly as they reflect upon the interests of their 
l. Picciotto, ?1977, page 8. 
2. Hahlo and Kahn, 1968, page 103. 




Insofar as workers are concerned, the interpellation as individuals 
serves a useful divisive purpose. With the development of 
production workers in a single productive unit come ever more to form 
a collective labourer, rather than to function as individual producers 
They exist as a group and have power as a group, rather than as 
individuals. The law recognises workers and their rights on the indivi-
dual, rather than collective, level, and this serves to isolate and 
weaken them. Class solidarity and organisation become more difficult 
when issues and cases are fought on this individual level. When added 
to this the individuals have differential rights and access to privi-
leges in law based upon their individual status, colour, etc., dis-
couragement of organisation as a body or class is further enhanced. 
One of the sources of strength of the law in regard to the maintenance 
of ideological and political hegemony is the fact that this role is 
often not perceived by the workers. Domination is exercised not only 
repressively, but also ideologically, and the most effective hegemony 
is the "spontaneous consent given by the great mass of the population 
to the general direction imposed on social ~ife by the dominant funda-
mental group. 112 Law encourages workers to conduct legal affairs on 
an individual level and ~ith a limited legalistic perspective which 
will not challenge the system. This encouragement is engendered by 
the very structure and concepts of the law, which, however, appear to 
enforce equality, rather than domi~ation. Perception of this function 
of the law would allow workers to guard against it. The fact that 
it is hidden by a seemingly fair and equal exterior militates 
against such perception. 
11 
The extent of the law 
Most people, when confronted with the question, "What is law?", would 
immediately think of statute law - direct law-making by Parliament. 
This, however, constitutes but a small portion of law in society. 
"The rules of law are ••• to be found in a bewildering 
array of sources: the statutes of the Union Parliament, 
1. Wedderburn, 1965, page 18. 
2. Antonio Gramsci, quoted in Alan Hunt, "Perspectives in the Sociology 
of Law", in Pat Carlen (ed), THE SOC~OLOOY OF LAW, 1976• page 42. 
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provincial councils, and subordinate legislatures, the 
legislation of the pre-Union colonies and states, the 
decisions of the Privy Council, the Union Supreme 
Court, and the pre-Union courts; the statutes and 
court decisions of the Netherlands during the 17th and 
18th centuries, the writings of the Roman-Dutch jurists, 
the Roman law and the works of continental writers 
on the Roman law; and the decisions of the English 
courts ••• 11 1 
Many writers go even further. Gramsci asserts that 
"law will have to be extended to include those activities 
which are at present classified as •legally neutral' ••• 
(which) operate wihout sanctions or compulsory obligations 
but nevertheless exert a collective pressure and obtain 
objective results in the form of !n evolution of customs, 
ways of thinking, morality, etc." 
\ 
Such a view would include the rules and regulations of such institutions 
as the family, church, ·trade union, factory, which all have lawmaking 
and sanctioning powers in various degrees. 3 All these provide norms 
and rules for conducting everyday life and all impose penalties for 
contravention. 
Ihis wider definition of law is i~portant. In relation to factory 
workers, this can be clearly seen in the distinction between factory 
rules and societal rules. 
"Two codes of rules and regulations affect the workers: 
the law upon the statute books and the rules within industry. 
The first determines their relationship as citizens to 
all other citizens ·and to property. The second large)y 
determines the relationship of employer and employee, 
the terms of employment, the conditions of labour, and 
the rules and regulations affecting the workers as em-
ployees ••• The second, except where effective trade 
unionism exists, is established by the arbitrary or auto-
cratic whim, desire or opinion of the employer, and is 
based upon the principle that industry and conunerce can-
not be successfully conducted unless the employer exer-
cises the unqeustioned right to establish such rules, 
regulations and pr~is~ons affecting the emplpyees as self-
~nterest prompts." 
1. Simons, in Hellman, (ed), 1949, page 42. 
2. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON 
NOTEBOOKS OF~ANTONIO GRAMSCI, 1973, page 142. 
3. Friedmann, 1967, and Van der Vyver and Van Zyl, 1972, are two other 
sources, of widely different ideolq8ical perspectives, which make 
a si~ilar claim as to the definition of law. 
4. CFLU ORGAN, December 1937, page 16. 
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This other law adds to the inequality of the system. The employer 
has an "unquestioned right" to lay down rules, and in this domain 
there is no pretence at democracy. The example also illustrates 
the role of ideology in the maintenance of hegemony. The rule of the 
employers is usually accepted without question. The power of ownership 
is the unquestioned power of conunand. The second informal system of 
law thus provides a support for the formal system,and while it is 
the latter which will be analysed below in detail, the former is 
important in establishing the ideological and political support for 
the formal structure. 
Who makes the laws? 
The basis of formal law in South Africa is the Roman Dutch system, and 
this section of the law is the so-called "common law". Statute law 
is brought into being in cases where the objective situation has so 
changed that old laws are not adequate to deal with the situation, or 
where new practices and ideas are opposed to those upon which the 
Roman Dutch law was based. 
A statute in the strict sense is a law emanating from the legislature 
of the country, and in the more extended sense covers the legislation 
of all public bodies with original legislative capacity - 'in South 
Africa Parliament and the provincial councils. These bodies in turn 
delegate law-making power to local institutions in civic matters such 
as public health, buses, municipal rates and tariffs, and advertising 
control, and the whole is thus added to, and has preference in acases 
of conflict with common law. (The laws of this second group of bodies 
is subject, unless expressly forbidden in the delegating legislation, 
to the test of reasonableness in a court of law, although the courts 
are loth, as will be seen later, to use this power.) 
The "normal" form of the bourgeois state is the liberal-democratic 
one, in which there is universal suffrage in one form or another, and 
where the state presents itself as a popular class state. Theoretically 
class domination is presumed to be absent, and all subjects of the 
nation are equal citizens before the law, with equal ability to influence 
decision-making and legislation. 
In this "normal" form, contrary to all appearances, however, the state 
, 
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continues to fulfil its function as guarantor of the status quo. 
Parliamentary democracy does not mean an equal voice for all citi-
zens. Socially, some individuals and groups have more material 
and non-material power to influence groups, parties and individuals, 
and indeed society as a whole. The structures and form of the state 
bureaucracy and hierarchy limit the options possible for the 
capitalist state, and the ideological domination of the ruling classes 
further limit the perceived options. Functionally, the 11 (individual) 
doctrine of separation of powers, parliament's merely legislative 
powers, alienate it from the decision-making executive power." 1 
Citizens vote once every three or so year to choose their representatives 
and the latter then have a free hatd to do as they wish, as far as 
the structures will allow them, until the next election. 
In South Africa even this parliamentary democracy and universal 
suffrage did not exist in the period under discussion. Here once 
again South African reseni>led England of .the previous century rather 
than the more developed and 11normal 11 bourgeois democratic form. Most 
blacks were excluded from voting. At the beginning of the period the 
franchise for the central Parliament and provincial councils was 
afforded only to those men who were literate and who had an income of 
£50 per annum, or fixed property to the value of £75. In 1930 this 
franchise was extended to white women, and in 1931 the income and 
property qualifications were dropped for white men. Meanwhile, in 
1937, those African men (about 10 628 in 19352) who had managed to earn 
the vote, were also disenfranchised with the passing of the Native 
Representation Act. Thus whites came to dominate the enfranchised to 
an ever greater extent. The enfranchisement of white women alone 
meant that black voters in the Cape decreased from 19,9% of the total 
voters role in 1929 to 10,9% in 1931.3 Town Councils and the local 
institutions were elected by the rate-payers, in effect a property 
qualification in which few black were qualified. 
The property and colour qualifications made this form of democracy a very 
1. Shlomo Avinerl, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX, 1968, 
page 210. · 
2. R.H. Brookes, "Government· and Administration~' in Hellman, 1949, .page 29. 
3. Cheryl Walker, WOMEN IN TWENTIETH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS, 
M.A. Thesis, 1978, page 87. 
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obvious class rule. The right to vote was dependent upon one's 
position in the rest of society. Blacks, if enfranchised, were those 
who had money or property and the few privileged anought to have got 
some education. They were the (aspirant) petty bourgeoisie rather than 
the unskilled workers and peasants who formed the bulk of the population. 
The average black man and woman was thus excluded even in the election 
of representatives who would make, if not ex~cute,legislation. For 
the average black worker the substitution of one government for another 
made little difference; 
"•• •• the substitution of one capitalist government for 
another can bring no benefits to the workers. The 
Smuts Government was a government of, by and for the 
industrial capitalist. The Hertzog Government is 
one of rural capitalist, of big land-owners and farmers, 
which, true to type, is more thoroughly conservative 
and more blatantly opposed to working class interests 
than the more progressive governments of urban ex-
ploiters.111 
The white workeis were more privileged in that from the 19301 s the 
franchise was virtually universal. By this means the formerly 
militant fraction of the working class was appeased and pacified 
and their support for the regime ensured. But even among white 
workers the benefits of the franchise were limited. Structural 
limitations in all liberal democracies were noted above. More 
mundane considerations further limited activity. DIE WARE REPUBLII<EIN 
noted the high costs involved in becoming a candidate for the central 
Parliament, a £50 deposit and another £500 "om stemme te werf en 
2 persone na die stembusse aan te ry. 11 · Very few whites had even 
the £50 necessary for the initial deposit. Delimitation of consti-
tuencies further aggravated the inbalance. The procedures adopted were 
seen by the Labour Party as tending to"rnake the vote of a miner worth 
less than that of a farmer in the Orange Free State" , thus "crippling 
. 3 
the industrial workers' vote. 11 
White workers did manage to influence policy and legislation, and did 
elect representatives - Communist Party and Labour Party - to Parliament. 
1. WORKERS HERALD, 12 May 1928. 
2. DIE WARE REPUBLIKEIN, 12 October 1941. 
J. Henderson, quoted in FORWARD, 16 July . 1937. 
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It remains an open question, however, how far this presence led to 
concessions to these workers by the state, and how far the con essions 
would have been granted even in their absence. McPherson notes the 
rise of the welfare and regulatory states in Western Europe, but attri-
butes these to the needs of capital rather than the presence of workers 
in Parliament. The regulatory state arises because "the capitalist 
economy had turned out to need a lot of regulation and control to keep 
1 it on an even keel." The welfare state arises "from the sheer 
need of governments to allay working class discontents that were 
dangerous to the stability of the state. 112 Equally, in South 
Africa, it can be argued that the conciliatory methods and measures 
adopted towards white labour were an answer to their militancy and 
importance in the economy and society, and the result of an attempt 
by capital to divide and weaken the working class as a whole. In-
clusion of militants in Parliament served to weaken the onslaught of the 
workers rather than endanger the system. "The whole parliamentary 
system is farcical, but it seems to be taboo, and even the most violent 
revolutionaries, when they become members of Parliament, seem to 
look upon the system as sacrosanct and make no effort to amend or 
end it", 3 complained a_worker newspaper in South Africa shortly after 
the PACT election of 1924. 
The predominantly white parliament, dominated by those dominant in 
society, could not fail to act in a colour and class-1:iased manner. It 
was only natural that the law makers should act in their own interests 
and those of the people who put them in power. "As long as there 
are differences in the conditions of persons, legal differentiation 
is inevitable, ••• such differentiation lest it offend against the 
postulates of justice, must not be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonabble; 
it must be based on objectively aacertainable and logically relevant 
distinctions in the conditions of men. 114 But to a class-biassed 
legislature, the question of whether a man is a worker or owner is a 
1. C.B. McPherson, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY, 1972, pages 10-11. 
2. ibid., page 11. 
3. FORWARD, 13 March 1925. 
4. Hahlo and Kahn, 1968, page 34. 
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"objectively ascertainable and logically relevant" distinction, 
just as the question of the colour of one's skin is ascertainable and 
relevant in South Africa. "Justice is compatible with legal systems 
that discriminate between free men and slaves, between blacks and 
whites ••• between rich and poor, between men and women. For all 
of these are "class concepts", groups which the legal order may 
1 consider as being equal or unequal in relation to each other." 
Even where no overt or specific differentiation is made in the 
legislation, bias can and does enter into the question. "To be 
2 colour blind in a racist environment issimply to ignore the problem." 
To be blind to class distinctions has similar effects. Ample evi-
dence of the truth of these assertions is afforded by South African 
law between 19a4 and 1945. 
Administrative law 
"Monopolistic capitalism involves the organisation of 
production on an increasingly large social scale, al-
though still within an essentially capitalist frame-
work. The main contradictions of this phase, sununarised 
by Marx in his analysis of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall and the countertendencies, can no longer 
be overcome simply by maintaining equivalence of ex-
change in the sphere of circulation, but increasingly 
requires the direct planning of production on a social 
scale. This means that the reproduction of capital 
increasingly takes place through the mediation · of the 
state ••• The general codes of the liberal form of 
law become the overblown regulatory systems of the 
bureaucratic apparatus, which take the form of 'dele-
gated legislation' but in practice become no more than 
a validation for discretionary administrative decision-
making.113 
The period 1924 to 1945 covers the growth of the capitalist system in 
South Africa, and the consolidation of monopoly capital on a world-
scale. It also covers the growth of such administrative type legislation 
described above, legislation designed to control the anarchy of production 
and the protests of the workers. This administrative law expanded in 
South Africa at a greater rate than the more 11normal II type of 
1. Friedmann, 1967, page 21. 
2. K, Cloke, in Lefcourt, (ed) , 1971, page 69. 
3, Picciotto, ?1977, pages 7-8. 
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legislation, until a clear-cut distinction between law and administra--
tion became more and more relative, with legislative, administrative 
1 
and judicial functions being combined in the same bodies. The 
courts were no longer the only interpreters of the law. Parliament 
framed the statutes, the Governor-General issued regulations, but it 
was the civil servants who interpreted these regulations and deter-
mined to what extent they were to be implemented. 
Hahlo and Kahn distinguish this type of law-making from truly delegated 
legislation, such as that of the provincial councils, or even city 
councils. They term the former "administrative quasi-legislation", and 
include in it the pronouncements of government departments and civil 
servants as to the meaning of ambiguous legislation and directives 
(for example , the differing interpretations of "civilised labour", 
which alternatively included and excluded "coloured" workers), and of 
departmental concessions. 2 The fact that the law could thus be 
classified into two components did not, however, alter the very real 
effects of administrative law-making. In .effect, this law-making was 
even stronger than ordinary legislation in that the role of the courts 
in questioning it was more limited. Although the courts were entitled 
to rule on the reasonableness of the administration, 3 and although they 
4 were disturbed by the extent and growth of government by regulation, 
they were not inclined to interfere with such delegated authority. 
Justice Greenberg stated that "the court will not place itself in the 
position of a supervising official and will not arrogate to itself 
the latter's right of dictating to the official concerned, not only 
what he has to do, but how he has to do it, but will allow a great deal 
of latitude in its scrutiny of his conduct and delay caused by the 
5 failure on his part to envisage the problem in its true perspective. 11 
Kentridge, a member of the qewly elected PACT government at the beginning 
1. Friedmann, 1967, page 438. G. Budlender, in LEXIS, No 1, 1978, provides 
a contemporary analysis of the spread of such administrative legislation. 
RACE RELATI~S JOURNAL, VI, page 137 gives the position in regard to 
Africans for the period covered by the thesis. 
2. Hahlo and Kahn, 1968, page 165. 
3. Van der Vyver and Van Zyl 1 1972, page 101. 
4. Cape Law Society Report, in SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, LIII, 1936, 
page 70. 
5. CAPE TIMES, l April 1930. 
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of the period, fully appreciated the normous power this type of 
attitude placed in the hands of the administrators. 
"He said that he was one of those who advocated I Jobs for 
Pals' ••• in that ••• they contemplated that as and when 
vacancies occurred in the Civil Service those vacancies, 
and particularly the . important positions, should as far 
as possible be filled by supporters of the PACT so as to 
ensure that in the future the policy of the Government 
should be wholeheartedly given effect to in the admini-
stration of the country ••• This was imperative, he 
said, as he believed that the saying, 1You can make the 
laws, provided you allow me to administer them', is as 
true today as when it was first uttered. 11 1 
The filling of posts by people with the right outlook extended from 
the lowest official - often a 'poor white' recruit - to the highest, 
the provincial administrator. 
"The National Convention itself ••• realised that the 
Administrators had, of necessity to be of the party 
complextion of the Government in power ••• It is absurd 
to suppose that the Administrator, who is a sort of 
petty governor, deriving his authority and glory from 
the Cabinet, can be regarded merely !s an exalted Civil 
Servant or a glorified policeman ••• 11 
The spirit of the administrative law was thus not likely to be any 
more pro-worker than ordinary Parliamentary legislation. The particular 
nature of the restraints and biases were different, but their origin 
was the same. 
III 
The critique of the law presented above is the fundamental one for 
an understanding of law in Capitalist society in general, and in the 
South African social formation in particular. It shows how the law 
' can appear to safeguard freedom and equality and yet operate to ensure 
class domination and exploitation. The remainder of this chapter will 
deal chiefly with a subordinate source of inequality. While pointing 
out further structural and systemic sources of inequality, it will 
concentrate on an examination of ways in which the "rule of law" is 
v~~l~ted, and on how the bias of individual agents and institutions 
----·-1. FORWARD, 26 June 1925 • . 
2. FORWARD, 11 Decenber 1924. 
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upset the neutrality of the law. Such inequalities exist in all 
class societies, but in a society like South Africa, with its many 
prejudices and social inequalities, such biases are even more 
important and numerous than usual. This secondary inequality, in 
which the law appears as a mere instrument of the ruling class, is 
always based on the more pervasive inequality whereby relations are 
reproduced "behind the backs" of the ptl:> ducers. The structure and the 
social relations these represent are the primary determinants of the 
form and function of the law. The allocation of individuals to fill 
the various roles, the social origin of these individuals and the 
malfunctioning of the law even within the limited objectives and ideals 
it sets for itself, are merely indices of the inequality of the law, and 
are derivative of, rather than original sources of, its inequality. 
lncognosc ib i 1 ity 
One of the biggest problems in regard to law is the question of to what 
extent it is possible for the individual to be aware of what the law is -
that is, the law's cognoscibility. "To the laymen, and indeed to many 
practitioners, South African law bears that quality of 1 incognoscibility 1 
which Bentham attributed to English law. 1It has been said of the Roman 
Dutch law of today, 1 one authority has written, 'that its textbooks 
1 
are antiquated and its weapons rusty. 1 The reproach is we 11 founded ••• " 
The problem lies in the fact that the system is uncodified, and that 
the law lies in numerous and difficult sources, often in foreign languages, 
and sometimes untranslated. An estimate for England puts the necessary 
bibliographical requirements of an adequate lawyer at one to two thousand 
personal books and ac~s to a library of about 50 000 volumes. 2 The 
interpretation of law, once it has been understood in the more literal 
sense, is also not always straightforward. It would be difficult for 
a layman to find ott all the common law relative to any specific subject 
or circumstance, but even were he to do so, the understanding and know-
ledge of how this law would be applied, how the old notions would be 
adapted and interpreted in order to cope with modern problems not existent 
1~ Simons, in Hellman, (ed), 1949, page 42. 
2. Mavis Hill, JUSTICE IN ENGLAND, 1938, page 76. 
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at the time the law was made, would still remain. He would also have 
to ascertain whether these old notions and laws had been superseded 
by subsequent legislation or not. Extensive legal training and ex-
perience are necessary to begin this task, and it is virtually · rtever-
ending. Professor G. Wille saw it as a "great advantage" that "it is 
possible to find every shade of opinion on almost every legal propo-
sition in one or other of the Roman-Dutch authorities. 111 What it 
means for those subject to the law's provisions is that they can never 
be sure just what the law says. 
The problem of incognoscibility also applies to statute law. Workers 
not only are differentially involved in the framing of the laws, but 
are also at a disadvantage in ascertaining what laws have been made 
and what they in fact mean. All legislation has to be published in . 
some or other official publication - the Government Gazette, the 
official gazette of the province, or as a municipal bye-law. But the 
actual interpretation of these laws has to await their coming into 
operation. Law is made not only by what is enacted, but also by the 
previous judgments and decisions of judges applying this law. This 
means that in order to know the law, one would not only have to consult 
the vast array of different sources in which the original enactments 
appear, but also to follow the law cases to ascertain how judges have 
interpreted this. 
The rich could afford to know the law. They could either engage a 
lawyer to do the work for them, or otherwise they were the ones with 
sufficient education and time to be able to attempt the task themselves. 
The workers were often illiterate and thus unable to do the necessary 
research themselves. African workers had an added disadvantage - that 
of language. All bills and acts were not only published in the stiff 
and formal language of the lawyer, but were also published: in English and 
Afrikaans. 2 Likewise, when notices of regulations and agreements had 
to be posted up in the workplace for all to see, this was done in these 
two languages only. As such the ·law was - "quite incomprehens:b le to 
the great majority of Africans. 113 
1. SOUTH AFRICA LAW JOURNAL, LIX, 1942, page 125. 
'-· Dutch was used prior to 1925. 
3. UMrETELI WA BANTU, 7 Septenber 1927, Editorial. 
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The Police 
"The European public, even that section of it which has 
reason to look upon the police as an enemy, are fully 
appreciative of their dual role, as protectors of pro-
perty against the ordinary criminal and of white super-
iority against the non-Europeans. The police force 
is, indeed, the first line of defence ani bears the 
stamp of a quasi-military organisation." 
On committing a crime, and sometimes even hefore this, the first 
branch of the state with which the offender comes into contact is the 
police, when either he is arrested or investigations take place. It 
is thus instructive to look briefly at this organisation. 
While in terms of most state services - education•l, medical, post 
office and telephone, utilities, etc. - Africans received less than 
a proportionate share of state provisions, in the case of the police 
the Africans were more than adequately attended to. For the country 
as a whole the Minister of Justice, De Wet, admitted that there was 
heavier policing in proportion to the population than in any other 
country. 2 This heavy policing was disproportionately felt by the 
poorer and darker sections of the population. 
It is generally acknowledged that crime usually abounds in slums and 
poorer areas. Engels saw in crime "the earliest, crudest, and least 
fruitful form· of the workers' revolt against social degradation and 
poverty.") Added to this in the South Africa case, the African 
workers had their movements and actions circumscribed by a vast array 
of major legislative and minor technical rules, all aimed at limiting 
their freedom of movement, residence, employment, association and 
expression, and thus restricting them in their place in the social 
structure. The abundance of crime was thus exacerbated. The statistics 
for 1939 alone, in respect of convictions for trivial offences by 
Africans, are startling, and evidence of the constant presence of the 
law~enforcing agents - the police. 
l. Simons, in Hellman (ed), 1949, pape 75. 
2. INTERNATIONAL, 2 Septetmer 1921. 
3. Simons, in Hellman (ed), 1949, page 94, quoting from THE CONDITION 




CONVICTI~S OF AFRICANS - 1939 - - ---
Offence No.convicted 
Drunkennes 38 271 
1- - - ·-· I 
I Offence No.convicted I 
I 
Native Labour Act 19 459 I 
I 
I 
Liquor possession 69 077 Pass laws 71 052 
J 
Location rules 21 584 Urban Areas Act 9 839 
Masters and Servants Act 19 712 Taxation 95 716 
--
The ever-present police performed a useful function, even when not 
apprehending offenders. The presence of these authority figures was 
a constant reminder of the omnipresence of the state, and the lack of 
freedom of the population. The African was generally unaware of his 
own rights and of the limits of the powers of the police. The presence 
of the police was thus often enough to prevent even that which was 
legal but might be perceived as a threat to the system. Police super-
vision could thus play an integral part in the disorganisation of the 
workers. 
The fes- of arrest and harrassment for legal actions was not entirely 
unwarranted. It was not only the workers who were not aware of the 
limits of the law. The police, too, were not well informed. Black 
policemen had no formal training besides drill 2 and, "with rare 
exceptions ••• (the policeman) was unable to write or read. 113 Wit-
nesses to the Police Co111llission actually admitted that within rural 
areas uneducated Africans were considered to make better policemen. 
The white section of the police force was an important avenue to which 
"poor white " unemployment was channeled, and thus consisted of individuals 
most threatened by black workers. The average policeman was often 
4 uneducated, and prone to a "nazi en Fascistiese gesindheid." Their 
training was also gravely insufficient. Foot policemen, for example, 
spent only 140 of their 544 training periods on the study of police 
5 regulations and laws. Once in service, the bureaucratic organisation 
1. Police Commission, UG 50-1937, page 69. 
2. ibid., page 18. 
J. ibid., page 14. 
4. WARE REPUBLIKEIN, 24 January 1942. 
5. Simons, in Hellmsn (ed), 1949, page 78. 
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of the force encouraged a marked tendency to measure police ·efficiency 
by the number of arrests and convictions, and by the aggregate amount 
1 
of fines or prison sentences imposed. Innocent people were often 
apprehended, and because of inability to meet bail requirements and 
because of the over-conscientiousness of the police, were forced to 
spend time in jail awaiting trial. Suspects were treated rudely and 
often assaulted. Illegal pre-trial questioning of the accused and wit-
nessed occurred, without legal aid being offered, and the accused 
were often advised to plead guilty in the hope of thus receiving 
lighter sentences. Many other workers chose to plead guilty in the 
hope that they would thus be enabled to return more quickly to their 
jobs, and thus not forfeit wages and job. Even before trial, therefore, 
workers had a greater chance of unfair treatment and prejudice before 
the law. 
The · . Courts 
a) Magistrates 
It is probably justifiable to state that magistrates heard most cases 
involving workers. The lower courts were restricted in terms of crime 
and punishment in their jurisdiction, hearing all the "less important" 
civil proceedings and criminal trials. 2 In 1943 947. of prison 
admissions were for such "less important" convictions, in that sentences 
of less than six months were imposed. 3 The scope of this thesis 
concerns mainly criminal cases of contravention of statutes or civil 
cases where breach of contract between employer and worker were con-
cerned. In the latter case the employer was unlikely to be an African, 
and the alternative of a Native Commissioner Court was thus also ruled 
out. 
The predominance of lower court hearings made the magistrate's role 
very important. The accused, if a worker, and especially if black, 
was not only tried by a man who was not his peer, but also by one who 
from the outset was inclined to be prejudiced against him and tended 
to accept the case of the law enforcement. agents. 
1. Police Commission, lC 50-1937.,. page 35. 
2. Hahlo and Kahn, 1968, page 237. 
3. ~ACE RELATIONS JOURNAL, XII, 1945, page 66. 
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"Much of the magistrate's experience is gained before hi. 
elevation to the bench, as clerk of the court or as 
public prosecutor. In these capacities he develops 
a tendency to view the machinery of justice from the 
standpoint of the prosecution, and through an intimate 
association with the police, to acquire a dangerous 
confidence in their infallibility. To accept the 
evidence of a police witness against the uncorroborated 
evidence of the accused is very nearly a principle in the 
magistrate's courts. The bias, however, is not only 
acquired through earlier training; it is also a product 
of the conditions under which the courts function. Over-
whelemed in the larger centres by a great mass of petty 
cases, most of them undefended, the courts are con-. 
strained to adopt the most expeditious methods for 
completing the roll. Unable for want of time to inves-
tigate cases thoroughly, they assume tacitly that the 
police would not have laid a charge if the accused were 
not guilty of some offence. 11 1 
Lack of legal advice, and defence, ignorance of the law on the part of 
the accused, and pure disregard for the humanity of many of ·the 
accused, creates a "sausage-machine court.# .. churning out 'criminals'." 
"Seven minutes for thirteen cases ••• Ariy man with an 
unbiased spirit will be anxious to know whether real 
justice can be meted out at the rate of thirty seconds 
per case. Why, it takes that time for a prisoner to 
plead or for a witness to take the osth, and it should 
take the smartest of smart magistrates at least five 
or ten minutes to write down the records of the shortest 
case imaginable." 2 
In the country, where the magistrate, by virtue of living in a small, 
relatively closed, communit' was more open to public pressure and 
opinion, the effect was exacerbated. Magistrates who gained a repu-
tation of lenience with regard to workers - usually farmworkers -
in regard to trials under, for example, the Masters and Servants Act, 
could find their fell ow "dorpenaars" complaining to the relevant 
Minister. Although there would not, as a rule, be open interference 
with the judgments, the complaints would not be neglected or forgotten •• 
They would be recorded in the Departmental files. The man might suffer 
both social ostracism by his peers, as well as his chances of 
promotion being jeopardised by these records. 
The worker could, of course, have his own counsel to put his side 
of the case and try to deflect the bias. Procedural complications made 
self-defence a difficult and rarely successful venture. Where legal 
help-was available, cases could be won. Barend Van Niekerk reports 
1. Simons, in Hellman (ed), 1949, page 61. 
2. WORKERS HERAID, 6 April 1927. 
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a case where an African worker was arrested on an ordinary pass offence. 
His employer "took the matter on appeal to the Supreme Court and had 
the conviction thrown out by a Full Bench under circumstances in which 
hundreds of .thousands of Africans over the pasttwe~tY-five years could 
have had their cases thrown out. The availability of a competent 
and vigorous defence, and the willingness to fight the whole way, 
1 made all the difference." But the cost of defence was usually 
prohibitive for a worker. The prosectuion•s case is paid by the state 
out of taxpayers I money, but! the accused is expected to pay his own 
defence fees. Most cannot afford this, or have, in the absence of 
committed lawyers, to make do with inferior lawyers, unless their 
trade union comes to their aid. For the lawyer "it is the ~ not 
2 the guilt that determines in most .cases." The "well-heeled type 
(of lawyer) ••• will fight for justice till his last breath or the 
last cent of his client, whichever event,as the saying goes, romes 
first. In most cases he will have a second breath soon after the 
disappearance of the last cent. 113 
b) Juries 
Some law reformers see the remedy for the possibility of bias in judg-
ment in a jury system. This system is one where the accused is allegedly 
judged by a panel of his "peers". In countries other than South Africa 
the system is, however, still found by many observers to have an in-
built tendency to bias, in, for example, educational qualifications, 
the pressure and persuadability of public opinion, and the legal ig-
4 norance of the juries. Bankowski notes that juries only too often 
5 reflect what they think the judge wants. In South Africa the case is 
aggravated when juries were used. Juries were employed in a limited 
number of cases here until 1969, when they were phased o~ completely. 
They consisted solely of white males, until 1931 when white female 
jurors were allowed in ·certain cases. 6 This in itself was enough 
to prejudice the case against any black accused, and was added to the 
1. Barend van Niekerk, in SOUTH AfRICAN OtrrLOOK, 1975, page 141. 
2• Robert Lefcourt (ed), LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, 1971, page 
3. B. van Niekerk, in SOUfH AFRICAN OUTLOOK, 1975, page 141. 
4. D.N. Pritt, EMPLOYERS, WORKERS AND TRADE UNICNS, 1970, as well as 
his other books, and Mavis Hill. 1938, can be consulted for elaboration 
on this point. 
5. r.. Mungham and z. Bankowski, "Legal Profession and Judicial Process", 
in Carlen (ed), 1976, page 212. 
6. Act 20 of 1931. 
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ordinary disadvantages. "There is little to suggest that the jury 
would have acted as a 'bulwark of liberty' in South Africa" , except 
1 
perhaps in cases such as that of the 1922 strikers. The Minister of 
Justice, Tielman Roos, in opening the Native Conference of 1924, 
himself admitted to "the complaint that a jury in the case of crime 
against Natives is prone to acquite or convict of a smaller offence than 
2 that actually perpetrated. 11 
c) Judges 
In the higher courts, too, the individual agents in the state apparatus 
were not such as to favour the worker. Advocates are not allowed to 
work for reduced fees without the prior permission of the bar council. 
Monetary considerations thus excluded most workers from appeal to 
the higher courts. However, even when the money was obtainable, and 
the worker dissatisfied enough to feel the extra time, expense and 
trouble justified, or where the case was serious enough to go immediately 
to the higher court, the judge presented a barrier to justice with 
much the same result as in the case of the magistrates of the lower 
courts. 
"Judges, like magistrates, are exclusively Europeans. 
They are recruited mainly from the Bar; the few exceptions 
consist of government law advisers appointed to the Bench. 
Appointments are often made for political services, as 
well as juristic distinction. The transition from poli-
tical action to judicial objectivity is usually rapid 
and thorough, but years of political partisanship cannot 
fail to leave an ineradicable impression. Nor can the 
judge divorce himself from the outlook acquired in prac-
tice at the Bar. 11 3 
A naive conspiracy theory of the law would see society "dominated by 
an intellectualised version of Freemasonry; a knowing, self-interested 
4 
and capable elite." Judges and advocates were drawn from one 
small section of the population. The SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL 
carries life-stories of some of the more important personalities. A 
1. Jo1iii"15'ugard in Ellison Kahn (ed), SELECT SClJTH AFRICAN LEGAL PROB-
LEMS , .. 1974, _page 62. 
2. Dept Native Affairs, 1924, page 21. 
]. Simons, in Hellman (ed), 1949, page 59. 
4. Rock, quoted in W .G. Carson, "Synbolic and Instrumental Dimensions 
of Early Factory Leg is lat ion", in R. Hood, CRIME, CRIMINOLOCY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY, · 1974, page 109. 
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few of these are "rags-to-riches" stories, but most had attended 
1 
SACS or Bedford School and had the corresponding outlook and way of 
life. Most appear, by the time of wtiting, to have achieved a stable 
position in the middle and upper segments of the population, with the 
2 minimum salary for a judge being £2 250 per annum after 1934. They 
had had a legal training that was thorough, but which excluded a 
relation of the law to the social sciences. (Even today, with the 
current popularity of industrial relations type courses . in the 
university, labour law is only one half course, at most, of the 23 
courses necessary for the degree of B.A. Ll.B, and this is regarded as 
a great advance on the earlier legal education.) As such, law 
education was a formalist one, with law developed into a "skilled 
craft, a professional technique pursued with less and less regard for 
3 the social matter which it was to regulate." 
On the level of the social status of the individual incunbents of the 
positions of power in the legal system, the conspiracy theory thus 
se~ms to be supported. But this is obviously too simple a view. It 
is the system within which they operate that provides the greater bias 
to their actions. 
"Just as power in a capitalist society is not concentrated 
in the capitalist as an individual, the law's protection of 
the middle and upper classes is not exercised directly by 
individuals. The enforcement of criminal sanctions is 
dictated by the necessities of the economic an~ political 
system in which the profit motive is central." 
Judges and magistrates do occasionally adopt positions or reach ver-
dicts favourable to the working man, but against the system which makes 
the laws, and the system in which they have to judge, and indeed have 
to spend their whole lives, they are powerless to act consistently 
in the workers' interest. The structural limitations are against this, 
"· •• the criminal law, the whole of which is of course 
instinct with reactionary orthodoxy, forbidding most 
of the things which some of the poor would naturally 
1. Albie Sachs, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1973, page 46. 
2. Judges Salaries and Pensions (Amendment) Act, No 30 of 19341 clause 1. 
3. Friedmann, 1967, page .71. 
4. Lefcourt, 1971, page 23. 
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tend to do to the annoyance of the rich, and not doing 
much about the anti-social things which the rich are 
prone to do. 11 1 
A legal system which does not view sending people unerground to dig 
for gold, asbestos and mercury as criminal, yet feels that taking food 
when dying of hunger is against the interests of "society", is not one 
\ilhich operates equally in the interests of all in the society. Judges 
who ignore the social bias of the law are themselves biased, but this 
is almost inevitable with the existing social and educational set-up. 
"The· habits you are trained in, the people with whom you 
mix, lead to your having a certain class· of ideas of 
such a nature, that, when you have to deal with other 
ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate a judg-
ment as you would wish. This is one of the greatest 
difficulties at present with labour. Labour says, 
'Where are your impartial judges? They all move in 
the same circle as the employers, and they are all edu-
cated and nursed in the same ideas as the employers. 
How can a labour man or a trade unionist get impartial 
justice?• It is very difficult sometimes to be sure 
that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial 
position between two disputants, one of your own 
class and one not of your own cla·ss. 11 2 
The bias of the judges is particularly important, because it has 
relevance not only as far as individual judgments are concerned, but 
also because judge-made law is an important part of South African law. 
By the "stare decisis" rule, a court has always to decide according 
to the ratio or reason of a higher court when this has been taken 
previously. (The rule of precedent). The law is not definite and 
all eni>racing, and there is much scope for judicial law-making. 
Firstly, there is the factor of human fallibility of the law-makers, 
their inability to foresee every eventuality. Secondly, "efforts 
at precision where the circumstances do not permit it may well result 
in II failure to achieve legislative intention. 113 "Theoretically 
law is capable of dealing with every concrete situation that may arise, 
a fiction that must be maintained at all costs if the divistn between 
judiciary and legislature is not to break down. In fact every system 
is . incomplete in coverage, and the gaps have to be filled in as they 
1. Mavis Hill, 1938, page 83. 
2. Lord Justice Scrutton, quoted in Pritt, 1970, page 50. 
J. Hahlo and Kahn, 1968, page 179. 
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1 
are revealed, by judicial law-making. 11 The legislators leave these 
gaps and must have enough confidence in the judges' support of their 
basic intentions and prejudices to leave the finer details to the latter. 
Judges thus actually had quite a wide range of freedom in interpreting 
the law, and this interpretation had a marked effect on what the law 
actually said and did. 2 In South Africa positivism was the ruling 
principle of interpretation, an approach which "has always flourished 
when the laws favour the group of which the legal administrators are 
representative. It enables the courts to take the laws at their face 
value and to avoid functional enquiries which might disclose the 
3 sectional interests advanced by these laws." 
In South Africa of the 19301 s the judges' interpretation and its role 
on the form and content of law was even more restricted that is usually 
the case, even within this positivistic approach. The Appeal Court 
"appeared to emphasise its subservience to the legislature rather 
than its independence of the executive." A future Chief Just ice 
(Stratford) stated that Parliament could make any inroad it wished 
upon the "life, liberty or property of the individual", and the courts 
would feel bound to abide by this. 4 The judges were thus not the 
bulwark of liberty they would like to have considered themselves. 
IV 
Cone lusion 
Workers were thus at a decided disadvantage before the law. The 
concepts and form of the law incorporated notions and principles 
favourable to the continued reproduction of the capitalist system, 
and the simultaneous disorganisation of the ruled. The actual legal 
procedure and institutions themselves carried added bias in the form 
of the social origins of the individuals who controlled them and the 
complicated procedure, a bias which started with the framing of the 
legislation itself and ended only with the imposition of punishment. 
1. Hahlo and Kahn, 1968, page 304. 
2. SOt~H AFRICA LAW JOURNAL, LV, 1938, pages 187-194, gives the 
principles ·of interpretation in South Africa, and the leeway and 
freedom these afford. 
3. C. Dugard 1 Inaugural Lecture, 1971, quoting Mathews, page 11. 
4. Sachs, 1973, page 246. 
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The law often failed to live up to even its own limited ideals and 
principles. 
As shown above, the blame should not be laid on the courts alone, 
however, or on the agents of these courts. The court only adjudicates 
the law; first it has to be made and prosecution instituted. "Whenever 
the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters 
1 and their workmen,. its counsellors are always the masters." The laws 
and the system are thus biased against the workers from the outset. 
Such bias is found in all capitalist legal systems, but the South 
African system has an added bias relevant to the more repressive nature 
of the regime and the related colour divisions in the population. 
Nonetheless, it is not always that the workers• perception of the law 
is such as to allow them fully to appreciate the reality of the law's 
inequality. The law is an instrument of ideological domination, as much 
as of repressive domination. Such is the ideological sway of the ideas 
of the ruling class that despite the obvious biases in the law, workers 
often still believed in it. Lawyers and the courts were only too often 
looked upon as the defenders of the workers, their protectors against 
injustices. Champion, ICU leader, called the organisation's legal 
adviser, Mr r.owley, "the greatest gentleman in Durban - and Natal for 
that matter ..... a man who -gives up his livelihood for the protection 
of an inarticulate people. 112 Trade union and worker struggle was often 
waged in the courts rather than in the factories or in the streets. 
IKAKA LABASEBENZI provides an example of perception unusual in a domi-
nated working class, yet one which gives a better picture of the 
limitations of the law: 
"There are certain matters in which legal . defence is of the 
utmost importance. But we do not want people to think that 
they can win their freedom merely by employing lawyers. Even 
employing the cleverest lawyers in the country would not save 
one from being arrested and charged under the pass laws. The 
chief weapon in the hands of the people is mass protest and 
publicity ••• In this way we can secure recognition and win 
justice and freedom, ·which can never be brought from the 
lawyer. 113 
1. Adam Smith, quoted in frontispiece to Pritt, 1970. 
2. WORKERS HERALD, 17 May 1927. 
3. II<AKA LABASEBENZI, April 1936. 
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CHAPTER THREE THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT 
"Legislation providing for the institution and registration 
of trade unions in South Africa dates back t·o the early 
years of this century ••• As these laws have in the main 
been directed at white wage-earners, their fundamental 
purpose has often been misunderstood. Repeated state 
interventions, often against the protests of individual 
capitalists and fractions of capital to confer substantial 
economic and social benefits on white wage-earners, have 
fostered the belief that the industrial ·conciliation · 
system in South Africa is designed to oenefit white wage-
earners as much as, if not more than, capital. This how-
ever is a fiction. The industrlat ·conciliation laws 
directed at white wage-earners were and are, like all such 
laws emanating from a capitalist state, fundamentally 
aimed at defending the political interests of capital, 
under•conditions of class struggle which make the undermining 
of trade union combination impossible or impracticat."l 
The .present chapter deals with the Industrial r.onciliation Act of 
1924. -As one of the pivotal acts of the labour legislation system, 
this Act is fundamental to an understanding of the system. The attitude 
and reaction of the South Africa state to worker organisation is one 
example of the world-wide phenomenon in which, by various forms of 
recognition and registration, such organisation has been restricted 
and controlled. The differential treatment of different groups of 
workers within this measure introduces the particular South African 
slant, with its emphasis on characteristics of both class and colour. 
The description and analysis which follow will attempt to illustrate 
the truth of the assertions made by Davies and Lewis above, by showing 
the interrelation of these two different aspects of the measure - one 
unani>iguously favouring capital, the other ensuring its interests in 
a more roundabout way by discrimination between workers. 
Section l of the chapter will summarise the history of the Act, in order 
to demonstrate the necessity for some such measure in 1924, as well as 
the content of and changes in the Act occurring within the period 1924 
to 1945. The following sections will deal with the various provisions 
of the Act under the headings of 
(a) the right to organise (Section II), 
(b) the right to collective bargaining (Section 111), and 
(c) .. the right to strike (Section IV). 
1. R. Davies· and n. Lewis, "Industrial Relations Legislation: One of 
Capital's Defences", ~EVIEW OF AF~ICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, VII, 1976, page 58 • 
• 
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The mere adoption of these categories is a statement on the ambit of 
the Act. All these rights, while very important, are ones which can 
operate w-ithin capitalist society, and indeed assume such a society, 
with the antagonism between capital and labour. The rights are aimed 
at a settling or diminution of such antagonism. A second difficulty 
with such a classification is the overlap between the three. None of 
them can be discussed in isolation from the others • .. The right to 
organise and bargain means nothing if the ultimate weapon of a strike 
is denied. Similarly, a strike without the backup of organisation, is 
usually an expression of weakness, a last resort when all other methods 
of persuasion fail. Despite these difficulties, the structure adoped 
will, hopefully, illustrate some important aspects of the Act, the 
intentions of its proponents, and its effects. It is these aspects 
and insights which will be sultlllarised in the concluding section, Section v. 
I 
Historx of the Act 
Davies1 provides a detailed study of the history of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (ICA), - in which .he demonstrates how the Act and all 
its precursors were a definite response to heightened struggle on the 
part of white workers, together with the first stirrings of black labour 
organisation and militartcy. He traces the Act back to the 1909 Industrial 
Oisputes Prevention Act 2 of the Transvaal • . This Act was passed in the 
wake of the militant organisation of white workers on the Rand and 
catered primarily for the mines and local authorities providing essential 
services, in which it would "aid in the Prevention of Strikes amongst 
Employees or Lockouts by Employers and ••• make Provision for the 
3 Settlement of Industrial Oisputes by r.onciliation after Investigation." 
In 1914, after industrial trouble had again erupted on the Rand, another 
Bill was introduced - the Industrial Disputes and Labour Bureau Bill. 
Whereas the 1909 Act had provided no special role for trade unions (TUs), 
any group o~ more than ten (white) workers being able to utilise the 
'machinery provided, the 1914 measure provided for the forming of TUs 
1. R. Davies, CAPITAL, THE STATE AND WHITE WAGE-EARNERS, 1977, pages l07ff. 
i. Act 20 of 1909. 
J. PreaDi>le to Act 20 of 1909. 
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according to employer rather than on craft lines (an early attempt to 
institute company unions?), with the same compulsory conciliation 
principle contained in the 1909 Act. The bill was passed by the 
House of Assenbly, where it was vigorously opposed by the Labour Party 
strengthened by recent election victories, as a bill which would only 
delay settlement of disputes, and therefore act in capital's interests. 
Characterised by the Member of Parliament, Fawcus, as 11hasty, 111-
1 considered and panic-stricken legislation" , the bill was rejected by 
2 the Senate because of the "vehement" labour protest,. as too harsh 
and precipitate a measure for the few TUs then in existence. 
In 1922 the Brace Commission began to operate, concentrating on the 
mines, in an attempt to devise better conciliation machinery for 
white workers. Their concern was even more exclusive than the 1914 
one in that. it was _now confined to unionised white workers only. A 
bill emerged in 1923 based on the Commission's findings, and met 
with weak protests from the Labour Party and white trade unions, 
both of which were weakened after their recent defeat in the 1922 Revolt. 
This .. bill was eventually rejected by the trade unions, more because of 
its dubious origins and history than its actual content perhaps, but 
this was not the end of the principle. In 1924 came the "voluntary113 
negotiating machinery of the 1924 lC Bill, which was passed by both 
4 houses and became Act 11 of that year. This was basically the same 
act as that first passed by the Smuts government. Although the 
balance of power on the political scene had changed, the Act actually 
"represented a rather less conciliatory approach than the earlier 
system which had operated in the mining industry" ,5 and on which it was 
based. Nevertheless, it was passed "almost without opposition. Most 
of the Trade Union officials ••• and other labour MPs .supported the 
Bi 11. 11 6 Simons and Simons assert that the TUs accepted the new Act 
7 "gratefully" •. This reaction can be explained both by the weakness of 
l. HAD, 1914, col. 4298, quoted in L.E. De Broize, 1924 - A VICTORY 
EOR CAPITAL, 1977, page 110. 
2• J.A. Grey Coetzee, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1976,page 13. 
3. So-called, although it still had distinct elements of the previous 
compulsory conciliation of the previous bills. 
. .. 
4. Davies (1977) and De Broize (1977), both give more detailed and 
analytical histories of the Act. 
5. Davies) 1977, page 8. 
6. W.H. Andrews, CLASS STRUGGLES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1941, page 37. 
7. H.J. and R.E. Simons, CLASS AND COLOUR IN Sa.ITH AFRICA,1969, page 321~ 
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of labour and by the concessions to white, organised labour. 
Outline of the Act 
The full preamble to the ICA of 1924 was "To make provision for the 
prevention and settlement of disputes between employers and employees 
by conciliation; for the registration and regulation of TUs and private 
1 
registry offices and for other incidental purposes." 
The Act provided for the establishment and procedure of lCs and 
conciliation boards, and for the appointment and functions of mediators 
and arbitrators to settle disputes. Industrial councils were permanent 
bodies composed of an equal number of elected representatives from 
both registered TUs and employers organisations (EOs) in a given 
industry, and were an attempt to institute home rule, and thus peace, 
in these industries. Conciliation boards, mediators and arbitrators 
were the various ad hoc means provided for dealing with particular 
disputes in industries where either no IC existed, or the IC had not 
been able to avoid or settle the dispute. The various statutory 
bodies were all given wide powers (subject to ultimate approval by 
the Minister of Labou before becoming enforceable as law) to lay down 
wages, hours, and conditions of work. Once a conflict had been 
declared in an industry, and while it was being dealt with under the 
IC machinery, all strikes and lockouts were prohibited until the IC, 
mediator, arbitrator or conciliation board had reported to the Minister. 
The 1937 Amendment did not introduce any fundamental changes in 
direction, when it provided "for the registration and regulation of Trade 
Unions and Employers Organisations, for the prevention and settlement 
of disputes between employers and employees, for the regulation of 
conditions of employment b.y agreement and arbitration, for the control 
of private registry offices and for other incidental matters. 112 While sig-
nificant changes to cope with a changing situation were introduced 
in 1937, the -Act retained its earlier ambit and aims. The changes 
merely reflected the changing interrelation of skill and colour in a 
workforce subjected to the simultaneous processes of mechanisation and 
industrialisation. The 1924 Act, together with its later amendments, 
1. Act 11 of 1924. 
2. Act 26 of 1937. 
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in short, an attempt, .after tl.!i= industrial and particularly mining, 
trouble of 1907, 1914 and 1922, to control the labour movement. To 
do this it attempted to REGULATE the trade unions, and to PREVENT or 
SETTLE disputes, so as to ELIMINATE strikes, both .in organised indus-
tries, and in industries not governed by lCs (for example by arbitration 
in trades under the Wage Act.) In doing this it controlled and 
restricted three fundamental areas of worker strenth, 
(a) the right to organisation - by the registration of TUs, 
(b) the right to bargain - by- the prevention and settling of disputes, and 
(c) the right to strike - by the attempted elimination of strikes. 
11 
The right to organise 
The ICA did not make provision for TUs. These had existed before. 
All workers in South Africa had the common law right to coni>ine into 
organisations .. to "protect, preserve and further their interests by 
means of collective bargaining", and these organisations had the 
l status of "voluntary associations11 • The Act attempted to control 
. 2 
and contain the unions already established, and to .discouraRe the 
spread of unionism amon~ the unskilled, black,and as yet largely 
unorganised workers. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Act in this regard, it 
is helpful to .. look at international trade union theory, and then to 
compare this with the South African experience. 
Trade unions .outside the South African context have been seen by revolu-
tionary leaders as tending to reformist action and ideology, if not 
3 
being actually counter-revolutionary. Hyman provides an exposition 
of the more noteworthy of the theories as to why trade unions tend in 
this direction in his summary of the thinking of Lenin, Michels and 
Trotsky on the subject. 
Lenin wrote of the dangers of economis and the integration of the 
unions into the system. Without an explicit revolutionary ideology 
1. 11 ••• a legal relationship which arises from an agreement among three 
or more persons to achieve a common objective, primarily other than the 
making and division of profits." (J. Bloch, LLM Thesis, 1977, pp.17 and 30.) 
2. The Hansard debates provide ample evidence of these aims • 
. 
3 • R. Hyman, MAAXISM· AND THE SOCI OLcx:;Y OF TRADE UNIONISM, 1971, and 
lKDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A MARXlST INTRODUCTION, 1975. 
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a "trade union consciousness11 rather than a 11.class consciousness" would 
concentrate on bread .and butter issues, rather than wider political 
ones.. If these objectives proved attainable within the capitalist 
system, the TUs were likely to restrict their demands and become inte-
grated into the system as part. -and parcel of the general economic, 
l political and ideological framework. Organisation on in:lustrial 
lines would tend to emphasise these economistic and sectoral emphases. 
Michels analysed the oligarchic tendency .. in .unions. For the most 
part it is an impossibility for all TU menf>ers to .participate in the 
running of a union's day to day activities. While all can participate 
in a strike, negotiation and administration require the activities 
of only a few union leaders and organisers, and this tendency is aggra-
vated the larger and more established the union, and the more complicated 
the procedure and history of negotiation. As time passes,insti~utional 
needs tend to take predominance over workers' needs, and the organisation 
develops "a profoundly conservative character, 112 with the emphasis 
being on conservation and protection of the union itself and the 
leaders' positions. 
Trotsky concentrated on the active and deliberate strategy waged against 
unions by capital and the state, as opposed to the unintended and 
struct~rally determined tendencies analysed by Lenin and Michels. 
Trostky 1 s thesis was that capital and the state usually attempted to 
incorporate unions within the system. "Union leaders, having acquired 
authority over their members, are used to assist capitalism in controlling 
3 the workers." As this tendency increases, the unions grow closer 
and closer to the state itself, becoming part of the state (ideological) 
apparatus. 
Hyman's work examines both the tendencies mentioned above, and the 
counteracting tendencies which would tend to stave off these trends. 
In. the analysis which follows the general form of the South African 
social formation and the particular form of the lCA will be assessed 
insofar as they affected the development of these tendencies and counter-
t end enc ies. 
1. Hyman, 1971, pages 11-14. 
2. ibid., page 16. 
3. ibid., page 18. 
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As far as incorporation was concerned, the 1914 Conunission had realised 
that, 
"Recognition creates responsibility ••• experience proves 
that organisation in the open, made sober by recognition, 
is a very different thing from ·organisation which has to 
fight against contempt ••• Moreover, the (trade union) 
officfal is more likely to take the business point of view 
and examine the situation calmly than the work1f8n who has 
some personal grievance rankling in his mind. 11 ·-
By providing that non-African trade unions could (and the Act seems to 
imply that they had to do so under the ICA, and that the Registrar 
was, in turn, obliged to accept this registration) register under the 
Act, recognition was officially conferred upon the TUs by the 1924 Act. 
Lack of militancy and conservatism were encouraged by the protection 
afforded by registration. The re.&!stered unions were not dislodgeable 
unless the TU had actually ceased to exist or was dissolved by its 
meni>ers, and it was also protected from competition by other TUs in 
2 the same industry. The complicated nature of the Act necessitated 
the services of a well-organised TU bureaucracy, and oligarchy was en-
couraged by this bureaucratic trend in the Act. The officials of the 
TU were often full-time paid officials, often with no factory experience. 
In many instances, even where they had been workers, the financial situ-
ation necessitated an individual having to serve many different unions 
in order to receive an adequate salary, an extreme example being Rob 
Stuart, who in the 1930's was secretary of eight of the existing 13 
unions in ' the Cape Federation. At best this meant that workers within 
one industry did not have the full services of the individual at their 
disposal. At worst it caused a "trade union imperialism" among the 
officials. 
The form of the Act and the functions bestowed on TUs also meant that 
officials of the TU were often full-time paid officials and became cut 
off from the workers. They were more concerned with their duties under 
the Act - conciliation boards, lCs, and preparation of minutes and finan-
cial statements,. than with organising workers, as it was the former upon 
which "existence" was judged, and upon which their jobs depen~ed. To 
1. Quoted in Davies, 1977, .page 10. 
2. Sect ion 4, Act 11 of 1924. The problem of 11c losed shop" agreements 
also added to the invulnerability of unions. On this problem see 
E. Emdon, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLOSED SHOP, 1978. 
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safeguard these they often resorted to underhand methods - the 
manipulation of constitutions and meetings, the threat of expulsion 
and dismissal for militants, and the use of closed shop and stop or-
1 der provisions to eliminate competitors. Even where such dubious 
methods were .not employed, official duties took up a large amount 
of time and effort. Simons and Simons claim that there were four to 
five hundred on lCs, conciliation boards, Apprenticeship Committees 
2 and other statutory bodies. As a result of this many workers 
tended to lose interests in the unions, and the Van Reenen Commission 
noted with dismay the apathy and careless attitude of workers towards 
organisation, and the consequent numerical weakness of the unions. 3 
As long as the TUs retained a paper membership and functioning bureau-
cracy, .. however, they were adequate for the Act's purpose - self-government 
4 which was slowly but surely converted into self-administration. 
The viewpoint of the 1914 Co11111ission was thus borne out by experience 
post 1924. .Already in 1929 the Labour Party journal reported that 
"the average member of a trade union in one of the 'sheltered' trades 
seems to have lost all class~outlook and to regard himself as a 
5 superior sort of individual with no time for agitators." In 1938 
the Department of Labour's Annual Report stated that that government had 
I 
"at all times encouraged the trade unions -to maintain their 
·membership, as it believes thaf the higher the degree of 
organisation among workers, the greater are the prospects 
of securing general compliance with the terms of agree-
ments and determinations. Moreover, the basic principle 
underlying the Act is the prevention and settlement of 
disputes by negotiation and it is plain that the nego-
tiations carried on by non-representative bodies of employers 
and employees must necessarily prove ineffective. 116 
Management aided the government in this encouragement, and in some 
7 
cases virtually established the unions themselves. In such a climate 
oligarchy and incorporation were thus real dangers for many South African 
unions. 
1. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 33. 
2. ibid. They give no date for this assertion. 
3. Industrial Legislation Commission, UGJS-37, page 88. 
4. Bloch, 1977, page 54. 
5. FORW~D, 11 January 1929. 
6. Page 38. 
7. Martin Nicol has interesting evidence for this period and later of 
the ·manner in which the TU and management worked hand in glove in the 
Cape garment industry, with management supporting the conservative leaders. 
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Concessions to the white and skilled - Sectionalism 
• ! 
"I say if is an unfair thing. It · is a Bill which deals 
with the workers of the whole country and you leave out 
five sixths of them, and they will be handed over to the 
tender mercies of the remaining sixth.11 1 
The second source of weakness in worker organisation in South Africa 
was the colour a skill bias of the Act, a bias which encouraged 
economism and sectionalism. While non-African worker organisation was 
hamstrung by the lCA in the ways described above and below, African 
organisation was perceived as such a threat that it was denied even 
that restricted recognition afforded by the Act. African workers 
were restricted to their common law right in terms of organisation. 
Although in individual areas conditions differed, .. and the strength 
of __ 1,0rker organisation could result in lCs being established even in 
predominantly black sectors such as stevedoring in the Cape, it was 
in those-industries where the percentage of whites was highest that 
ICs tended to be established in most . areas of the Union. Thus printing, 
with a 7C1'1.. white labour force in 1924/5, 2 had a national IC even before 
the lCA came into operation, while transport, at 60-~, construction, at 351., 
and metal, at 44%, were all highly organised industries-under the Act 
At the other end of the scale were textiles at 21% white labour force, 
food at 24% and chemicals at 26%. In all these areas lCs were the 
exception rather than the rule, or, if they existed, comprised only 
a small section of the sector and were thus internally divided and 
3 weakened, both geographically and inter-sectorally. 
Although de jure the Act only p:mhibited African organisation, de facto 
its armit was even more restricted. It was skilled, rather than 
unskilled, workers who were protected, a fact borne out by the corre-
lations between industries covered by Apprenticeship Committees and 
I Cs, as well. as by average wage stat 1st ics. 
Apprenticeship Committees were committees charged with controlling the 
training of apprentices in scheduled industries, in terms of Act 26 
t. HAD, 1914, col. 4299. The quote is from Merriman. 
2. UNICN STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, pages Gl0-12 for these and following 
statistics. 
3. Clothing was an exception, perhaps explained by the comparatively 
large female labour percentage. 
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of 1922. The committees consisted of a 11equal number of representatives 
of employers and employees chosen by the organisations, associations 
l 
or trade unions of employers and employees concerned." These 
conmittees not only served to limit black advancement into these jobs 
2 (by, for example, . education qualifications ) , but also to restrict 
the absolute number of workers• either black or white - gaining 
these qualifications, and thus competing for .jobs that were declining 
relatively in number. In this way they served to "limit the supply 
and thus to raise the earnings of artisans, rather than to maintain 
3 standards of technical performance. 11 
The Van Reenen Commission lists the different industries ·in which 
Apprenticeship Committees existed as at the end of 1935. 4 .. When this 
5 list is compared with that in which ICs operated at the same time, it 
is found that of · all these industries, it is only in state service 
{South .African Railways and Harbours, and government building and 
engineering operations), where ICs were .statutorily prohibited, in 
carriage building and dental mechanics work, that lCs did not exist. 
It thus appears that in this case it was workers who already were 
highly organis~d and protected by the Apprenticeship Act who gained 
ex~ra protection through the lCA. 
Figures for 1924 average whitemonthly wages, which give the average 
wage in gene~al manufacturing as 115s 3d, as opposed to 144s 2d in 
6 printing, 123s 9d in engineering and metals, and 135s in building , 
again suggest that it was the already organised and privileged who 
benefitted from the Act rather than all workers, black or white. 
When the Act was passed the .bulk of the stronger unions were craft 
ones, and the trend mentioned above thus seemed the logical one in the 
light of the government's general policy. The late twenties, however, 
saw the emergence of two trends immediately obvious in comparison with 
1. Section 11 (2)(a). 
2. See S.T. van der Horst. "Labour", in E.Hellman, "RACE RELATI~S 
iN SotrrH AFRICA. 1949, contains an an analy1£s of the effects of this law. 
3. ibid., page 151. 
4. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG35-1937, page 144. 
5. ibid., page 97. 
6. Official Year Book, 1924, pages 230-32. 
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the decade 1910 to 1920, viz., (a) the rapid growth of white female 
labour, and (b) the preponderance of African males in the workforce, 
both of which groups played a prominent role in the "new unionism" 
l of the following decade. Meanwhile, the development of a machino-
facbure-based .. industry also involved the deskilling of a large nurrber 
of white workers, and the promotion of many other unskiled whites, 
"coloureds" and Indian workers, and even in some cases Africans, 
to semi-skilled positions. 2 The increasing importance of .this semi-
skilled fraction, and the less clear distinction of this fraction in 
both skill and colour terms, initiated a change in the function of the 
lCA. Whereas ~raft-based industry was actually a declining force 
throughout the period, the ·nuni>er of workers and industries covered 
by ICs continued to increase, and did so at a faster rate that for 
WDs. The number of workers falling under ICs increased by 728%, from 
17 946 to 148 581 between 1932 and .1945, while those und«· WDs increased 
by only 120'7., from 73 000 to 160 343 in the same period. 3 (This 
increase was an underestimate in the case of the ICs, in that in these 
figures "employees" only are included, and with the increase in the 
participation rate of African workers in the economy, the significance 
of the exclusion of non-employees would be greater in the latter period). 
With this growth in the nunber of workers covered the Act's field of 
operation was thus extended to cover areas where class and colour dis-
tinctions were not so clear. To protect white, rather than only 
skilled, workers in th~s situation the state and capital had to adopt 
an ambivalent and fluctuating position, a position which corresponded 
to the different objective conditions · in the specific industry and 
area concerned, both in relation to the labour process and to the 
strength of labour organisation. 
In the first place, the unequal development of official organisation 
among white and black, skilled and unskilled, had its effect on workers' 
wages and conditions. "The object of the Union was to work in the 
4 interests of those already members. 11 111n many instances representatives 
of the lCs and of trade unions admitted that they are not catering for 
1. Jon Lewis, "The New Unionism"; in SOtrrH AFlUCAN LABOUR BULJ..ETIN, 
Ill (5), March/AprU, · 197.7,. page 299. 
2. " Dept Labour Annual Reports .and Industrial Leg is lat ion Commission, 
V.q35-1937, comment extensively on these trends. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Reports, own calculations. 




the interests and needs of .the less privileged labour groups. " Those 
2 
workers who were unorganised and unrepresented were "exploit ab le" ( sic) 
by those enjoying representation on the ICs. Relatively high wages 
and good conditions were extracted from the employers for the skilled, 
while the employers were left free to lay down what conditions they 
wished for the unskilled or unrep~esented, or else forced to concede 
only minimum demands. Thus Adnrews notes the very satisfactory wages 
laid down for Grade One workers in the Printtng Industry, while those _ 
3 for the lower grades were far less generous. An examination of 
relative wage levels further bears this out. Table 3.1 gives the 
weekly wage_of unskilled labour as a percentage of skilled as at 1935, 
Decen:ber 1938 and August 1950 for different .industries. All the 
industries included, except baking and confectionary in 1935, were 
covered by ICs. The rates in these sectors must _ be compared with 
the Wage Act rate for baking and coofectionary (30, 271.) ,_and with 
the e~en higher overseas rates of 52,9% for Canada and 82% for Sweden 
in 1938. 
TABLE 3.14 
UNSKILLED REMUNERATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF SKILLED : 1935, 1938 and 1950 
-
Industry Area 1935 1938 1950 
Baking and Confectionary Natal 30-27 
Pretoria 16,5 30,0 
Cape 25,6 42,0 
Clothing Cape 33,3 25 ,o 
Durban 24,0 25,0 
- - --- - - - ·----· 
Furniture Cape 25,9 26,8 
Durban 20,0 26,8 
Witwatersrand 18,0 26,8 
·-
Motor Durban 13,6 21, 7 
Witwatersrand 18,0 24,4 
Cape 22,2 31,9 
- -
These figures again suggest a ."protection" and promotion of the better 
off worker.s by· the ICA, with either a lower comparative unskilled wage 
or a higher skilled. 
·-
In the courts the same guidelines seemed to Qe adopted. In Gravenor v. 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 1935-1937 1 page 47. 
2. ibid. 
3. Andrews, 1941, page 40. 
4. Industrial Legislation Commissions, u; 1935-1937, page 15; UG62-l951 1 
page 49. 
-79-
1 the nunswart Iron Works the court ruled that because a worker 
was not .. an artisan, he was not covered by the overtime, leave or 
any other of the conditions laid down in an agreement. All these 
applied only to artisans. 
The prohibition of African organisation did not put an end _to all 
organisation however. In some cases white and black even organised 
together, encouraged perhaps by the fact that-.not all whites were 
protected to the same extent. In 1928, for example, the Amalgamated 
Laundry,Cleaners and Dyers Union set an important precedent by being 
the first white union to affiliate to themselves all 700 Africans 
employed in the industry, and formerly menbers of the Native Laundry 
Workers Union. 2 Many of the Cape unions, in particulary, admitted 
Africans to their membership, and in 1939 the Minister of Labour said 
in Parliament that African were not prohibited from joining registered 
TUs. 3 Many such unions continued to function successfully in terms 
of the Act with both employers and the state. 
In the 1940 report of the Labour Department, however, a slightly 
different attitude was expressed. It is probably that the growth of 
the new unionism among the semi-skilled in the machine-based factories 
precipitated the harsher outlook on the part of the.state. 
"During the year a number of applications for registration 
were received from trade unions whose menbers consisted 
mostly of natives, and in one or two instances it was 
found that registered unions accorded full membership 
rights to natives, even to the extent of having elected 
them as office bearers. Natives are excluded from the 
definition of "employee" contained in Section l of the 
Act and as a trade union (as defined) may only consist 
of "employees", it follows that natives may not be admitted 
to membership. There is of course no legal objection to 
native union' functioning under the aegis of registered 
unions, but these workers may not, in terms og the existing 
Act, be meiooers of a registered trade union." 
(A corrolary of this was that they could not take part in the collective 
bargaining machinery). In 1945 this opinion was formalised with .. t.he . 
1. Reported in SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, VIII, 1929, pages 339-340. 
2. CAPE TIMES, 20 July 1928. 
3·; ~ HAD, 1939, col. 3077. In its 1924 form the Act did not effectively 
exclude all African workers, as there were no pass laws as such in the 
Cape at the time, control being instituted under the Urban Areas Act. 
The 1937 Act clarified the matter by ppecifically including this Act. 
(INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOtrrH AFRICA, Septetrber, 1936). 
4. Labour Department Annual Report, 1940. 
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Supreme Court decision that the Sweetworkers Unb n was not a · TU 
1 . in terms of the Act in view of its fifty African members. 
In other instances division between white and black were accomplished 
by other methods. In industries where white and black did not 
organise together, for example baking and furniture, the Wage Board 
was called in to set wages and conditions for the unskilled, as it 
was feared that the absence of such legislation would cause the dis-
2 charge of white workers and their substitution by cheaper black labour. 
In other cases the ICs themselves acted in much the same way as the 
Wage Board. By including in their agreements "suitable provisions to 
meet the requirements of civilised workers"? even insofar as unskilled 
work was concerned, the ICs encouraged the replacement of black by 
white labour by eliminating the possibility of undercutting by members 
of the unregistered TUs in particular industries. 
Changes in the legislation in regard to this matter, together with 
the clamping down on mixed union organisation mentioned above, give an 
indication of the growing importance of this aspect of protecting the 
unskilled and semi-skilled whites as ~he coverage of the Act increased. 
Before 1930 the Minister of Labour was reported as stating, 
"I do not allow !Cs of Europeans to lay down wages for 
natives on unskilled work who are not represented on such 
councils. The only exception is that rates of wages laid 
down by industrial councils shall apply to any person, 
native gr otherwise, employed in these specific occupa-
tions." 
This proviso was, however, enough to avoid undercutting if the unskilled 
whites were members of a registered and represented union. The 1930 
amendment to the Act explicitly conferred the additional power on the 
TUs of negotiating conditions for non-"employees " , even where these 
latter workers belonged to their own unions, or were not unionised 
at all.5 Thus •provision . was made for the setting of wages and 
conditions in all areas where white and black, organised and unorganised, 
might compete. By 1935 the Department of Labour could report that 
1. CAPE TIMES, 21 August and 11 December 1945. 
2. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, VII (XXXVlll), page 134. See also 
Ghapter Four on the Wage Act. 
J. Official Year Book, 1934/5, page 204. 
4. CAPE TIMES, 14 May 1927. 
5. Section 7, Act 24 of 1930. 
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"approximately 3 100 additional European workers were absorbed into 
industry ••• as a result of special provisions having been made for 
1 them in Industrial Council agreements ••• 11 
The position was still not sufficiently clear, however, particularly 
in those areas where the unskilled and semi-skilled whites were not 
well organised. ln 1934 the courts ruled it ultra vires the powers 
of the Minister to refuse to gazette an IC agreement merely because it 
did not lay down wages and condtions for the unskilled. The following 
year ~nother court ruled that it was intra vires for the Minister 
to extend an agreement to all, including the unskilled, in an industry, 
even where no unskilled workers were represented on the -IC. This was 
a "matter of mutual interest" to the workers and employers on the IC. 2 
The question was an important one, and had to be settled. A Minimum 
Wage Bill was introduced which provided for the setting of a minimum 
wage for. all industry, and was "designed to replace 30 000 Africans 
by white workers, 113 by eliminating cundercutting. The Bill was greeted 
with much opposition, however, not only from blacks but from most 
of industry. The Cape Chamber of Industries feared that the bill would 
4 cause an influx of rural Africans (The bill did not apply to agriculture). 
Industry also feared the setting of an overall wage for industry as a 
whole, in the determination of which they would have no say, and which 
might thus be against the interests of their particular industry. After 
a convention had been called of the Federated Chauber of Industries 
and ASSOCOM to express concern, the 1937 amendment of the ICA and 
Wage Act coped with the problem from capital's point of view, if not 
from that of black workers, by allowing the !Cs to set wages for the 
unskilled in the industry, an arrangement which industry preferred in 
5 that it allowed _the different industries to have differing conditions. 
The new Act corrected the position by 
(a) allowing for the IC to be registered for the .industry, trade, under-
taking or occupation, interpreted by the Department to mean all in that 
i. Davies, 1977, page 251. 
2. Rex v Campbell, TPD 18 October 1935, in Sotrl'H AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, 
tIII, 1936, page 116. 
3.. UMI'ETELI WA BANTU •. 23 March 1935. 
4. Annual Report, 1939. 
5. H.J. Laite, THEY BUILT A SYS!EM, (unpublished), c. 1946, page 229. 
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industry, etc., even if not TU members, 
(b) providing that those not covered by the agreement were not 
covered in the Department's eyes, as the Wage Act stated that a 
Wage Determination did not apply if there was an agreement in the 
industry, even if some of the workers were not covered by that agree-
ment, and were not members of the union 
(c) .providing that the Minister could, under Section 19 (8), include 
those not in a registered TU, but under the same employer, and 
(d) providing that a Labour Department officer could be present 
1 at the IC to put forward the case for the unrepresented workers. 
nte state claimed that the amended Acts dealt adequately with the 
interests of both black and white workers. 
"(The) quest ion of the union's not being representative 
of unskilled labourers should not be over-emphasised ••• 
for the metrbers of an Employers Organisation who employ 
unskilled labourers can surely be regarded as competent 
to put forward suggestions for wages for tnem, while the 
unions in the interests of industrial peace would be 
acting in full accord witn the purpose of the Act re-
ferred to {n negotiating suitable rates with the orga-
nisation.112 
The Minister claimed that the 
"exclusion of natives from the def in it ion of "employee " 
under the ·lndustrial Conciliation Act is frequently 
given an exaggerated importance. In fact the exclusion 
makes little practical difference, its main effect 
being merely to close one particular channel of activity 
to natives, viz. that of statutory trade union activity ••• 
All Industrial Councils today recognise the desirability 
of looking after the interests of the unrepresented 
workers ••• 113 
In effect, however, the ICA was discriminatory. The correlations noted 
above in terms of (a) the percentage of white workers in IC industries, 
{b) the coverage of the lCA and .Apprenticeship Act,. and (c) the wage 
levels in IC and other industries, must all to some extent be attributed 
to the fact that lCs in fact operated there, and were thus an effect, 
rather than a cause,of IC organisation. However, the opposite direction 
of causation . is also indicated, especially where 1924 data have\been 
1. Laite, c. 1946, page 229. 
2• Dept Labour, Annual Report, 1939, page 5. 
3. CFLU memorandum to Industrial Legislation Commission, 1934, page l. 
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used. In general, in the early years the ICA appears to have operated 
in the interests of the .. highly skilled and white craftsmen. The needs 
of the rest of the white workers were catered for to a limited extent 
by the lCA, but mainly by other measures such as the Wage Act and the 
"civilised labour" policy. The IC machinery served to further 
cement and promote the privileges of the upper segment of the white 
workers. Africans were meanwhile almost totally excluded from the 
1 Act's advantages by their exclusion from the category of 11employee". 
Lack of registr.ation could have been advantageous in a situation 
where it was general, i.e. where no TUs were registered. In that 
case the TUs might have avoided, to some extent, the dangers of incor-
poration, bureaucracy and integration to which official organisation 
is so prone. Industrial TUs~ by their very nature, constitute an 
acceptance of the system, its method of organisation and its divisions, 
it hierarchy and ideology, .. and a reject ion of revolution in favour of 
more reformist demands. Registration and collective bargaining machinery 
further entrench this tendency, by- limiting demands and action even 
further and restricting them to the economistic. As soon as some 
unions were registered and received state recognition, however, non-
registration became disadvantageous. 3 African unions not only had 
to fight ev~n for the limited gain of union recognition by the employers 
and the state, but were also explicitly excluded from all official 
channels of negotiation with management, negotfation which fundamentally 
affected their work and genera 1 conditions of living. Those workers who 
were recognised meanwhile were tempted to promote only their own sect i onal 
interests. 
1. The colour bias of the Industrial Relations system is one of its 
more notorious traits, and one of the constant features ·in the history 
of such legislation. The 1909 Act had defined "employee" to include 
only a "white person", whether employed in manual, clerical, or super-
visory work. By 1914 the definition had attained its later sophisti-
catfon, although retaining the original meaning, and read as in the 
1924 Act to exclude all those whose contract was "regulated by at'\y 
Native Pass Laws or Regulation or by Act 15 of 1911, or by Law 25 of 
1891 of Natal, or by Act No 40 of 1894 of Natal." 
2; The non-iridustrial form of organisation in the ICU was yet one more 
~eason why the state perceived it as such a threat. 
3. This becomes debatable when restrictions on registering mixed unions 
were imposed, but this occurred at the end of our period and so does 





The right to collective barga1ntn8 
The lCAs by means of !Cs, introduced a measure of home rule into 
industry, but this was 
"· •• not Home Rule giving equal status to all partners. 
The weight of authority and power remain heavily on 
the side of the employer and it remains at least an 
open question whether this Act has not been of
1
greater 
benefit to them than to the organised worker." 
The IC consisted of an equal number of representatives of both the 
EO and the TU. Any employer or EO (there is no mention of registration 
requirements for the EO) could agree with a registered TU or group of 
TUs to establish an IC for the industry, and the two sides would then 
each elect their representatives to sit on the IC, a permanent, regis-
tered body, to negotiate on "all matters of mutual interest to them and 
the prevention and settlement of disputes between them." 
In composition the IC was thus formally equal. But .. the formal equality 
was an illusion. !Cs operated in those industries which were more 
concentration and centralised, and in which capital was thus bigger, 
more organised, and more unanimous in its views and demands. Whereas 
the nuai>er of workers per establishment under WDs increased from an 
average of 3,5 in-1932 to 8,1 in 1945, that in IC industries increased 
from 7,4 to 16,l.i The average IC industry was thus at least twice 
the size of that under WDs throughout the period, an index of this 
concentration. Inequality went beyond this,however, for large estab-
lishments alone would also have meant an increase in organisational 
potential for workers. The increased size and complexity of the indus-
trial process and the splitting up of .. jobs and loss of control by the 
individual worker also meant that it was more difficult for the workers 
to have an o,rerall view of the industry from which to bargain effectively. 
This overall view could only be obtained if the employers supplied the 
necessary information of their own free will. The Van Reenen Commission 
reported that they 
"found that there was a strong feeling among some of the 
· · · ··· unions that the employees' side of a council is always_ 
1. CFLU .memorandum to Industrial Legislation Commission, 1934, page l. 
2. Dept Labour, Annual Reports, own calculations. 
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at a disadvantage owing to the lack of information 
which it is essential that they should have for pre-
senting and arguing their case; information such as 
the position in regard to trade, costs ·of pro duct ion, 
turnover and returns on capital invested ••• There 
is of course a great difference between supplying the 
Wage Board with detailed information of this descrip-
tion and placing it at the disposal of the employees' 
side of a council. At .the same time there should be 
a nunoer of general facts about the industry which 
the employers' side of a council could collect witnoui 
much trouble and coJllllunicate to the employees• side.n 
The Comnission saw the solution to this prcblem in .. a "capable, inde-
pendent chairman", who would ensure that the TUs received more adequate 
information. But "with a few exceptions the secretaries of councils 
are also secretaries or officials of either the EOs or the TUs which 
are parties to the councils". The practice was a 
"dangerous one and is certainly not conducive to a council's 
functioning as they should. --·No man can serve two masters, 
and it is unreasonable to expect any secretary of a council 
who is ·in the paid service of an employers organisation or 
a trade union to have that independent outlook which is so 
essential when the interests of both employers and employees 
are at stake. lt is easy to conceive of such a secretary . 
being influenced in the performance of his ~uties as a coun-
cil official by extraneous consider at ions." 
The demand .for -an !!independent outlook" is obviously a naive one in a 
situation where the conflict is that between capital and labour. 
F.mployer organisation secretaries would have an obvious anti-worker 
bias. TU secretaries, where these were the secretaries of the IC, .. 
often also posed problems for militant trade union demands. The tendency 
towards integration within the system would encourage such officials 
to restrict demands to those which were "reasonable", and thus stay 
within the bounds of the system. Bureaucratism and the need for 
irldividual security encouraged the safeguarding of their own position, 
while operation within the limits of the council meant that .the officials 
very often began to see things from a 11business point of view1'. The 
very concept and practice of collective bargaining in fact implied an 
acceptance of the ,ystem whereby employers owned the means of production, 
were entitled to extract surplus value, and the only questions were 
those · of how high the rate of exploitatioo wou-ld be. 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, UGJS-1937, page 96. 
2. ibid. 
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The Conmission had put its trust in the post of chairman, but this 
post was alsmost -always held by the employer's side, a fact demonstrable 
by the large percentage of ICs whose postal addresses are found to 
be the same as those of the relevant EO. The employer had more spare 
time to attend to IC matters, and as this was not a full-time job, but 
rather an "extra-mural" activity, this was an important conside1;ation. 
The employer could afford to take the position, which, although yielding 
no salar.y, bestowed powere "more valuable t-han a salary. 111 It is 
to be expected that the authority structure of . . the usual factory, and 
the accompanying ideology, would also encourage the acceptance of 
the factory "boss" as the "boss1' of the IC. A worker whose livelihodd 
depended on his job would be unlikely to want to argue too strenuously 
with, or to exercise authority over, the man having the power to 
dismiss him. 
Victimisation was a major _problem .. for workers, and the cause of many 
strikes. Although the 1930 Act expressly prohibited victimisation 
and entrenched freedom of association, while instituting heavy penalties 
for failure to observe these two clauses, the problem remained unsolved. 
Victimisation was difficult to both find and prove. As Madeley pointed 
out, "the magistrate ••• can never ••• demand from a man what is passing 
through that mental arrangement which is called his mind. 112 The 
courts made it even more difficult by being loth to convict in such 
offences. As one judge commented, 
"This statutory shifting of the-onus (onto the accused 
to prove that victimisation was not the cause of dis-
missal -DB) has cast upon the accused the burden of 
proving a negative, which is a very difficult thing 
to do. In my judgment that difficulty facing the accused 
in this respect is a ·consideration which must always be 
kept in mind when deciding whether the accused has 
dischai-ged the onus. nJ 
The very composition of the main statutory body set up by~ the ICA, 
together with the prevailing .. ideology and climate of "public opinion", 
thus militated against true worker control of the workplace, even on 
a _50:?0 basis with management. 
l. GUARDIAN, 15 April 1943. 
2. HAD, 1937, col. 5306. 
3. Bassa and Another v. Rex, NPD, 24 February, 1944, in SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW JOURNAL, LX, 1944, pages 514-15. 
Economism 
The. ICA introduced "home rule11 into strongly organised industries in 
the belief that workers and ~mployers would, on the whole, prefer self-
regulation to regulation by an "outsider". The Wage Board proved the 
well-founded basis of this belief in the impetus it gave to IC formation. 
Lucas, chairman of the Board, stated his helief that without the Wage 
1 Act there would probably have been very few IC agreements, and the 
proportionally faster growth of ICs and their coverage in comparison 
with WDs, bears this out. 2 But the very concept of "home rule" 
had inadequacies from the worker viewpoint• many of these inadequacies 
lying in the limit at ion of the definition of "home1'. 
ICs and TUs were confined to one industry or trade. This limited the 
struggle primarily to the more economistic issues and suffered, al-
though not to the same degree, from the drawbacks and criticisms levelled 
against present-day liaison and works co111nittes, which are confined to 
one factory • . The -vorkers suffered by being unable to unite with all 
their fellow workers. While the employers were also formally bound 
-by this provision, it was not as serious for them as for the workers. 
The employer's main competitors were those within the same industry, 
those producing the same goods for the same market, and with the same . 
factor prices and .. supplies facing them. But for the majority of the 
workers their competitors - or potential comrades - were the rest of 
the workforce, both employed and unemployed. Workers were too easily 
replaced from among the pool of unemployed. Unskilled, semi-skilled 
and black workers in particular were easily replaced, and more likely 
to move from one industry to another, having no skill to tie them to 
an industry, and likewise no skill which the employer would feel con-
strained to keep within his power rather than let loose on the market. 
These unskilled workers thus had more in common with workers in other 
industries and · more to gain from .. seeing that all their conditions were 
organised together. The .general workers union, the ICU, was refused 
registration in 1926, one of the grounds for refusal being the fact that 
it was not confined to one industry, but were .employe~ in "almost every 
conceivable occupation. 113 The CFLU reported in 1938 .. that 
1. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, VII, (XXXVIll),page 134. 
2. See above for figures. 
3. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 361. 
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"Anomalies in the interpretation of various clauses of 
the lCA continue to harrass the organisers of unskilled 
workers ••• These workers are labourers without any 
trade distinction to make them different from labourers 
in other industries. The Federation wishes to organise 
such unattached labourers ••• into a general workers union. 
However, difficulties are constantly being interposed by 
the Department. The !CA is intended to organise the 
workers in a respective industry ••• 11 1 
A case which illustrates the importance of this question is that of 
the Building Workers Industrial Union . (BWIU). 2 The BWIU had registered 
under the 1924 Act for all those workers employed in the building _ 
industry, _irrespective of their craft or occupation. After the 1937 
Act was passed, the union applied for an amendment to their constitution 
to allow artisans, employable, but not employed, in the building industry, 
to be allowed to belong, by catering for "any persons who belong to 
a trade commonly associated with the building industry. 113 Such men 
had in fact been meni>ers of the union for years, and the proposed 
amendment was designed merely to validate their position. The 
Registrar rejected the amendment, and this was upheld by the Minister, 
on the grounds that a TU could be registered only for workers in a 
"particular trade", and that this latter phrase meant a single trade. 
The registration of such a general union .would hinder the attainment 
of the objects of the ICA as he saw them, and "particularly, it would 
be prejudicial to the prevention and settlement of disputes between 
employers and employees and to the regulation of employment by agreement 
or otherwise. 114 In the courts the BWIU was victorious. The Supreme 
Court ruled that "particular" must be interpreted as meaning "specified" 
and not "single", and that the Registrar could thus not legally so re-
5 strict the membership of the Union. The Minister was prevented from 
taking the matter to the Appellate Di~ision on appeal as this was an 
administrative matter, and not a judicial one, and it was only that 
latter type which could be contested. The Union had thus won a temporary 
victory, albeit one based_on technical and legal arguments. 
1. CFW Organ, August 1938, page . 3. 
2. BWIU v Minister of tabour, 1938, TPD in INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL 
S.OUTH AFRir.A, April, 1937. 
3.. CAPE TIMES, 1 'December · -1938. 
4. ibid., quoting ,, H.@ • . Lavrt-ne-e, Minister of Labour. 
5. CAPE TIMES, 24 March 1938. 
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The matter was a serious one, however, and there was immediate talk 
of amending the ICA the nex year in order to bring it into line with 
the Department's wishes. The registered TUs, perhaps fearing the compe-
tition and friction in recruitment for TU menvership among workers 
eligible for more than one union, and not themselves able to change 
industry so easily, promised not to take advantage of the loophole 
in the interim, and to "settle matters by mutual cooperation between 
trade unions" rather than pressing ahead with the idea of one union. 1' 2 
Thus nothing was done in the 1939 session about amendiag the legislation 
to cover the loophole which the case had uncovered. 3 But in the 1945 
Annual Report the Minister of Labour once again expressed misgivings 
about the 
"• •• tendency for trade unions which are organised for 
a nunber of crafts in a particular industry to apply 
for extension of registration in respect of similar 
occupations in other industries and so to extend their 
sphere of influence frequently in conflict with unions 
already functioning .. in these .industries. This had led 
to internecine competition••• and if such competition 
becomes intensified lelislation to control the position 
may well be required." 
In accordan~e with this preference for sectional organisation of workers, 
the courts had handed down a judgment against the South African Industrial 
Union in 1925, in which it was stated that a general workers union 
could not be registered under the Act.5 The 1937 amendment changed 
this position by allowing for federations of industrially organised TUs 
or EOs, with the objection of "the promotion of the interests of employees 
1. SATJ.r. Annual Report, 1939. 
?.. The confinement of organisation to one trade or industry must be 
understood as a trend encouraged by the state and industry, rather than a 
fact. Hyman, ( 1975) ·compares the posit ion in Britain, which has an even 
more complicated mixture of craft, industrial and general organisation, 
with that in the United States, where the orga1isation is predominantly 
industrial, and attributes the United Kingdom mixture to the particular 
historical ·development there. The South African situation is somewhere 
between the two, with the historical debt to the English movement ac-
counting for a lot of the confusion. 
3. It appears that there was actually some difficulty experienced, pro-
bably in view of the mixed nature of the existing organisations, in framing 
a suitable amendment. 
4. Dept Labour, · Annual Report, 1945, page 5. 
5. Sout·h African Industrial Union v Registrar of Trade Unions, 1925, 
TPD, 703, quoted in Bloch, 1977, page 37. 
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1 or employers." This, however, was not to interfere with the basic 
idea of home rule. The federation ~id ' not cater for the unemployed 
or for the unskilled .worker who was constantly changing his job and 
industry, as it was still necessary to belong to one of the affiliated 
organisations before becoming a member of the federation. Even for 
those who achieved this, the TUs and EOs remained operative primarily 
in a single industry or trade, and it was only as such that they 
could function in IC 111atters or other institutions and procedures per-
taining to the Act. The National Joint Council was 1'inf ormed by the 
Labour Department that registration as a "federation" in terms of 
Section 80 of the Industrial Conciliation Act did not confer -any 
statutory right under that Act. For example, a "federation could not 
function in connectiog with a conciliation board of an Industrial 
Council. Section 80(3), however, empowered the Minister to consult 
any registered federation in connection with any matter concerning or 
affecting the interests of employees in general. 11 2 
The "in gene,:al" was interpreted strictly, as evidenced by the Andrews 
case. In 1927 a Conciliation Board was appointed in the comnercial 
trade. The Commercial Employees Association, the relevant TU, elected 
as their representative to the Board Bill Andrews, general secretary 
of the TLC, but not a menber of official of the union itself. The 
Supreme Court ruled that Andrews could not represent the union as he 
was not a member of it. 3 
This restrictive sectional organisation once again tended to favour 
both the employers and skilled workers, rather than the semi- or unskilled. 
Employers could cooperate with their main competitors and had more 
of an industrially specific concern than an overall industrial one • . 
Skilled workers, too, were mainly concerned with conditions in a specific 
industry, as their mobility between 'industries was very restricted. It 
was the unskilled and mobile whose interests coincided across all industries 
and who thus were prejudiced bJ this restriction. 
l. Section 80 of Act 26 of 1937... 
2• NJC Minutes, 2 February 1935 in .Simons Manuscripts. 
J. Cape Peninsula Comnercial Employers Organisation v Cape Peninsula 
Colllllercfal Employees · Association, the Minister of Labour and W.H. Andrews, 
CPD, 2 and 3 June, · t927, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ~EVIEW, v1 · (XIX), page 76. 
The CAPE TIMES of 23 . June 1927, noted that this practice of representation 
by ·an official of a federation was a 11well-worn11 and generally accepted 
one overseas. 
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Enforcement of agreements 
The lC's power of collective bargaining extended beyond that of merely 
drawing up agreements. IC s were also to be used to control the enforce-
---
ment of the wages and conditions laid down. Another index of the anbit 
and effectiveness of the Act and the councils is thus provided by the 
extS1t to which the agreements arrived at were enforced - the extent 
of policing and prosecution, and how far those prosecuted were convicted 
and punished. 
ICs were expected to appoint their own inspectors to police the industry, 
with the state providing additional inspectors only where the staff and 
funds of the IC proved insufficient. This in itself constituted a diffi-
culty. lC's money came from subscriptions from the affiliated EOs and 
TUs, and was thus often inadequate • . . State inspectors, even for those 
acts .such as the Factories Act, where they were the only form of 
inspection staff provided for, were notoriously insufficient. Where 
other staff were provided f.or, one can assume that their performance 
was even more perfunctory. Thus, in the first place, 11 ••• inadequate 
1 inspection resulted in a large instance of undetected contravent f.ons." 
Even where offenders were caught and prosecuted, conviction was obviously 
not inevitable. The Act provided for contravention being a 11criminal 
offence". Under common law procedure, the accused is always given 
the benefit of the doubt when the proof of guilt is not perfectly clear. 
In many instances lawyers could secure acquittal on these grounds, while 
the technicality of the Act provided numerous additional possibilities. 
Section 75 of the 1937 Act provided that defects and omissions in the 
framing of agreements and constitution of the various bodies could not 
secure the innocence of offenders. This had been necessary after a 
great many employers had been able to escape the law because of minor 
technical points. Even after 1937, however, lawyers could still 
find many legal loopholes by means of which acquittal was assured. - . . . 
11Council' agreements are regarded as subordinate legislation 
and are therefore subject to a wide field of invalidation. 
Thus agreements can be declared invalid on the ground that 
the definit!oris 2therein attempt to define an unknown by* ·· another unknown, or are. too vague or utterly artificial 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 35-1937, page 82. 
2. This, and all further· examples marked with an asterisk, were cases 
which occurred before 1945. 
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or that the agreement gives insufficient instruction 
to those affected by it to enable them to know how to 
comply with it, or that the agreement 1impropertly dis-criminates against certain employers. 
Incorrect dating of the alleged crime in the indictment was also suffi-
cient to ensu~e acquittal. 2 
In .many cases the defence managed to protect the accused by persuading 
the court that the matter was one for civil, rather than criminal, 
charges. It was thus up to the disadvantages person, in effect the 
worker, to institute and pay for proceedings. In once case it was 
ruled that non-"employees" (i.e. Africans) could only sue civilly .. 
for underpayment, even where the agreement had been extended to them. 3 
In another case the employer was acquitted of contravention of the Act 
because the workers had already recovered arrear wages in a civil 
4 case. .. A third case failed when the court ruled that one could only 
sue under the ICA or Wage Al;t if one was underpaid. If one was not paid 
at all, this was not underpayment, and the only resort was again civil 
5 action. A final and important example, is that of Rex v Fletcher 
F.lectrical r.ompany6 in which the court ruled that in an order of 
repayment "the amount of such difference (between amount .paid and 
amount owed) should be satisfactorily proved, and that the Court is not 
justified in awarding an amount based on an estimate, even though on the 
conservative side." In most of these .cases it would be sufficient for 
the court to decide to leave it to the civil courts to have the matter 
left for good. Few workers had the money necessary to institute civil 
proceedings. Even if they could get the money, the dangers of losing 
it, and the small prospect of recovering their arrear wages, made the 
gauble a large one for small stakes. 
The courts appeared reluctant to enforce what they considered to be 
1. Bloch, 1977. 
2. Rex v African Press, CAPE TIMES, June .. 1926, . .. 
3. Parisian Bakery v Ben,·· TPD, 29 November 1933, in SOCIAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, LI, 1934, pages 560-61. 
4. Rex v T.J. Rossouw, in SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, XXVI, 1928, 
page 12.7. 
5. ·· Rex v Lurie, TPD, 26 Septenber 1935, in SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, 
1935, pages 116-17. _ 
6. TPD, 8 June ." 1936; in SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, 1936, page 518. 
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restrictive legislation. The CFLU put the difficulty of conviction 
in the following terms, 
"· ••• it is one thing to know that the law is being 
broken and a somewhat different and more difficult 
thing to obtain the necessary evidence to satisfy the 
court in order to obtain a conviction ••• most 
(magistrates and court officials) ••• do not appre-
ciate the necessity for making the underpayment of 
wages a crime and are apparently not acquainted with 
the economic conditions of present-day industry which 
make the legislation necessary. Some are unsympathetic 
to the principle underlying the legislation. A few 
are even actively hostile and go so far as to voice 
their aytagonism from their seats on the magisterial 
bench. 11 
While upholding the freedom of the employers, the majority .did not 
perceive that they were, in effect according to him the freedom to 
ill-treat his employees. The principle of freedom did not ensure 
equality or equitability. 
I 
When prosecution was successful despite all, the paltry nature of the 
fines imposed again bore witness to this attitude of the judiciary. 
Laite, Secretary of the Cape Chani:>er of Industries,. admitted that 
. . 2 
"generally speatci~~ the punishment . does not fit the crime." . Of the 
forty-four prosecutions for ICA violations in 1929, one ended in a 
repri11Jand, one a caution, seven were fined 10/ each, seven £1 each, 
one £20, and one £25. 3 Only too often, the CFLU again commented, 
"••• a wage thief proved guilty and fined for the crime, keeps the 
4 plunder and keeps out of gaol." 
Thus, in the enforcement of agreements, as in its other aspects, the 
tr.A was not a -charter of equality between workers and employers. 
Employers, the chief offenders, were seldom prosecuted. Where they 
were, the system operated in their favour even then - their access 
to legal aid, t~e poverty of the workers and their reliance on their 
employment, and the prejudice of the judiciary all ensured the lightest 
punishment possible. The agreements were just what the name implied, -
conditions which would be enforced only if the employers, those with 
1. CFLU ORG~, February 1937. 
2. Laite, c. 1946, page 181. 
J. ibid. 
4. CFW ORGAN, May 1937. 
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real control over the production process, agreed to abide by them. 
Conciliation boards, mediators and arbitration 
Not all white workers were afforded even the limited right or opportunity 
of collective bargaining affor:ded by the ICA. Workers in agriculture 
and those . employed by the Crown, government, or provincial administra-
1 tion.could not form .an IC "or like body" .. in terms of the 1924 Act. 
In addition, there were specific rules regarding the rights of workers 
for local authorities and other bodies supplying "essential services". 
Thus workers "connected with the supply of light, power; water, 
sanitary, transportation or fire-extinguishing services" 2 were restricted 
to the more compulsory provisions of the Act and excl.uded from voluntary 
bodies, .. and also denied the right to st-rike. These exc lusions . .related 
to the workers' particular place in the political economy, the role 
played by the institutions for which .they worked, and the increased 
fear of unrest in these particular sectors. Although the ICA as a whole 
was seen by the original proposers in parliament as a measure to control 
and thus disorganise labour, rather than to strengthen organisation, 
in these sectors even the limited encouragement afforded to TUs by the 
ICA was seen as dangerous. 
The restrictions .on agricultural and government employed workers were 
explained by the Minister on the grounds that these two areas had 
neither the workers nor the employers organised in them,. while the 
Railways were excluded because they had their "own machinery". 3 
In the light of the analysis of Chapter-.One more plausible reasons are 
apparent. The agricultural employers were .. certainly not unorganised. 
They presented a stronger lobby than that which would have been expected 
from the degree of economic development in this sector alone, and formed 
part of the ruling PACT alliance. The exclusion here rested rather 
on the particular obj.ective conditions - different relations . of production 
and the preponderance of cheap, .. unskilled, black labour •. These workers 
were controlled by legisl.:ion which was more repressive and more 
\:. 
restrictive than that applied to white workers, and in this way it was 
hoped. to keep them disorganised. 
1. Section 2. Minor adjustments were made to this section in 1937. 
2. Section 11 (1). 
3. HAD, l924t pages 26-34. 
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In the case of state instituions and essential industries, the exclusion 
rested on the role played by these in the maintenance and reproduction 
of -the conditions of existence of capital. This function of the 
exclusion of essential industries from the machinery is illustrated by 
an event of the 1930.'.s. Before this time these services had been 
defined to include "work connected with the supply of light, power, 
1 water, sanitary., transportation or. fire-extinguishing services" , as 
.mentioned abov.e. After a .. prolonged and serious strike by the tranway 
workers of the Cape in 1932, the state felt it necessary to amend the 
ICA. Act 7 of 1933 added to the definition of . . essential services the 
road passenger workers, and thus imposed on these militant workers 
. 2 
the. no strike provisions and the compulstion to use arbitration. 
Essential services -were,. in ef feet, those services and industries . 
necessary to provide the infrast~ucture upon which the rest of the 
economy operated. State employment and South African Railways and 
Harbours were also, in general, concerned with the provision of the 
infrastructure for the functioning of .. the rest of the social capital. 
In these areas, too, the state and capital as a whole preferred arbi-
tration to bargaining. By 1935, of the 89 conciliation boards which 
had been established since the inception of the Act, 32 were in respect 
of municipalities.3 
The boards and arbitrators were. perceived by the workers as just as 
biased against them, if not more so, than the IC machinery. A witness 
to the Industrial Legislation Commission claimed that the arbitrator 
was 
"almost invariably a man who either dir.ectly represents 
the interests of the ·employers, or a professional man 
perhaps, or a man whose outlook on life, whose whole 
living, whose whole conception of everything is that of 
the employer. 114 
Conciliation boards, with their emphasl son avoiding disruption and 
thus ensuring the continued provision of the infrastructure of the 
system, were also unlikely to be receptive to the more revolutionary 
demands of workers, demand• . which challenged in any way the existence 
of the system itself. 
l• Section 11 (1). 
2. CFLV., Annual ieport, 1933, page 2. 
J. lndustrial -:Lesisiation Conmission, UC 35-1937, page 80. 
4. ibid., page 84. 
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The circumstances for which a conciliation board could be appointed 
were also restricted, and the establishment of a board was forbidden 
for "individual matters" unless a matter of principle was involved. 
1 
This excluded many potential issues, as illustrated by a case quoted 
in AMBAC of 1945. A Mr Karl Muehlendorf had been dismissed by Rand 
Steam Laundries after complaining about the new wages for vanmen. 
He was a member of the Laundry Workers Union and applied for a 
conciliation board under S64 of the Act on the grounds that his conditions 
of employment kad been altered by the dismissal and that two principles 
were involved, and it was thus not an "individual matter". The two 
principles were . (1) that he was a spokesman, and it was thus victimisa-
tion, and that (2) if he had been dismissed for "neglect", he should 
have been given a chance to defend himself. 
The Minister appointed a board, against which the Employers Organisation 
appealed. Millin J found in favour of the firm, in that outright dis-
missal was not an alteration of conditions of employment. It was only 
on appeal to the Transvaal Provincial Division that Justices Barry, 
Hurray and Ramsbottam found in favour of Muehlendorf. 2 
In another case the court ruled that the phrase "and the matter giving 
occasion therefore is one upon which a conciliation board may be 
appointed" meant 1'in respect of which there is a possibility that a 
conciliation board may be appointed. 113 This decision meant that every 
strike in an industry in which there was no IC was a contravention of 
that section of the ICA until the Minister had refused to appoint a 
conciliation board. 
The right to collective bargaining was thus severely restricted by the 
ICA. Where such bargaining was instituted, it was only between employers 
and registered TUs. It suffered from all the drawbacks relating to 
these unions mentioned in Section 11. The demands of the TUs were 
mostly the sectional ones related to those of the workers concerned, 
being limited on the industrial, skill and colour levels. Even these 
l. Section 4 of Act 11 of 1924. Sampson, Labour Party representative, 
noted that of the 17 strikes in which he had been involved, 11 had been 
over individual worker matters i.e. victimisation, piece work, or related 
issues. (HAD debates on lCA, 1924). 
2• AMBAG. September 1945. The second principle was not mentioned. 
3. Rex v De Freitas and Others, CPD, 29 June 1936. 
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demands \lere faced by tha,;pro-capital bias implicit in the very compo-
sition and form of operation of the ICs. 
In other areas all collective bargaining was prohibited, on the grounds 
of the national interest, capital~s ·collective interest, or the 
specific nature of the labour process and labour force. Here concilia-
tion boards, arbitrators and mediators were the state's method of 
dealing with unrest where such unrest was perceived as being potentially 
more explosive than in the ordinary industry or sector. 
IV 
One of the primary aims of the ICA was 11to make provision for the 
prevention and settlement of disputes between employers and employees 
1 by conciliation" and thus to avoid the recurrence .. of disruptive 
conflict auch-.a• had occurred in the mines and elsewhere in the early 
part of the century. Strikes, as the most obvious gener.al form and 
evidence of such conflict, and as the form against which much of the 
legislation was aimed, provide a useful index both of the ambit and 
effectiveness of the Act in this respect. Entrenchment of the right 
to strike is an important aspect of l4bour legislation, for although 
a strike is often a sign of weakness - a last resort• the very exis-
tence of this last resort, the ability to withhold their labour - is 
an important and strong weapon of any workers• organisation. 
The Act did not outlaw strikes completely. South African common law, 
unlike English law, knew of no offence of participation in an unlawful 
asseni>ly, unless there was "geweld" involved, but this was curtailed 
by the Riotous Aaseni>lies Act of 1914 which provided for the pro-
hibition of such meetings, while the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
had s~milar provisions before 1914.2 Thus the INTERNATIONAL reported 
in 1921 that 11 in Johannesburg at least one incautious speaker was fined 
£100 for saying "Now is the time to strike1'. 3 The 1924 lCA maintained 
in theory at least, the right of workers to strike, but so restricted 
1. Pre4ni>le to Act 11 of 1924. 
2. Ellison Kahn, 11The Right ·to Stike in South Africa", SOUTH AFRICAN 
JOUR~AL OF ECONOMICS, 11, 1943, page 24. 
J. 29 January 1921. 
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this right that, de f a·cto , strikes became virtually 11 an impossibility ••• 
1 in legal form. 11 
The Act attempted to avoid strikes both by providing the machinery for 
self-rule, which it was hoped would minimise dis allowing 
employers and workers to discuss areas of confli t and, in .. the event 
of failure of such machinery and negotiation, or here it was not 
possible or permissible for some reason, by plac severe restrictions 
and penalties on the cases in 'Which employees co resort to strikes. 
Wcr kers would be loth to transgress this law, they knew that "die 
staat nie alleen die nodige 'swaardmag' ~ eg op 'n effektiewe 
wye toe te pas nie, maar ook dat die staatsorgan sonder aansien des 
persoon inderdaad hierdie mag eal toepas waar di funksie van die reg 
2 -dit vereis. 11 It was without doubt a "funksie an die reg" to 
prevent industrial disturbance. 
In its original 1924 form a strike was defined merely as the "suspension 
or temporary cessation of work" by any nuni>er of workers in order to 
compel agreement with specific conditions of employment. The declaration 
of a strike was made illegal (a) when the matter had been handed over 
to an IC to deal with, or (b) before a conciliation board had reported 
in the event of such a board being resorted to.3 No strikes were 
allowed in essential services. 
In 1930 the Act was tightened up. Firstly, strikes were outlawed during 
the period of effectiveness of an agreement. Secondly, the burden of 
guilt was extended. Not only those who declared, advocated or incited 
the strike were now guilty. The guilt of all those who took part in 
the strike was also expressly provided for, thus also placing a further 
burden of guilt on all those who encouraged others to strike and thus 
commit a crime. 
The effect of the Act in regard to strikes is difficult t .o judge, but 
statistics for the period do .. provide some clues. Tab le 3. 2 gives the 
number : · of strikes, the_nunber of workers involved, the aggregate duration 
1. Andrews, 1941 page 37. 
2• .. J.D. van der-Vyver and F.J. van Zyl, INLEIDING TOT DIE REGSWETENSKAP, 
1972, pages .253-54. 
3. Section 12 of Act 11 of 1924. 
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of ... individual strikes, and the .. estima~ed loss of wages (in £'s) for 
the five five-year periods between 1921 and 19~5. The final column 
of the table, the quotient of estimated loss of wages by aggregate 
1 
duration, gives the average daily wage of the average striker. 
STRIKE INCIDENCE 1921 - 1945 .. 
Period Number .. of Number of Aggregate Loss of wages 
strikes workers Duration 
1921-25 46 40 799 1 462 734 £1 952 965 
1926-30 47 19 684 23 151 10 014 
1931-35 70 16 626 168 386 85 944 
193.6-40 116 18 622 47 129 15 190 











3 Individual figures in colour terms are available in each year but are 
difficult to analyse as they fluctuate widely, often due to one or a 
few individual strikes involving a large nuui>er of workers in the . 
few big factories, and thus inflating certain figures. The average 
wage in the table does suggest a trend which is consistent with what 
one would expect with the changing nature of the main focus of the 
struggle in terms of sexual and .colour changes. The general drop from 
£1,34 in the period 1921 to .. 1925, _. £0,43 for the following period, and 
£0,3 for the last ten years would seem to reflect the growth of the 
"new unionism", with strikes in the later period being concentrated in 
the industrial unions, with their higher proportion of both female and 
black workers. Strikes in the first interval, on the other hand, were 
concentrated among well-paid craftsmen. 
The 1921 to 1925 period was one of violent white worker unrest, concen-
trated in the privileged white sectors. This is reflected both in 
the ave~age wage and the aggregate duration of the individual strike -
1 462 734 days. This length of duration reflects the seriousness of 
the conflict and the ability of better-paid workers to hold out for 
longex periods. Black participation in this period was meanwhile very 
low. with blakcs forming only a small part of the industrial labour 
force. 
... .. .. -
· 19t6-30 · t he perio_d immediately following the .. passing of the Act, saw 
1. This . l.aat . ct,lumn was c.al culat·ed:...\)y my"sel.f. 
~-· Simona in~»el lJJlan._. ,19.49>· page .. .167. · 
3 . UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEAAS ; p4ge G-18. 
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a dramatic .. decrease in all statistics, with less than half the total 
nuni>.er of workers involved, less than 11. of the previous loss of 
wages, and a marked shift from white to black strikes • ... While white 
workers had obviously been subdued or otherwise pacified by the ICA, 
by parliamentary incorporation under the auspices of the Labour Party, 
and by the wide-ranging "civilised labour" policy, black labour was 
militant, having been e~cluded from, and disadvantaged by, the mass of 
measures implemented by the PACT government. 
1921 to 1925, with an increased nuai>er of sttikes and aggregate dura-
tion oL.the individual str.ike to 70 and 168 386 days respectively, and 
an increase in the average ,-1age to £0,51, saw a decrease in the number 
of ~orkers involved to 16 626, the lowest level yet. These figures, 
and the increased number of whites involved in the individual years, 
would seem to sug~est that the depression, and decreased harg11ininp power 
of the unskilled, together with the demise of the 1r.u, .. once a,zain shifted 
the focus more to the skilled or semi-skit led ,,1orkers who, in these 
hard times, also felt the strins on the economy. 
Strikes did not reach anywhere near their former level of seriousness, 
hO\,,•ever. The Minister of Labour, in introducin~ the 1937 Bill, 
looked back upon the industrial peace of the previous thirteen years 
,-,1th .satisfaction, as proof of the Act's effectiveness, and he seems 
to have been justified in this satisfaction. The skilled workers 
appeared once again to have been pacified, with the aver age . wage never 
again reachin~ its level for the period 1921 to 1925, and the state 
thus had a loyal ally and useful division in the ranks of labour. 
There had, however, been changes in the nature of trade unionism, 
with an increase in trade unionism among the workers of emergent 
industry, the semi- and unskilled black and white workers. This 
trend \tas a warning against undue optimism on the part of the state. 
This fact, pLus certain decisions such as those mentioned belat~• 
"'hich provided or appeared.-to provide loopholes for striking workers. 
necessitated changes in the legislation. 
l ln ·Re~·vs~Schroeder andpOthers workers ~ere charged with striking after 
l. TPD# 16 February 1934, in SOCIAL /.PD INDUST~IAL REVIEW, LI. 1934, page 447. 
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they .had all refused to work on account of the dismissal of a. fellow 
worker. The magistrate ruled that it was not a strike, as the cause 
had nothing to do with wages, hours or general conditions of work. It 
was only in the Supreme Court that this decision was overruled. 
1 A more important case ,.~a; Re>e v Macdonald and others. . ..Here the 
court ruled that the stoppage of work was not a strike as all the 
workers had terminated their employment at twelve noon in that they had 
handed in the necessary one hour's notice at eleven o'clock. They 
,.,ere thus no longer employees when they stopped work at twelve, and it 
could not be construed as a strike. It was this loophole in particular 
that the 19Z7 amendment in respect of strikes attempted to cover. 
While the 1<)37 definition of a lockout was so vague that "under this 
definition th& employer could discharge all his employ~es to evade 
the Act 112 the definition of a strike was expanded and elaborated 
to the "refusal or failur~" of employees to continue or resume work, 
or the 11,.,nful retardation ••• or wilful obstruction ••• of work or 
the breach or termination ••• of their contracts of employment", if 
this "•as as a result of a "dispute regarding conditions of empioyment 
or other matters", or if it was "in pursuance of any cod>ination, 
agreement, or understanding, ~hether express or not, ~ntered into 
bet.ween them", and where the purpose of the abovement ioned act ion 
\.•as to "induce or compel II any elllployer to agree•wtth their demands 
or with the demands of others. 113 
Despite such changes, however, and despite the resultant tightening up 
strike figures in the following period increased,. particularly in the 
war years, and particularly among blacks. At a time of inflation, the 
ave.rage wage of those involved dropped from the £0,51 level of 1931 
to 1915 to £0,33 and £0,32 respectively in the two subsequent five• 
year periods. The total number of strikers increased from 16 626 in 
1921 to 1935, to 18 622 in 1936 to 1940, and 36 939 in .1941 to 1945. 
The increasing participation of blacks, women, and other less privileged 
~orkers · in the workforce, and the increasing organisation and militancy . 
1. TPD, 3 Oecember - 1?34, SOUTH AF~lCAN LAW JOURNAL, LII, 1935, pages 241-42 
2. HAD, 1937, col. 9~~ Van den Berg quoting TU: memorandum. 
3. Section 1 of Act t6 of 1937. 
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of. these groups, in a situation whr:re -working and living conditions 
,.,ere not easy, accounted for increases in all the figures except that 
of average wages. 
The Act attempted to minimise strikes, or eliminate them completely, 
,.,hUe technically safeguarding the right to strike. The bias of the 
operation of the Act meant, h0"1ever, that in many cases disputes could 
not be "settled'' by the machinery of the Act, ,,,hich favoured capital 
or skilled workers while often disregarding the demands of the semi-
skilled or unskilled, and particularly the blacks. The increase in 
absolute terms in the strike statistics, and the changing nature of 
the strikers, is an indication of the nature of the Act - one which 
helped to pacify the upper segments of the workforce but did little 
to satisfy the lower strata. The figures for strike occurrence mP.rely 




This chapter has e~amined the changing nature of the lCA in the period 
1924 to 1945, and its effect ~n the political, economic and ideological 
levels. Overall, the act can be seen to fit in with the framework 
suggested by Davies and Lewis in the introductory quote to this chapter. 
The law, while .. often intervening in the interests of the white workers, 
and against the .. black workers, had as the main aim the defence of the 
political interests of capit~l. 
The Act must be seen as an effective answer by capital and the state 
to the gr°"'ing militancy of the white workers in the period prior to 
1924, and a partly effective one to the changing nature of the workforce 
and worker organisation in the later period. ln the early period the 
or@anisation of the privileped was controlled within acceptable limits 
by the machinery of the Act, which functioned to emphasise all the 
conservative and restraining influences of the form of organisation, 
while minimising their revolutionary potential. As a reaction to parti-
culax:ly militant organisation, however, and in an attempt to divide 
the workforce, the Act did incorporate some concessions to the workers, 
at least to the white and skilled among them. 
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In the later period, with the growth of militancy in the "new unionism" 
and increasing participation and organisation of females and blacks 
of the thirties, the ambit of the Act changed and its coverage was 
e~tended. The earlier strategies had to be adapted, and. this necessity 
,,ras evidenced by several changes in the 1937 Act - for e,-,:ample the 
tightening up on std ke provisions and the extension of agreements 
to non-unionised .and non-repr~se,ted • as well as by a change in 
administration, with a clamping down on mi~ed organisation. On 
another levr.t, the change sparked off renewed debate on the form of 
. 1 
control to be ~laced on black trade unions. At this level the Act 
\•as not quite so successful, as evidenced by the increased strike 
statistics, and the eruption of the massive 1946 African mine workers 
strike. 
As wP.11 as looking at developments over the years, the chapter also 
described examples of the operation of the Act• !Cs themselves, 
conciliation boards, mediators, arbitration, and the courts. All 
these operated in a capitalist framework. ln their very structure 
they ~1ere seen to be biased, and the South African situation was 
seen to bear out the analysis given for the British situation by 
Hyman in that trade unions usually succumbed to the pressures. towards 
economism, inte~ration and cooptation. On occasion the bias was 
'urther amplified in South Africa by the narrow perceptions of the 
actors involved, with the division afforded by colour distinctions 
among the ~orkers. 
Overall the picture presented is one of an Act aimed fundamentally 
at the rel!ulation and control of the organisation of "t-1orkers and 
their division along racial, skill and industrial lines. The Act 
was an ans\•r to militant class struggle by the workers. Trade unions 
"'ere too strong to be eradicated completely. Rather the state and 
capitAl attempted to influe~ce and deform them so that they would 
operate in the interests of capital, rather than the workers by 
~hom and for whom they were originally created. Those workers 
'"~ho had historically proved themselves to be more mi lit ant were 
accorded limited rights to organisation, bargaining and strike. 
These rights were so restricted, however, both in terms of to whom 
they · "Were afforded and in terms of the limits of the rights themselves, 
L D. Lewis, "African Trade Unions and the State·: 1946 - 1953", 
1976. 
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that they could not question the basic fact of capital's rule of 
industry and society. Insofar as the state and capital were successful, 
by this means, in buying off a large section of the white workforce, 
the title of De Bl'ohe' s thesis is very apt .. "The Industrial 
1 Conciliation Act - A Victory for Capital." 
1. De Broi%e, 1977. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE WAGE ACT 
In the first quarter of the twentieth century in South Africa there 
emerged a strong and militant movement among the workers on the mines 
and in the towns, a movement concentrated within the more privileged 
sectors of the society, namely the craftsmen and. the whites. This 
movement was, for the most part, ~ffectively curbed and controlled 
by the ICA, which served to channel and restrict worker demands and 
militancy in certain directions, and also to separate this organised 
section of workers frcm the rest of the working class, both in 
organisational terms, and in aims and ideas. 1 
However, the rest of the workers, while not organised so strongly at 
the time, and thus not so much of an immediate threat, were also a 
force which capital and the state--could ignore only at their peril. 
To ignore the demands--of the .. latter, many of which were justified in 
terms of bare .. subsistence needs, even from capital's limited point of 
view, would be to ignore the development of a potentially more radical 
and broad-based threat. These workers had thus also to be contained, 
and laws were passed which imposed extensive controls on this labour, 
including the shape of the labour market, the conditions of work, and 
ultimately, if indirectly, upon the opp~rtunity for and structure of 
organisation. 
Chapter One looked briefly at the "Native" laws and saw how they esta-
blished an all but complete system of control of the African population, 
particularly as workers. This chapter will .look at the Wage Act, which 
also provided for the control of both white and black labour, and of 
the capital which employed them. 
Section I of the chapter will deal with the history of the Act, giving 
a brief description of legislation of a similar nature which preceded 
the 1925 Act. Section II will examine the Act insofar as it affected 
the different section of the labour force. Empirical evidence of the 
changing nature of the workforce in terms of both colour and skill will 
be presented. These changes, as well as the changes in the framing and 
1. See Chapter Three, supra, for a fuller discussion of the ICA. 
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function of the Act itself which accompanied them, will then be situated . 
against the various forces necessitating them. 
Section 111 will then deal with the effect of the Act on capital-labour 
relations, as well as inter-capitalist relations. It will be shown 
how the Act. advanced capital's interest as a whole, while within capital 
it advanced the interests of certain capitalists against those of others. 
The operation and enforcement of the Act forms the substance of Section 
IV. The first half will provide illustrations as to how the form of 
the machinery of the Act encouraged the biases described previously. 
The second half of the section will deal, as did Sectionlll of Chapter 
Three in the case of the ICA, with the extent and manner in which the 
Act was enforced. Court cases which indicate significant aspects of 
the Act's nature will be cited and discussed. Finally, Section IV 
will summarise the main conclusions to be drawn from the preceding 
descripti~n of the Act. 
1 
History of the Act 
The Wage Act of 1925 was not the first attempt at control by way of 
a system of wage determinations made by a wage board • . The Regulation 
of Wages, Apprentices and lmprovers Act, No 29 of 1918, had provided 
for the establishment of a board to regulate the wages of "women and 
1 young persons" and to achieve this aim had created boards, appointed 
for specific trades and areas, consisting of equal nuni>er of repre-
sentatives from capital and labour directly involved under a neutral 
chairman. This act, limited in terms of trade, sex, as it was in terms 
of age, had, however, failed to be as effective as was hoped. The 
absence of a ·colour bar in the measure tended to encourage the employ-
ment of adult "coloured" male labour in place of the control led white 
females and juveniles, and thus frustrated the objectives of the 
legislators, which had been to "protect" white female and juvenile 
2 workers. The weakness of organisation among female and juvenile workers 
I. Preanble to Act 29 of 1918. 
2. Wages and Economics Commission, 1925, clause 76. 
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also hampered the effectiveness of the measure. "Employees in the 
occupations to which this Act was intended to apply are not organised. 
Any employee who made himself prominent on behalf of his fellow 
employees •had reasons to fear the consequences for himself.• 
1 
This alone is quite sufficient to explain why the Act has failed." 
In 1921 a new bill passed successfully through the House of Asseobly, 
allowing for wage boards to lay down minimum wages for all white 
workers, male and female. 2 (The boards were again to comprise 
worker and employer representatives). The widespread industrial 
unrest of the following year prevented the passing of the bill through 
the Se~ate3 , and a subsequent bill which eventually replaced it and 
became law, encompassed significant changes -in .that (a) it covered 
all workers regardless of colour, and (b) representation of workers 
and employers on the board was abolished, except insofar as they sat 
as assessors in equal nuobers. 
The new act, No 27 of 1925, provided "for the determination of condi-
4 tions of labour and of wages and other payments for labour" for all 
industrial workers - male, female, juvenile and adult, black and white, 
in industries not governed by IC 1 s, and included one-man businesses 
excluded from the ICA. A permanent wage board of three meubers, 
employed and remunerated by the state, and independent of EO or TU 
organisations, was established. This board was to investieate ,and 
report on wages and conditions in any specified industry and area 
when directed to do so by the Minister of Labour, or where a "suffi-
5 
ciently representative" group of employers or workers had applied. 
Based on this investigation, and taking into account the condition of 
capital in that industry, the board was then to make a recommendation 
as to the minimum wages and conditions which should apply. After this 
had been made public and interested bodies and individuals had been 
allowed a period of a month for representation and complaints, the 
1. Wages and Economics Colllllission, 1925, page 287. 
2. AB 49 of 1921. 
3. R.H.Davies,CAPITAL, THE STATE AND WHITE WAGE-EARNERS, 1977 , page 137. 
4. Prean:ble to Act 27 of 1925. 
5 • . Section 3 of Act 27 of 1925. 
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Minister could then declare this reconunendation to be a binding 
wage determination (WD) ·for the industry, and contravention of any 
of its pro~isions to be. a criminal offence. 
II 
The Act as Part of the Civilised Labour Policy 
The Act was clearly part of the PACT governr.ien~s attempt to appease 
white workers and to protect them at the expense of the black workers. 
The Wages and Economics Connnission of 1925 had noted the wide wage 
gap between skilled and unskilled in South Africa. It had remarked 
that while urban wages, excluding those of labourers, were much higher 
l than in any other comparable country~ labourers' wages, i.e. those 
accruing chiefly to blacks, were lower than overseas. 2 In the skilled 
trades, where whites were primarily engaged, the workers found it 
easier to org~ise and were thus more likely to be covered by TUs and 
IC agreements. In industries engaged in the "winning of raw materials, 
where cheap labour is necessary to enable the product to be sold at 
low rates", blacks were employed,. and the posit ion of these workers 
in the political economy, and the lack of competition with whites, 
obviated the need in the state's eyes for control. It was in the 
"general and more unorganised trades, where the white and coloured 
workers are compelled to compete, that it seems necessary to establish 
a reasonable standard of living by means of wage legislation" by a 
3 wage board. 
The Act laid down that the board could only make a recommendation if 
it could recommend a wage on a "civilised" level, unless given the go-
ahead by the minister, and it was only these recommendations which could 
then become WDs. 4 While the recommendation could discriminate on 
the basis of age, sex, length and type of experience, discrimination 
5 along colour lines was expressly forbidden. 
1. Wages and Economics Commission, 1925, clause 
2. ibid., clause 29. 
3. INDUSTRIAL SOUTH AFRICA, April, 1925. 
4. Section 3 of Act 27 of 1925. 
5. Section 5 of Act 23 of 1930. 
28. 
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This "civilised" level was the rate upon which workers were deemed 
able to support themselves on an acceptable level, in practice the 
standard deemed necessary to support WHITE workers at this "accept ab le" 
level. Where blacks and whites were employed exclusively in different 
trades or jobs within a trade, the Wage Board could, and Lucas, the 
first chairman of the board, admitted that it did, "take into consi-
deration in fixing the wage for an occupation, not only whether such 
occupation was one requiring a degree of skill which .. should be re-
munerated above the level of native wages, but also whether one race 
or another predominated among the employees in .that occupat ion. 11 1 
Where black and white did the same work, however, the setting of a 
single minimum wage, at a "civilised" level, eliminated the "unfair 
competition" amongst the various "races" that would have resulted 
"were the employees of one race permitted to perform given operations 
at lower rates .. 112 Blacks, through various historical and social 
developments, were accustomed to survive on much less than whites, and 
their subsistence wage, socially and historically determined, was thus 
lower than that of whites. Any sound businessman would thus have 
preferred to employ blacks in a "free" market situation. When there 
was a .minimum wage set at the higher white level, however, the situation 
changed. In a society with the colour prejudice of South Africa, in 
the absence of any consequent economic disadvantage, the predominantly 
white employers preferred, and were encouraged in several additional 
ways (e.g. tariffs, government contracts, etc.) to employ whites. The 
"colour-blind" Wage Act was thus utilised as an implement in the 
"civilised labour"policy of the government. 
The 1936 Annual Report of the Labour Oepartment illustrates the point: 
"The experience gained since 1934 has sfiown very clearly the 
relationship between wage rates and the employment of civi-
lised labour. In industries not subject to wage regulations, 
or where no special provision has been made in regards to 
rate of pay, attempts to increase the num>er of civilised 
workers met with little success. Indirect pressure, exerted 
through the protective tariffs under which certain industries 
have grown up, also proved of little avail." 3 
1. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, XXIX (Vil), 1929, page 202. 
2. Pept Labour Annual Report, 1940, page 31. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1936, page 12. 
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Wage regulation by the wage board often had the desired effect. As 
early as 1930, Abdurahman, president of the African Peoples Organisation, 
complained in an address to the conference of this "coloured" organisa-
tion, that: 
"This repressive piece of legislation has dealt the severest 
blow of all to the coloured worker - man and woman, espe-
cially ·to the aged and semi-skilled. It was deliberately 
designed to hit the coloured man who has not the ability 
or has not had the opportunity to acquire that amount of 
.skill that entitled him to a full wage. 
"··· .how well it has succeeded will be seen by going about 
the streets of the Peninsula. Here hundreds of semi-
skilled men and women are now swelling the ranks of the 
unemployed without any hope of employment. 11 1 
The Cape Federation, on the other hand, with a substantial white menDer-
ship, noted with satisfaction in 1934 that in positions where "prior 
to the passing of the Wage Act only the lowest type of employee was 
willing to accept employment, things have greatly changed for the 
better. 112 The principle of the rate for the job served to favour 
white workers rather than providing equality on the labour market. 
Changes in Coverage of the Act 
The Act's function was not static throughout the period, however. 
Changing economic and political condition; occasioned amendments, and 
resulted in blacks being included to an increasing extent. Among the 
causes were the improvement in .the position of male white workers, the 
partial solution of the "poor white problem", the emergence of a more 
organised and economically important black proletariat, and the general 
development of manufacturing industry. Unfortunately, it is only 
after the 193S Industrial Legislation Coamission officially "recognised" 
the importance of this colour aspect of labour legislation that any 
colour breakdown is given in the statistical information on the overall 
operation of the Act. At this time the functions were already changing, 
and empirical comparisons of the "before" _and "after" position are thus 
difficult to make, but the trend after 1937 does provide some indication. 
After the Industrial Legislation Conmission had conducted a full-scale 
1. Report on 29th APO conference in CAPE TIMES, 2 April 1930. 
2. Memorandum to Industrial Legislation Commission, page 10. 
-111-
investigation into the operation and effects of both the ICA and the 
Wage Act, significant changes were introduced into both the Acts in 
the light of the shortcomings highlighted by the Commission and the 
changing structure of the labour force. 
Although the Wage Act was more widely cast than the ICA, many workers 
were still excluded from its ambit. It covered all workers in those 
spheres where it applied, including Africans, and did not limit itself 
to the restricted definition of "employee" contqined in the ICA. But 
workers in agricultural work, private domestic service, and to a 
certain extent .. those in government employment, were excluded. Few 
white workers were employed in these occupations, and, where they were, 
it was in positions for which black workers did not compete. It was 
in industry, whe~e black and white competition did exist, and in those 
levels of skill where the competition was at its most intense, that 
the Act was applied. This bias in the Act's application must be con-
sidered in addition to other forms of bias which the tables below 
illustrate. 
The tables below supply important indices of the changes in the nature 
of the Wage Act, .by comparing the statistics for WDs made in 1937 and 
1938 with those covering the full period 1937 to 1945. Since the change 
was gradual - a change in emphasis, rather than a complete reversal -
the differences between these two periods should indicate the direction 
1 of the trends, despite the lack of earlier comparative data. 
Table 4.1 show1 changes in the colour composition of workers covered 
by WDs. In 1935 whites constituted only 42% of the total employment 
in private industry. 2 In 1945 they constituted 31% 3• However, 
in 1937 and 1938 .whites comprised 48,5% of workers covered by WDs, as 
opposed to only 26,7% on average overall for 1937 to 1945. As the 
Wage Act prohibited colour discrimination, and thus the exclusion of 
blacks, in those areas covered, these figures suggest that bias 
1. These figures, being only for two years, are not strictly representa-
tive, as individual WDs, for industries with exceptional characteristics, 
might influence the totals. As the WDs were intended to last for only 
:two years, however, a two year stretch should provide a reasonably 
~epresentative picture. 
2. Union Statistics for Fifty Years, pages Gl0-12. 
3. ibid. 
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was accomplished rather by the choice of sector and skill covered 
than by this direct and blatant exclusion. In the early years the 
sectors and skills chosen were those where whites formed a signifi-
cant porportion of the workers • .. Later the focus shifted so as to 
cover areas where black workers were more important. 
COLOUR BREAKDowN OF WORKERS UNDER WAGE DETERMINATI~S, 1937-1945. 




6 135 ~ 923 
48,5'%. 38,81. 5,0% 7,8% 
79 680 167 600 16 190 34 166 
1937-45 
26, 71.. 56, 3"1.. 5, 5°/.. 11,5% - ·-.. --
The change was to some extent an acknowledgment of the number of whites 
still filling these positions, particularly with the increasing parti-
cipation of women in the economy - an involvement concentrated in the 
low-paying and predominantly less skilled industries, such as clothing, 
food and canning, textiles and the connercial trade, where blacks were 
also employed on a large scale. The Department of Labour reported that 
"investigation has shown that there is scope for a considerable increase 
in the number of civilised persons employed in industry and conunerce ••• 
The Department has therefore pressed, wherever possible, for the ad-
justment of the wages paid to semiskilled and unskilled workers, in 
order to provide suitable openings for civilised persons. The task · 
is not a simple one, as it involves the abandonment of the principle 
that the remuneration for this class of work in industry should be 
based on the needs of uncivilised workers. 112 
Even the CFLU admitted that "the present rate of wages paid to unskilled 
labourers are totally inadequate and the gap between skilled workers 
and those of unskilled workers far too great. 3 
An attempt to solve these problems by the introduction of a minimum wage 
1. Dept Labour Annual Reports, 1938, Table 11; 1945, Table IX. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1934, page 18. 
3. CFLU Memorandum to Industrial Legislation Comnission, 1934, page 16. 
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bill for the unskilled had been shelved, after prolonged discussion 
and debate. It is noteworthy that a coui>ined conference of the SAFCI 
and Assocom had asserted that the Wage Act was already sufficiently 
1 restrictive. Instead of an all-eni>racing act, the Wage Act and 
ICA were amended to permit a gradual and industry-specific introduction 
of minimum wages, as and when acceptable. The ICA was amended to allow 
ICs, whether representative of the unskilled or not, quite unambiguously 
to fix minimum wages and conditions of service for the unskilled 
within their own areas of jurisdiction. The Wage Act was also amended 
to facilitate the same trend. (See . infra for further elaboration on 
this point). These changes were reflected in the operation of the 
2 Board, which became involved "in a totally different set of functions. " 
It is these forces and factors which the shift in the colour coverage 
of the Act highlighted above reflects. In attempting to upgrade the 
conditions of the white unskilled, and in response to the increased 
power and importance of the black workers, the board laid down wages 
for unskilled grades .at a higher level than those previously paid. 
While this probably caused the displacement of some blacks by white 
workers, it also served to keep the conditions of those who remained 
from being too depressed. At the same time the Act was also extended 
to areas almost exclusively black, where the lack of competition with 
whites provided more unambiguous benefits for black workers. The 
increase in the .percentage of black workers after 1938 thus also reflects 
increased investigations into the least skilled areas of work (besides 
those excluded from the Act completely), namely those of "unskilled 
labour" . Up until this time the only unskilled determination had been 
for Bloemfontein, where the strength of the ICU had forced the issue 
as early as 1928. In 1937 the board received a request for an investi-
gation into unskilled labour in all the principal towns. 3 On 9 Septeni>er 
1938 the WO for unskilled labour in eleven industries in the Cape was 
gazetted, and on 38 October, again prompted by black unrest in the 
area, a determination was gazetted for Durban. 
1. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOUTH AFRICA, January, April, May 1935. 
2. Davies, 1977 , page 226. This "totally" is perhaps an overstatement. 
It should be interpreted as a different set -of functions in addition 
to the previous ones, rather than a complete change. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1937, page 60. The source of the request 
is not stated, but it is probable that it could come from the Institute 
of Race Relations, black trade unions, or a combination of the two. 
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Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide further evidence of the changing nature of 
the Wage Act. 
TABLE 4.2 1 
SKILL BREAKDGTN OF WORKERS UNDER WAGE DETERMINATIONS,1937 - 1945 
Year Skilled % Semi-skilled % Unskilled% 
-- ----· . ------- - .. 
1937-38 57,3 5,5 37,l 
1937-45 36,6 18,1 45,3 
~ --- . - -
TABLE 4~3 2 
SKILL AND COLOUR BREAl<DCK,IN OF WORKERS UNDER WAGE DETERMINATIONS, 1937-\945 
(A: WDs passed in 1937-38; B: WDs passed 1937-45 inclusive) 
1 Category A Whitf! African Total B B A - B A -- ----- -- --- - - -- - -· ---
- ~ -- -
- . .., 
Skilled 5 588 62 702 921 3 826 6 896 73 679 
75% 85% 12% 5% 100% _ l 00"/o 
~ - - . 
Semi-skilled 327 13 533 306 11 293 664 36 500 
I 
50% 37% 44% 31% 100"/o ' 100% 
I 
Unskilled 200 1 717 3 696 72 119 4 471 90 952 
4% 2% 82% 7~% 100% 100% 
Table 4.2 gives the skill breakdown of workers under WDs, while Table 4.3 
gives the statistics for both skill and colour divisions. At .. the begin-
ning of the period there had been much evidence of black and white 
3 competition at both the semi- and unskilled levels. The concerted 
operation of the Act and other measures under the "civilised labour" 
policy served to ensure that it was only in the semi-skilled group, 
the smallest group, that whites and blacks competed to an important 
extent by the time of the Industrial Legislation Commission. The 
skilled jobs, even in this area of machinofacture rather than craft-
4 dominated industry, remained dominated (75%) by whites. The growth of 
machinofacture meant, however , .. that the semft.skil led section of the 




Dept Labour Annual Reports, 1938, page 69; 1945, page 43. 
Dept Labour Annual Reports, 1938,Table 11; 1945, Table X. 
Poor White Conmission,passlm., e.g. page 209. 







a fact reflected in the 18,1% semi~skilled for 1937-1945, as compared 
to 5,5% for the same category in 1937-38. 
The board continued to see its task as being concerned chiefly with 
this middle group, the operatives, as opposed to the supervisory and 
1 clerical staf.f, the skilled mechanics, or the unskilled workers, 
but, as stated above, it also turned its attention increasingly to 
the black workers, both semi- and unskilled. The shift was to some 
extent a new interest in black workers, due to their increasing 
economic, social and political importance, but, to some extent, it 
was also the effect of a constant policy maintained under changing 
circumstances, resulting in a different range .. of workers covered. The 
percentage semi-skilled workers of the .. total workers covered by WDs 
increased from 5,5% to 18, 1% for .. the two periods compared here, while 
the percentage of .unskilled increased from 37,1 to 45,3%. 2 This 
change was also reflected in the colour composition of the workers 
covered. While the percentage of whites covered increased for the 
skilled category from 75% to 85%, in the case of semi-skilled workers 
it dropped from 50,4% to 37,1%, and for unskilled from 4,.4% to 1,9%. 
Blacks thus predominated in the categories upon which the board came 
increasingly to concentrate. 
In the late twenties and thirties moderate African trade unionism 
had been at a low ebb and could easily be ignored, while that which was 
strong was too "revolutionary" in its aims to be tolerated by the 
state. In the period 1933-36, with the economy recovering from the 
depression, the nuni>er of WDs and workers covered by WDs, both black 
and white, remained virtually static. The wage board was in no 
position to push for better .conditions while businessmen were 
seriously "considering a proposal to suspend the Wage Act for twelve 
months on the grounds that it ta adversely affecting the unemployment 
position. 113 In the late thJ.rties, however, African trade unionism 
and workers in general again became a force to be reckoned with. 
Their strength was enhanced by the shortage of black labour occasioned 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, ·1937, page 67. 
2. "Unskilled" determinations, as well as coal and timber, are excluded 
from these statistics, which are thus an understatement of this category. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 27 June 1932. 
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by the gold boom, the expansion of industry, and the good maize 
harvest, the latter having the "awkward habit of helping maize pro-
duction not only on the white farms, but in the native reserves as 
well. 111 
In the light of these .. developments, the Act was amended in 1937 to 
facilitate the black workers using its machinery. 
In the original Act the Minister had been empowered to authorise the 
board to make a recomnendation even where it could not recommend a 
"civilised" wage, .but this was not the usual procedure. In the new 
Act, the "civilised" wage clause was removed altogether,. and the pro-
cedure by. which Africans could actually initiate an investigation was 
facilitated. The initial Act had stated that the board was to conduot 
an investigation wherever a sufficiently representative group of 
employers or workers applied. Africans at this stage were in many 
industries effectively organised in .such organisations as the ICU, and 
it appears that the board was in the early period inundated with 
requests from African workers. The first investigations of the board 
were -often into workers outside the definition of "employee" in the 
ICA, 2 and the strength and importance of African organisation was so 
great that in the case of the Bloemfontein unskilled labour investiga-
tion, the wage board actually agreed to postpone one of its sittings 
for a day to suit the ICU representatives. 3 
At this stage, however, this was not the aim of the state in passing 
the Act. To forestall the act being used in this way for the "wrong" 
purposes, a regulation was passed in 1929 stipulating that all those 
supporting an application for an investigation had to sign it them-
selves, and this "in practice makes it impossible for any large body 
of natives to make a successful application within the terms of the 
Act and the regulations, and since the promulgation of the amended 
regulation no application from Natives has been received. 114 The 1937 
1. GUARnIAN, 24 September 1936. 
2. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, 1926, page 86. 
3. WORKERS HERALD, 17 May 1927. 
4. Chairman of the Wage ~oard, quoted in Jon Lewis, "The New Unionism", 
SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR BULLETIN, March-April, 1977, page 37. 
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Act lifted this restriction. With it now being easier for Africans 
to initiate reports and determinations in their .. industries, they 
"increasingly made use of this right until it was abolished in 1957. "
1 
In their new thrust the trade unions were supported and aided by the 
white liberals, in particular the lnstitute .. of Race Relations and 
the Friends of Africa. From 1936 onwards, when the SAIRR granted 
an initial £200 towar.ds this, 2 Rheinallt Jones, William and Margaret 
Ballinger, Maurice Webb, A.L. Saffery, J.L. Rollnick and others 
under.took invest.ig.at ions into the wages and cost of living of black 
workers, .. and the effects of industrial leg is lat ion, as well as 
helping with the presentation of evidence to the wage board. The 
board itself encouraged this "European leadership". whose "presentation 
of ••• and grasp of the issues at stake and of the ebb and flow of 
the argument is generally more effectiv.e than is the case when pre-
3 sentation is in the hands of the less experienced Natives ••• " The 
restraining influence of these liberal helpers on the workers' de-
mands made .. the wage board more amenable and open to their demands, and 
by the late thirties and forties the trade unions were receiving much 
help from the Department of Labour itself, even in the enforcement of 
wage determinations. 4 
The state's policy was now one of encouraging an increase,but a slow 
one, in African wages. !'A sudden increase in pay would be merely 
demoralising to natives whose actions are determined so much more by 
custom and tradition than by ordinary economic considerations. 11 But 
a slow increase in wages would not .. upset industry, and would ensure 
that Africans keptdeveloping "new wants ••• at an increasing rate, with 
5 a corresponding possibility of stimulating their willingness to work." 
This would help both to avert serious labour unrest, and increase 
consumption of industry's products. 
1. Jonathan Bloch, THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1977 , pages 5-6. 
2. SAIRR Annual Report, 1937. 
3. McGregor, Chairman of the wage board, quoted in Hark Stein, Honours 
Thesis, 1976, page 45. 
4. Stein, 1976. -· 
5. Industrial Legislation Co11111ission, UG 35-1937, page 44. 
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The Effect of Skill Division in Wa_ge Determinations 
"The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour rests in part on 
pure illusion,or, to say the least, on distinctions that have long since 
ceased to be real, and, that survive only by virtue of a traditional 
convent ion ••• 11 1 
Thus far it has appeared that skill is an objectively determined and 
measureable concept. The definition of skill levels in wage deter-
minations was, however, another means-which could-be manipulated to 
achieve definite ends, .. and capital and labour, and different groups 
within labour, often held conflicting opinions of just how such skills 
should be defined. 
With the development of machinofacture, as opposed to manufacture, a 
development situated firmly within the period being studied, and one 
which changed the shape of the labour. process and the working popu-
lation significantly, skill requirements changed substantially. The 
former craftsmen, with their high levels of skill and control over 
the labour process, disappeared, to be replaced by a larger group of 
machine operatives. As machines were applied in ever larger fields 
the demand for pure manual unskilled labour also decreased, to the 
advantage of the semi-skilled. 2 Whereas in the craft trades, where 
the distinctions were relatively clear and where labour aristocrats 
predominated (an example par excellence of this is printing), lCs 
and the Apprenticeship Act operated to keep distinctions as clear as 
possible. 3 It was in the manufacturing industries that the Wage Act 
1. Karl Marx, quoted in Tony Cutler, "The Romance of 'Labour'", 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY Vll (1), 1978. 
2. The concept of deskilling is a difficult one. For a fuller discussion 
on should look at the whole current labour process debate, .. e.g. Harry 
Braverman, .. LABOUR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL, 1974, with his contention that 
all work, with mechanisation, is being deskilled, as opposed to others, 
the Labour Department among ·them, who contended, in reply to such claims, 
that "with the advance of mechanisation , comparatively less unskilled 
and more skilled and semi-skilled labour will be employed." (1945 Annual 
Report, page 44). A deskilling trend seems to hold for the period 1924 
to 1945 and is supported by the work of such as Davies "(1977), although 
further work is still to be done in individual industries to determine 
the varying rates and extent of the process. 
J. Debate on the Apprenticeship Act at this time shows that even in 
these Industries skills were being progressively downgraded, with some 
considering that .. shorter periods of apprenticeship were necessary to 
acquire the lesser skill levels. (See Annual Reports of the Dept Labour). 
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was chiefly applied, and where the more ambiguous and imprecise defini-
1 
tion and limits oJ skill were interpreted in different ways. 
The more skilled workers feared job dilution, and thus feared any 
diminution of the skilled-unskilled division, or an expansion of the 
semi-skilled group by the "promotion" of the unskilled. They complained 
that "the introduction of a semi-skilled class will result in a loss 
of employment or an encroachment upon the recognised sphere of work 
. 2 
of any artisan and it will interfere with .. the training of apprentices. 11 
"The effect on the skilled worker of allowing some operations to be 
done by the semi-skilled worker will be that there will be much less 
opportunities for the skilled man who is the natural breadwinner in 
the family to obtain, or retain, employment in the industry. 113 Unskilled 
workers, meanwhile, urged rising scales of wages for unskilled work, 
as for other "classes of labour", pointing out, with reason, that there 
was "no occupation in which experience and practice do not bring 
4 
increased efficiency and with service, proof of dependability." 
Employers, however, opposed this demand and backed skilled white 
workers in their opposition to an increase in the numbers of semi-
skilled workers, or to pay for experience. By keeping the number of 
workers classified as unskilled as great as possible they could 
decrease their wage costs. They thus protested against any attempts 
to increase the number of skilled and semi-skilled, to impose ratios 
for qualified and unqualified workers, or to impose rising wage levels 
5 based on experience or length of service, especially for the unskilled. 
The wage board admitted that their "classification of labour into 
semi-skilled and unskilled is misleading. You can have a thousand 
classifications and then group them together and regard them as one. 
Much divergence exists in respect of unskilled labour - you have the 
unskilled ·street sweeper and the unskilled dock worker; they are 
separate classes and can not be grouped together. 116 The board never-
theless refused to accede to the demand of the unskilled workers for 
1 E •. J. Hobsbawm, LABOURING MEN, 1964, pr av ides suggestive English material. 
2. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG35-1937, pages 70-71. 
3. ibid. 
4. Dept Laboig Annual Report, 1940, page 29. 
5. In the 1933 WO for textiles labourers get no recognition for experience 
while "all other" categories do get this in_ terms of increased wages. 
6. Industrial Legislation Commission, tx;J5-1937, page 35. 
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a recognition of this level of skill in their determinations on the 
grounds that such regulation would be difficult to enforce, and that 
"the measure of skill added by experience in an •unskilled' occupation 
1 is necessarily small." Even where recognition was given for time 
worked, the .interpretation of this could go against the unskilled 
worker. The CAPE TIMES reported a case in 19372 where an employer 
was acquitted of underpayment on paying a machinist e wage which did 
not take into consideration the time she had .. worked for him already. 
The court held that the time worked, during which time she had 
been employed as a cleaner, should not be taken into consideration in 
arriving at her wage as a machinist. This, the CAPE TIMES reported, 
affected about three thousand other textile workers. 
The 1937 Act facilitated the discrimination and differentiation which 
could be achieved by breaking the workforce into smaller groups entitled 
to different wages, by allowing for the fixing of rates not only between 
qualified and unqualified, but specifically also between any "classes" 
of labour. Thus, for example, whereas the WO of 1933 for the textile 
industry had only 2 categories • "labourers" and "all other employees113-
the 1937 determination recognised four distinct levels - supervisory 
4 and skilled mechanics, clerical worker.s, operatives, and unskilled. 
Other determinations showed similar developments with regard to increased 
stratification. By fixing these internal proportions and differentia• 
tions, the board was able to afford differential protection to the 
different groups and also to divide the work force. The Van Reenen 
Comnission had noted that "in most cases ••• ratios were designed to 
protect the interests of the qualified employees. 115 Further proportions 
and systems of differentiation would facilitate this trend. Capital, 
however, was also to gain from the provision. Increasing stratification 
and increasing differentiation in wage payments meant a lowering in 
the overall wage costs, as workers did not receive anything beyond the 
price for their precise job. 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1940, page 29. 
2. CAPE TIMES, _.26 February 1937. 
3. No 46 of 1933. 
4. No 55 of 1937. 
5. Industrial Legislation Commission, 0035-1937, page 73. 
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III 
The Effect of the Wage Act on Capital 
The last point introduces the question of capital's interest in the 
Wage Act. One of the aims of the Act quite clearly was the promotion 
of the white labour policy .. of the government, as shown above. The 
concern of the state with white workers, could not, however, be at 
the expense of the profit rate, and the Act was passed as much, if 
not more, to aid capital, as to aid the white workers. 
1 It was expressly laid down in the Act that, in making a recommendation, 
the board was to take into consideration the ability of the industry 
to carry on its trade under the new conditions, and this in fact was 
the barrier to its recommending a "civilised" wage in all the 
recommendations it put forward. The chairman of the wage board issue 
a "warning to those who hold the view that the primary factor in Wage 
Determinations is the cost of living or standard of living of the worker. 
It is suggested that •••• the Board is bound to accept paying capacity 
as the basis of prime importance for its .recommendations, aiming at 
the same time at the attainment of the maximum improvements for the 
employees. 112 
While the board agreed that wages must be set at a "civilised" level 
if at all possible, to avoid "serious dislocation" the board "endea-
voured to make (the) suffering (of industrialists) as light as possible. 113 
With a policy of "festina lente11 , in order n~t to hinder the develop-
ment of industry, they thus allowed up to four and a half years in 
4 some instances for industry to adjust to the desired conditions. 
Davies suggests that the policy of the wage board was in fact one of 
promoting the efficiency and development of industry,5a suggestion 
corroborated by the Department of Labour itself, when it gave this as 
at least ONE of the aims of . the Act. 6 Davies claims that WDs 
1. Act 27 of 1925, Section 3. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 57, emphasis added. 
J. ibid., page 56. 
4. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, VI (XXXIII),1928. 
5. Davies, 1977, pages 194ff. 
6. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, IV (XIX), 1927. 
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were based on the actual existing wages of the mechanised industries, 
and those where white workers predominated. The setting of these 
standards as minima forced all firms to use methods as efficient as 
those used by this "bigger" capital if they were to maintain their . 
profit le.rel and not break the law. Thus, the quote by McGregor above, 
continued to say that "Although the Board must not cripple the 
industry as a whole, some industrial employers who cannot bear the 
additional costs imposed by a determination may be eliminated from the 
industry; this is frequently in the interests of employers, employees 
11 and the conmunity as "Whole. 
Insofar as it was effectively applied and enforced (see following 
section), the Act served to encourage the promotion of efficient 
industry, and the concentration and centralisation of industry. It 
served to increase profits, rather than to cut them. From calculations 
based on production statistics of the main industries falling under 
the Act, Davies estimates that whereas the index of the mass of surplus 
value produced by industry as a whole increased by 3,68% between 
1926 and 1933, the first eight years of the Act's operation, the 
index for the major industries in which WDs applied increased by ·s,66%. 2 
The SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW for 1929 noted that profits had NOT 
dropped in the various industries to which WDs had so far been applied. 3 
The CAPE TIMES of the same year noted that sweet and clothing, recently 
put under WDs, both showed progressive employment returns for the 
4 year , which, while not providng a direct reflection of the profit 
trend, does provide some indication of a generally "healthy" business 
situation and also gives an indication of the general growth of the 
industries concerned. Analysis of the relative nunbers of workers 
and employers covered by WDs likewise supports the contention that 
1. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, 11 (II), page 11. 
2. Davies, 1977, Taole 4. This is obviously only an index of surplus 
value, which is a category not calculable from crude empirical data 
or statistics provided in such reports, if at all. The general movement 
of trends computed of these data should however, give a rough indication 
of developments. 
3. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, VII (XXXVIII), page 138. 
4. CAPE TIMES, 11 April 1929. 
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concentration and centralisation occurred in these _industries. Where-
as the average number of workers per employer was 3,5 in 1932 (73 000 
workers, 21 000 employers), by 1945 it was 8,1 (160 343 workers and 
1 19 835 employers), with a peak in 1941 of 9,3. This growth in the 
average size of establishment does not reflect the full growth, as with 
the advent of machinofacture and a higher capital concentration, one 
can also expect a higher capital/labour ratio, and thus even more 
2 concentrated and centralised industry. 
The Act was intended to regulate those industries and trades where 
employers and workers "being unorganised, could not be disciplined 
through agreements with trade unions113 , i.e. where the ICA was not 
able to be applied. Workers organised in trade unions and employers 
in employer organisations preferred.-to battle directly with each other 
and to lay down conditio.ns in this way, especially where the small num-
ber who ~ere organised allowed concessions to be granted fairly easily 
to these vorkers. (See "employee" definition of ICA). Laite reports 
that the Wages and Economics Cormnission of 1925 resulted in five WD 
recomnendations being put forward by the board. After a delegation 
from the FCI expressed that body's consternation at this interference 
the reconmendations were withdrawn by the Minister, and the industries 
4 were given a chance either to form ICs or to be reinvestigated. The 
Wage Act was generally seen by employers, organised workers, and the 
government as inferior to the ICA, and the state, in particular, 
expressed the hope that control by the board would encourage "both 
parties (to) turn sooner to the ICA rather than be under the influence 
and compulsion of an outside body~5 This viewpoint also accorded with 
1. Data from Annual Reports, Dept Labour. Own calculations. 
2. The 1960s wage debate (see references below) examined the extent 
to which legislation, as opposed to "pure economic forces'\ could 
cause an increase in wages, especially for black workers. Their con-
cern was chiefly with the play-off, if any, between wage and output 
increases. The debate is thus interesting, but of limited value in 
relation to this thesis, due to the restricted, mainly neo-classical 
analysis and perspective of the writers. The debate is also concerned 
chiefly with alternatives for the future. Past effects are either not 
envisaged or not discussed. See J.A. LoDDard, 1964; O.P.J. Horwood, 
1962; Ian Hume, 1970; L.B. Katzen, 1961; w. Steenkamp, 1961 and 1962; 
S.P. Viljoen, 1961. 
3. Davies, 1977, page 177. 
4. Harold Laite, THEY BUILT A SYSTEM, n.d., page 171. 
5. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, II (II), 1924, page 114. -
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the dominant ideology which at this early period was against the large-
scale state interference in the economy now prevalent and acceptable. 
For labour the ICA, despite its many drawbacks, usually provided "a 
substantial ·advance on the rates of pay prescribed under the Wage 
1 2 Act", especially for qualified workers. Organised capital, too, 
generally preferred self-regulation to interference by an outside 
body. Protection was thus instituted for all in ICs in that there could 
be no investigation into an organised trade without the Minister's 
permission, and in that no WO could be passed in any area where an IC 
3 already existed. It was not possible, however, or even advisable from 
capital's viewpoint, to have ICs in all industries. Some industries 
consisted of too many small employers, and in these cases organisation 
was difficult, the pressure of peer public opinion diminished, and 
thus the effectiveness of self-regulation hampered. Analysis of the 
numbers of employers and workers covered by ICs and WDs shows that 
it was precisely in these dispersed trades that WDs, rather than ICs 
operated. 
TABLE 4.44 
COMPARIS~ BETWEEN WAGE ACT AND INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATICN ACT 
Year R.Age Act Workers ICA Workers 
Workers Employers Employers Workers Employers Employers · 
------- ---·- -- -- - - - -
1932 73 000 21 000 3,5 17 946 2 464 7,3 I 
1940 139 330 15 109 9,2 91 897 7 872 11, 7 
1945 160 343 19 835 8,1 148 581 9 242 16, l 
------- --
While, as can be seen from Table 4.4, the nunber of workers and employers 
covered by WDs exceeded those covered by ICs throughout the period 
for which we have statistics (see columns land 2, 4 and 5), the average 
nunber of workers per employer, an index of the size of the establish-
ment, was greater under the lCA than under the Wage Act. (Columns 3 and 6) 
The Wage Act thus catered for the larger, but more dispersed trades in 
this period of the development of industry. 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1937, page 60. 
2. An exception to this is provided in ~rtin Nicol, "Riches from Rags", 
unpublished, 1979. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1932 and 1940. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Reports, own calculations. 
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Because of these effects of the Wage Act in the promotion of concentra-
tion and centralisation, the attitude of capital towards the various 
bills and acts was anbivalent, and depended on the fraction of indus-
trial or commercial capital involved. Agricultural and domestic 
workers were excluded from the Act, which thus did not affect their 
employers. These two groups were both chiefly black, where black/white 
competition did not constitute a problem, and "nationalists were mostly 
employers of farm labourers and the Labour Party were employers of 
. 1 
domestic servants. 11 These groups of employers, both strong in the 
government of the time, also benefitted in indirect ways from the 
exclusion of the sectors. Agriculture gained as the employment of 
white, instead of black, workers in industry meant that their black 
workers would not be so strongly attracted off the farms to the towns. 
The white workers gained in the ways described above in Section II. 
Mining capital was ideologically opposed to the "interference" that 
the Act constituted, but for itself was largely unconcerned. This 
fraction appears to have received an assurance that it would be 
excluded de facto, if .not de jure, from the act's provisions. The 
Board of Control of Alluvial Diamond Diggings, for one, had received 
a letter from the Labour Ministry in which they were assured that 
"althought the (Wage) Act did not exclude them, its provisions were 
not likely to affect them. 112 It is likely that other mining concerns 
were given similar assurances. It was thus industrial and commercial 
capital in which the interest and concern in the Act was most significant, 
as these were the fractions which would be most affected. Within these 
fractions opinions differed according to the stage of development of 
the particular trade, or even of the particular individual concern. 
An example of this is afforded by the differences within -and between 
industrial capital and commercial capital. The FCI from the beginning 
urged the new government to put the bill through as soon as possible~ 
and INDUSTRIAL SOUTH AFRICA, the federations 1 s organ, carried an 
editorial which stated that "the manufacturing industry for many years 
has advocated the establishment of wage boards. 114 The commercial 
trade, which consisted for the most part of many small and unconnected 
1. WCEKERS HERALD, 12 May 1928, page 5. 
2. Wages and Economics Commission, 1925. 
J. FCI Annual Report, 1924, page 123. 
4. INDUSTRIAL SOUTH AFRICA, December 1924. 
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establishments and where control by the industry itself was thus not 
feasible, presented a slightly different picture. It was an area 
where undercutting by the small establishment, operating with family 
or unorganised and superexploited workers, was a problem for the 
bigger concerns, who had to keep a larger workforce under control. 
The spokesmen of coimnercial capital (probably the larger concerns) 
1 thus favoured wage regulation by WD rather than IC, preferring the 
state to be responsible for regulation and control, and not trusting 
reliance on their smaller competitors' doubtful concern for the 
requirements of total social capital. This support did not stop 
the individuals objecting to the actual terms of the WD eventually 
applied to them however. 2 The very diversity and disunity within 
the fraction which meant that wage regulation by WD would be preferred 
to IC regulation, also meant that agreement on the terms of such 
regulation was very unlikely. Within industrial capital itself this 
split between smaller and bigger capital showed in the Cape Chani>er 
of Industry's adopting a contrary position to that of the FCI. The 
former body, which at this time was dominated by small capital3 , be-
moaned the existence of the Wage Act and extolled the superiority 
4 of non-regulation for those industries where !Cs were not possible. 
While the Act thus operated in the interests of capital, it did so 
differentially. In promoting concentration and centralisation, and 
the efficient organisation of industry, the Act promoted big capital's 
interests and speeded up the development of the economy as a whole. 
It can be seen as state interference in the private sector in the 
interest of the development of efficient capitalism. 
The Operation of the Wage Act 
When the Wage Act was first passed it was seen by labour organisations 
as being an act in their interest, to protect their members. The board 
was inundated with requests for investigations, even from black 
1. ~ndustrial Legislation Commission, UG35-l937, page 83. 
2. CAPE TIMES, 28 March 1939, reported 103 objections to the new WD 
for the coimnercial distributive trade. 
3. Davies, 1977, page 63. 
4. Annual Repcrts, CCI, bear testimony to this. 
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organisations, and on the publication of the first recommendations "a 
considerable amount of discussion took place, illustrating the very · 
1 
great interest manifested in these reports and reconmendations." 
Black workers were quickly excluded from the main operation of the 
• Act by the methods mentioned above. White workers, however, continued 
to view the board as their champion for the longer period, but also, 
with time, found shortcomings in its operation. 
Complaints became particularly evident after the first euphoric years, 
and with the passing of wage determinations for industries such as 
garment, liquor and catering, laundry, and conunerical distributive, 
2 where there were a large number of women, and where even a "civilised" 
wage level was not at a very high level. The CAPE TIMES3 reported 
that the theoretical budget used in computing the wage for female 
labour, for example, allowed 17s 6d a week for board and lodging, 
4 
two tubes of toothpaste a year, and stockings at ls l ld a pair. 
The years of the depression during which WDs did not raise wages, and 
in some cases even cut them, added to the discontent. In 1931 Bill 
Andrews, secretary of the SATLC, ~lready perceived a change in the 
policy of the board. In a latter to Creswell, the current Minister 
of Labour, Andrews noted that "during the last year or so the outcry 
from employers and the Press has ceased, but on the other hand, the 
action of the Wage Board ••• has caused serious misgivings in the minds 
of workers and their representatives. In fact workers are coming to 
regard the Wage Board as a wage-cutting machine. "5 Even after the 
depression, cause for complaint did not disappear. With the changes 
in the labour process and composition of the workforce, conditions for 
many unskilled and semi-skilled workers remained very poor. The conhined 
1. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, II (Xl), page 899. 
2. In clothing, for example, the whitP. female ratio in 1933 was 
335:665, while the black ratio was 632:368. (Industrial Legislation 
Commission, UG 35-1937). In the European population as a whole, the 
percentage of women in commerce was 25~ - in 1926, compared to 15,4 for 
the economy as a whole. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 25 June 1931 •. 
4. The marked neglect of the sexual aspect of labour legislation, both 
in this chapter, where it is of primary importance with the superexploited 
and unorganised nature of female labour in general, and throughout the 
thesis, should not be taken as indicating that this is unimportant. It 
is rather, BECAUSE of its importance and the lengthy treatment needed, 
that l have neglected the issue. 
5. CAPE TIMES, 31 Deceuber 1931. 
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effects of the growth of factory industries, the increasing proportions 
of semi- and unskilled, of women and of blacks in the workforce, as 
well as the exclusion of the Labour Party from the government; provided 
the economic, political and ideological conditions for discontent to 
be expressed by a growing mass labour movement. FORWARD, the Labour 
Party journal, claimed that the wage board was being used to postpone 
decisions on wage questions rather than to settle them. 1 Eli Weinberg 
of the Sweet Workers Union, a mixed union, expressed the opinion that 
the "Wage Board is an instrument to keep the wages of the workers low 
in order to keep the profits of the employers high. 112 And it was 
not only the radical leaders who felt this way. They were supported 
by the workers. Burnside, a Labour Party member, and menber of the 
Cape Garment Workers Union, was applauded for the following speech to 
the union: 
"With the Wage Board the posit ion is very serious. Here 
we have a very expensive Board, set up for the specific 
purpose of seeing that the workers are paid an adequate 
wage. But the conditions in tbe clothing industry and 
bespoke tailoring industry have gone from bad to worse 
after every investigation by the Board. It has laid 
down conditions which are not compatible with civilisa-
tion and wages which do not allow the workers to live 
in decency. 113 
The menbers of the Wage Board seemed to 11 f orget that it was originally 
constituted not to protect the profits of the employers, but to pro-
tect the wages and living standards of the workers. 114 
Many of the shortcomings were generated or exacerbated by the lengthy 
procedure of the board. Unlike the 1918 Act and the 1921 Bill, the 
1925 board was a "neutral" one, rather than one composed of worker 
and employer representatives. Presentation of the points of view of 
the two protaganists was provided for, but in effect this conferred an 
unfair advantage on capital. 
In investigating a trade the general procedure was to issue a questionnaire 
1. FORWARD, 22 June 1937. 
2. GUARDIAN, 21 July 1939. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 7 February 1935. 
4. Editorial, GUARDIAN, 29 Decenber 1939. 
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to all employers in the industry, in which they were required to 
furnish balance sheets and financial statements. After inspection 
of both these questionnaires, and a few representative establishments, 
the board held meetings where interested parties could present ·evidence.
1 
Capital was at an obvious advantage in this procedure. Balance sheets 
and financial statements are generally accepted as hiding more than 
they reveal. 2 This evidence was the first heard by the board, and 
thus the basis of all future findings. Employers were also well able 
to afford the legal representation most capable of presenting their 
case in the sittings of the board, while the workers had to rely on 
semi- or untrained union officials, or the goodwill of bodies such 
as the Institute of Race Relations. Technical argument and language, 
which were likely to be used in the auditor-and lawyer-edited reports 
of the employers, and unlikely in those of the workers, were also 
more likely to appeal to the Board menbers, most of whom had legal 
backgrounds or some form of technical training.3 
Although the board was obliged to give the representatives of all 
representative organisations a hearing, workers were still disadvantaged 
at this stage, with the bias again against the unskilled and un-
organised. Even more than in the case of the ICA there was the serious 
problem of victimisation. Even where forbidden by the law, it was 
unlikely to be detected ( cept by the workers), or to secure conviction. 
The first Cape prosecution for this offence only occurred in 1939,4 
when an employer was prosecuted for dismissing three labourers without 
5 reasonable cause. In another interesting case an employer, a Mr Bolon, 
was convicted by a magistrate of dismissing a worker who had given 
1. RACE RELATIONS JOURNAL, VII (I), 1940, page 4. 
2. Christopher Hird, YOUR EMPLOYERS PROFITS, 1975, provides a useful 
explanation of just how some of this camouflage is effected, and how 
one can begin to decipher it • 
• 3 . F.A.W. Lucas, the first chairman, was an advocate. The second board 
consisted of Botha, a professor of economics, Windsor, a magistrate, 
and McGregor, the chairman, who was an official of the Department. 
4. The CAPE TIMES claimed that this was the first Cape prosecution. 
The case immediately following in this thesis seems to suggest that 
it could not have been the FIRST prosecution. The fact that the TIMES 
was mistaken, however, does suggest that there must have been very few 
before this date. 
5. CAPE TIMES, 17 February 1939. 
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information to an officer of the public service, and thus victimising 
him. On appeal evidence was led that the officer was a certain S, 
who was employed by a competitor of Bolon•s, and who had been appointed 
in a temporary capacity and paid his salary indirectly. As such it 
was ruled that he was not an officer of the public service, and that 
l Bolon should thus be acquitted of victimisation. 
Concern over the reluctance of workers to present evidence in this 
climate prompted the board to resort to separate sittings for employers 
and workers, so that the former would not know who of the latter had 
taken part. However, this position applied only to the offical worker 
organisations, i.e. the registered trade unions. These organisations 
could put their ~ase privately, while 11unorganised labour, (the trade 
union representatives) declare, is still able to voice its opinion 
at the public. sittings of the Board. 112 This position was obviously 
very unsatisfactory for the unregistered, and provided the situation 
in which the aid of the SAIRR and like organisations could play a 
very significant role. 
In acknowledgement of the growing importance of women, particularly 
white women, in the labour force, changes were also made in this regard. 
Additional female me100ers · (often also from Race Relations or university 
economics departments) were appointed to the board in trades where 
women predominated in the work force. Hansi Pollak, for example, was 
appointed in the garment-making investigation in 1936, receiving a 
3 special welcome from the chairman. 
It was, however, not only -in the original drafting of recommendations 
that capital seemed to exert disproportionate influence. Before a 
reconmendation was gazetted as a determination, allowance was made in 
the Act for complaints and suggestions for improvements. Capital, with 
its qualified technical advisers gained here, and the final recommendation 
for the distributive trade in 1939, for example, was even lower than 
the original report of the board, despite the fact that the board had 
then stated that the industry was "well able" to stand an increase. 4 
1. Rex v Bolon, CAP 31 March 1933, in SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, 1933, 
pages 407-408. 
2. CAPE TIMES, 11 Septenber 1931 
3. CAPE TIMES, 7 May 1936. 
4. GUARDIAN, 28 July 1939. 
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In baking and co.nfectionary the non-civilised wage levels were in 
several cases reduced to meet the demands and complaints of small 
1 
capital. 
Once a determination was gazetted, there was still a final chance 
for capital to escape, by applying for exemption for the individual 
establishment on the grounds that the conditions of work of those 
particular workers were "substantially not less favourable to them 
2 than the conditions of employment prescribed by that determination." 
In 1943 riots erupted in the Marabastad location of Pretoria. The 
inhabitants were annoyed that the Municipality was applying for 
exemption from the unskilled WD on the basis that they were not able 
to afford such high wages. After fourteen Africans had been killed, 
a conmission was set up to investigate the cause of the riots, and it 
was revealed that the Municipality was in fact well able to pay. 
Madeley, then Minister of Labour, and thus the one who would have 
granted the exemption, gave evidence that before the commission he 
had fully believed the Municipality, and had been prepared to grant 
the exemption. 3 
Employers were more likely to receive government gazettes and to 
possess other legal and relevant knowledge than workers were. They 
had the time, money and education either to take advantage of the law's 
provisions themselves, or to hire others to act for them. The lengthy 
procedure involved in setting up WDs delayed the granting of worker 
demands and resulted in the eventual WD often being out of date by the 
time it became law. Only a few examples of the bias of the Act in 
operation are cited above. They serve to illustrate what undoubtedly 
occurred, on a smaller or larger scale, in a large nunber of similar 
cases. 
Enforcement of the Act 
Generally IC agreements were better observed thah WDs, the determination 
covering more and smaller employers, with the latter often not being 
1. Davies, 1977, page 198. 
2. Section 19 (1) (a) of Act 27 of 1925. 
3. GUARDIAN, 7 and 14 January 1943. 
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1 
members of an employer organisation. The latter organisation's 
"outlook'' had a "marked influence on their attitudes towards wage 
control, rr 2 due chiefly to the preponderance of larger capital, who 
recognised that the various measures operated in their interests and 
against those of smaller capital, enhancing their competitive position. 
Among the smaller and less organised capitals of the WDs, self interest 
and moral suasion by fellow EO members did not exert such an influence, 
and the wage board thus, to some extent, became the "tribunal of 
appeal for those delinquents who can not be reached or thwarted in 
3 any other way. 11 
The Act provided for inspectors and officers who were to police the 
determinations, these inspectors being salaried members of the public 
service, and having powers of entry without previous notice to any 
4 establishment, entitled to question and examine workers and employers. 
The Department maintained, however, that it was not its duty solely 
to secure enforcemert: of determiflat:ions, but that the trade unions should 
cooperate in securing observance. The wage inspectors doubled as 
inspectors for the Board of Trade and Industries, 5and.·also had duties 
6 to perform under the Workmens Compensation Act. During the first full 
year of the war, with reduction in staff in the Department, and the 
imposition of other increased duties, inspections fell by 10 881 in 
l. Nothing prevents workers or employers, if otherwise qualified, from 
forming EOs, or TUs, even if these do not then form an IC. In most Wage 
Act trades there were, in fact, such organisations, although they did 
not necessarily cover ALL the workers or employers. The table of IC 
EO and TU membership below shows the latter always to be significantly 
higher than the former. This does not, however, negate the previous 
remarks about IC pressure. (1) IC organisations were formed by the orga-
nisations themselves. (2) The IC itself exerted an influence. (3) Not 
all the employers concerned necessarily belonged to the EO, while with 
most ICs, closed shop agreements of some sort existed. (See Erica Emdon, 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLOSED SHOP, 1978, Chapter II). 
Year IC workers TU members 
1932 17 946 76 943 
1940 91 897 233 780 
1945 148 581 346 509 









2. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 35-1937, pages 121-22. 
3. CFUJ Organ, Noveni>er 1938. 
4. Act 27 of 1925, Section 11. 
5. CAPE TIMES, 28 October 1933: Ivan Walker, Dept Labour, to SATLC. 
6. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1937, page 63. 
-133-
1 comparison with the previous year. Weinberg noted that "until his 
organisation took a hand in matters there had been no prosecutions 
of unscrupulous employers in the clothing trade. But during the last 
2 six months (after he took act ion), four employers had been prosecuted." 
Even where the Department did take action, their policy was to secure 
compliance without recourse to legal action wherever possible, a 
policy criticised even by the state's own commission as being too 
easy on offenders. They noted that this policy meant that 11the 
careless employer who does not take the trouble to ensure that he is 
within the law will not be inclined to act as he doesnlw in the firm 
belief that he will not be proceeded against so long as he makes the 
necessary adjustments when an inspection reveals that he out (sic) of 
3 compliance with the law. 11 Where recourse was eventually had to the 
courts, weeks or months would elapse before the case was heard. Jn 
appearance in court the boss would be defended by his "clever legal 
representative" while the 11 poor illiterate workers is battered about 
4 
in the witness box. 11 By dint of clever argument the employer would 
often get off on technical point while in terms of the spirit of the 
law he was guilty, as illustrated by the few cases which follow. 
If it could not be proved that an employer knew a worker did more 
qualified work than that for which he was pai.d, the employer could not 
5 
be found guilty of underpayment. In another case it was held that, 
whereas it was an offence not to keep a record of wages, this was not 
6 so in the case of advances on wages. In yet another case, the first 
private prosecution under this Act in the Cape, the secretary of Messrs 
J.w. Jagger & Co (Pty) Ltd was charged with two contraventions of the 
WD for the toIID11ercial distributive trade after the Attorney General 
had declined to prosecute. The case was lost in the courts. The 
magistrate, Mr Corder, found that the wrong person had been brought to 
court, in that in the summons the prosecution had failed to state that 
the secretary was the "representative" of the company. Corder went on 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1940, page 26. 
2. CAPE TIMES, 15 April 1936. 
3. Industrial Legislation Commission, tx:; 35-1937. 
4. CFLU, METHODS MOST FOUL, (?1934), page 5. 
5. Rex v Falkson, TPD, 16 November 1931, in SALJ, XLIX, 1923, page 293. 
6. Rex v Fabian, CPD, 31 March 1937, in SALJ, LII, 1937, page 30. 
-134-
to admit that the law did not make it clear how a company should in 
1 fact be sU111llonsed to court in such a case. One of the most outrageous 
findings, perhaps, was that in Rex v Sharp. In this case the employer 
had underpaid his African workers, been convicted and ordered to pay 
the underpaid amount into court. This amount was then paid back to 
the workers by the court, whereupon the employer ordered them to pay 
it back to him or be sacked. The court ruled that this latter action 
by the employer was not extortion, and therefore not illegal, as 
there was no "illegitimate pressure" applied. The employer was 
merely "bargaining with them in regard to terms of employment in the 
future. 112 • 
Although these individual cases are interesting and informative as 
to how many individual workers could be deprived of what were, to all 
intents and purposes, their rights under the Act, rulings became even 
more important when whole determinations became invalidated through 
some nice legal point raised in an individual court case. Of the 
fifty-four determinations made up to 31 March 1935, no fewer than 
thirteen had been declared invalid by the courts. 3 Two of these 
invalidations were so far-reaching that they invalidated several, if 
not all, the WDs then in existence and necessiated the passing of 
the Wage Determinations Validation Acts of 1930 and 1935. 4 
The first instance arose out of a series of cases in which the status 
of the SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW was in question. This review 
was a forerunner to the Department of Labour's Annual Reports, and was 
published monthly by the Department, on the same day of each month. 
It was in these publications that the first recommendations of the wage 
board were published for public scrutiny. The courts ruled in several 
cases that (a) it was doubtful whether the SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW 
was a newspaper, and that this doubt applied specially in the case of 
special editions in which the wage recommendations were often published, 
and (b) that as no specific date, but only the month, was printed on 
the periodical, it could not be determined if the full thirty days 
necessary for complaints had elapsed before the reconmendation became 
1. CAPE TIMES, 6 April 1939, and 8 June 1939. 
2. Rex v Sharp, TPD, 1936 in INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOUTH AFRICA, 
April 1937. 
J. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG35-1937, pages 110-11. 
4. Act 21 of 1930 and Act 16 of 1935. 
-135-
1 a lawful determination. The Validation Act cleared up the confusion 
by official 1 conferring the status of 11newspaper" on the REVIEW, and 
at a later date the recommendations were published in the government 
gazette rather than in a newspaper. 
The second instance concerned the question of the setting of piece-, 
as opposed to time-rates. In the most pertinent of these cases the 
Chief Justice ruled in the Appellate Division that bhe piece-work 
provisions of WD No 42 were ultra vires. 11Th·e Chief Justice said that 
such an absurd result could never have been contemplated by the Wage 
Act as 1the remuneration which a piece worker received he receives 
for his work upon so many pieces or things, irrespective of the time 
he takes to do the work.' The remuneration which a wage-earner gets 
is money paid to him for the time he works. You cannot compare one 
with the other. There is no conunon denominator. In one case the 
measure is •things', in the other 'time•!12 The invalidation of this 
rate was then held to be so material to the WD as a whole that the 
latter itself was invalidated, and affected in the same way the deter-
minations for clothing, bespoke tailoring, hairdressing, textiles, 
sweet making, furniture, tea, coffee and chicory packing, Bloemfontein 
unskilled work, laundry, cleaning and dyeing, Durban bakery, glass 
bevelling and silver, and the Witwatersrand and Hefdelberg Native 
trades.3 The Wage Validation Act No 16 of 1935 was then necessary to 
allow the fixing of minimum remuneration for piece work, and to validate 
the necessary WDs already possessing such clauses. 
Although these were the only two validation acts passed, the problem 
of whether a technicality rendered a whole determination invalid or 
not, was also an important one, determining whether it was just the 
individual who escaped, or whether the board and the workers were put 
to more trouble and time in securing a completely new determination. 
l. Portuese v Rex, CPD, 11 March 1929, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, 
Novenber 1979, page 1038; C. Strieter v Rex, TPD, 10 Septemer . 1928; 
ibid., December 1929; Daya Morar v Rex, 14 June 1923, ibid., August 
1929, · page 745. In HANSARD it was claimed that the Supreme Court had 
twice rule that it was a newspaper, in June and J~ly 1929, while the 
previous week the Appeal Court had ruled that it was not. (col.2333,1930) 
These dates conflict with the cases mentioned above. 
2. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOUTH AFRICA, June 1934. 
which is very similar is Repanis v Rex, OFSPD, 26 August 
SA~J, November 1929, page 1040. 




The Barone brothers, bakers in Pretoria, were also involved in a 
court case in this regard. They had been charged under seven counts, 
five relating to wages, and found guilty by the magistrate. On 
appeal they contended that the final WD differed from that first 
published by the Minister as a recommendation, with regard to the area 
of applicability, and that for this reason the whole WD was ultra vires. 
This contention was upheld by the court, the judge stating that he did 
11not think it can be said that •••• (they are) setting aside the 
determination on a trivial or unimportant point. 11 This one judgment 
1 
rendered the sweet, clothing and baking determinations invalid. 
Employers, were however, not the only ones who could be taken to court 
for breaking the law. Section 8 of Act 27 of 1925 laid down that 
both parties who agreed to a contract, express or implied, paying less 
than the rate laid down by a WO, were guilty of an offence and liable 
to a £100 fine, while the contract was regarded as null and void in law. 
This was serious not only in that workers were convicted, but in its 
other effects as well. Firstly, a realisation of this fact discouraged 
many workers from reporting to the Department, this reporting being 
one of the more efficient means by which transgression were detected. 
Secontly, such contracts, despite the fact that 1'economic stress had 
forced" the workers to enter the contract or that they had done 
so through ignorance of their legal rights2, usually disqualified 
their title to recovery of the amount underpaid. In terms of the 1925 
Act the court could order how much the employer should repay to the 
3 4 5 worker. In terms of the 193~ amendment and the 1937 Act , the 
employer had to pay the full amount to the court, but the latter would 
decide how much was to go to the worker. In cases where he had entered 
the contract, they would be unlikely to award much, if anything. In 
all these cases "the only chance of an employee who had agreed to 
work for a smaller wage than the minimum determined by law, to get 
more than the amount contracted for, was to lay a complaint and to get 
the state to prosecute and show that he had an equitable right to get 
1 • . Francesco Barone and Felice Barone v Rex, TPD, 25 April 1927 in 
SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, 111, page 607. 
2. Industrial Legislation Conmission, UG37-1935, page 132. 
J. Section 8 of Act 27 of 1925. 
4. Section 7 of Act 23 of 1930. 
5 • Section 21 of Act 44 of 1937. 
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1 
a greater reward for his labour than he had contracted for." Even 
when a civil case was within the melll s of the worker, this was not of 
much use. Civil proceedings could only be resorted to if the state 
refused to press charges, or if the amount repaid was not the full 
difference between the legal minimum and the amount actually paid. 2 
If the worker had entered into the contract, as the contract was 
null and void, the court would be unlikely to uphold his claim. 
Repayment was also forfeited, even where the worker was not guilty, 
in those cases where the employer, "having traded in a state of 
3 insolvency", declared himself bankrupt. With small proprietors 
the main culprits, this was not beyond the bounds of possibility! 
V 
Conclusion 
It cannot be denied that individual members of the wage board saw 
their function as raising the living standards and general conditions 
of the workers, and helping to create a more just South Africa. Lucas, 
the first chairman of the board, had a view of change in South Africa 
which would: 
"not involve violent revolutionary act ion •••• is not 
communism or Nazism or any form of totalitarianism 
•••• will take the monopoly our of'capitalism' and 
make it harmless (and) •••••• end exploitation ••••• 
It will in fact give us a far greater degree of 
individual liberty and scope for individual 
initiative and enterprise than we have under our 
present laws •••• " 
The system would operate on a principle of Roman Dutch law, from which 
"we have departed very far", i.e. that "no-one should be enriched at 
the expense of another person." 4 
Individual motives were not paramount, however. The law was designed 
for specific ends and would in the long run fulfil these, regardless 
of the individual .functionaries and their aims or ideals. To some 
extent this was because these very aims and ideals were formed within 
1. CAPE TIMES, 31 March 1934. 
2. Act 44 of 1937, Section 23. 
3. CFUJ, METHODS MOST FOUL, (?1934), page 5. 
4. SOt.rrH AFRICA AS SHE MIGHT BE, 1945, Foreword. 
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the situation that was South Africa between 1924 and 1945 (e.g. Lucas' 
consideration of who filled certain jobs in setting wages, mentioned 
above). For the rest, the strength of the system managed to subvert 
an individual's aims. For Lucas, the decisive defeat came in 1936, 
when he was "resigned" from the board. Mr Fourie, of the Department 
of Lab'our, announced that Lucas would not accept re-appointment. 
Lucas claimed that 11 the first intimation that (he) had that the 
Government did not wish (him) to continue as chairman of the Wage 
Board was Mr Fourie•s letter of April 23, 1935, telling (him) that 
1 (he) was not to be reappointed. 11 A reference to the forced resig-
nation in Andrews2 claims that Lucas had managed to "slightly improve 
conditions in a nuooer of small, poorly paid industries", but that 
after his resignation "it became simply a government machine to keep 
wages at the lowest possible level." This supports the suspicion that 
a conflict between Lucas' ideals and the aims of the new government, 
with its more blatant anti-labour bias, were at least partly responsible 
for his dismissal. 3 
Overall, it does not appear that the wage board served to raise wages 
or better conditions substantially. Minimum wages were usually set 
4 below average wages. While this did mean an increase for the lowest 
paid in some cases, it was a minimal one - one which followed,rather 
than created, a trend, and served chiefly to advantage labour only in 
so far as it favoured the better paying and more efficient larger 
capital. By 1940 "evidence is accumulating that in general the 
wages of unskilled workers, and often of the semi-skilled also are 
5 insufficient for the maintenance of a healthy existence. 11 
Within the labour force the Act did, however, have other effects. It 
was made quite explicit that the Act was intended to benefit white 
workers and prevent "unfair" competition by black workers. This 
1. CAPE TIMES, 28 May 1936. 
2. W.H. Andrews, CLASS STRUGGLES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1941, page 38. 
3. I have been told by other researchers that it appears that Lucas 
had also started, or attempted to start, a political party of some sort 
among workers. At a later date it appears that Steenkamp, also a 
chairman of the board, suffered the same sort of dismissal for similarly 
unacceptable pro-worker sentiments. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 56. 
5. Dept Labour Annual. Report, 1940, page 31. 
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function persisted, as shown above, even when the Act began to be 
applied to increasing nurrbers of black workers. Together with this 
change also went an increasing tendency towards stratification and 
differentiation within the determinations, and thus within the labour 
force. Both these facts tended to make the Act .yet another factor 
in the increasing division, and thus weakening, of the labour movement. 
The Wage Act thus served as an adjunct of the ICA, for those workers 
who, being less skilled and less well organised, did not take advantage 
of the latter, and for the increasing nunber of workers in the rapidly 
developing machine-based industry. The Act controlled their conditions, 
and thus imposed some degree of control upon capital, but, more 
importantly, it protected capital by dividing the workforce, channelling 
their demands along controlled, official paths, and thus keeping 
the demands within acceptable limits. 
• 
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CHAPTER FIVE THE FACTORIES ACT 
11Factory legislation, that first conscious and methodical 
reaction of society against the spontaneously developed 
form of the progress of production is ••••• just as much 
the necessary product of modern industry as cotton yarn, 
self-actors, and the electrical telegraph. 111 
In 1918 the first Factories Act was passed in South Africa, and in 
1931 this was amended by Act 26 of that year. In 1941 this first 
hasic statute was replaced by a longer, and more far-reaching, piece 
2 of legislation, the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act of 1941. 
The two acts provided for the "regulation and control of factories, 
regulation of hours and conditions of work in factories, supervision 
of the use of machinery, and for precautions against accidents to 
1 d 113 Thi h h persons emp oye ••• s c apter attempts to set out t e reasons 
for the passing of the two acts, and to assess their effectiveness 
in terms of the aims, hopes and needs of the different groups affected. 
Possible reasons for changes and developments in the legislation be-
tween 1918 and 1941 will also be put forward. 
Section I of the chapter will discuss the forces necessitating the 
passing of such legislation and control; why such legislation was, 
in fac the "necessary product of modern industry"' as well as 
additional reasons for such legislation in the specifically South 
African context. The following sections, II to VI, will examine 
the various aspects of the measures - hours of work, "welfare11 , 
restrictions on the employment of women and children, colour discrimi-
nation, and accident prevention. In the light of the general remarks 
of Section I, the reasons for such provisions will be discussed, and 
the effect of the restrictions on employment practices and production 
in general. Section VII will concentrate on the manner and extent to 
which enforcement of the Act was effected. This will be related back 
to the forces supporting legislation and the aims of the state in 
promulgating it. The penultimate section, Section VIII will examine 
1. Karl Marx, CAPITAL, Vol. 1, 1974, page 451. 
2. No 9 of 1918, No 26 of 1931, No 22 of 1941. 
J. Preani>le to Act 22 of 1941. 
4. Marx, 1974, page 451 • 
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those areas excluded from the Act, in the belief that the reasons 
for these exclusions and the alternative provisions applicable throw 
some light on the Factories Act itself. Finally, the conclusion will 
examine the effectiveness of the Act in terms of its overall aims 
and objectives, in the light of the different areas discussed pre-
viously. 
I 
Reasons for the Passing of the Act 
"Apart from the working class movement that daily grew 
more threatening, the limiting of factory labour was 
dictated by the same necessity which spread guano over 
the English fields. The same blind eagerness for plun-
der that in the one case exhausted the soil, had,in 
the other, tfrn up by the roots the living force of 
the nation. 11 
The conditions necessitating control in the form of a Factories Act 
can be directly related to the form of capitalist production. Under 
this system profit is the motor force of production, and the size of 
this profit is directly related to the amount of surplus value ex-
tracted from the workers. The employer pays to the workers the value 
of their labour power in the form of a wage. Any value produced by the 
~orker above this value is appropriated by the capitalist, and through 
several mediations, becomes his profit. 
This form of production encourages the employer to extract the maxi-
mum amount of labour out of his workers in any given period, in that 
he can in this way appropriate more sur-plus value in proportion to 
the wage, the paid labour. The maximisation entails - besides the 
more obvious means of cutting wages - an increase in the working day, 
decrease in holidays and work pauses, as well as a minimisation of 
all non-labour expenditure which does not contribute to a direct and 
immediate increase in production - safety equipment, welfare and 
provision for the health and comfort of the workers. Overwork, 
accidents and bad conditions might incapacitate a .worker, but this 
does not usually constitute a problem for the individual capitalist. 
As long as the labour supply is a large one, and the individual 
1. ibid., page 229. 
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employets demand, especially in the early days of small-scale manu-
facture, merely a tiny proportion of the total demand, workers can 
be easily replaced. There is thus nothing to prompt an employer 
motivated solely by self-interest to improve the conditions for his 
workers. From the individual viewpoint such improvements would seem 
pure charity, and against the logic of production and profit-making. 
However, while this attitude might be logical for the individual 
capitalist, it is counterproductive for social capital, the capitalist 
class considered as a whole and as represented by the state. Social 
capital, while striving as individuals to increase profit, has to 
ensure that the working class continues to reproduce itself in order 
that it may produce tomorrow. For social capital the labour supply 
is limited in that it is not possible for all to steal each others' 
workers, and in that the reserve army, especially the skilled one, is 
itself limited. Steps have to be taken to curb the worst excesses 
of the system and to protect the workers' health and productive 
capabilities in order that not only the individual capitalist, but 
social capital as a whole, will continue to be able to obtain the 
labour power necessary for its functioning. 
While it was the state, in its role of representative of social capital, 
which undertook this task of regulation of conditions, individual 
capitalists were not unaware of the necessity for such regulation. 
Bigger capital, aware of the needs for controlled exploitation, due to 
their own larger needs in terms of labour, imposed conditions on 
itself, even in the absence of state intervention. In many cases this 
developed into a form of joint capital-state control (in some cases with 
the cooperation of labour) in the form of ICs and WDs. In these ways 
control of the more developed industries and sectors was developed. 
There remained, however, large areas which did not fall within these 
controlled sectors, and which did not feel the need to control them-
selves. Here some sort of general regulation became important, to 
obviate unfair competition by the smaller competitors against the 
bigger capitals, by the smaller capitals' not incurring extra expendi-
tures and thus being able to offer their goods at lower prices, and -
in the interests of industrial peace - to avoid excessive exploitation 
~l~~-
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The remarks above apply equally well to all capitalist societies, but 
the timing and ultimate form of factory legislation obviously depend 
on the specific conditions of each particular country. In the United 
Kingdom the first factory legislation was passed in the mid-nineteenth 
century. In South Africa it was only in the early twentieth century 
that industry and labour organisation had expanded and developed 
sufficiently to warrant such legislation. 
An early report of the Inspectorate of Factories in South Africa 
reports that: 
"In the early days, manufacturers have been intent on 
producing goods and disposing of them without paying 
very much attention to the conditions under which 
they were produced. This attitude of mind was en-
couraged perhaps by the fact that the class of labour 
employed chiefly was accustomed to live under primi-
tive conditions ••• nor did any change give an imme-
diate advantage to the employer by increasing output 
or efficiency. The result was that employers generally 
treated with scepticism any attempt by inspectors to 
introduce improvements. 11 1 
Already by 1907, however, the bigger and more organised capitals had 
begun to have a wider perspective. In that year the Manufacturers 
Association, "the pioneer mouthpiece of South African Industrialism", 2 
prepared a draft factories bill to regulate the hours of labour and 
3 
conditions of service of workers in factories. This bill did not, 
however, become law. By 1918 Mr H. Warrington Smyth, Secretary for 
Mines and Industries, "found consistent support for the (Factories ) 
Act from all Manufacturers Associations in the country. He found that 
employers of the better class were aware that standard legislation of 
this kind constituted a base for competitors who had less high ideas 
as to how to treat their employees. An Act of this kind protected 
4 the better class of employers. 11 
Factory legislati~n, as other industrial legislation, however, to the 
extent that it did benefit workers, conferred differential benefits 
on the different groups. Black, and particularly African workers, were 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1927, page 14. 
2. SOUTH AFRICAN COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURERS RECORD,August 1918, page 361. 
3. ibid., April 1918, page 146 
4. ibid., September 1918, page 420. 
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available in abundance. The multiplicity of laws affecting them 
ensured that in their case the reserve army of labour was virtually 
unlimited. Legislation was passed to limit the urban supply of black 
labour, rather than to augment it (for example, the Urban Areas Act). 
In terms of pure "economic" logic, capital should have provided 
protection only for white skilled labour, where scarcity was a very 
real problem. Political and practical problems, however, necessitated 
that Act's taking the "colour blind" form it did. All white workers, 
skilled and unskilled, were seen as part of a potential supportative 
class for capital and the stat9, and this feeling was particularly 
strong after the Great War, in which white labour had pledged their 
full support to the state. It was among whites too, that worker 
organisation had taken root, and the increased unrest of the latter 
half of the second decade of the century meant that this, too,was 
an important factor favouring concessions. While it will be argued 
below that it was this white group which the legislation was intended 
to cover, the "colour blind" form of the legislation was, in fact, the 
way in which this was effected. The most organised and skilled of the 
whites were generally covered by ICs or WDs, The Inspectorate reported 
that the "mixture of Races" and "application of the (Factories) Act 
to Native races generally engaged on a monthly basis with practically 
1 no limitation of hours", presented difficulties. It was, however, 
only in this way that the unskilled whites could be protected from 
competition by the "more exploitable" African workers. 
Factory legislation, while improving the conditions of work for those 
in factories, was not passed with this as the sole, or even chief, aim. 
The regulation and control contained in the Act were imposed rather 
in the interests of capital. In order to survive capitalism had to 
ensure the continued existence of a healthy, efficient, and relatively 
peaceful workforce. In order to protect those individual capitali~t 
who took cognisance of this overall need of capital in their establish-
ments, the state, as the representative of the social capital, had . 
to ensure that all were subject to the same restraints. Examination 
of the different aspects of the Act below provide evidence of the way 
in which the regulations, even while restricting capital, did not 
fundamentally a~fect its functioning and profitability. 
1. Dept Mines and Industries, Annual Report, 1919, page 3. 
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The discussion below will thus attempt to show how the Factories Act 
contributed in these two conflicts of interest - that between capital 
and labour, and that between white and black labour. Additional areas 
of interest will be other divisions within the work force - e.g. sex 
and age - and how these were affected by the legislation. 
II 
Regulation of Hours of Work 
Employers were eager to lengthen the working day to the furthest limit. 
In this way they could increase the value produced by the workers 
and thus the surplus value appropriated by themselves. There were, 
however, two limits to this relentless search. Firstly, lengthening 
the working day would not necessarily increase the amount of goods 
produced, even for the individual capitalist, in that the average 
production per hour might decrease under stress. Men have limited 
capacities and cannot and will not work beyond these limits. Driving 
them beyond endurance will induce a slowing down and deterioration 
in their work, and increase, not the value produced, but the hostility 
towards the employer. Secondly, overwork on a protracted basis would 
affect the supply of labour in the long run. Even if the effects of 
overwork were not fatal, the workforce might be so injured by over 
long hours that its strength and productive capcity would be impaired. 
Thus, in the interests of capital as a whole, and with a limited 
labour supply, the drive to produce, or to drive others to produce, 
had to be held within limits. 
The first Factories Act of 1918 instituted a 50 hour week. In 1931 
this was reduced to forty-eight hours, and in 1941 to forty-six. What 
is noteworthy about these restrictions is their paltry nature, and the 
fact that they lagged considerably behind actual conditions in the 
more organised industries, and behind worker demand in general. 
The Annual Department of Labour Reports repeatedly comment on the 
discrepancy between conditions under the Factories Act and those in 
individual industries under the . lCs or WDs. In the latter, though 
progress was slow, worker strength and the more developed organisation 
and solidarity of capital, often combined to ensure a shorter working 
day than that laid down by the Act. The highly organised printing 
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industry already had a 46-hour maximum week in 1920, and by 1945 this 
had been reduced to 44 hours. 1 Building had a 44-hour week from 
1920 through to 1944. 2 In these groups the case for such regulation 
was stronger. The workers, if more skilled and more militant, had 
the power necessary to support demands, as well as the power concomi-
tant with increased control over their work conditions connected with 
IC and TU organisation in general. The employers, usually organised 
in and employers organisation, realised that even within the limited 
industrial subdivisions, some of the con,traints of social capital 
were at work. Skilled workers in the industry formed a specialised 
labour supply which could not be easily supplemented and thus had to 
be protected. A lack of generality in conditions throughout the 
industry would allow .unfair competition by those who competed in the 
same product market. The forces favouring regulation were thus 
stronger and could result in shorter hours. 
Other facts also illustrate the paltry nature of the general conditions 
laid down in the Factories Act. In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles, 
ratified by the South African government, recommended a 48-hour week, 
but this was only implemented in South Africa in 1931. In relation 
to worker demands, the Act seemed to be retrogressive over the period, 
rather than progressive. Before the Labour Party achieved seats in 
the government, Madeley had demanded a 36-hour week. 3 In 1937 the 
CFLU demanded a 40-hour week. 4 When the Factories Bill was debated 
in parliament in 1941 several MPs received telegrams from the (Transvaal) 
5 Garment Workers Union demanding a 44-hour week, and "there was talk 
here and there of a 40 hour week. 116 
By this latter date Madeley was Minister of Labour, but he could not, 
and indeed did not, advocate the imposition of his earlier demands. 
Before accepting his ministerial post, Madeley had been warned that "if 
he took a seat on the cabinet he would find that these Imperialists 
1. UNIOO STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page G-27. 
2. ibid., page G-29. 
3. Nationalist Party taunts, HAD cols. 3955-3960, 1941. 
4. CFW OOGAN, April 1937. 
5. HAD, col. 4010, 1941. 
6. TRADE UNION BULLETIN, WESTERN PROVINCE AND DISTRICT COUNCIL, 
Septeni>er 1941. 
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and these capitalists would prevent him fron doing •••• on behalf of 
l 
the workers of South Africa what he would like to do for them. 11 
In 1941 South Africa was in a war situation and the economy was feeling 
the effects of this. The ordinary supply of labour was depleted due 
to recruitment. Demand for internal production had increased as a 
result of diminished imports. Industry was straining to increase 
production with decreased inputs. Organised capital was thus not 
prepared to accede to workers I demands. 11Almost to a man they feel 
that in these times when .the utmost industrial effort is required 
there should be no question or reducing working hours •••• The problem 
is not a mere problem of wages, it is a problem of maximum output 
from the minimum labour force. It is a problem of maximum hours, not 
of minimum wage and maximum profits."2 Despite the fact that Madeley 
headed the Department of Labour, and despite earlier worker demands, 
the new Factories Bill only legislated for a 46-hour week, and set 
the overtime rate at one and a quarter times the hourly rate, rather 
than the one and a third times demanded. 3 The Bill was nevertheless 
4 accepted by the official workers organisations. 
Even this paltry provision was not effectively instituted. Throughout 
the war years the Department of Labour reports show increased contra-
5 vention of the Factories Act provisions in regard to working hours. 
In a time of crisis for the state and the economy, the emphasis 
appears to have shifted from long•term to short-term needs. The 
demand was for an immediate increase in labour, and, with a decreased 
absolute number of workers, this could only be achieved by increasing, 
or by not decreasing at the very least, the maximum nuni>er of hours 
worked. The changed composition of the workforce probably also 
militated against a substantial reduction of hours. Many skilled 
white workers were absent of active service. The remaining skilled 
workers were at a premium and had their hours regulated by emergency 
regulations rather than by the ordinary factory legislation.6 During 
the war the participation of blacks and women in the workforce increased 
1. HAD, Col. 4012, 1941. 
2. INDUSTRY AND TRADE, February 1941. 
3. GUARDIAN, 20 and 27 March, 1941; HAD, Col. 3960, 1941. 
4. ibid. 
5. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 49. 
6. See Chapter Seven. 
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markedly. These two groups were consistently less successful in gaining 
concessions from capital and the state in comparison with white male 
workers. Both the economic and political demands of the war, and 
the political and ideological demands of a changed labour force thus 
weakened the forces favouring a shorter working week during the 
latter years of the period. 
Regulation of hours was not, however, related simply to total nuuber 
of ordinary hours worked per day. Rest pauses and breaks also meant 
a break in production. The first Factories Act provided a lunch 
l 
break after five hours' continuous work. But this was found not 
always to be optimal in terms of production maximisation. "Just as 
the engineer studies the output of the 1Dachinery, endeavours to 
increase its productive, without injuring the lasting, powers, and 
endeavours to use it in the most e·conomical way, so the physiologist, 
regarding man as machine sui generis tries to increase his output 
without tiring him out and having regard to the greatest econ~my in 
working. 112 Surveys and experiments undertaken overseas showed the 
benefit of rest pauses in the middle of a shift. A report of the 
Medical Council of the Industrial Research Board of London indicated 
that the introduction of systematic rest pauses had "invariably 
resulted in a geniune impEOvement of output and tended in the case of 
light repetitive work not only to reduce monotony and so increase 
contentment of the workers, but also to produce an increase in the 
3 output of from 5 to 10%, despite diminution in the working time. 11 
Many workers had not eaten breakfast, or had eaten very inadequately, 
and had travelled long distances to get to work, and thus eaten 
hours before. The provision of regularised pauses would, it was 
hoped, cut down on unofficial pauses,and workers' eating and ablutions 
could be confined to a "non-productive" period. 
In South Africa between 1924 and 1945 there were forces at work both 
for and against such rest pauses. Increased mechanisation in the 
period would have increased the importance of production line work, 
and presumably increased the disruption and loss of production engendered 
1. Section 13 of Act 9 of 1918. 
2. Article quoted in the Department of Labour Annual Report, 1930, page 15. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 3 March 1924. 
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by one or more workers' being absent for a short period and having to 
stop the machines. Conservation of the energy and power of machinery 
also involved different calculations from that involved in the case 
of workers. The capitalist had bought the machinery itself, and was 
stuck with it unless he sold it. In the case of labour, however, the 
capitalist had only bought the P°"-'er of the workers for a certain 
period, and thus, as long as other labour was available in the next 
period, that particular labourer's strength did not have to be con-
served. In some factories,steps were thus taken to eliminate pauses 
rather than introduce new ones. The GUARDIAN reported in 1937 that 
"in one particular factory not very far from the centre 
of Cape Town ••• the lavatories are kept locked until 
10.30 a.m., one visit is allowed mornings and afternoons, 
and if a worker stays away longer than five minutes she 
is in trouble. Work continues until 6 p.m., but the 
lavatories are locked at 5 p.m. (Evidently the workers 
in this factory are supposed to have well organised 
interiorsl) Incidentally, the1 are not irresponsible young girls, but mature women." 
Another GUARDIAN of roughly the same period provides additional 
examples of several factories its reporters had come across where 
similar conditions prevailed. 2 
Capital's own journals publicised evidence of the benefits of regularised 
3 breaks, both in terms of increased output overall, and in terms of 
diminished unofficial pauses. But employers remained jealous of every 
minute for which they felt they had paid. In 1927 tea breaks were 
still often not granted unless there were female employees, and then 
4 only in the mornings. By 1936 UMI'ETELI could only hope that "before 
many years elapse the ten minutes rest with a cup of tea, will be 
5 the rule in all factories rather than the exception." By the end 
of the period the provision of rest pauses was still not a legal 
compulsion on the employers. 
1. GUARDIAN, 19 February 1937. 
2. GUARDIAN, 2 July 1937. 
3. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SCUfH AFRICA, Decenher 1938, is one 
example of this. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1927. 




The provisions with regard to hours ensu~ed that the workers would 
not be worked beyond endurance. The welfare provisions of the Act 
attempted to ensure that conditions in the factories were such that 
the health and comfort of the workers while at work were not unduly 
endangered. Provision was thus made in regard to the structure of 
factories, ventilation and sanitation. In regard to restriction 
of hours and overtime the regulation was framed in fairly definite 
terms, and the main opposition from capital came in the form of 
attempts to minimise the restrictions imposed. Many of the welfare 
provisions, on the other hand, were rather vague, and here it was 
the vagueness which constituted the weakness in regard to worker . 
protection, as well as providing difficulties in finding reliable 
and quantitative evidence on which to base research and evaluation 
of the Act. 
These regulations were in direct opposition to the generally accepted 
rules of law, which require the law to be 1'positive" and "certain11 , 
so as to allow one to know what is right and what wrong in the eyes 
of the law. In regard to sanitation, for example, the 1918 Act laid 
down that the factory should be in a "clean state", with no leakage 
from drains or privies, and that the latter should be "sufficient 11 
in nunber, with separate accouanodation for the sexes. The factory 
should also be ventilated "as much as possible", with adequate 
lighting and drinking water. 1 The annual reports throughout the 
period under consideration are a series of complaints with regard 
to the inadequacy of provision with regard to ventilation, lighting, 
structure and cloakrooms, and the difficultly of enforcement in view 
of the subjectivity of the measure of adequacy in this regard. 
In 1941, probably in part at least as an attempt to overcome these 
difficulties, the principle of regulation was introduced on a large 
scale into the Act. The Minister was empowered to make provisions 
on a wide range of subjects. Act 28 of 1918 had allowed for regulation 
2 on ni~e .matters. Clause 52 of the Act of 1941 allowed for regulation 
1. Sect ion 29 of Act 28 of 1918. 
2. S~tion 42. 
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on twenty-two matters, ranging from 
to 
"(a) the measures to be taken to secure cleanliness, 
. safety, and preservation of health, industrial sanitation, 
ventilation and lighting, in or about factories, and on 
premises where machinery is used, or building work or 
excavation work is performed; and the duties of occupiers 
of factories, users of machinery, builders, excavators, 
employers and employees in connection therewith11 
1'(v) generally, all matters which he considers it necessary 
.or expedient to prescribe in order that the purposes of 
this Act may be achieved. 11 
Section 54 of the Act conferred upon the Minister the additional power 
to exempt from most clauses of the Act employers or workers in any areas 
where, in his opinion, "special circumstances1' existed, and in so 
doing to use any method of differentiation or discrimination deemed 
advisable. 
The administrative trend in the legislation was not related solely to 
the difficulties of vague generalised legislation. Such regulation 
was a trend evident in much of the legislation of this later period, 
and corresponded with the needs of a more developed capitalist 
economy, in which production had to be controlled and regularised 
1 
to an even greater extent than before. For the workers, the increased 
bureaucratic administration meant that their control of conditions 
was diminished. Madeley himself, in 1918, had already objected to 
the wide powwers conferred upon the Minister and left to regulation. 
Increased regulation meant that it became more difficult to find out 
what regulations applied, as these were hidden in numerous separate 
government gazettes, and usually uncodified. In some cases, in 1978 
at least, it appears that workers are actually denied access to some 
2 of the documentation on rules and regulations. This ignorance meant 
that workers could not insist themselves on employers' observing the 
law, but had, rather, to rely on state officials. 
Worker influence on law-making was also diminished by the new form. 
"One person has been given arbitrary powers over the rest of the 
provisions of the Act ••• not answerable even (to) Parliament or 
1. See Chapter Tllo, Section 11, supra 
2. Taffy Adler,"The Prevention of Occupational Diseases and Industrial 
Accidents in South African lndustry11 , Paper 68, SALDRU-SAMST Conference, 
University of Cape Town, 1978. 
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1 
the Courts of law.11 It was difficult for labour to exert influence 
in parliament, but "there at least provision was made for procedural 
representation. ln the case of a Minister making regulations, there 
were no formal channels for demands. A memorandum submitted by 
several trade unions complained that "(o)n a careful examination of 
the Bill it will be clearly seen that · any privileges which many of 
the provisions of the Bill purport to give to the workers can be 
taken away arbit~arily at any time without reason or explanation by 
the Minister. 112 Legislation by regulation might have increased the 
specificity and coverage of the ·law, but in increasing its ineognos-
cibility, it decreased the workers• control over the conditions. 
Here again the Factories Act provided nothing near the protection 
afforded to workers under IC agreements, where workers had 
participated in drawing up the conditions, and had their own agents, 
who, if not able always to enforce regulations, could at least give 
them a general picture of how far and in what ways the law was being 
broken. Even WDs, while not drawn up by workers, made the conditions 
easily ascertainable and thus more easily a focus of labour organisation 
and demands. The Factories Act was a case of a general, state- imposed 
set of conditions calculated to avoid excesses and so to avoid the 
organisational and economic disadvantages which such excesses could cause. 
IV 
"(The purpose of the restrictions on employment of women) 
is to maintain intact the ability of the woman-workers so 
as to fulfil this function normally, and to help her to 
carry out the tasks resulting from maternity in succeding 
years, such as the care of her children, their education, 
etc. By strictly limiting the hours of work for women, 
by sparing them night work, which is so exhausting and 
trying, and by preventing their physical organs from 
being deformed by carrying too heavy weights or poisoned 
by dangerous substances, the legislator is really en-
deavouring to preserve the maternal function and to ensure 
the well-being of future generations. 113 
One of the aims of the Factories Acts was to ensure the reproduction 
of the labour force. Women and children thus required extra protection. 
Women were the producers of the future generations of workers, and 
1. CFLU <EGAN, Septeni>er 1941, page 10. 
2. Memorandum, March 1941. 
3. International Labour Organisation, 11 WOMENS'WORK UNDER LABOUR LAW11 , 
1932, page 18. 
, 
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children were themselves these workers of the future. Long hard 
hours for children in their formative years would have long-term 
deleterious and stunting effects and the harming of women's health 
might harm their reproductive abilities, and thus their offspring. 
Restrictions on juvenile employment served to protect future workers 
during the important developmental years. Restrictions on female 
employment served to uphold the sexual division of labour and sexism 
in general, while ensuring the continued reproduction and care of the 
future workers. Women had other roles to fulfil, besides that of 
wage-earner. Reproduction of the labour force entailed not only 
pregnancy and child-bearing, but also housework and care of the 
children. In addition to the strictly economic reasons for preserving 
women's and children's health, were the general ideological ones 
pertaining to woman's role in the family and society, and her 
weakness, and the specifically South African necessity, in the case 
of white women, of ensuring the propagation of a "civilised" white 
race. 
The Mines and Works Act of 1911 had placed restrictions on female and 
juvenile employment on the mines. No females, and no male children 
below the age of sixteen years, were permitted to work underground, 
and no child of less than sixteen years was allowed to work for more 
1 than eight hours a day or 48 hours a week. The Factories Act of 
1918 extended restrictions to factories. The Act prohibitied all 
children under fourteen years of age (fifteen years from 1941) from 
working in factories, while those between fourteen and sixteen were 
subjected to medical tests to ensure that they were fit enough to 
survive factory conditions. Juvenile workers had hours of work limited 
to 45 per week in 1931, with restricted overtime, while both juveniles 
and women were not to work without permission in the hours between 
6 p.m. and 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. and 7 a.m. respectively. Juveniles were 
also not to work in processes exceptionally deleterious to health, 
e.g. typesetting, metalgrinding, work with lead and mercury, etc. 2 All 
these were seen as necessary measures to prevent the long hours and 
contact with dangerous and unhealthy conditions which might have 
permanently endangered their health and fulfilment of roles as future 
producers and reproducers. 
1. Act 12 of 1911, Section 8. 
2. Act 28 of 1918, Section 20. 
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Concessions for women went further than those mentioned above. 
Maternity benefits were granted to certain women with a view to 
enabling them to carry on their reproductive functions at the same 
time as their productive function in the factories. Naude, Nationalist 
MP, noted in Parliament that "It is the poorer class who contributes 
. 1 most to the increase of the population. 11 In the 1924 to 1945 period 
it was primarily white women who were employed in industry. The 
protection of their reproductive functions was thus important not 
only for economic, but also for ideological and political reasons. 
The necessity of ensuring that women return to work meant that the 
benefits were very unsatisfactory, even after gains in 1938, won by 
a campaign by the Garment Workers Union and Chemical and Allied 
Workers Union, under the leadership of Ray Alexander. The system 
entailed support for women in the short period. before and after giving 
birth, when it was impossible for them to work but at the same time 
avoided giving too much, in order that the women might return to 
work as soon as possible. Workers pointed out, correctly, that those 
rich enough not to work would hardly subject their womenfolk to the 
rigours of the factory, but the granting of benefits remained 
dependent upon the passing of° a means test. Benefits could only 
be claimed if the husband's and wife's joint income was less than £5 
for Europeans, £3 for Africans, and £4 for other workers,per week. 2 
If the court deemed it advisable, the father of the child could be 
served with a court order forcing him to pay back to the state any 
amount of which he was judged able.3 
The amounts granted, which were for a four week period prior to 
delivery and eight weeks postnatally, remained paltry. The law provided 
for a maximum payment equivalent to the woman's weekly wage, but not 
4 exceeding 25s per week. In 1924 a total of £2 036 was granted to 
228 women5: and in 1939, under the new regulations, this had only 
increased to £4 962 in respect of 476 applicants. These figures give 
average amounts of £8,93 and £10,42 per women, or £0,74 and £0,87 per 
1. HAD, col. 4197, 1941. 
2. GUARDIAN, 22 July 1938. 
3. Section 23 of Act 22 of 1941. 
4. ibid. 
5. Dept Mines and Industries, and Dept Labour, Annual Reports, provide 
statistics as to the amounts awarded from year to year. 
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1 week based on a twelve week period. 
Women and juveniles usually receive lower wages than men for equivalent 
work, or else are restricted to work for which pay is traditionally 
lower. Tab le 5 .1 below gives the aver age monthly wages in 1924 for 
white males and females respectively. 
tABu: ·s~i 2 
COMPARATIVE AVER.AGE WAGES FOR MALE AND FEMALE - 1924 
·-
! ' I Sex Printing General Transport · ! Trade I Clerical a Domestic 
Manufacture Government 
Male 144s 2d 115s 3d 126s lld 132s 8d 143s 6d 102s 5d 
Femal~ 39s 9d 51s 2d 79s ld 53s 9d 64s 57 s lld 
In almost all cases the average female wage was less than half that 
of the male. Female labour was an important means of lowering the 
wage bill and thus increasing the rate of profit. This discrimination 
was, however, not imposed only by the employers. The figures for 
the printing industry, where the female wage was less than a third 
that of the males, is an indication that even where strong trade 
unions and !Cs existed, this did not prevent unequal conditions 
for male and female workers. The !CA and Wage Act, while prohibiting 
discrimination on colour lines, did not prohibit sexual discrimination 
and most agreements and determinations took advantage of such differentia-
tion. Although figures are not available for juvenile rates, one would 
expect much the same pattern to emerge in this regard, as again discrimi-
nation was not disallowed, and agreements and determinations usually 
carried separate juvenile and adult rates. 
Despite the restrictions on female and juvenile employment, these sources 
of labour thus remained such cheap ones that women and juvenils continued 
to be employed. As far as female employment was concerned, the entire 
period between 1924 and 1945 saw an increase in employment in both 
relative and absolute terms. Even in the Depression, white female 
employment was less adversely affected than white male employment. 
Between 1936 and 1946 female employment as a percentage of total white 
1. Own calculations. 
2. Union of South Africa, Offical Year Book, 1924, pages 230-32, 240. 
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1 female population increased from 19,4% to 22,7%. Meanwhile white 
female employment also increased as a percentage of the total work 
force, from 2,47% in 1936 to 3,03% in 1946, 2 and this increase was 
concentrated in industry, and in particular in the emerging machine-
based industries. In 1931 the employment of women was so important 
that it was felt necessary to extend the hours during which women over 
sixteen years of age could be employed, and hours were thus extended 
to 12 midnight. 3 During the war, when women took the place of many 
men absent on active service, further concessions and exemptions were 
4 granted. 
In the early thirties the number of juveniles in employment dropped. 
The Inspector of Labour put this decline down to the provisions of 
the 1931 amendment to the Act, the raising of thes schoolgoing age, 
the restrictions on employment, and the necessity of reaching sixteen 
years of age and having passed Std VI before being accepted for 
apprenticeship. Later in the thirties howe~er,the amount of certificates 
issued (to those between fourteen and sixteen years of age) increased 
from 197 in 19355 to 405 in 1940.6 (After this the 1941 Act laid down 
fifteen years as the minimum and thus did away with the need for 
certification). The employment of juveniles thus appeared to depend 
not only on restrictions, which did no~ in any way become less severe 
over the period, but also on the needs of the economy. The 1930 1 s 
boom increased the demand for labour, and the change in the production 
process would also have increased the openings to utilise unskilled 
child labour. 
The restrictions on hours and place of work in terms of female and 
juvenile employment, and the extra expenditure on such things as separate 
7 cloakrooms and eating rooms, all entailed an addition to the employers' 
costs. In the case of "civilised" juveniles, there were also the 
1. M.J.M. Prinsloo, BLANKE VROUE-ARBEID IN DIE UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA, 
1957, page 126. 
2. ibid. 
3. Section 4 of Act 26 of 1931. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Reports. (They were not actually published each 
year during the war). 
5. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1935, page 55. 
6. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1940, page 55. 
7. Section 29 of Act 9 of 1918 stated "Sufficient privy acconmodation 
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1 
problems of parents' "inter£ erence11 and 11unreasonab leness1'. Never-
theless, in many cases the advantages of the cheaper labour out-
weighed the added cost and trouble. It appears that the effect of 
the legislation, and probably the intention of the legislators, in the 
case of the Factories Acts, was not so much to improve the overall 
position of women and children in the workplace as to protect them 
from certain forms of exploitation which might adversely affect their 
fulfilling their roles in society, i.e. reproduction and future 
production. The Factories Acts did not lay down the principle of 
equal pay for equla work, a fundamental principle if inequality and 
unfair discrimination are to be abolished. For the most part women 
and juveniles did not do equal work to that of males. They were 
restricted to the semi-skilled work. Even within this category, 
however, they did not receive the same wages for equal work. Children, 
and particularly, women, were seen as ideally suited to the unskilled 
and semi-skilled requirements of machinofacutre. "In contrast with 
the manufacturing period, the division of labour is thenceforth 
based, wherever possible, on the employment of women, of children 
of all ages, and ,of unskilled labourers, in one word, on cheap 
labour ••• 112 Women and children also lacked the organisational history 
of male workers. 
V 
In the previous section the effects of the Factories Act on female 
and juvenile labour were noted. It was seen that the cheap nature of 
this labour meant that, despite the restrictions on hours and conditions 
of work, this labour continued to be employed and continued to be an 
important means of increasing the rate of exploitation and profit. In 
a non-racist capitalist situation (or a relatively non-racist one), 
women form one of the main sources of cheap la~our. In a situation 
where there was also colour discrimination, with black workers also 
providing an important alternative source of cheap labour, the pros 
shall ••• • be provided for all persons in the factory and where members 
of both sexes are employed not being members of the same family, the 
accommodation shall be entirely separate for each sex, and so as to 
ensure privacy. 11 
1. Dept Mines · and Industries, Annual Report, 1925, page 503. 
2. Karl Marx, 1974, page 434. 
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and cons of, especially white, female labour had to be carefully 
weighed up. The Van Reenen Commission reported that 
"The requirements of the Factories Act ••• were stated 
to exert an influence on the demand for women ••• The 
danger exists ••• that the adoption of the principle ••• 
(of equal pay for equal work) must result in an 
elimination process in which women, on account of the 
disabilities referred to above, are more likely to 
suffer than men. The supply of women in the remaining 
restricted spheres would thereby be increased with a 
resultant further depressing influence upon their 
wage levels ••• What has been stated above refrrs 
primarily to European male and female workers.-" 
In the 1924 to 1945 period female employment in industry was restricted 
primarily to whites. By 1945-1946 the white females constituted 7,77. 
of the total private employment, as opposed to only 0,77. for African 
women. 2 The extent of African male employment was also increasing 
over the period, however, the discrepancy between African and white 
wages being so great that in many cases African male labour was a 
viable and economic alternative to white female labour. In 1944/5, 
for example, the average male African wage (£91,0) in manufacturing 
3 was just over a quarter that of the average white male (£340,7). 
Prinsloo noted in 1957 that "die (blanke) vroue arbeid is geleideU:k 
maar sterk besig om die s@kondere nywerheid to ontruim vir die op-
4 komende groep van die arbeid van die nie-blanke rasse van die land, 11 
a process which had already presumably begun in the pre-1945 period; 
5 Writers such as Hirsch have, in case studies, suggested that in 
industries such as textiles, first African men, and then African women 
(the latter discriminated against on both colour and sex lines), replaced 
white women in the factories in the later period. How far and how 
early this was wholly or partially due to restrictions imposed by the 
Factories Act is a difficult question to answer, and one that will 
have to await further research. The provisions of the Factories Act 
did also discourage black employment to some extent, as seen below, and 
the countervailing effects of the two processes would have to be 
ex~mined in each case. 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 35-1937, page 24. 
2; Prinsloo, 1957, page 143. 
3. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 62-1951, Table 37. 
4. Prinsloo, 1957, page 120. 
5. Alan Hirsch, "Ducking and Weaving", Honours thesis, 1978. 
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The Colour Bias of the Act 
The 1918 Act did not, in general, contain overtly discriminatory 
measures. Nevertheless, as with all other labour legislation in South 
Africa, the operation of the Act affected black and white differentially. 
Even before the Factories Act provisions in this regard, it appears 
that segregation was enforced to some extent in many factories. The 
1918 Act did not specify that separate facilities had to be provided 
for the different "races", yet the 1928 Departmental Report noted that 
such facilities were indeed provided and had encouraged the employment 
of workers of a single colour, rather than the establishment of "multi-
1 raciaJ" factories. Duplication of facilities meant increased ex-
penditure, and would be avoided by the employer, who would prefer to 
stick to the employment of workers of one colour. The introduction 
of ICs and WDs further increased in the colour discrimination in industry 
as seen above, encouraging the employment of whites in all jobs, except 
the least skilled. 
Such segregation was not general, however. White and black continued 
to work together, and sometimes also to wash and eat together, a 
situation which was inconsistent with the general ideology, both in 
terms of the breaking down of the divisive colour and sex barriers, 
and in terms of the protection of white labour and women. With the 
increasing participation of blacks and white women in the economy in 
the late 19301 s, the extent of the danger appeared magnified. It 
was feared that black and white would not only work together, but also 
organise together, and the justifiability of this fear was borne out 
in the growth of the "new unionism", in which these two groups were 
2 prominent. 
3 The 1941 Bill was an attempt to introduce compulsory segregation by 
legislative means. Section 24(4) stated that "If in the opinion of 
an inspector, conditions exist in a factory which result in undesirable 
contact between persons of different races, or sexes, he may, subject 
1. Dept of Mines and Industries, Annual Report, 1928,page 7. 
2. Jon Lewis, "The New Unionism", SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR BULLETIN, 
111, .5 , March - April, 1977, pages 25-49. 
3. No AB 19 of 1941. 
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to the directbns of the Minister, by notice in writing setting forth 
the said conditions, require the occupier of the factory to take such 
steps (including any steps specified in the notice) as may be 
h 111 necessary to prevent sue contact ••• 
This clause of the Bill caused an uproar in the left trade union circles. 
These workers, often those involved in the 11new unionism" unions, were 
not standing for such measures at this stage. There were reports of 
official TLC and CFLU support for the Bill as a whole, 2 but many rank 
and file workers were not in favour of the "Nureuburg Laws" of the 
section. 3 Protest meetings were held in the Johannesburg City Hall 
and the Cape Town City Banqueting Hall, the former attended by 4 000 
4 people, and the latter by over 2 000. At the latter meeting, pre-
dominantly black, a resolution was passed urging the government to 
amend the Bill so that "it will emerge from the Senate free from any 
undemocratic provisions ·or any provisions which would seek to segregate 
or separate workers on the grounds of race or colour." A deputation 
of Sachs, Cohen, Snitcher, and several others referred to later in 
Parliament as "extreme communists115 , spoke to the Minister. In Par lia-
ment itself, Margaret Ballinger, the Native Representative, objected 
to what in effect amounted to a "colour bar bill. 116 
There was also support for the Bill, however, not confined to employers 
wishing to divide the workers along colour lines. The National Party, 
with its overt colour prejudice, was at that time in the ascendant. 
National Party leaders had captured several trade unions, and were 
particularly active in and concerned about trade unions such as the 
Garment Workers Union where there was evidence of increased black-
white cooperation. In Parliament the National Party lobby was a strong 
and vociferous one. 
In the face of the left agitation, Madeley retracted. He announced that 
1. Simons and Simons (CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1969, page 534) 
claim that Sachs, in "a purely technical capacity", drafted this clause. 
2. GUARDIAN, 20 and 27 March 1941. 
3. GUARDIAN, 13 May 1941. 
4. CAPE TIMES, 3 April 1941. 
5. HAD, col. 4017, 1941. 
6. SOUTH AFRICAN LEFT MONTHLY, 1941. 
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he had discovered (or been told, as his Afrikaans was not very good), 
that a large number of discrepancies existed in the Afrikaans version 
of the Bill. It would be easier to withdraw and redraft the whole 
thing, rather than to pass the 11101 different amendments" necessary 
to correct it. 1 To satisfy the right, he assured Parliament, however, 
that the new Bill would introduce no new principles. 
The new Bill did not include Clause 24 (4), but Madeley was true to 
his word. Section 45 (h) provided for regulation by the Minister of 
the "conditions of work of employees in any factory where in the 
opinion of the Minister special provisions ••• as to the conditions 
to be observed in order to prevent undesirable contact between 
employees." Madeley explained that "the objection to (the previous 
clause) was largely psychological, and I agreed that neither I nor 
anyone else has the right to upset the sensibilities of anyone, and 
so far as I was able to do I departed from the phraseology which 
gave the impression that such discriminations were to be made ••• and 
I provide for it under the regulations. 112 
Both left and right were still dissatisfied. An article in the GUARDIAN3, 
and a telegram sent by a group of "coloured" voters to their MP, 
and thence to the Prime Minister, attest to · the fact that the more 
left workers were not misled ; by the change in phraseology. Meanwhile 
the amendment came under fire in Parliament from National Party rnerrbers, 
who strongly objected - if partly for propaganda reasons - to the removal 
of the more explicit original clause. 
In the long run it was the segregationists who triumphed. At the time 
of the passing of the Act the National Party cited several instances 
of white women and African men working - and eating - side by side. 
Perhaps as a result of the general resistance of workers, and probably 
also due to employer resistance to increased costs in difficult times, 
the necessary regulations to separate them were not promulgated imme-
diately. Even where separate facilities were provided, workers did 
not always use them. In 1941 11 some difficulty is still experienced 
regarding European Females making use of non-European lavatories 
1. HAD, col. 3811, 1941. 
2. ibid. 
3. GUARDIAN. 6 March 1941. 
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and cloakrooms, although they have their own." 1 During the war years, 
with an acute shortage of labour and increased need of black labour, 
restriction was also not in the interests of capital and the state. 
Nevertheless, the regulation was not always necessary. As with other 
legislation, the regulation was a reflection of a general trend preva-
lent in industry, rather than a trend-setter in itself. Cases of 
integration were not all that common, and would be avoided by manage-
ment wherever economically feasible, even without regulation. Before 
the passing of the 1941 Act the Department noted "considerable. im-
2 provement in the proper segregation of races and sexes. " When the 
economy was less hard-pressed for labour than in the war situation, 
resistance to segregation would be less, at least from the franchised. 
Employers could obtain sufficient labour of one colour, and thus up-
hold the divisions in the workforce. White workers would have the 
threat of competition by the black workers redUced insofar as the costs 
of employing them were increased by extra expenditure on separate 
facilities. 
The provision of separate facilities was the one area in which the 
Act actually specified the existence of workers of different colours. 
Restrictions on hours and conditions of work in the Act applied 
equally to workers of all colours, as did restrictions on female and 
juvenile employment. In the latter case, it was the inclusions of 
blacks which acted against them. Fewer . restrictions might have en-
couraged employers to engage black workers rather than white, even 
where their wages had to be the same under WDs or ICs. Additional 
surplus value could have been extracted by forcing these workers to 
work extra long hours. Inclusion of blacks was thus important from 
white labour• s point of view in eliminating compd:ition. In regard 
to juvenile employment this generalised application was particularly 
important. By the time the Act was passed,education was compulsory 
up to the Std VI level for all white children, while very few black 
children attended school, especially up to this high level. Pro-
hibition of all juvenile employment prevented black children from 
being employed, and thus gaining the advantage of experience over 
white children still at school. Beyond the age of sixteen years, the 
white ~hildren would have the advantage of their education in finding 
l. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1940, page 51. 




The Factories Act, while theoretically protecting all workers in-
discriminately, thus once again acted in white labour's interest. 
Where separate (but equal?l) facilities had to be provided for workers 
of all colours, employment was likely to be restricted to one colour 
group - the white one - the one which could provide both the skilled 
and unskilled labour necessary. Where maximum hours and conditions 
were equal, "unfair compet it ion11 by .black workers was obviated. 
VI 
Accidents 
As can be seen from the preaoi>le to the Act above, another important 
area covered was accident prevention and rec<rding. As industry 
progressed and mechanisation advanced, the tendency was for more and 
more machinery to be employed in more and more factories. This machi-
nery greatly increased the productivity both of the individual worker 
and of the factory and country as a whole. The new machinery was, 
however, also larger and more powerful than the tools used earlier, 
and often brought with it the increased possibility of ever more 
serious accidents. <l>viously there would not be legislation to ban 
such machinery with its phenomenal productive potential. Rather there 
were attempts to instigate safety measures and to lessen the suffering 
of those injured. The latter aspect will be looked at under the 
Workmens Compensation Act in Chapter Seven. The former was covered 
by the Factories Act, as a matter "which vitally affected the con-
2 servation of human labour as well as economic output •11 
Employers were not against such regulation. Besides the cost of 
insurance, accidents also entailed indirect costs. Other workers 
had to be engaged and trained to replace those injured or killed, and 
these workers would not immediately be as efficient and productive 
as the older, experienced workers. When skilled workers were injured, 
the disruptive effects were often magnified, with many unskilled 
1. Dept Mines and Industries, Annual Report, 1919, page 6. 
2. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOUTH AFRICA, April 1933. 
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workers temporarily unable to continue production. The accident 
itself involved an immediate loss of valuable production time, as 
1 well as harming morale. The prevention, wherever possible, of 
accidents was thus a rational step for capital upto a certain point. 
Table 5.2 gives the figures for accidents between 1924 and 1945. 
rAi3u:·5.22 
ACCIDENTS REPORTED UNDER FACTORIES ACT - 1924-1945 
--.. 
Year Accidents Deaths Gross Output -Output Real O~f:p~ 
{£1 OOO•s) Accidents Accidents 
r ----- -
1924 256 26 57 304 224 184 
1925 254 28 63 766 251 213 
1926 339 40 67 219 198 166 
1927 318 30 75 642 237 206 
1928 378 28 80 648 213 192 
1929 376 26 78 425 209 213 
1930 407 52 
1931 335 31 
N OT AV A I LAB LE 
1932 319 31 67 332 210 236 
1933 334 29 82 448 247 255 
1934 391 46 95 373 244 269 
1935 574 47 108 412 189 199 
1936 624 62 126 036 202 208 
1937 720 63 134 142 186 186 
1938 683 73 140 587 206 210 
1939 879 75 161 671 184 170 
1940 969 66 189 849 196 165 
1945 2 796 84 334 554 120 78 
These figures do not tell nearly the whole story of injury suffered by 
workers in the production process. The Act required all accidents 
involving death or absence from work of any worker for more than 
fourteen days to be reported. The figures thus include only those more 
serious injuries, and also exclude the dangerous work on the mines, 
SAR & H, and in construction. Research overseas at this time indicated 
that 70% of total injuries did not involve more than ten days' 
disablement. This figure would probably have been aggravated in the 
South African situation, where workers often could not afford to stay 
off work for fourteen days, despite the seriousness of their injury, 
1. INDUSTRIAL SOUTH AFRICA, October, 1924. 
3. Departmental Annual Reports, and UNIOI'i STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, 
provided the basic data for this table. Real output ~as obtained from 
nominal output by correcting with the wholesale price index. All 




because of either the lack of, or inadequacy of, sick pay and leave. 
(The Factories Act did not at ,this stage provide for paid sick leave). 
With accelerated production over time, minor injuries - cuts, sprains, 
and hand injuries - would also increase, these being such that they 
too would not necessitate a fortnight's absence, and so not be included 
in the statistics. With improved medical knowledge, one can expect the 
percentage of reported accidents to have decreased over time, with 
new knowledge necessitating shorter absences. Calculating only on 
the 7Cflo figures, however, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOOTH AFRICA 
estimated in 1933 that 1'the total nunber of accidental disablements 
(in South Africa) would be not less than 1 000 in twelve months. 111 
(Compare with the 334 reported for that year). 
The statistics show a steady increase in accident occurrence and 
casualties, despite the fourteen days requirement and the improvement 
in medical care. This increase was, of course, due in part to the 
general increase in production over time, but it was also due to the 
increasing use of machinery. Accidents increased fairly steadily from 
256 in 1924 to 2 796 in 1945, while deaths increased from 26 to 84 in 
the same petiod. The figures for gross output of manufacturing, enable 
one to estimate the effect of increased mechanisation. Gross output 
also shows a f aii:.ly constant .. upward trend, besides the Depression 
years, from £57 304 000 to £334 554 000, The last two columns give 
the quotient of output . over accidents i.e. the output per accident, 
in both nominal and real terms. The latter fluctuates, but shows 
neither a marked upward nor downward trend. But at the same time the 
productivity of the individual wqrker was increasing, resulting in 
increased danger to the individual worker. While output 
per accident remained constant, the accident rate per individual 
worker was increasing. In 1925 0,2% of the total workforce was injured. 
In 1945 the figure was 0,8%.2 The percentages might appear to be 
a small proportion of the total workforce, but the increase was fourfold. 
Another interesting point emerges when one looks at the breakdown of 
the accidents according to the. industries in which they occurred. 
The _pattern which emerges gives the lie to the conunon view that accidents 
1. April, 1933. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Reports, UNION 
c::alculations. 
~TATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, own 
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are due to the ignorance or carelessness of unsophisticated workerss 
a view put forward by the Department of Labour, among others. While 
accidents certainly did occur through ignorance and lack of adequate 
training, instruction and supervision, and while the blame for this 
usually lay with inadequate provision of training facilities rather 
than with the worker, the machines had inherent dangers even for the 
trained and skilled. Indications of this are obtained by examining 
the breakdown of accidents along (a) industrial lines, (b) sex lines, 
and (c) colour lines. 
(a) In the 19201 s and early 19301 s the food factories accounted for 
1 the largest proportion of accidents in industry. In the 1940's it was 
the engineering trade that occupied this position. In the food 
industries, accidents decreased from 28% to 9% of the total accidents 
for private industry, while output and employment decreased relatively 
less, from 32% to 22%, and from 28% to 20% respectively. In metal, 
engineering, electrical and mechanical industry, total accidents 
increased from 12% of the total in 1926 to 42% in 1945, while the 
percentage contribution to output increased .in the same period from 
16, 7% to .. 27 ,6%, and employment from 18% to 27%. 2 The latter sector 
thus showed a more than proportionate increase in accidents. 
3 Hobsbawm identifies the electrical and engineering sector as one 
with a high percentage of labour aristocrats (predominantly skilled), and 
foor one with a low percentage in early twentieth century Britain, 
and it is probably that the situation in the period under discussion 
in South Africa would be similar. With the advance of industry, and 
with a higher percentage of skill. it appears that accidents did not 
tend to decrease - if anything they increased. 
b) Female workers were generally unskilled. Female-dominated industry 
had low accident rates. for example, a contribution of between 2% and 
4% to the overall statistics for the clothing industry. The Department 
of Labour noted the low accident rate among women in general in several 
of its annual reports. Once again the facts suggest that it was not 
lack of skill that caused accidents. 
1. Dept Labour Annual Reports, 1925 and 1931, provide statistics as 
to the breakdown •.. 
2. See full table at end of chapter. Calculations are my own. 
3. E.J. Hobsbawm, LABOURING MEN, 1964, page 28~. 
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c) TABLE 5.3 1 
BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF COLOUR 
Year White% of employment White "L. of accidents 
1925 36 35 
1934 42 46 
1945 31 31 
Table 5.3 shows the participation and accident rate of white workers 
in industry. Whites were predominantly skilled,while black workers 
were unskilled. - This table therefore also gives some indication of 
the skill-accident link discussed above. The fact that the part 1-. 
cipation and accident rates tally very closely suggest that accidents 
were not noticeably linked to skill level. If ignorance was, in fact, 
a cause of accidents, the dangers involved in the large and more 
complicated machinery outweighed the benefits for the skilled of 
knowledge. Thus, in 1939, 40% of all accidents were found to be 
due to "working machinery", and of the total accidents only 20% were 
due to the fault of the injured, while 68% were due to "misadventure 
2 or danger inherent in the work. 11 
With this correlation between technological advance and accidents, 
little could be done if quantity was to remain the main aim of production. 
Whereas with earlier accidents, those such as occurred in the· food 
industry could often be avoided by impr.oved hygiene and methods, in 
industries such as the electrical and engineering one the danger was 
more inherent in the work, and likely to remain so without expensive 
safety equipment, regulations, and research .. directed specifically in 
this direction. While accident prevention was in capital's interest, . 
where this became too expensive, and especially where the labour supply 
was not a serious limiting factor, a cost benefit analysis would at 
some ·point favour more accidents, rather than expensive safety 
equipment and research. 
~ I 
(The table at the end of the chapter~ gives a breakdown of percentages 
for the different industries for employment, output and accidents. As 
yet there is too little research to extract too much from these tables, 
besides the general conclusions such as those drawn above from the more 
1. Dept Labour Annual Reports, 19.25, page 432; 1935, page 41; 1945, page 58. 
2~· Dept Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 7. The last category is not 
exclusive with respect to the first two, accounting for the percent~ges 
adding up to more than 100%. 
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obvious industries. Further research on the discrepancies between 
the different percentages for different categories in the same 
industry requires further knowledge of the labour process within 
each industry, and will, in some cases, require a more detailed 
breakdown of these still rather large sectors and categories.) 
VII 
r.ompliance with the provisions of the Act had to rely heavily on 
the self interest of certain fractions of capital, and the resultant 
pressure on their competitors, or else on .worker pressure, for 
official machinery for enforcement was ineffective. The Inspectors 
of the Factories Department were overworked to such an extent that 
by 1930 they had to give up their surveys of individual industries 
and individual industrial problems due to lack of .. time, and con-
1 
centrate full-time on inspections. The size of the inspection 
staff increased from ten (chief inspector, four ordinary, and five 
assistant, inspect.ors). in 1924, to thirty-five (chief, seventeen 
ordinary, and seventeen engineering) in 1945. 2 Calculations based 
on the number of manufacturing establishments in the corresponding 
years give figures of 600, 323, and 266 establishments per inspector 
3 for 1924, 1930 and 1945 respectively. These figures, though 
decreasing, were still very large, and have to be discounted for the 
larger size of the establishments in the latter year.s, and for the 
increased duties of the inspectors under a new .. and expanded Act. The 
need for engineering inspectors, for example, was dictated by new duties 
for inspectors under the 1941 Act. The figures also show a much slower 
proportionate decrease for the latter years. While establishments 
per inspector almost halved in the six years between .1924 and 1930, 
in the next fifteen yea~s they only decreased from 323 to 266. 
The chief failure of enforcement lay, however, not in the numbers of 
the staff, but in the limited sanctions available to them, and the even 
more limited way in which they were applied. Carson's work on Britain 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1929, page 8. 
2. Dept Labour Annual ReportsJ 1924 and 1945. 
3. Own calculations. 
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is suggestive in this regard. He lists six major methods of enforce-
ment, which "can be arranged on a continuum running fr om I no f orma 1 
1 
actior,' at one end, to prosecution at the other, 11 i.e. 
a) No formal action 
b) Notification of matters requiring attention 
c) Notification of matters urgently requiring attention 
d) Indirect threat of prosecution 
e) Direct threat of prosecution 
f) Prosecution. 
The ultimate penalty was prosecution and conviction, but the inspectors 
preferred, as in most cases of 1'white collar crime1', to use the large 
''range of administrative alternatives to enforcement through the criminal 
courts. 112 
The general procedure, both in Britain and South Africa, was that of 
serving notices on offenders, On discovering a transgression the 
inspector would probably first discuss it with the owner. If no im-
provement was forthcoming, a notice would be served officially notifying 
the offender of what he was accused. Only then, if the offender still 
proved intransigent, would prosecution and a fine result. 
The procedure was even more protracted when the shortcoming was subject 
to the jurisdiction of a · local authority. In these cases, on discovering 
unsatisfactory conditions, the inspector had first to serve a notice 
on the local authority concerned. Only if no~ action was forthcoming 
l . 
from that quarter, could the Fac1;,Eries Department prosecute the occupier 
charging the local authority for any expenses incurred. The factory 
reports note the close relation between health and welfare provisions, 
3 4 and services such as waterborne sewerage , adequate drainage, 
paving· of lanes 
6 requirements. 
local authority, 
5 and yards, and bye-laws setting out structural building 
These were all either under the jurisdiction of the 
or else were services provided by that authority. The 
1.· W.G. Carsons, "White Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory 
Legislation", BRITISH JOURNAL OF CRIMINOL<X;Y, 10, 1970, page 391. 
2. ibid., page 387. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Reports, 1930, page . lO; 1932, page 17. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1926, page 430. 
5. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1927, page 10. 
6. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1926, page 12. 
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authorities were usually very dependent upon and influenced by big 
business in the district (cf ownership qualifications for voting roll), 
and were only likely to provide services, or pass laws, where these 
were deemed appropriate or necessary by the electorate. In the absence 
of such bye-laws or services, it was difficult fo the factory owner 
to pr.ovide adequate conditions, and the inspectors could be exptected 
to -"exercise their discretion in the dirtiction of leniency and limit 
1 
their requirements as far as possib le. 11 
There were also uncertainties over where the Wage Board and IC powers 
began and ended and where the f ac.tory inspectors fitted into those 
industries where such measures existed. It was specified in the Act 
that where these other measures provided conditions equal to, or 
superior to, those in the Factories Act, the former should prevail. 
It was not specified, however, how the inspection systems of the 
three different measures should inter act, especially where the IC 
or WD covered some, but not all, the areas and workers covered by 
the Factories Act. The gravity of this confusions was increased where 
only a por,tion of the workers were covered by the more specific measure. 
The statistics available give very little indication of the total number 
of violations of requirements of the .Factories Act. In 1939 the 
inspector reported that of eighty•six contraventions in working machinery 
regulations, only six prosecutions resulted2, but no figures are given 
for the other sections of the Act, or even for this section in other 
years. What the statistics do provide is the number of notices served, 
prosecutions and convictions, and it is very likely that these represent 
' only a small percentage of those .found committing transgressions and 
merely warned informally. In 1935 4 993 notices were served on muni-
cipalities by inspectors, resulting in only 36 fines, 52 prosecutions 
and 45 convictions. · In the same year 139 notices were served .directly 
3 on occupiers. Calculations for the years 1932 and 1940, in which 
there were nine and 130 convictions respectively, give average fines 
4 5 
of £1 lOs and£ 2 18s respectively, while the maximum fine provided 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1932, page 14. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Report, 193.8, page 87. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1935, pages _49, 50, 57. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1932, page 27.. 
5. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1940, page 92. 
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for in the Act was one of £10, or, in the case of a continuing offence, 
l £5 per day. The nuuber of cases reported in the South African Law 
Journal during the whole p~riod 1924 to 1945 can be counted on the 
fingers of one hand, of which most concerned the definition of "factory". 
Cases in the Journal are recorded because of the relevance of their 
findings and thus do not comprise all cases taken on appeal. One 
would eJJJ)ect, however, that if there were a substantial nuuber of 
cases on one subject, the area would have been considered a relevant 
and important one, and more cases reported. The small number suggests 
that either the court was never reached, or the fines too paltry to 
justify the cost to the employer of an appeal. Both possibilities 
suggest poor enforcement of the Act. 
In many cases, it was only direct action by the workers which could 
secure compliance. At Pattisons, a building firm in Pretoria, for 
example, two stewards were sacked after pressing for compliance with 
the Act. It was only after all the artisans in the firm resigned 
in protest that the company hacked down and agreed to comply. 2 
The WD and IC Acts provided certain channels for such worker action 
and enforcement of conditions. In the case of the Factories Act such 
channels were not provided. For the most part compliance with the 
law depended more on the employer's perceiving this to be in his 
interest than in the efforts and capabilities of the law enforcement 
agents. In other cases it was only strong organisation, a factor 
often absent in non-IC or WD industries, which could secure enforcement. 
VIII 
Coverage of the Act 
The Factories Act did not cover all workers. Several large and important 
sectors were excluded, either in .part or totally. At the time of the 
~assing of the second Act, in 1941, it was estimated that 1 800 000 
workers would be left uncovered by the new Act, as against a coverage 
3 of only 200 000. Even insofar as factory workers were concerned, the 
1. Section 35 of Act28 of 1918. 
2. DIE BOUWERI<ER, February 1942. _ 
3. SOUTH AFRICAN LEFT MONTHLY, I, 2, April 1941. 
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Department of Labour itself admitted that the definition of 11f actory" 
for census purposes was wider than that contained in the Factories 
Act. 1 
This section will examine the reasons - economic, ideological and 
political - f.or the exclusion of several of the more important sectors, 
and briefly examined the alternative measures operative there. 
These sectors are {a) mine workers, (b) shops and office workers, and 
(c) farm workers. 
(a) Mine Workers 
It has already been noted that .legislation on the mines in terms of 
protect ion of women and children preceded that of the Fae.tor ies Act 
of 1918. This applied to other areas of the Act as well, and was a 
reflection of the earlier development, and the often more dangerous 
conditions. 
A twelve hour day had originally been the norm on the Rand and De Beers 
mines, the site of the earliest capitalist production in the country. 
In 1908 an attempt to substitute an eight hour day was quashed by the 
mine owners as subverting the principle of free contract. A church 
deputation on behalf of the workers two years later was also unsuccess-
ful. By 1918, however, the year in which the first Factories Act 
inst.ituted a fifty hour week for male adult labour in factories, the 
underground hours for miners were set at forty-eight. 2 
As far as women and children were concerned, the mines were again in 
advance of industrial establishments. The 1911 Mines and Works Act 
prohibited all female employment underground and restricted the 
employment of juveniles in this sector with its tiring and dangerous 
work. 
Statistics on mine accidents are not given in the Factory Inspectorate 
reports, but information from sources such as the Department of Mines 
and the Chanber of Mines itself make it clear that the accident rate 
here was higher than that in industry. Deaths on the mines fluctuated 
from year to year, with a low point of 440 in 1926 and a high of 723 
in _l938 for 11coloured" workera3 and ·betweeri ·28 (in 1945) and 63 (in 
1. Dept Labour Annual lieport; 19'29, pag~ 6.· 
2• SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, II tX1) 1 Jnl8« .907. 
3. This included all blacks. 
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1939) for white workers •. The death rate per thousand workers per 
annum, perhaps a more meaningful measure, varied between 1,47 (in 
1942) and 2,47 ( in 1927) for 1'coloured" and 0,73 (in 1945) and 2,31 
1 (in .1927) for whites. Total deaths in factories meanwhile varied 
between 26 (1924 and 1929) and 84 (in 1945), giving a death rate of 
0,12 per thousand per annum for private industry in 1926. 2 As far 
as injuries were concerned, there were 632 white and 6 629 "coloured" 
casualties on .the mines in .1927, the first year in which all incapaci-
tation of more than fourteen days duration was reported, whereas the 
total figure for industry for the same year was 318. 3 
On the mines, as in the factories, casualties were not due to the 
fault of the workers in the majority of cases. The largest proportion 
4 of deaths were .. caused by falls of ground, a danger more or less 
inherent in the work, and increased with increasing depth of mining 
5 operations. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 was the major legis-
lative measure in this regard, providing, among other things, for the 
issuing of certificates of competency to workers involved in parti-
cularly dangerous or important work. The Department of Mines itself 
noted that accidents were minimised where employers ensured that 
"systematic supporting had reached the greatest perfection. 116 Never-
theless. it appears that the protection was not as effective as it 
might have been. Mining continued to have a substantially higher 
accident rate than industry, despite the earlier legislation. The 
majority of the workers were blacks, and thus in plentiful supply. 
Workmens Compensation rates were so low that the cost for management 
of this insurance was not an important consideration. Abysmal living 
conditions for the black workers suggest that it was only where the 
accident rate seriously affected production, or involved skilled and 
organised workers, that the mining regulations were effective. 
The exclusion of the mines from the other legislation reflected both 
1. Chanber of Mines, Annual Reports. 
2. UNION STATISTICS FCR FIFTY YEARS, page C-14; Dept Labour Annual Re-
ports, own calculations. 
3 • Dept Labour Annual Reports. 
4. 41% according to Dept Mines, Annual Report, 1924, page 40. 
5. Alide Kooy, i1Notes ·on Accidents on South African Mines1', Paper 74, 
SALDRU-SAMST Conference, University of Cape Town, 1978. 
6. Dept Mines Annual Report, 1924, page 68. 
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the importance in the economy and the earlier establishment of this 
sector. Mining was a particularly dangerous occupation, while both 
employers and white workers in the sector organised themselves strongly 
early in South African history. Both factors .encouraged the establish-
ment of a system of protection for the workers, and thus indirectly 
for capital, at an earlier date than the rest of industry. The 
specific conditions in the industry precluded their being included in 
the general legislation at a later date when such legislation existed. 
(b) Shop and Office Workers 
The Factories Act excluded workers in .. shops and offices, and those in 
factories employing fewer than three workers. Office workers in 
factories were also not covered. It was only in 1939, after a long 
and turbulent parliamentary passage, and a similarly long and turbu-
lent struggle waged by the National Union of Distributive Workers 
1 that the Shops and Offices Act was eventually passed, and provided 
for the regulation of hours, conditions of wrk, leave, maternity 
benefits and overtime pay in the sector. 
The shop workers, divided as they were into many small groups, and 
spread over a wide and dispersed geographical area, had a longer 
battle than the industrial workers. The typical shop was small at 
this stage, with department stores the exception rather than the rule, 
and organisation in such establishments, where there was more or less 
a patron-client relationship between employer and worker, was more 
difficult than in bigger establishments. Office workers, too, were 
often in small groups, and not involved in truly cooperative work. 
Ideology encouraged the latter group to view themselves as part of 
management rather than of the mass of workers. The shop workers 
also had problems, however, because of the established position of 
commercial capital. Commercial capital had established itself in 
South Africa long before industrial capital, and thus had had a longer 
time in which to build up ideological beliefs in private property and 
its accompanying r-ights and powers. The shopkeeper, it was dee lared 
in Parliament, regarded his place of business as his ·castle, in the 
same way as the proverbial Englishman did his house, 2 Resistance was 
1. Act 41 of 1939. 
2. HAD, page 750, 15 June 1939. 
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thus stronger on ideological, as well as economic grounds. 
Prior to 1939 commercial capital had not been totally unfettered, 
however. Provincial councils had had the power to regulate matters 
1 such as. seats for females , hours of trading and work, inspection, 
leave, etc. 2 . In addition, in the bigger urban centres, where organi-
3 4 sation had been easier, workers had won !Cs or been placed under WDs. 
Most . . of the legislation, however, applied to bigger concerns or 
larger industrial areas. Section 18 of the 1930 Cape Ordinance, for 
example, excluded all towns of less than five thousand inhabitants. 
Those in the smaller towns or rural -areas were excluded either wholly 
or partially from control. Even where legislation applied, it was 
not often adhered to. In the Transvaal there were only three inspectors 
for the six thousand establishments and 15 000 people covered5 , while 
in Cape Town in the 1930's there was only one inspector.6 The CAPE 
TIMES -described the Cape Ordinance .as a "Dead Letter" and stated that 
11it was a well-known fact that there are very few shops which are 
observing the law, with the result that flagrant breaches occur almost 
7 daily. 11 The 1939 Act attempted to regularise the position by pro-
viding one union-wide law, and by extending it to cover all shops and 
off ice workers. 
Conditions laid down in the Act were similar to those in the Factories 
Act, sometimes being marginally better, sometimes marginally worse. 
Thus shop workers gained a forty-six hour week in 1939, two years 
before workers in factories. On the other hand, Section 19 of the 
Shops and Offices Act declared that the Minister could exempt any 
"class of employees" from regulations regarding hours, overtime, leave, 
records, seats for females, notices, or "any regulation", and that in 
doing so he could "apply any method of differentiation or of discrimi-
nation he may deem advisable." When this law was passed there was 
little or no complaint about this sectionuhile with the Factories Act 
1. Shop Assistants Act, No 20 of 1899, Cape of Good Hope, which provided 
for "Lightening the Labours of Shop Assistants". 
2. Ordinance 14 of 1930, Cape Province. 
3. For example the Commercial Distributive Trade of Kini>erley, Tea 
Rooms and Restaurants, Johannesburg, Hairdressing, Witwatersrand, etc. 
4. For example the Coltlmercial Distributive Trade, Witwatersrand, Pre-
toria, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth; Hairdressing, Bloemfontein, etc. 
5. Norman Herd, CaJNTER ATTACKt 1974, page 33. 
6. ibi~., page 55. 
7. 7 February 1936. 
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l the similar section attracted much attention. In the main, however, 
the analysis applied to the Factories Act applies equally well to the 
Shops and Offices Act. The latter can thus be seen .as the logical . 
extension of . . the Factories Act,and legislation and control of a greater 
area with the increasing development, concentration and centralisation 
of capital, both industrial and commercial. The inclusion was later 
because of the particular nature of the growth in the area, both 
as regards the size of establishment and organisation of . .workers, as 
well as because of the involvement in distributionr rather than 
production work. But as more and more . . of the population became ab-
sorbed into the proletariat, and the reserve industrial army 
became increasingly one labour pool, such extension wa; necessary 
"to curb the passion of capital for a limitless draining of labour 
.. 2 power ••• 
(c) Farm Workers 
In the period under. consideration .farm workers were generally black and 
unorganised. There was a developed complex of laws applicable to 
Africans which ensured a plentiful supply of cheap labour to the 
rural areas and to farmers in particular. Black workers were not 
perceived as a potential supportative fraction for the state 
as were the white workers. All these factors combined to obviate 
the necessity being felt for protect ion of these workers to be . 
instituted. Economically, the supply of labour was not a problem. 
Politically, agricultural capital was very strongly organised, whereas 
agricultural labour organisation was weak. Ideologically, the pro-
tection of black labour was something with which the state rarely 
even pretended to concern itself. 
Objectively, the conditions on farms warranted regulation. Work on 
farms was often extremely dangerous. In certain seasons hours of 
work were extremely long. However, the fact that machines were not 
used was used to justify the exclusion of the sector. 
Other sector were also excluded. Construction was excluded until 1941, 
when the new Act laid down cer.tain 11vague1' requirements for scaffolding. 
Ra~lway _employees were also excluded, even after other government 
1. HAD, col . . 4045, .. 1941. 
2. Karl Marx, 1974, page 229. 
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employees were included in 1941. These two areas were both ones in 
which, objectively, protection of the workers appears · to have been 
1 
an important issue. Rackham writes that in England the largest 
nurrber of fatal accidents occur in the building industry, and there 
is nothing to suggest that conditions would be better in South Africa. 
In 1939 17% of .those receiving Workmens Compensation benefits, and 
2 8% of fatalities were government _or SAR & H employees, while S,A.R.& H 
employment accounted for only 123 421 (14.6%) of those employed in 
3 
private industry, mining and the Railways alone. 
What the three sectors described above illustrate is the fact that 
the Factories Act was not imposed only out of consideration for the 
workers' health and welfare. Several factors interacted to determine 
whether ~ertain groups of workers would be covered or not, and also on 
what areas of protection the Acts would concentrate. On the mines 
the conditions were such that workers were badly in need of protection. 
The strong organisation of both capital and white workers established 
an early system of protection, concentrated on certain sections of the 
work force. In conunerce the dangers were less, as was the organisation 
of the workers. Here, despite the early establishment of the sector, 
protection only came much later. Farming was also one of the early 
forms of economic activity. The strong organisation of the employers 
in this field and the weak position of the workers determined that, 
despite the dangers, legislation was not enacted to cover the workers. 
The abundance of black labour also obviated the need for the protection 
of women and children. 
IX 
Conclusions 
\ The process of factories legislation in South Africa is found to bear 
remarkable similarities to that of the United Kingdom, descri\ied so 
convincingly by Marx in CAPITAL. The "economic" causes are the same, 
as are the types of law passed. The objections of sections of capital 
are also markedly similar, despite the many years separating the 
two processes in the different countries. South African development 
1. Clara D. Rackham, FACTORY LAW,_ 1938, page 48. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 115. 
3. UNIQN STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, pages C-4, G-6 and G-15. 
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occurred much .later than that of Britain, and factory protection was 
thus felt necessary at. a corresponding later stage. The provi.sions 
implemented did not depend on the advance of technical knowledge -
otherwise South Africa would have had a Factories .Act much earlier. 
It was only when the need was dictated by the development of production 
and by the threat of labour that legislation was . passed. In Britain 
it was the fight against the Corn Law, in which capital desired the 
support of labour, that prompted the passing of the Factories Act. 
In South Africa the original Act was passed in 1918, in the post 
World War Two boom, and with the lessons of war fresh in the minds 
1 of employe~s. The first major redrafting of the Act came in 1941, 
with the fear of worker unrest in World War Two. 
a) Legislation in the interest of capital: Carsons2 notes that for 
England "there is strong evidence to .suggest that reconcilement to 
the instrumental facets of further legislation may have been greatly 
facilitated by the competitive advantages which might ensue therefrom." 
In South Africa the same forces were probably at work to promote the 
passage of and compliance with the Act. Certain fractions at least, 
of capital, realised that the legislation was in their favour, rather 
than (solely) in the interests of labour. 
The reactions of capital to factory legislation were mixed, however. 
Some individuals were totally opposed to control. A letter to the 
CAPE TIMES, for example, complained: 
110ur Government, our administration and our council are 
destroying all initiative and effacing individuality, and 
I may add, enterprise. Many young manufacturing firms 
have not the capital to meet regulations that are taken 
from some American or other text-books and they require 
every encouragement·; instead of being pestered by of fi-
cials who have no experience. 113 
In 1924, the year that this letter appeared, however, the FCI, the 
recognised representative of capital, passed a resolution at its 
annual congress asking that the factory division of the Department 
be "urged to administer the regulations under the Factories Act in 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1929, page 5. 
2. W.G. Carsons, 11 Syubolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early Factory 
Legislation", in Roger Hood (ed), CRIME CRIMINOL(X;Y AND PUBLIC POLICY, 
1974, . . page 119. · 
3. Letter to the Editor, CAPE TIMES, 10 April 1924. 
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such a manner as to ensure the strictest observance of the provisions 
1 
of the Factories Act by all manufacturers. 11 
This apparent contradiction can perhaps be resolved by acknowledging 
the internal divisions in industrial capital, and particularly that 
between the bigger.,. more organised, fraction and smaller capital. 
With increased size and complexity of manufacture, self-interest 
would dictate an increased interest in hygiene and safety of the work-
place on the part of the employer. The larger manufacturers, forced 
by the pIX>duction process and its needs to undertake this extra ex-
penditure, would be unwilling to .allow that .others escape and gain a 
competitive cost advantage. After 1924, when many larger concerns 
had the additional restraints of lCs and WDs, such pressure increased. 
II ... Safety both literally - in the case of machines ,-_ and figura-
tively - in the case of industry as a whole - ••• is an extra that the 
employer may decide not to purchase rather than .an integral part of 
2 the way work is donel' 
safety is impossible if 
However, complete disregard for workers' 
capital as a whole is to survive, for the 
industrial reserve army is never inexhaustible, and accidents, as has 
been seen, entail immediate losses for the individual capitalist as 
well. With the increased size of the production unit and the increased 
use of machinery, these dangers and needs both increased. · Women and 
children had to be protected so as to safeguard the workforce of the 
future, for reasons also related to the labour supply. Factory legis-
lation was thus in the interests of social capital - capital as a 
whole - if not that of the individual capitalist, and the state thus 
had to step in to protect the workforce where capital individually. 
was not prepared to do so. 
The degree of organisation of the workers and employers, the dangers 
of the work, .. and the nature of the workforce were al 1 important in 
determining where measures would be implemented, and what the form of 
. 
these measures would be. Ultimately, however, while the Factories Acts 
did afford ce~~ain protection to the workers, the protection was not 
such as to hinder .the appropriation of profit, but rather to ensure 
the . continued possibility of such appropriation. 
l. FCl Annual Congress Report, page 77. 
2. Patrick Kinnersley, THE HAZARDS OF WORK, 1975, page 9. 
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The Factories Act was, however, very much in the nature of last resort 
legislation. In the well-organised industries, where capital was 
more inclined to perceive its communal interests, !Cs or WDs existed. 
In these areas better conditions were laid down, regulations were in 
clearer terms, and enforcement was more effective. The Factories Act 
was for those industries not covered by other legislation. Its con-
ditions w.ere paltry, regulations were unclear, and workers, and indeed 
the state, had little control or power to enforce the legislation. 
b) Worker agitation: While it can be argued that factory legislation 
was logical from the viewpoint of capital, as done above, the effect 
of labour on the passage of such legislation should not be under-
estimated. Some overseas observers suggest that in England factory 
legislation was passed in response to agitation by capital or humani-
1 
tarian reformers, r.ather than in response to worker agitation. (In 
regard to the latter reformers it is even suggested that worker 
militancy often diminished their zeal2). In South Africa indications 
are that -similar forces for a large part were responsible. Labour 
organs devoted very little space to articles dealing with the Factories 
Acts, and reports of labour organisation and agitation arou, d the 
issue are few and far between, especially as far as limitation of 
hours and , conditions is concerned. Much of the impetus appeared 
to come either from the International Labour Organisation, at whose 
annual conferences the matter was regularly discussed, or from 
capital itself. 
Nevertheless, the nature of labour action did affect such legislation, 
although at times only indirectly. Early labour organisation, in 
both England and South Africa, tended to concentrate on the issues 
of wages and hours of work within the individual factories and indu3tries, 
and attempted to win restrictions on this particularistic basis. The 
first Factories Act was passed in 1918, at a time of heightened and 
generalised activity in many different industries. At that time there 
1. W.G. Carson,1970; 1974. 
2. K• Wedderburn, 'THE WORKER AND THE LAW, 1965, page 165)• in writing 
of Plimsoll, one of the great factory reformers in England, notes-: "His 
eventual coolness towards industrially militant organisation may be 
compared with the distance which always separated most of the factory 
reformers in Parliament from the TUs. 11 The Hamnonds, in writing of 
Shaftesbury, another reformer, co111llent on the ''hostility ••• and great 
dread of the trade union movement ' the tightest thraldom the worker 
has ever endured, 11, (ibid) which this man had. 
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~ere no general limitations on hours of work. The Factories Act can 
be viewed as an attempt at pacification by the provision of a maximum 
for all industry, a maximum upon which workers in individual factories 
and workplaces could then base further demands. 
The slow progress in the limitation of hours under the Factories Act 
can also be understood with this interpretation and in the interrelation 
between the Act, the ICA, and the Wage Act. After 1925 most white 
and skilled workers had an alternative means of gaining. their demands. 
The Factories Act, as one now chiefly applicable to unskilled workers, 
was no longer an area of major importance in the eyes of capital or 
the state. Organised labour, too, with other prcwisions, would not 
be over-concerned about an Act laying down standards inferior to those 
they had already gained for themselves. It was only in 1941, when 
worker organisation among the unskilled and unprotected was on the 
increase, and when the political and ideological compulsion to provide 
concessions to a wider group of workers had again become important, 
that the Factories Act underwent a major overhaul. 
The Factories Act, although to some extent in the interests of capital, 
was ~hus also a concession to workers. Physically, workers generally 
could, and had, worked more than the 48 or 46 hours laid down as a 
maximum. When overtime was demanded, and particularly during the 
war, they would continue to work beyond these limitations. Worker 
action forced the passing of an Act limiting the hours beyond the 
objective necessity. The action was primarily aimed at the individual 
establishment or industry level, but when this indi idual organisation 
was widespread, the threat of unrest prompted a general rneasure,which 
could then serve as a basis for demands by the most militant, while 
satisfying or at least muting the demands of the less well organised. 
c) Differential treatment of sections of the ~orkforce: The Act, in 
totally excluding certain workers, obviously discriminated 
against certain sections of the workforce. Thus farm, shop, construc-
tion and government workers did not get even the minimal protection en-
compassed in the Act. Of those workers covered by the Act, protection 
also acted in a discriminatory manner. 
The interrelation between the Factories Act and other legislation -
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particularly the Wage Act and ICA - was important in this respect. The 
Factories Act, as seen above, was for the most part colour-blind. Dis-
crimination was introduced when the Factories Act was used in con-
junction with the ICA and Wage Act. The latter forbade the determination 
of conditions on a standard inferior to that provided by the general 
Act. In Chapters Three and Four it was seen how the Wage and IC Acts 
tended to favour the more privileged section of the workforce, despite 
the fact that they were also allegedly colour blind. It was chiefly 
for the more privileged workers that conditions more favourable than 
the Factories Act were provided. Even where conditions under these 
additional measures were only minimally better, it was probable 
that there was also more pressure for capital to observe the prescribed 
regulations. In the case of ICs, for example,. the council agents per-
formed inspections and would have notified the Department of any 
contraventions. The latter itself, which "accepted responsibility 
l only for 'races which subscribe to a civilised standard of life'" , 
would have been more inclined to investigate and act further on 
complaints affecting such 11races11 • The mere presence of more 
established, better organised, and more 11visible11 groups of workers 
would have increased the pressures for observance. 
The imposition of general conditions on all workers favoured the em-
ployment of white workers. WDs and ICs forbade discrimination on 
colour lines in the matter of wages. The Factories Act rendered it 
difficult to extract surplus labour in other ways from black workers, 
and operated in a much wider range of industries that merely those 
under WDs or ICs. Black workers were thus prevented from competing 
with white workers on the grounds of their cheaper availability, and 
white employers thus tended to favour white workers. Prohibition of 
juvenile employment likewise prevented black children from competing 
with whites on the basis of longer experience. In the case of 
segregation and the provision of separate facilities, the necessity 
of providing separate accommodation for white and black increased 
costs and would be avoided wherever possible by the employer, again 
usually favouring white employment where some whites were already, 
'of necessity, employed in the skilled positions. 
As far as women and children were concerned, the Act appeared to favour 
them, . in providing better conditions of work than for adult males. Again 
l. Simons and Simons,, 1969, page 378. 
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appearances were illusory. Wage discrimination was not forbidden by 
either the Factories Act or the Wage and IC Acts, and the latter 
indeed expressly provided for this. Women and children were a cheap 
form of labour, and the performance of this function was not inter-
fered with by the Factories Act. 
The presence of other measures .. such as ICA and the Wage Act also 
explain why worker agitation which did take place concentrated on 
certain areas - those areas not covered by the other measures. Examples 
of this were maternity benefits and the provision of separate facilities 
for the different colour groups. Organised workers, insofar as they 
were protected by other measures, only showed an interest where their 
personal interests were concerned, and where they did not enjoy other 
protection. The orientation of established labour organisations was 
once again towards particularistic interests rather than a concern 
for labour as a whole. 
The Act thus followed the trend in all South African labour legis-
lation. Workers were .differentially treated, and legislation served 
to entrench the various divisions in the workforce - colour, sex and 
age. 
d) The effect of the conjuncture on legislation: The Factories Act 
provides an excellent example of the effect of the conjuncture of the 
form of legislation. The two major acts were passed at the time of 
the two World Wars, times of increased labour unrest, and with organised 
labour forming a constituent part of the government. Politically and 
ideologically there was thus a need for apparent protection of labour's 
interests. 
The 1941 Act illustrates, however, that this function of the Act was 
limited by economic constraints. In 1941 South Africa had a war economy 
and was hard pressed in terms of the need for increased production 
with decreased inputs. The measures imposed were thus often less than 
had been demanded a long time before (as for example shown with regard 
to hows of work). In other cases measures which would hamper production 
were either not passed (segregation regulations) or waived (restrictions 
on women's hours). Even those measures official on the law books were 
less strictly enforced than before the war (for example the structural 
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requirements). Because of the war situation. the established 
labour organisations meanwhile felt obliged to give their support 
to the law, or at least to avoid protesting too much. Even Bob 
Stuart wrote that, as far as he knew, 1'no effort was made by organised · 
1 
labour to arouse pub lie interest or to educate public opinion. 1' 
Worker agitation did affect the Factories Act. Organised presentation 
of demands within the workplace, in ICs and at wage board sittings, 
as well as on the wider political front, strengthened the case of 
those advocating factory reform, and hastened up its implementation, 
as well as influencing its form. In the case of alternations to 
maternity benefits, and in the 1941 reframing of the Act, this agi-
tation was partic~iarly evident, at least in some trade union circles. 
As in England, however, the causes of factory legislation in South 
Africa were also to be found in the hazards of work and the need to 
curb these - needs felt by either humanitarian reformers (here we 
could include factory inspection staff, Department officials, and even 
perhaps Madeley and some trade union leaders), and, more importantly, 
employers forced by their advanced methods to observe these conditions 
themselves. 
1. TRADE UNION BULLETIN, September 1941. 
TABLE 5.41 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT SECTORS OF PRIVATE MANUFACTURING TO OUTPtrr, EMPLOYMENT AND ACCIDENTS 
·-- -· 
OUTPUT EMPLOYMENT .ACCIDENTS 
C51tegories 1925/6 1934/5 1944/5 1924/5 1934/5 1944/ 5 1926 1935 1945 
I. Food, drink, tobacco 32,0 27, l 22,3 28 22 20 28 1· 21 
II• Clothing, textiles, 10,0 13, 9 16, l 14 20 18 2 I 4 
laundry ! 
Ill. Wood, furniture 7,1 6,3 6,6 8 8 9 26 18 
IV. Printing and paper 11,2 9,4 6,4 6 6 4 2 s 
-. 
v. Chemicals, petrol, 12,3 8,9 9,7 9 7 7 11 7 
explosives 
VI. Non-metallic minerals, 7,0 7,8 5,4 12 13 9 8 10 
stone, clay 
VII. Metals, enginerring, trans- 16, 7 23 ,5 27 ,6 18 22 27 12 22 
port, electrical, machinery -
VII. Other 3,7 3,1 5,9 5 2 6 11 13 
NOTE: The categories in the different sources vary slightly. I have attempted to assimilate categories to 
obtain similar categories, but the correspondence will not be exact. 
"Building" is not included in any of the categories. 
"Leather", especially footwear, and "Rubber" are problematical categories. For accidents they are 









The "Other" category for employmett and accidents is a residual one. Here the difference in percentages 
would probably reflect the difference between the classifications rather than a large difference in percentages 
for outpu~, employment and accidents for a constant categorisation. 
l. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, pages L-4, Gl0-12; Dept Labour Annual Reports. The percentage cal-






CHAPTER SIX: THE RIOTOUS ASSEMBLIES ACT AND RELATED MEASURES 
"· •• it may be said that anyone conversant with the 
inherent psychology of the South African, whether f~orn 
English or Dutch extraction, knows his passion for free-
dom and liberty of speech and action. The mere thought 
of placing him under additional restraint is abhorrent 
to him. 11 1 
South African citizens did not have complete freedom of speech and 
action. Several laws already examined in this thesis were shown to 
place restrict ions on these freedoms. The "Native" laws and 
Masters and Servants Act curtailed freedom of contract and expression, 
as well as movement and residence, for African workers, thus seriously 
limiting their bargaining power. 2 Other restrictions were placed on 
the South Africans "from English or Dutch extraction", as well as on 
black workers. 
Chapter Four of this thesis examined the ICA and the way in which this 
law, by regulating worker organisation in those industries where it was 
most advanced, .limited and controlled such organisation and the threats 
it posed to the state, both in terms of who organised and how they did 
so. Chapter Five looked at the Wage Act and the way in which this func-
tioned,in industries where workers were not organised,to channel their 
demands. 
Many workers were not covered by these acts, and although they might be 
covered in some respects by the Factories Act, many demands went beyond those 
catered for by all three measures, all of which concentrated on the eco-
nomic sphere. For these reasons it was necessary to pass other, more 
explicit laws, and it is these more overtly political laws which form 
the subject matter of this chapter. 
The laws were not framed in purely industrial terms and would not normal-
ly be included in a study of 11 industrial law". They are included here 
because of the wider connotation of "labour law"., and in recognition 
of the fact that the political and ea>nomic spheres are not completely 
separat~ ones - that worker protest and organisation can extend beyond 
1. SATLC Annual Report, 1938. 
2. See above, Chapter One, Section II. 
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the boundaries of the economic sphere, that this protest and organisa-
tion can affect the economic sphere, and that state action and control 
must thus also be able to act in other spheres. The role of the state 
in the maintenance of the conditions of production and reproduction of 
the system entail not only the reproduction of the economic conditions, 
but also the reproduction of the political hegemony and dominance of 
capital and the state. This entails political and ideological control 
as well as control in the workplace. 
Section l of this chapter will describe the Riotous Asseni>lies Act and 
the more political aspects of the Masters and Servants and "Native" 
Acts. It will be seen how these were used to discourage and control 
strikes, meetings, and other concomitants of organisation. Section 11 
will examine the extent of freedom of speech and expression, and how 
they were restricted by statutes, subordinate legislation and regulation, 
under the conunon law, and in sundry other ways. This section will also 
look at non-statutory restrictions on organisational aspects such as 
meetings and strikes. In both sections numerous individual cases will 
be cited as examples of the way in which the different laws were used, 
against whom, and to what purpose. Finally, Section III will draw 
some conclusions b.ased on the description and examples of the preceding 
sections as to the 'intent and effect of the curtailment of freedoms, 
and the restrictions on and control of organisation. This will, as 
always, be looked at in the context of the political economy of South 
Africa between 1924 and 1945. 
I 
. . . . 
Riotous Asaeni>lies, Masters and Servants and "Native" Acts 
"It is because of the changing nature (of the •strike) that 
great limitations have been placed upon the use of the 
strike weapon. When it .is no longer employed merely in 
local differences between employers and employees, but 
extends through sympathy or force beyond the field in 
which it is immediately concerned, it constitutes a threat 
to the general public and to the sovereignty of Parlia-
ments. The first concern of a government is the pre-
servation of its existence ••• 11 1 
1. Ellison Kahn, "The Right to Strike in South Africa: A Historical 
Analysis", SOtrrH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF ECOOOMICS, II, 1943• page 25. 
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l 
The Riotous Asseublies and Criminal Law Amendment Act is the archetype 
of political legislation designed to curb strikes and other worker · 
organisation. Originally enacted after the 1914 unrest on the Rand, 
the law aimed, inter alia, at preventing white workers. from applying 
2 
pressure to blacklegs and scabs in strikes on the goldmines and railways. 
Prior to the passing of this measure, the holding of open air gatherings 
had been legal in the Cape and Natal, except where violence was in-
volved.3 In the Transvaal and Orange Free State, however, with their 
earlier mining economic development, and thus earlier large agglomerations 
of workers, similar legislation had been passed prior to Union. In 
the Transvaal there was the Resolution of 1851 "Against public dis-
turbances and discussion", Law 6 of 1894 "On the right of meeting and 
asseubling of persons", which made it an offence for more than five 
4 or six persons to asseuble in any street or public place, The Ordinance 
for Indemnity and 
6 
5 Peace Preservation of 1902, the Crime Ordinance of 
1904, and Act 16 of 1908.7 The Orange Free State, with less economic 
development, had only one measure, the Indenmity and Peace Preservation 
Ordinance of 1902. 8 
The 1914 Riotous Asseni>lies Act, passed at a time when worker organi-
sation was spreading beyond the mines and surrounds, repealed all these 
measures and replaced them with a countrywide measure, which covered 
both the holding of meetings and the 11removal from the Union of persons 
convicted of certain offences. 119 
Section 1 of the Act gave the Minister the power to prohibit a public 
gathering (i.e. a gathering of more than twelve people with a common 
purpose) in a public place, if he had"reason to apprehend that the 
public peace would be seriously endangered." If a meeting was banned, 
1. No 27 of 1914. 
2 • Jonathan Bloch, THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWOOK OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1977, page 112. 
3. Kahn, 1943, page 27. 
4. W.H. Andrews, CLASS STRUGGLES IN SCXJTH AFRICA, 1941, page 22. 
5. Part II, Qrdinan~e 38. 
6. Sections 36 and 37, Ordinance 26. 
7 • . Criminal Law ~ndment Act, Section 7. 
8. Part II. 
9. Preamble to Act ?.7 of 1914. 
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any police officer above the rank of captain could order the 
participants to disperse. The same powers were granted where the 
meeting was not banned, yet where those attending killed or seriously 
injured any individual, or appeared to want to destroy or damage pro-
perty. In the event of their not dispersing, the officer was em-
powered to use force 1'moderated and proportionate to the circumstances 
1 
of the case and the object to be attained. 11 
Sections 8 to 11 of the measure can more clearly be seen as a reaction 
to the 1914 struggle, for use against pickets and to protect scabs. 
Section 8 made it an offence to "threaten or suggest" violence, 
to remain in the vicinity of an individual's workplace or home, to 
hide his tools, clothes or other property, or to follow or jeer at 
him or his family in order to cause him to break the law. Section 9 
made it an offence to threaten such an individual in order to force 
him to join any organisation, an obvious potential weapon for use against 
union organisers or TU mem:,ers attempting to recruit fellow workers, 
while Section 10 prohibited the encouragement of stoppage on work pre-
mises by an individual without the "lawful right" to be there, a 
serious impediment to union organisers, especially of the unregistered 
unions after 1924. Section 11 made it an offence to abuse, either 
verbally or in writing, workers who continued to work, or to "cause 
information to be sent to any person" in order to prevent an individual 
from obtaining or retaining his employment, or to force him to refuse 
to work. 
Finally, as the ultimate discouragement of leadership in organisation, 
anyone who attempted to commit a statutory offence or conspired with 
others, incited, instigated, or commanded commission of such an offence, 
was liable to conviction as if he or she were the principle offender 
under that statute. 2 
For workers in public utility services, and those employed by a local 
authority or a company supplying light, power, water, or sanitary 
or transportation services, restrictions were even more severe, due 
to the more far-reaching consequences of disruption in these sectors, 
~~~~~~~ . upon which all other branches of capital were dependent for 
1. Section 4, Act 27 of 1914. 
2. Section 15, Act 27 of 1914. 
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functioning. In this case it was an offence for workers, either singly 
or in concert, to break a condition of a contract of employment, 
knowing, or "having reasonable cause to believe11 that the "probable 
consequence" of this would be to deprive a 11 large section of the 
community" of their supply of one of the above -services to any "great 
1 extent." 
The various clauses of the measure described and quoted above express 
adequately the intent of the legislators. The Act was far-reaching 
in itself, and its terms were so indefinite and subjective as to make 
it even more extensive. However, perhaps because of this very lack 
of clarity, and perhaps because of the hesitation of the state and 
judiciary in acting too harshly when the offenders were part of the white 
group, in this early period Simons reports that difficulties were 
2 experienced in securing convictions. 
By 1930 the situation had changed. It was no longer only white workers 
who were organising. The ICU had been active since the beginning of 
the previous decade, and the Communist Party and African National 
Congress (t'he latter particularly in the Western Cape) were also 
active among black workers. An amendment was thus introduced, changing 
the Act so as to make it a more effective weapon and to bring black 
organisation - both worker and non-worker - into its anbit more easily. 
Section 1 was extended to make it an offence to preside at or convene 
those meetings where one "had reason to apprehend that feelings of 
hostility (would be) engendered between Europeans and any others" or 
against any particular individual. Individuals could be removed from 
an area if deemed "undesirable inhabitants" by the authorities. The 
Governor General was empowered to punish "offenders" without trial, and 
3 there was no provision for appeal to the courts against his decision. 
The Riotous Asseublies Act, thus amended, was used together with the 
Masters and Servants Act to curtail strikes and all matters ancillary 
to them, i.e. picketing, blacklisting, intimidation, and the holding 
1. Section 12, Act 27 of 1914. 
2• RACE RELATICNS JOURNAL,(VI), 2, 1939, page 61. 
3. Section l (16), Act 19of 1931. 
l of strike meetings. A few examples serve to illustrate the possi-
bilities in this direction. 
In 1924 a baker was requested by the South African Industrial Federation 
(Baking and Milling Section) to replace two African delivery men by 
white vanmen. The baker refused and the Federation then placed an 
advertisement in two newspapers urging TU members to boycott the 
baker, as he was "using coloured labour for work which other firms 
employed Europeans _to do." The TU members were convicted under 
Section l of Law 13 of 1880 of the Transvaal Republic, the law "voor 
het reguleeren van de betrekkelijke regten en pligten van Meesters, 
Bedienden en Leerlingen". The magistrate ruled that "it is actionable 
intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course 
of events to damage and does in fact damage another in that person's 
2 property or trade if done without just cause or excuse. 1' In his 
opinion the TU did not have such cause or excuse. 
ln the same year, however, the lCA was passed, bestowing official 
recognition on TUs and further defining the right to strike. The 
Riotous Assemblies and Masters and Servants Acts were then used 
against more left-wing organisation, the former being able to be 
udlised even where workers no longer fell under the Masters and Servants 
Acts. 
After a strike at the African Clothing Factory in 1931, for example, 
twelve people, including Johnny Gomas, James la Guma .and Lazar Bach 
were arrested and charged with throwing stones at scabs, despl te the 
. 3 
fact that pickets had police permission. On the occasions of another 
strike, among tramway workers in Cape Town, Douglas Wolton, a leading 
Communist Party meni>er, was arrested and charged under both the !CA 
and the Riotous Assemblies Act. 4 
To. control aspects of organisation besides strikes and meetings, the 
amended Riotous Assemblies Act was used in conjunction with, and extended 
by, the provision of the Native Administration Act for the rural areas 
and the Native (Urban Al"eas) Act for the towns, both of which acts 
1. Kahn, 1943, page 31. 
2. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, XLI, 1924, page 408. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 2 September 1931 and 15 Septeni>er 1931. 
4. CAPE TIMES, 10 December 1932. 
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carried clauses which could be used against the growing organisations 
among blacks. 
A resolution of the ICU in 1927 stated that the Native Administration 
Bill "is anti-British and unjust interference with free speech and 
the liberty of the subject. We are convinced that Clauses 25 and 26 
is (sic) a deliberate attempt to prevent the legitimate TU organisation 
of the Native workers ••• 111 Sect ion 25 of the Act allowed the 
administrative prohibition of meetings in the rural areas by the 
Governor neneral. Section 29 stated that "any person who utters any 
words or does any other acts or things whatever with intent to promote 
any feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans shall be guilty 
of an offence ••• " Such person, if an African, could be confined to 
a scheduled area, a non-African national could be kept out of the area, 
and non-nationals, both black and white, could be detained and deported. 
In the towns Section 36 of the Urban Areas Act 2 gave the urban local 
authority the power to make or adopt regulations for the "conduct, 
control, supervision and restriction of meetings or asseni>lies of 
natives within the urban area1' if there was 11reasonable ground for 
believing that the holding of such a meeting (might) provide or tend 
to a .breach of the peace. 11 The pass provisions of the same statute 
allowed for deportation or other removal of 11undesirables. 1' 
The enactment of these laws was not merely an empty threat on the part 
of the legislators. The provisions were used to prosecute, convict, 
and generally harrass worker organisers, as well as to prohibit or 
disrupt their meetings. 
In the first six months of operation of the Native Administration Act 
four CP members, Johnny Gomas, Stanley Silwana, Bransby Ndobe and 
Abdurset Brown, and five ICU members were charged under the hostility 
clause, the offence of the CP members being protest at police shooting 
of an African rioter, and disparaging comments about King GeorFe, Smuts 
and Hertzog during the flag debate. 3 Later Kadalie, Sam Malkinson (CP) 
1. WCRI<ERS HERALD, 17 May 1927. 
2. Construction in Act 25 of 1945, with similar clauses in previous acts. 
3. H.J. and R.E. Simons, CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOtrrH AFRICA, 1969, page. 346. 
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and Mrs N. Bhola (ANC) were prosecuted under the same clause. 
1 
Another clause of the same act was used to harrass Champion's ICU 
at the time of riots in Natal, when the Governor General banned all 
2 meetings of Africans without former approval from the magistrate, 
and again in 1945, when Proclamation GN 31 prohibited all gatherings 
of more than ten Africans in Natal, the Transvaal or the Orange Free 
State, unless for religious, domestic or official administrative 
2 purposes. In 1930, by charging six ANC organisers, Kennon and James 
Thaele, Vumazonke, J. Oosthuizen, Lester,and Jacob Conscience under 
the Act, and by prohibiting their addressing any meetings in the 
"banned" areas (i.e. those in which they were organising) for the 
duration of their trial, the state effectively weakened this organisation 
for a crucial period of over three months. 3 
The Urban Areas Act tended to be used on a less individual and larger 
scale, all<;>wing for the removal of large groups of people, rather 
than only individuals. Using the administrative procedures allowed 
by the Act, magistrates 11 declared that any African who held a 
(Communist) party card or who worked with the party was 'idle, 
dissolute or disorderly' and thus subject to two years banishment." 
Besides the removal of leaders such as Gana Makabeni (CP) to the 
Transkei, and Nduweni (ICU) to Standerton, this facilitated the removal 
of more than two hundred other militants to the outlying rural areas 
within the period of a few months. 4 Ramutla, a CP organiser, was 
meanwhile declared a "vagrant" because of not being "employed" in 
an ordinary job, and as a result spent twelve months in a labour 
camp.
5 
(He also served five months at a later date under the hostility 
clause of the Native Administration Act. 6) . 
Besides effecting the removal of organisers, the Urban Areas Act 
also restricted their action while in the towns. In 1944, for example, 
when the Minister prohibited all meetings in proclaimed areas, he 
claimed that this would not interfere with TU organisation. He refused, 
however, to give permission to the African Mine Workers Union to hold 
1. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 400 
2• Proclamation 252, Simons and Simons, 1969, page 367. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 26 June, 23 July, 26 Septeni>er 1930; WORCESTER STANDARD 
AND ADVERTISER, 26 July 1930. 
4. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 436. 
5. ibid., page 459. 
6. ibid., page 468. 
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a meeting to collect dues. He suggested that they meet ten by 
ten instead. Unfortunately for the organisation, there were 16 000 
1 
members, and dues had to be collected monthly. 
The picture that emerges is one of harrassment and discouragement, 
rather than systematic prohibtion of organisation. Besides the 
Masters and Servants Act and the Native Service Contract cases, where, 
because of the strictness of the Acts prosecution was usually success-
ful for the state, the prosecution often lost its cases under the 
other acts. These acts were used for areas more open to the public 
eye, often where white organisers were involved, and where it was 
' difficult for the state to restrict 11freedom11 too blatantly. Instead 
the aim appears to have been one of discouraging such activity. When 
Bunting stood for Pa~liarnent in the Transkei, for example, he, his 
wife, and Makabeni, who was his electoral agent, were charged and 
convicted under Section 29 of the Native Adminstration Act, the hostility 
clause. On appeal, however, the Supremem Court ruled that it was 
necessary for the prosecution to prove intent for this crime, and 
that it was "not easy to declare with any precision what exactly was 
meant by the expression" (incitement to racial hostility). 2 On the 
setting aside of the conviction, the state withdrew fourteen similar 
charges against the three. 
It was difficult to prove that the individuals and organisations 
involved in most cases intended to promote hostility between the 
different colour groups. Proof of the truth of the statements claimed 
to be inflammatory was often sufficient to secure acquittal. Pro-
secution, even witho~ conviction, served a purpose nevertheless. 
Organisers were removed for some time; court cases involved heavy 
expenses and a waste of time for workers prosecution usually entailed 
the forfeiture of wages, or even of their jobs; the possibility of 
conviction must have frightened away many would-be participants. 
1. CAPE TIMES, 9 November 1944. 
2. Simons and Simons, 1969, pages 352, 419. 
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11 
Freedom of Speech and Expression 
The Riotous Asseni>lies and''Native"Acts were not the only weapons to 
be used to restrict, control and contain worker organisation outside 
the official channels. General restrictions on speech and expression 
also affected labour organisation. Other statutes, legislation and 
authority of subordinate bodies, as well as the common law, were all 
used at different times. 
Press freedom provides a suggestive example of how the ordinary 
workings of the society favoured the case of capital rather than 
labour, even in the absence of legislation or rules of any kind, as 
well as serving as an introduction to areas where regulation was used, 
"· ••• the Press wing of the Capitalist army was in action 
daily, nay hourly, firing volleys of mud at the worker 
leaders in the hope that some of it might stick. 11 l 
At the time this was written, FCRWARD was complaining about the 
fact that, while during elections the names and addresses of all 
writers had to appear on articles, letters, etc., during an industrial 
dispute there was no such law. As the press was almost exclusively 
financed and controlled by the capitalist class, they could present 
their opinions as the unbiassed truth, and this was what reached and 
informed the general public. Radio broadcasts, too, under the control 
of private capital, . axpressed the views of the state and its supporters. 
The WORCESTER STANDARD AND ADVERTISER was quite explicit about this 
bias at the time of the ANC "riots". The newspaper stated that it 
would not do to give too much publicity to the black organisation. 
"Naturally the more publicity the affair is given, the better pleased 
the Natives wi 11 be - and that is what they are after. 112 · 
This original, non-legislated bias necessitated freedom of speech and 
expression if the viewpoint of the non-rulers was to have a chance of 
1. F~WARD, 3 July 1925. 
2. WORCESTER STANDARD AND ADVERTISER, 19 April 1930. 
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being heard. However, further restrictions were imposed on freedom 
of expression. 
Section 5 of the Entertainments (Censorship) Act of 1931
1 
declared 
that the Censorship Board should not approve any film which, in its 
opinion, depicted material that "prejudicially affects the safety of 
the state, or is calculated to disturb peace, or good order, or to 
prejudice the general welfare ••• " Disapproval was conferred on films 
depicting,"in an offensive manner", 
a) scenes related to controversial or international politics2 
3 b) scenes representing the antagonistic relations of capital and labour 
c) scenes tending to create public alarm 4 
d) scenes calculated to bring any section of the public into ridicule 
5 or contempt 
e)"pugilistic encounters" or "scenes of · intermingling11 between whites 
6 
blacks. 
Unfortunately, no list of rejected films is available, but the fact that 
these clauses were considered necessary, suggests that they would have 
been used and were contemplated in the framing of the Act. 
An amendment to the customs regulations in July, 1934, provided for 
censorship of reading material, by providing for the prohibition on 
the importation of political literature. Among the first publications 
to fall foul of this law were the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO and LABOUR 
DEFENCE NEWS. 7 Nonetheless, the Minister responsible was reported as 
stating that he had no knowledge of a seriously written book that had 
been bannedl He claimed that extra vigilance was needed in South 
8 
Africa on account of the "mixed population"; "·· •• complaints had 
been made to the authorities that such literature was freely distributed 
among Natives, and that this type of reading matter incited the 
9 readers to overthrow any form of government l' 
1. Act 28 of 1931. 
2. ibid.' clause (g). 
3. ibid.' clause (h). 
4. ibid.' clause ( j). 
5. ibid.' clause (m) ·. 
6. ibid., clauses (q) and (r). 
7. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 471. 
8. SATLC, Annual Report, 193.8, page 21. 
9. SATLC, Annual Report, 1939. 
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Besides statutory provisions, the pre-statute law also could be used 
to control freedom of expression. Because of the uncodified nature 
Of these measures, a full description or even listing of the 
measures is impossible, but the following examples give some idea 
of the flexibility, adaptability, and far-reaching nature of the civil 
and criminal law in this regard. 
In a civil case Cleghorn and Harris, a large retail firm in Cape Town, 
successfully applied for a temporary interdict prohibiting the further 
distribution of publications of the National Union of Oistributive 
Workers pamphlet listing the names of firms which did NOT dismiss 
workers in the face of a new WD, a list from which Cleghorn and Harris 
1 had been excluded. Meanwhile, the firm planned a £1 000 damages 
suit against the union. 2 
In a second civil case £50 damages were awarded against Basner, and 
in favour of Trigger, the manager of the Mines Police Department, for 
a comnent before the Mines Natives Wages Commission in which Basner 
alleged that Trigger had spied. The judge ruled that it was not a 
case of heavy damages as the Chamber of Mines, and not Trigger, was 
the real target, and secondly, because of Trigger's conduct, which 
had been highly provocative. The case,however, had cost Basner more 
than £1 000 in cash and six days in court. 3 In a later case four 
gold mines were awarded £750 each plus costs, for libel,against the 
GUARDIAN. This was for comments by the newspaper staff in their 
evidence to the same commission. 
In a criminal case, on the other hand, Johnny Gomas, Minnie Gool, 
Eddie Roux and Joseph Ngedlane were found guilty of the crime of 
"laesae majestatis venerationis", for articles published in UMSEBENZI. 
This law, dating from BC 29, no longer operated in Britain, the home 
of the monarch whose dignity was apparently at stake.4 The Cape 
Supreme Court overturned this ruling, but it was upheld by the Natal 
Supreme Court, and had to be taken to the Appeal Court in the latter 
case. Douglas Wolton, mentioned earlier, was convicted under this 
1. CAPE TIMES, 2 March 1940. 
2. CAPE TIMES, 8 March 19AO and 27 April 1940. 
3. GUARDIAN, 4 January, 1 February and 17 _May 1945. 
4. UMVIKELI THEBE, January, March, May 1936. 
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same law for an article about the treatment of conununists in prison 
1 
road camps, and he served a four month jail sentence as a result. 
Whereas in the case of hostility clause prosecutions a defence of 
the truth of the statement in question often secured the accused's 
2 acquittal, in both the above cases truth was not an adequate de-
fence. Publication of the truth was a punishable offence when the 
state or an individual capitalist took exception to such publication, 
and instituted charges. 
Non-statutory control also extended to meetings and strikes. In 1935 
Johanna Cornelius, two other women, and two men, were charged with 
"disturbing the public peace by fighting and quarrelling, shouting, 
swearing, and abusive language. 113 In 1940 Cornelius was again 
charged, and fined one month or £10,for obstructing the police during 
a strike at the African Tobacco Company. She stood in front of a 
bus load of "onderkriupers" to try and prevent their strikebreaking, 
and hit a Captain Van Wyk when he grabbed her by the hair. The 
magistrate described her as a 11betaalde agitator", although she was 
4 the UNPAID secretary of the trade union concerned. 
ln 1944 municipal. regulations were used to institute charges against 
three trade unionists - Waterfield, Pauline Podbrey, and Katie 
Kagan. It was alleged that the three had contravened municipal regu-
lations by addressing meetings in the city streets without the consent 
of the Cape Town City Council. The Council later withdrew the case 
on learning that application had in fact been made, but that they 
had been referred to the Deputy Conunissioner of Police, who had re-
5 £erred them back to the Cape Town City Council. 
The ability of workers to strike could also be limited beyond the 
limits imposed by wage loss or the restrictions in the ICA and Masters 
and Servants Acts. After a textile strike Bill Andrews and Issy 
Wolfso. secretary of the Textile Workers . Union, were to be charged 
1. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 446. 
2. ibid., page 400. 
J. CAPE TIMES, 18 June . 1935. 
4. DIE WARE REPUBLIKEIN, Novent>er 1940. 
5. CAPE TIMES, 10 May 1944. 
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1 
with "wrongfully and unlawfully conducting a charitable institut ion11 , 
2 because of having stt up a strike fund for the workers. (This case 
3 was later withdrawn). 
The above examples illustrate the extent and diversity of measures 
which could be and were used. As with the statutory measures, however, 
part of the effectiveness of the law in this regard lay in the dis-
couragement of worker action which the control entailed. Organisation 
which the state or capital percieved to be against their interest could 
provoke either criminal or civil charges being alaid against the 
organisers. The very diversity and uncodified nature of the range of 
options open to the prosecutors increased the uncertainties and dangers 
involved in provoking their anger or fear. The laying of charges, 
when successful, resulted in fines or prison sentences. Even when not 
successful, the costs, in terms of money, energy and time~ were 
often heavy, as amply illustrated by the case against Basner described 
above. 
Ill 
Cone 1 us ions 
The measures described in this chapter were used to control the more 
"extra-economic" activities of the workers, or the economic organisation 
which overflowed acceptable boundaries. The extent to which it was 
applied to different groups of workers, however, depended on three 
related factors, namely, 
a) the extent to which other acceptable methods of posing economic 
and other demands were provided, 
b) the extent to which organisation of the group was seen as consti-
tuting a threat to the interests of capital or the state, and 
c) the importance attached to the granting of the liberal "freedoms" 
to the group in terms of ideological hegemony and support for the 
rulers. 
The ICA and Wage Act provided acceptable channels for the demands of 
1. The Charitable Institutions Control Ordinance, No 50 of 1926. 
2. CAPE TIMF.S, 26 June 1935. 
3. CAPE TIMES, 16 July 1935. 
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the more privileged strata of the working class. White male workers 
and artisans in particular, could use these measures to attain limited 
ends, and were thus, to some extent, saved from the need to use more 
threatening methods. Access to Parliament provided another channel 
for more political demands. As a supportative class, and as part of 
the electorate, the restriction of the freedom of this group were 
less acceptable, and would have called into question certain important 
ideological tenets of a 11free caphalist system1'. 
Other workers were not protected to the same extent, being covered, 
if at all, by such general acts as the vastly inferior Factories Act. 
As less favoured workers they were also more likely to have demands 
for more fundamental changes. The vast majority of black workers 
were excluded from the ICA, and often from the Wage Act, while being 
restricted by the "Native" Acts and the Masters and Servants Acts. 
Unskilled whites, and particularly females, constituted an inter-
mediary position. They were enfranchised, and potentially capable 
of falling under the ICA or Wage Act, while exempt from the more 
restrictive 11Native11 Acts. The actual composition of the ICs, and the 
operation of the Wage Act, often served to work against their interests 
and ignore their demands, however. They were thus also often forced 
to resort to other, less economistic, and less restrained, action. 
The ''Native" Acts and Masters and Servants Acts applied chiefly to 
African workers, or to those attempting to organise them. The other 
Acts and measures - the Riotous Assenblies and the whole gamut of 
statutory and non-statutory controls described in Section II - could 
potentially be used against both black and white. No statistics are 
provided for prosecution and conviction under these measures, and their 
VPIY nature makes such empirical evidence impossible. Evidence thus 
tends to be anecdotal and suggestive, and depends very much on the 
sources available and utilised, and the contacts and knowledge the 
various authors and informants have in their possession. It appears, 
however, that the main use of the measures in the period from 1924 to 
1945 was against the unskilled and/or black workers, and their organi-
sations - the CP, the ICU, and, one suspects, the Nationalist Party, 
although the left sources do not dwell on the latter. Changes and 
extensions to the statutory measures over the years support this 
contention in that they appear to correspond to and be aimed at the 
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growing movement amon~ the unskilled. Skilled workers were mot!! 
literate and had easier access to ptblication than unskilled workers. 
The relative paucity of examples of action against such workers and 
their organisations is thus probably an understatement of their 
relative invulnerability rather than an overstatement. 
It was where organisation cut across colour lines that hostility 
clauses could most easily be used. It was in situations where there 
were no anti-victimisation provisions that the hindering of strikes 
and organisation was most easily effected, and indeed were most 
likely to be necessary. It was the poorer workers for whom the 
costs in terms of both time and money were most prohibitive. Legis-
lation in which white workers had ~t least a minimal say was unlikely 
to restrict their freedom to quite the same extent as it restricted 
that of the unenfranchised. 
The majority of laws analysed in this thesis aimed to incorporate 
at least a section of the workers. While controls were imposed, 
concessions were also granted. The measures were framed so as to 
appear to protect workers, rather than working only in the interests 
of capital. The laws analysed in this chapter were, on the whole, 
more explicit in their aims and ambit. The protection of labour was 
not an issue. The aim of thP. measures was the maintenance of "law 
and order" - and this meant hindering organisation in all its aspects 
so as to protect the hegemony of capital. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN INDUSTRIAL HEALTH 
Production can be a dangerous process. The progress of technology 
involves the use of ever bigger, more complex, and thus possibly 
more dangerous machinery. The extraction of raw materials and the 
manufacture of processed materials can involve processes detrimental 
to the health of those workers involved. With the passage of time 
medicine and medical knowledge also advance, but the motor force 
behind the society is that of the production of conunodities, not 
of social health and ~ell being. It is the former which generates 
profit, not the latter. 
Workers' health continues to suffer because of the way in which pro-
duction and society are organised. Thus, as seen in Chapter Five, 
1 above, on the Factories Act , despite advances in technical and 
medical knowledge, production appears, at least between the years 
1924 and 1945, to have become more dangerous for the individual 
workers. 'However, workers suffer not only from the hazards of 
work, but also those "of belonging to the working class, because 
2 disease and your position in society are closely linked." Low 
income and the resultant poor housing, poor nutrition and generally 
poorer "quality of life" all contribute to a less healthy existence. 
The state did little to ameliorate the basic form of society. Wo~kers 
continued to suffer because of lower incomes and poorer living con-
ditions associated with their position. Within the workplace, however, 
steps were sometimes taken both to minimise dangers and to compensate 
for injury suffered. 
In Chapter Five, on the Factories Act, the measures taken to minimise 
the dangers inherent in the production process, in the interests of 
continued production and reproduction, were analysed. In this chapter 
the measures taken to repair_the harm occasioned by the dangers will be 
examined. These were both social secu ri~ for the workers, in the 
form of compensation,and private security for the employers, in the 
way of compulsory insurance against common law liabilities and protection 
of the workforce. In addition, it can be seen as part of the mechanism 
examined in the Factories. Act, whereby capital augments its own efficiency. 
1. Page 16~,supra. 
2. Patrick Kinnersley, THE HAZARDS OF WORK, 1975, page 8. 
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As examples of this type of legislation, the Workmens Compensation Act, 
(WCA), and the Miners Phthisis (MPh) Act will be examined. The first 
WCA was .. passed in 1914.~ It was frequently amended! In 1917 (Act 
11), 1931 (Act 29), 1934 (Act 59), 1936 (Act 38)
2
, 1941 (Act 30) and 
1945 (.Act 27) • . The period 19l4 to 1945 was thus an important and 
interesting one in regard to this measure, and illustrates important 
developments in terms of just what such industrial health legislation 
involves. Most of these amendments incorporated major changes in the 
Act. It is thus instructive to study the Act chronologically to see 
how and why it was altered at different times. 
3 
The first MPh Act was introduced in 1911~ even earlier than the first 
WCA, but in this case applied only to the mines. The Act ts examined 
here chiefly for the insights it affords as to the differential 
treatment of different sectors of the workforce, and different 
groups within these sectors. This also provides important indications 
as to the nature of all such concessionary legislation. 
Section I of the chapter will describe the changes in the WCA between 
1914 and 1945, and examine the forces advocating such changes as well 
as their effect once put into operation. Section 11 will look at the 
problem of colour discrimination in the Act, both in terms of different 
provisions and the different positions occupied by these groups of 
workers. Changes in this respect will also be linked with changes in 
the workfor.ce. Comparison of colour differentiation in th is Act with 
that described later for the MPh Act will illustrate si~nificant 
differences in the two area. Finally, Section III will examine the 
actual operation of the WCA to see how the factors described in the 
previous two section affected the payment of compensation. 
Sections IV and V deal with ·the MPh Act, in order to show the treatment 
afforded these workers because of the special importance of mining to 
the economy and the specific forms of organisation there, both in terms 
of the labour process and in terms of labour organisation. Sect ion IV 
will give a brief history of the legislation from both the economic 
and political angles. A description of tuberculosis and silicosis 
will also be provided in order that the form and effects of the 
legislation can be appreciated. 
1. Act 25 of 1914. 
2. A minor amendment relating only to alluvial diggirgs and i~nored here. 
3. Act 12_ of 1911. 
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With this background, Section V will then examine the discrimination 
in the MPh Act, a discrimination shown by differential treatment of 
the workforce in their jobs, differential scales of compensation, and 
differential treatment,when illness was discovered,beyond the mere 
payment of pecuniary compensation. 
Finally, Section VI will draw some conclusions from the description 
of the two measures previously provided as to the general nature of 
industrial health legislation - the forces advocating it, the forms 
it took, and to whose advantage it ultimately operated. 
I 
1914 - The original act 
Before the passing of the 1914 Act, a worker's remedy in the event of 
an accident at work lay in a common law suit against the employer for 
negligence, with the onus of proof of negligence resting on the 
worker. N~gligence is, however, a very vague concept and "involves the 
further test of •reasonable foreseeability•, which has been. shown up 
as vague, capricious and subjective when. applied to anything more 
complex than bows and arrows or horses and carts. Some learned judges 
are able to forsee very little; .others, hy taking a complex succession 
1 of events step by step, are able to forsee almost anything." 
The difficulty of proving negligence and the high cost of civil liti-
gation rendered the common law right under the Roman-Dutch law . 
2 3 4 minimal. Before Union, the Transvaal . , Natal and the Cape passed 
various laws extending this common law right to some .. xtent, but it 
was only with union that an extensive law, based on the British Act, 
5 was passed. Under the common law the liability to pay compensation 
only existed if blame could be laid directly at the employer's door, 
the employer NOT being liable for damage 11due solely to the fault 
of the worker, to chance, to force majeure, to some risk inherent in 
1. K.W. Wedderburn, THF. WORKER AND THE LAW, 1965, page 184. 
2. Act 36 of 1907. 
3. Act 12 of 1896. 
4. Act 40 of 1905. 
5. SOCIAL ANO INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, II (IX), pages 806ff. The information 
inmiediately following also comes from this source. 
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the work itself and unconnected with any defect either in the installa-
ation or the working of the undertaking or in the selection of the 
1 
worker. 11 The new Act provided for compensation in the case of all 
2 accidents "arising out of or in the course of .. employment" , and where 
the accident was not due to the "serious and wilful misconduct of the 
3 P.mployee 11 • This latter "misconduct" was defined as drunkenness , 
contravention of the law, or of a statutory regulation if deliberate 
or reckless disregard was responsible, or anythi~ else the magistrate 
4 might decide. 
Under the 1914 law the worker could choese between making a claim 
under the common law and making one under the new statutory provisions. 
He could not attempt to get both remedies. In the event of choosing 
workmens compensation (WC), he had to hand in written notice of the 
accident to the employer, and the two parties would then try. to 
reach agreement as to what compensation would be paid. If, after 
two weeks, such a private agreement proved impossible, the dispute 
wou1d De referred . to a magistrate, and the latter would then decide 
on the "just ice" of the case, having due regard to any pension or any 
other scheme contributed to by the employer. 
1917 - Industrial Diseases 
The passing of the WCA formed a recognition on capital's part that 
many, if not most, ''accidents'' at work were not truly accidental, but 
rather a danger. inherent in production and thus to some extent predic-
table. ''Accident" was merely a convenient name for the occurrence 
"All that it means is that the employers did not actually plan to 
5 maim or kill." But injury did not result only from sudden , cata-
strophic causes. Long-term exposure to many working situations also 
impaired the health of the workers and caused or predisposed them 
to certain illnesses and diseases. In 1917 the Act was extended to 
provide for compensation also in the case of certain industrial 
diseases. The schedule of the Act contained a list of diseases 
accepted as compensatable industrial dtseases, together with a 
L OFFICIAL LABOUR GAZETTE, March 1931. 
2. Sect ion l. 
3. This was removed by Section 27 of Act 30 of 1941. 
4. Section 41 of Act 25 of 1914. 
5. Kinnersley, page 194. 
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schedule of the industries in which each disease was applicable. In 
the case of these diseases (cyanide rash, lead poisoning and mercury 
poisoning in certain industries in the 1917 Act), the danger inherent 
in the ordinary working of capital was recognised. 
In the case of unscheduled diseases er scheduled.diseases in unscheduled 
industries, compensation was not payable even if it was proved that 
the disease arose in or out of the course of employment. The only 
exception to this would be where the disease was caused by an "accident" 
rather than the "gradual process" of merely being in constant contact 
1 
with noxious substances. In the case of scheduled diseases, however, 
there was a great improvement in the sense that the disease was deemed 
to arise out of the work situation if a scheduled industry was involved, 
and this was accepted by a court until a doctor testified, or it was 
2 otherwise proved, to the contrary. 
The inclusion of a disease in the schedule thus provided an important 
area of struggle for workers in particular industries, for example 
those in the food and canning industry for the inclusion of dermatitis. 
This disease, which is caused by a wide variety of substances commonly 
used in manufacture, could affect workers in numerous industries and 
was worst where hygiene and ~ther precautionary measures were afforded 
scant attention. 3 • The disease was recognised by the Department of 
Labour as early as 1928 as occuring in high proportions among food 
4 and canning workers. However, it was only scheduled in 1941. 
1934 - Compulsory Insurance 
The WCA, in its early form, was not effective even to the extent of 
providing the meagre compensation provided for. Whereas WC could, 
theoretically, be claimed by all those covered, the employer would 
not necessarily be insured, and the inability of small, employers, in 
particular, to pay the compensation, might not make it worthwhile. 
As the Workmens Compensation Commissioner reported in 1931: " ••• the 
measure placed the onus of paying compensation upon the employer in 
l. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1937, page 83. 
2. Section 4, Act 13 of 1917. 
3. "Occupational Skin Diseases", W96/l, 1949?, a publication of the 
Workmens Compensation r.ommissioner, provides a long list of all the 
substances which can produce dermatitis. 
4. SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVIEW, 1928, page 937. 
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whose service the workmen is injured, and whilst many employers insure 
their workmen against this risk, the practice is by no means general, 
and it is understood that many employers, both in large and small 
concerns, prefer to carry their own risks. When the financial stability 
of the employer is beyond question (more likely with bigger concerns - D.B) 
little may be anticipated, but in other circumstances the result of 
a serious accident to any considerable number of employees may be the 
insol~ency of the employer and the penury of the .injured workmen 
1 or their dependants." The situation suited neither workers nor 
those employers who did insure themselves. The latter were usually the 
owners of larger establishment, who, due to the greater risks incurred 
by a larger workf_orce, felt constrained to undertake insurance. In 
so doing, however, they added to their costs, and thus were at a 
relative disadvantage in relation to their uninsured competitors. 
So unsatisfactory. was the WCA deemedto be in the original form, that 
before the 1924 election one of the six points on which the PACT was 
formed ~as the promise of a new WC Bill. 2 By 1930 nothing had as 
yet been done, however, and the debate surfaced again, with a select 
committee set up to consider amendments to the Act. 3 Both workers 
and organised industrial capital recognised the need for compulsory 
insurance. The workers favoured a state scheme along r.anadian/ 
Australian lines, and it was in this form that the Cresswell Bill4 was 
actually drafted. A ·central fund, into which employers would pay premiums 
according to the number of workers they employed, was to be established 
under state ausprices. All claims for WC would be directed to this fund. 
The TYPO JOURNAL commented on the many "satisfactory features" of this 
bill from the viewpoint of the worker, the chief among them being 
that "the whole question of compensation would be removed from the 
profit-making atmosphere entirely, and the unfortunate workman would 
4 consequence, receive a larger amount of justice. 11 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1932, page 50. 
2. HAD, .1934, col 4648. 
3. SC 13-1931. 
4. Quoted in FORWARD, 25 March 1937. 
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At this stage, however, organised colIDllerce and industry were opposed 
to any measure "stamped with pronounced socialistic ideas which 
1 
eliminate private enterprise. 11 INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SOUTH AFRICA, 
a representative journal for these fractions, ~eported that, 
"colIDllercial opinion is unanimously opposed to the principle 
of State insurance ••• It is impossible to justify the 
removal of the highly technical business of insurance 
from the sphere of many competent and expert corporations 
and its transfer to three government nominees, none of whom 
will bear the weight of responsibility involved in conuner-
cial competition ••• The financial risks arising from 
control without direct responsibility will become a burden 
upon the employer instead of being, as under the present 
system, borne entirely by private insurance companies. 11 2 
The General Manager of the Sun Insurance Company complained that the 
new scheme would mean that the companies would "lose an important 
3 section of their business" , perhaps a more important viewpoint for 
commercial capital than their purely ideological attachment to the 
freedom of enterprise. 
This attitude is supported by FCI evidence to the Select Committee 
on the bill. The FCI declared itself in favour of compulsory insurance, 
but not in favour of 4 a state run scheme. 
Mining caP.ital was not as concerned with the outcome of the debate 
as the other fractions of capital. Mining was more accident prone 
than other sectors of the economy, but it was also more organised. 
These two factors - the high accident rate and the concentration of the 
sector - had encouraged the early establishment of a compensation arrange-
ment satisfactory to capital. As early as 1894 the Rand Mutual 
Assurance Company was started. By 1914 half of the mines had joined 
this self-insurance scheme, and by 1931 all were included. Section 83 
of the 1931 bill exempted all those insured with "a mutual association 
which was established .prior to the commencement of the Act" against 
any liability to pay compensation to such workmen under the Act. (It 
appears that the Rand Company was in fact the only such association then 
1. GAPE TI~S, 16 April 1931. 
2. May 1931. 
J. CAPE TIMES, 25 March . 1931. 
4. CCI Annual Report, 1932, page 17. 
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in existence.) As such, the Act would not affect mining materially. 
Ideologically and politically, however, their interests lay with 
the other capitalist fractions, and they· thus also declared themselves 
1 
opposed to state interference with private enterprise. 
Agricultural capital was also exempted from the Act. Workers . in 
agriculture could not claim compensation unless employed 1'in connect ion 
2 with any vehicle or . machine, driven or worked by mechanical power". 
Agriculture presented no evidence to the Select Coumittee. Despite 
the fact that farm workers 7 whether on mechanised or non-mechanised 
farms, were presumably more likely to suffer an accident than clerks 
in business, who were covered, debate on the question was minimal. 
The majority of farm workers were black; agricultural interests were 
strong. It was realised that there would be "a tremendous outcry from 
the agricultural interests in this country if the farm labourers were 
included in the Bill. 113 
The dispute over the question of state insurance was a protraced one. 
Both the Select Committee and a departmental technical committee found 
in favour of a .state scheme, but capital's corrbined strength was such 
that the Cresswell Bill was dropped. But the need for compulsory 
insurance was still felt by strong. groups within both capital and 
labour, and thus, after a second select committee,a new bill was 
intr.oduced in 1934, this time with provision for insurance by registered 
private companies. 
By this time the positions of the protaganists had changed slightly 
with regard to their attitude towards insurance. The departmental 
committee had proved fairly conclusively that a state fund would mean 
substantial savings for employers, with the same benefits for workers. 
The FCI, the representative of industrial capital, thus reversed the 
position they had held in 1931, and favoured a state mutual fund, run 
by a board under a chairman who was a lawyer, with equal representation 
1. Memorandum to Select Committee, page viii. 
2. Section .5 (1) (g). 
J. SC 1-1931, comment by Steytler of the Nationalist Party. 
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1 of capital and labour. This departure from pure free enterprise 
2 
was, they felt, justified in terms of the legal compulsion to register. 
Although capital was generally opposed to state interference, where 
the arguments in favour of it were strong enough in economic terms, 
resistance diminished. In this instance the decreases in insurance 
costs were seen to be significant enough to compensate for the loss 
of a principle. 
Mr Barry, representative of mining capital, also found himself forced 
to support the state fund, although mining as a whole still remained 
3 largely unconcerned about the outcome. Commercial capital was adamant, 
howeveri- 11 •••• the association of Chambers of Conunerce considered 
that the (private) company system should he adopted irrespective of 
4 cost • 11 Commerce proper consisted largely of smaller firms, with 
lower danger .rates, and their insurance costs were thus lower than 
that of industrial .capital. Insurance companies were an important 
part of the commercial (at once time the chairman of an insurance 
5 company was actually chairman of the Federated Chambers of Conunerce) 
and were some of the larger firms in this fraction. There were thus 
strong forces in this group favouring private insurance rather than 
a state-run scheme. 
Despite the fact that both the TUs and the FCI - the latter being 
responsible for 85% of the premiums - were in favour of a state 
scheme, the 1934 Act was passed, giving effect to compulsory insurance 
by private companies. Labour was not strong during this period, and 
their voice was thus dulled. Without their collaboration, big capital 
did not yet have the strength to force compulsion and a state scheme. 
The new go~ernment was one in which the South African Party, the 
party most representative of commercial capital, had triumphed at 
the expense of labour, and the Act reflected this triumph. 
The 1934 Act introduced other changes as well. A WC Commissioner 
was appointed to supervise the running of the Act. After an accident 
1. FCl memorandum to Select Committee. 
2. ibid., page 112. 
3. SC 15-1934, page 60. 
4. HAD, 1934, col. 4632, quote from Select Commission. 
5. ibid. 
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the worker and employer were still, as under the old Act, given two 
weeks to settle the matter by a private agreement. Where this proved 
impossible, the matter would be referred to the WC Commissioner, who 
would attempt to settle it, and only in the event of his failure 
would the dispute reach the courts. Of the earlier Act it had been 
stated that it "seemed to breed litigation". and "almost _every time 
a working man has gone to court, whether he has won or lost his case, 
1 he is a loser". As with the English law, 
"There may be a dispute as to whether an accident happened 
at all, or whether if the accident did happen, it arose 
out of and in the course of the employment, or as to 
whether the workman is still incapacitated, or, if he has 
partially recovered, to what extent he is fit' for light 
work, or, if he is fit for light work, whether owing to 
the state of the labour market he is unable to obtain 
light work. rr2 
Costs and difficulties of litigation greatly diminished the available 
benefits. The new Act, by obviating the need for court hearings in 
many cases, was thus of advantage to the workers. The Commissioner 
was also to receive detailed returns from all the licensed insurance 
companies and no agreement was binding until approved by him. From 
all this information he was able to assist in whatever way he could 
in the limitation of industrial accidents, and to collect statistics. 
Until 1934 the worker had been abl~ to choose between a WC claim, 
which was relatively easy to prove, and a civil claim under the conunon 
law. The latter was much more difficult to prove, but could entail 
.much higher benefits. 3 Common law also provided that an employer was 
responsible for the torts/delicts of his servant, and thus invited 
the possibility of compensation where a fellow worker was responsible 
4 for the accident. The 1934 Act, as a quid pro quo to capital for 
compulsory insurance (This was the way in which it was seen, although 
it appears that capital was in any case not opposed to compulsion), 
removed all right to common law remedies, except where this was granted 
in addition to WC, in cases where the accident was due to the employer's 
negligence. Even here, however, the amount was restricted to "pecuniary 
1. HAD, 1934, col. 4634. 
2. Mavis Hill, JUSTICE IN ENGLAND, 1938, page 157. 
3. SC 13-1931. 
4. ibid., page 64. 
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, )'-
1 os s ••• suffered or ••• reasonably ••• expected to (be) suffered 
as a direct result of the accident. 11 In regard to accidents caused 
l 
by 11 strangers" (which included those caused by fellow workmen ) 
the employer could claim any compensation payable from the stranger 
by civil law, and so also avoid this responsibility. If the accident 
was due to the fault of the employer, it was thus the insurance company 
which paid out, with the slight possibility of ext.r.a fro~ the___e_mployer 
in the case of gross negligence. If the accident was due to the 
fault of a fellow workman, the latter paid, tne employer again escaping 
responsibility. If the worker himself was responsible, there was 
no compensation. In a danger fraught process, accidents could and 
did happen, and all were liable to make mistakes. When workers 
made mistakes,. they had to pay for them. The 1934 amendment to the 
Act constituted a great advantage to capital, from which the possibility 
of substantial claims was now removed, whoever had caused the accident. 
The compulsory insurance instituted by the Act was thus total insurance, 
except in the case of negligence. Workers• rights under civil law -
rights which were potentially much greater than WC - had been whittled 
away. In the 1914 Act provision had been made for the worker to 
choose between WC and a civil claim. The 1934 Act removed all 
recourse to civil law. 
Medical Aid 
The Act introduced higher rates of compensation for all workers, but 
also introduced a totally new concept - that of medical aid. All 
workers injured at work, whether entitled to other WC benefits or 
not, were to receive free medical aid on the premises, free transport 
to a hospital if necessary, and payment, according to a schedule tariff 
rate, of all medical treatment off the premises, upto an amount of £100, 
and all this would once again be paid for by the insurance. This 
medical aid was only an innovation for all those for whom it was not 
provided already under the Factories or Mines and Works Act, and it 
is difficult to say how far and for how many workers it did in fact 
introduce increased benefits~ The advantages for capital are 
however, obvious. Medical aid would ensure that workers returned to 
work as soon as possible, while saving on the costs of such treatment 
Those not receiving other WC benefits were mostly those less seriously 
injured, and thus more likely to be in a position to work again. Money 
1. Lees & Sykes v Dunkerley Bros, 1910 quot_~d in George s. Frank, 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF WCEKMENS COMPE~SATI~, 1940, page 30. 
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spent on these men was more in the interests of capital - both 
individual and social - than money spent on the permanent casualties 
of production. The logic behind this reasoning was evident, too, 
in the fact that a .permanently disabled, and thus useless (for capital) 
1 
worker, received less than a temporarily disabled one. Capital 
was more eager to help those who could later return to "help" them 
to increase production and profits. 
1941 - State Scheme 
Labour had been very unhappy about the 1934 Act. Despite the increased 
benefits, many memers of the Labour Party preferred to vote against 
the Bill because of the many unsatisfactory provisions. Within two 
years of the Act's being passed industrial capital was also voicing 
its strong disapproval. Despite compulsory insurance "many employers 
contraverethe provision of this section by failing to obtain the 
necessary policies of insurance or indemnity - •••• prosecution does 
not seem to have the desired effect ••• in one case the ••• employer 
2 actually gained by paying the fine instead of the insurance premium." 
Organised industry and the law-abiding firms, the two often coinciding, 
thus felt themselves threatened. The more important complaint, however, 
was that about the high premiums. The insurance company scheme had 
not proved to be such a bulwark of private enterprise and competition 
as had been hoped. There were, it is true, 57 different companies 
registered, but most of these were orgai ised in such a tight "ring", 
as the tariff companies, that competition was minimal. In 1940 
there were only five insurance companies which were not part of this 
ring, and one of these was the fledgling Mut:ua. Insurance Company run 
3 by industrial capital. 
The tariff companies were those insurance companies which had banded 
together on the issue of WC to agree on common rates and tariffs and 
thus reduce competition between themselves. These companies had 
4 promised at the outset to work on a 65:35 ratio. The original inter-
pretation of this was that the companies were to claim 35% of all 
1. HAD, 1941, col. 6799. 
2. Dept. Labour Annual Report, 1934, page 103. 
J. Dept. Labour Annual Report, pages 74-75. 
Company is discussed further below. 
4. Dept. Labour Annual Report, 1935. 
The Mutual Insurance 
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premiums paid by the employers for themselves, the remaining 65% 
to be dis~ributed in the form of claims and of refunds to the insured 
in the case of over-insurance. This, after refunds, gave an effective 
1 benefits:expense ratio of 54,3:45,7. ln the face of complaints at 
the high rates, it was agreed to include the refund money in the 
calculation, with 65% of gross premiums to be paid out, and 35% to 
2 be retained for "administration". (Any interest earned on the fairly 
large amounts involved accrued to the insurance companies and was 
not included in any of these calculations.) 
3 In Parliament it was disputed that this ratio was adhered to. The 
confusion could have arisen out of a different interpretation of the 
ratio in Parliament, where the concept seem to be that of 
(interest and premium): benefits, a ratio given as 58,5:41,5. This 
point was, however, not picked up by the insurance companies, and the 
allegation that the companies did not stick to the agreement is thus 
very plausible. 
Whatever the case, industry was not satisfied. The Rand Mutual 
Association had a claims:expenses ratio of 91:9. A state scheme 
4 had been calculated as costing 20 to 25% less than private companies, 
and overseas experience bore this claim out. With the political 
situation still the same as in 1934 the agitation for change failed. 
The 1936 complaints met with a proposal that the companies be given 
three years grace in which to prove themselves. Meanwhile the FCI 
and the building industry employers set up their own mutual associations. 
This was a difficult procedure in view of the geographical and economic 
extent of these sectors at this stage, but was one seen as preferable 
to the expense of private insurance. Thus in 1937 the Federated 
Employers Mutual Assurance Company was formed in the building industry, 
and in the following year the Chamber of Industries Mutual Insurance 
Company was registered and began business, the primary object being 
to "afford members of the constituent organs of the SAFCI the utmost 
relief from heavy premium charges by way of rebates from available 
1. ibid., page 82. 
2. ibid., page 88. "Paid Out" here means compensation paid. 
3. HAD, 1941, col. 67 83. _ 
4. FORWARD, 25 March 1937. 
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1 profits. 11 (This company was registered as a private company, and 
not under the Act, although the reason for this is not clear.) . After 
the formation of these companies the complaints from capital were 
heard no longer. Many were once again in favour of free enterprise 
2 insurance, so long as they were insured cheaply themselves. The 
ratio of the Mutual Company was not given anywhere, even to the WC 
Cormnissioner, but industry was probably more prepared to trust its 
own people in running the scheme, rather than allowing control to 
pass into the state's hands. The Federated Employers Mutual Assurance 
Company appeared to make very satisfactory progress. In 1941 it was 
reported that since its inception a total pr.emium income of £225 000 
had been received. Of this, refunds in excess of £83 000 had been 
made, in the form of reduced premiums, rebates, etc. 3 
By 1941 the political situation had· changed. A new coalition govern-
ment had been formed to help gain support for the war, and the 
Labour Party formed part of this government. There was still a 
fairly strong opposition to a state scheme from, fur example, the 
4 Associated Chani>ers of Commerce of South Africa, but the political 
interests of capital as a whole favoured a scheme of pacification 
of the worker, and the latter was still strongly in favour of a state 
scheme. Despite the fact that the insurance companies, with the 
increased pressure, felt II justified in proposing to alter the 65 :35 
ratio to 75:25 115, it was too late • . The political pressure was too 
strong. Mr Pocock, South African Party Menber of Parliament, and a 
6 "shining light of the Pretoria Chanber of Commerce" , "made it very 
clear that the only reason why the opposition to the State Insurance 
scheme has not been even more intense is that they hope the Bill will 
7 act as a bribe to workers to support the government• s war effort • 11 
In terms of the new Act all accidents were to be reported to the WC 
1. CCI Annual Report, 1938, pages 10-11. 
2. HAD, 1941, col. 6805. Mr Hooper. 
3. SOUTH AFRICAN BUILDER , May 1941. 
4. CAPE TIMES, 16 April 1941 
5. WC Insurers Association of South Africa, 11 Supplementary memorandum11 
CAPE TIMES files, Public Library. 
HAD, 1934, col. 4624. 6. 
7. CAPE TIMES, 24 April 1941. 
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Commissioner. Private agreements as to compensation between worker 
and employer were disallowed, and the Commissioner would investigate 
all accidents and adjudicate what compensation should be paid. Com-
pensation would be paid out of a state fund to which all employers 
would contribute on the basis of their wage budgets, with a rebate 
or surtax related to their accident rate. 
The .1941 Act had two aims. The first was the institution of a state 
scheme and the second was that of increased benefits. The second 
was envisaged as linked to the fir st. Employers were not to .. pay any 
more for these increases. Rather, the new system would allow the increase 
for the time being, on the same premium basis. Compensation rates, 
though raised, were thus no reason for capital to oppose the Act. 
Exemptions from the Act remained substantially the same - agricultural 
and domestic workers were still excluded, as were mutual associations 
registered prior to April 1940 (in effect only the Rand Mutual and 
the Building Association). These fractions of capital had obviously 
1 "again proved too strong for the Minister". A new exemption 
however, was that of all employers with less than five workers. 
Although not exempt from the compulsion to pay compensation, these 
employers were not obliged to register with the WC Commissioner. 
The reasons for this were not spelled out, although the cost of 
2 administration was hinted at. As these employers constituted 
75% of the total and employed 16% of the ··white workers alone, 
and as they were the ones least likely to be able to pay insurance, 
3 exemption of these was a substantial one. A possible reasons, 
additional to the administrative one, is the generally disorganised 
nature of workers in smaller concerns, and thus the decreased danger 
to the state of unrest and dissatisfaction among them. 
II 
The changes in the pro.risions of the WCA through the period have been 
described and discussed. In Section Ill these changes will be examined 
insofar as they affected benefits received under the Act. In this 
1. HAD, 194l,col. 6795. Schoeman about Charooer of Mines. 
2. HAD, 19ll, Borlase. 
3. HAD, 1941, col. 6801 for figures. 
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section it is necessary to digress to examine another aspect of the 
Act. In outlining the provisions an important area has been omitted -
that of colour discrimination and differentiation. 
The 1914 Act had excluded from compensation all those worker whose 
contracts of labour were governed by the Native Labour Regulation Act 
of 1911. This latter Act had provided for compensation, but at levels 
described as "meagre and scandalous" by the WORKERS HERALD. 1 The 
table below compares the provisions under the measure and the WCA of 
1914. 
TABLE7.12 
COMPENSATION PROVISIONS UNDER WCA of 1914 and NATIVE LABOUR REGULATION 
ACT OF 1911 
-----
Degree of disablement WCA Native Labour Reg Act 
Partial disablement Up to 50% X W (pdl) £1 - £20 
Permanent total Up to 3 years w or £30 - £50 
£750 
Death (to widow) Up to 2 years w £10 
-
(In the above, and all following tables the following abbreviations 
are utilised: w = wage; pdl - periodical payment; p.m. = per month; 
p.a.= per annum; lump= lump sum payment.) 
Table 7.2, calculated on the average black wage for 1924/5 of £41,8 p.a.: 
gives the comparative benefits under the Act with the above scales. 
TABLE 7. 24 
COMPENSATION UNDER WCA of 1914 and NATIVE LABOUR REGULATION ACT OF 1911 
COMPARATIVE BENEFITS BASED ON AVERAGE BLACK WAGE FOR 1924/5 
Degree of disablement WCA Native Labour Reg Act 
-
Partial disablement £20,9 p.a. £1 - £20 once only 
Permanent total £125,4 once only £ 30 - £50 once only 
Death £83, 6 once only £10 once only. 
-
The complaints of the WORKERS HERALD w~re quite clearly justified. 
The benefits under the Native Labour Regulation Act were "meagre and 
scandalous." In all cases a black worker received less than would a 
1. 15 February 1926. 
2. Information from the compensation clauses of the two acts. 
3. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 62- 1951, Table 37. 
4. Calculated from Table 7.1 and wage of £41,8 per annum. 
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comparable white worker. 
In 1934 the Native Labour Regulation Africans were included in the main 
Act, but discrimination was retained in that they were dealt with in 
separate sections of the Act. This laid down different rates and 
different conditions for African workers injured at work. 
If an African worker was temporarily disabled, yet received food, 
quarters and medical aid from the employer, the amount payable was 
reduced by his not being eligible f6r compensation_for the first 
six months of disablement, and only receiving up to 25% of the benefits 
for the rest of the period1, whereas the other workers would only be 
disqualified for the first few days of disablement, and then whether 
or not receiving such food and quarters. Titis clause was found to 
11cause much dissat isf act ion, hardship and many anomalies. 112 Because 
of the migrant labour system and the paternal and restrictive atti-
tude towards African workers, many men were housed in compounds or some 
other form of company housing. Even those usually providing their 
own food and lodging were often forced to submit to hospital treatment 
at a hospital nominated by the employer. Married men with families 
were thus the main sufferers. The employer had only to pay for 
accomnodation for the worker, and saved on the worker's wages. 
3 Meanwhile the rest of the family lost their breadwinner. 
Further discrimination existed in practice, both prior to and after 
1934. A few examples illustrate this. In the case of African 
compensation, it was the Native Affairs Department which administered 
the system. This department was less au fait technically with the 
4 workings of the Act and also associated in the minds of the ppopulation 
with far less pleasant tasks of administration. The GUARDIAN complained 
of the fact that .Africans, in filling out application forms for WC, 
had to state their poll tax receipt number on the claim, and that 
in the absence of this they would be declared delinquent, and not 
5 receive compensation. 
1. Section 69. 
2. Dept Native Affairs, 1937, page 66. 
J. De~t Labour Annual Report, 1936, pages 75-6 for further details. 
4. SC 15-1934, page 97. 
5. 4 JunP 1937. 
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1 It was only in a trial in 1948 that the Appeal Court overturned a 
lower judge's decisions and declared that colour or "culture11 did not, 
or should not, affect the assessment of pain or suffering, for this 
"could not be determined by whether the injured person was rich or 
poor, and certainly not by reference to his race. 1' Prior to this 
most cases, or many cases, were determined by this criterion • 
. With regard to medical aid, however, Africans were different even 
in the eyes of the explicit legislation. Different rates were pro-
vided for them, for example in the medical tariffs schedule2, where 
it was stated that "fees and charges in respect of services rendered 
to Native workmen shall, where not specifically provided for, be 
50'7. of the fees or charges herein prescribed. 11 The WC Commissioner 
admitted that "especially in Native cases, the amount payable by the 
employer is far too small, and frequently does not cover the costs 
of the necessary treatment. 113 
As far as diseases were concerned, the same diseases were usually 
scheduled for black and white alike. In the case of hookworm, however, 
the position was overtly on a colour bias. Management on the mines 
had "known for many years" that a high percentage of the African labour 
on the mines suffered from this disease. It appeared, however, to be 
restricted to these workers. After renewed investigations in 1926, 
cases were found among the white miners in two of the deeper mines, 
4 and immediate steps were then taken to eradicate the disease. The mines 
5 began to pay compensation shortly afterwards of their own accord, and 
in 1934 this compensation became obligatory under the WCA for 
"workmen other than Asiatics or Natives. 116 For Africans and Indians, 
however, it was not deemed necessary, for as Barry of the Gold Producers 
Conmittee explained, it was "· •• not a disease ••• (for these workers) 
it is an ordinary parasite which does not harm them at all whereas it 
injures the Europeans. 11 7 
l. Radebe v Hough, 1949, 819 SA 380 at 385, quoted in Albie Sachs, 
JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1973, page 150. 
2. Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 Deceni>er, 1937. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1936, page 55. 
4. Dept Mines Annual Report, 1927. 
5. SC 13-1931, page vi. 
6. Schedule to Act 59 of 1934. 
... 
7. SC 13-1931, page 4. In view of the fact that most Africans were 
housed by the mines, it is noteworthy that bad latrines were responsible 
for the spread of. the disease. (Dept kines Annual Report, 1927, page 107) 
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As far as ordinary compensation for accidents was concerned, the 
situation was not quite so simple. The tables below compare the 
compensation payable to Africans and non-Africans in te~ms of the 
1934 Act. As before the provisions of the Acts are first given, and 
then calculations on both scales based on the average African wage 
at the time, namely , £41 p.a. or £3,42 p.m. 
TABLE 7~31 
COMPENSATION PROVISIONS FOR AFRICANS AND NON-AFRICANS UNDER WCA 1934 
Degree of disablement Wage group Africans Non-Africans - - -- - - - --- - --
Total permanent £0 - £5 £75 lump \ x w less than £20 
£5 - £10 £75 - £150 \ x w. between £20 
£10 - £13/6 / 8 £150 - £225 and £33/6/8 
Above £13/6/8 Graduated 
Temporary total 60% pdl 60% pdl where w less 
than £20 
35% between £20 and 
£33/6/8 
Death Upto 80% of Upto two years 
total perm upto £500 
Upto £37 5 
Upto 18 months 
(In both these cases the srnal lest 
of the alternatives applied) 
--- --
TABLE 7 .42 
COMPENSATION FOR AFRICANS AND NON-AFRICANS BASED ON AVER.AGE AFRICAN WAGE 
Degree of disablement African Non-African 
Total permanent £75 £1, 71 p.rn. 
Temporary total £2,05 p.m. £2,05 p.m. 
Death Upto £60 . Upto £82 
The two tables on the following page give similar information as 
regards the 1941 Act, this time taking the average wage at £47,3 p.a., 
or £3,94 per month. 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, u; 62 - 1951 
Schedule to Act 59 of 1934. 
2. Own calculations based on above table. 
, Table 37. 
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TABLE 7.51 
COMPENSATION PROVISIONS FOR AFRICANS AND NON-AFRICANS UNDER WCA 1941 
- --· ,-·------
Degree of disablement Africans Non-Africans 
-- ----·----
Total . permanent Minimum of £150 55% X W pdl 
30 x w less than £20 
Temporary 66,6% upto £13/6/8 66,6% 
Death "Equitab le11 in WC Commis- Monthly as for total 
sioner's eyes, but not permanent 
more than 80% x lump 
TABLE 7 ~62 
COMPENSATION FOR AFRICANS AND NON-AFRICANS BASED ON AVERAGE AFRICAN WAGE 
--- - - -
Degree of disablement Africans Non-Africans 
Total permanent £150 £2, 17 pdl 
Temporary £2,62 pdl £2,62 pdl 
Death £120 £2, 17 pdl 
----·-
From the tables above it appears that the ordinary compensation for 
Africans was, if anything, more favourable than that for non-Africans 
earning similar wages. The African did receive a lump sum in some 
cases where the non-African received a pension, for example for total 
permanent disablement. Such a lump sum was often desired by non-
Africans in preference to their pensions, and was more sensible for 
Africans in view of the difficulty in the "homelands" of receiving 
smaller amounts regularly. Thus even this can not be seen as a real 
disadvantage. 
-
The seemingly reverse discrimination is however misleading. Non-Africans 
did not receive the same wages as Africans, and thus would not receive 
the amounts calculated above. The former's average wage was £18,3 per 
month, compared to the £3,42 used in the calculations for 1934 above, 
and this fact was implicit in the different maximum cut off points 
for the two groups, of £13/6/8 for Africans and £33/6/8 for non-Africans 
in 1934. While the payments were progressive, the poor workers suffered 
more, obtaining merely a fraction of their a.lready subsistence level 
wages. While most workers, white and black fell within the ambit of 
the Act (Compare average wages in Table 1.1 of Chapter One, above), it 
1. Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 62 - 1951, Table 37. 
Schedule to Act 30 of 1941. 
2. Own calculations based on above table. 
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did not afford much aid to the poorer ones. In 1937 the GUARDIAN 1 
noticed the large nunbers of workers receiving less than £8 per month, 
a fact borne out by the average annual wage in manufacturing of &78,7 
for "coloured" workers and £41,0 for Africans 2• As the Act provided 
for workers to receive 60"/o of the first £8 of their wages, if a worker 
rec ieved £6 at this time, the WC pay ab le would be £3 .12, 11 f ar fr om 
sufficient to allow them to maintain themselves and their possible 
dependents. 113 In 1929 even the government's S~IAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
REVIEw4 recognised the "inadequacy of the material assistance given ... 
as the majority of people require their full wage to live on when in 
5 
good health." 
The GUARDIAN also claimed that these workers were those who suffered 
most injury and disablement. This is not borne qut by the accident 
figures, which show a proportionate nunber of accidents to employment 
among whites, but the death figures do show a black bias. This suggests 
that it was perhaps the inadequacy of the black reporting of accidents 
that disguised the fact for accidents, while deaths could not be so 
6 easily hidden. The WC Commissioner noted in 1948 that "die getal 
sterfgetalle onder naturelle is meer as vier keer so groot as die 
van alle ander rasse, hoewel die getal ongevalle wat aangemeld is, 
ongeveer dieselfde is. Dit sou gevaarlik wees om enige gevolgtrekkings 
uit hierdie feit te maak. 117 The only apparent conclusions which can 
be drawn from this is the fact that it aris!s from the fourteen day 
proviso for accident reportage mentioned in the Factories Act, the 
ignorance of the law by the African workers, and their sense of futility 
with regard to claim compensation. Another possible contributory cause 
for th~ proportionately higher death rate is the worse medical attention 
afforded them. 
1. 5 March 1937. 
2. £6,7 and £3,4 p.m. respectively. (Industrial Legislation Commission, 
ix; 62-1951, Table 37). 
3. FORWARD, 5 March 1937. 
4. July, Vol VIII. 
5. In 1938-39, the first year in which such a study was undertaken in 
South Africa the Batson survey showed 50% of all black Cape Town house-
holds below the POL. This measure errs, if anything. on the low side. 
as admitted by Batson himself. (AN INTERIM REPORT, 1942. page 13) 
6. See. however, Chapter Five, pp.164ff, above. 
7. Dept Labour Annual Report. 1949, (English not available in library). 
page 86. 
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Despite the higher proportions of deaths of Africans and the 
relatively favourable compensation rates, the outcome of the dis-
crimination inherent in the social system as a whole and WC practice 
in particular was a situation where, in 1936, of the total workers 
receiving compensation 41% were African. Yet these men and women 
1 received only 21,5% of the total compensation paid out. Both the 
FCI and the white TUs must have been aware of this intrinsic nature 
of the discrimination. Both - with the Mine Workers Union included 
in the latter - declared themselves in favour of the removal of 
2 outright colour discrimination in the Act. · Although the removal 
of overt racial discrimination provided both negative and positive 
effects from the viewpoint of the African, social inequality would 
maintain the differentials whatever the changes envisaged. 
lll 
The WCA underwent major changes in the period under discussion, as 
seen in Section I. It is instructive to look at how these changes 
in the mechanics of the Act affected the payment of compensation, the 
ostensible reasons for its promulgation in the first instance. 
The changes in the Act incorporated fairly substantial increases in 
the rates of compensation provided. The provisions are complicated 
and not easy to compare. From Table 7.7, which gives the compensation 
for non-Africans for the 1914, 1934 and 1941 Acts, some idea of the 
increases can be gained, nonetheless. Thus compensation for temporary 
disablement increased from a periodic payment of 50% of the wage to 
66,6'%.; compensation for permanent disablement from a lump sum of three 
times the wage or £750, or periodic payment of 55% of the wage, and 
compensation for death from a lump sum upto twice the annual wage 
to compensation as if total permihent disablement had occurred. 
The actual amounts paid out in compensation are also difficult to compare. 
Prior to 1934 there was no WC Commissioner and no statistics were 
collected. One thus can not compare the 1914 Act with the later ones. 
In. 194? a new Act was passed instituting increased benefits, and one can 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1936. Own calculations. 
2. HAD, 1941, cols. 6825, 6850. 
TABLE 7. 7
1 
WC COMPENSATI~ UNDER THE ACTS OF 1914! 1934 and 1941 - N~-AFRICAN RATES ·----
Degree of Disablement 1914 1934 1941 
Temporary 50% x w, pdl, for a year at 60% X W under £20 166,6% x w under £20 
most 135t x w between £20 &· £33/6/8, 137,5£ x w between £20 & £33/6/8 
pdl, for upto 6 months pdl, for upto 6 months 
(Reduced pensions obtainable after the first 6 months) 
Permanent (100"!.) Lump sum, upto 3 x annual w, 50% x w under £20 plus 55% x w under £20 plus 
or upto £750 25% x w between £20 & £33/6/8, 27,5% x w between £20 & £33/6/8 
pdl pdl 
- - - - . 
Permanent partial 3 x annual deficiency in w, % of total permanent if be- % of total permanent if be-
or upto £375 tween 40% and 100"/. 25% and 100% 
16 x w less than £20 plus 10 x w less than £20 plus 
6 x w between £20 & £33/6/8 if 6 x w between ·£20 & £33/6/ 8 
less than 40%, lump sum if less than 25%, lump sum 
· - - -
Death (if widow but Upto 2 x annual w, lump sum Upto 2 x annual w or upto £500, Monthly pension as if totally 
no children) lump sum, smaller of options and permanently disabled 
Cut Off Point £400 p.a., i.e £33/6/8 p.m. £750 p.a., i.e. £62/10 p.m. 






thus not compare the period under discussion with the post-1945 period 
as this is not a ceteris paribus situation. There are only statistics 
from 1936 to 1945 for comparison. 
The amounts pa~d out in this period increase up until 1939 and then 
take a dive, which becomes even sharper with the introduction of the 
1941 Act, with its increased rates. This is despite the increased 
cost of living at this time and the increased amounts which would be 
expected, and despite the fact that because of the illegality of private 
agreements, all compensation was included. Table 7.8 gives the total 
amount paid out in WC, both for medical aid and ordinary compensation. 
from 1936 to 1945, the total number of workers receiving benefits, and, 
calculated from these two amounts, the average compensation going to 
each workers. It shows a decrease in total compensation only from 
1939 onwards. However, despite a constant increase in the number of 
workers receiving benefits, the average compensation did not show even a 
significant initial rise, and by 1945 was less than half of what it 
was in 1936. (£5,79 compared to £11,32). 
rAai1( La1 
COMPENSATION PAYMENTS UNDER WCA BETWEEN 1936 AND 1945. ·-
Year Total Compensat-ion No of Workers Average compensation 
-- ----
1936 £669 953 58 579 £11,44 
1937 £780 331 68 908 £11, 32 
1938 £832 652 77 016 £10,81 
1939 £906 308 81 892 £11,07 
1940 £881 857 94 988 £ 9,28 
1945 £694 600 --------- --- 119 883 £ 5, 79 
The decrease could be explained by a number of factors. The statistics 
under the new scheme are not strictly comparable, due to different 
reporting methods. The novelty and disorganisation involved in a new 
scheme, the exclusion of the mines in the overall average, due to 
the fact that they were still covered by the mutual association, whereas 
they had previously signif icantly increased the average, the increased 
percentage of African, and thus lower paid, workers who were compensated 
(53% in 1945 compared to 39,7% in 19382) - all these help to explain 
1. Dept Labour Annual Reports, own calculations. 
2. ibid. 
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a decrease in the average compensation. An increasing concen~ration 
on medical aid rather than true workmens compensation, sensible from 
capital's point of view, would also lower the average. But these are 
all conjectures, and account mainly for the initial rise (from £10,81 
to £11,32) in the average compensation and the subsequent fall (to 
£5,79) but are not adequate to account for the extent of this, nor the 
drop in total compensation. The report of the WC Commissioner itself 
offers no explanation, and does not even remark on the decrease. The 
Department of Labour does however note that during the "7ar years "die 
popul;re aantrekkingskrag wat (die nuwe Wet) \rel gehad het, is deur die 
1 dramatieser eise van die oorlog oorskadu11 • Despite the increase in 
accidents during the war, from 683 with 73 dead and 731 injured in 
19382, to 2 796 with 84 dead and 2 803 injured in 19453, the staff of 
the WC Comrnissioner was cut down during the period. By 1945 the WC 
Comrnissioner was complaining that at one stage they were 15 000 cases 
4 in arrears with the processing of claims. 
Thus, while the war, as shown, encouraged the passing of a new, more 
liberal act, it also had the effect of hampering the operation of 
the Act. The second tendency more than counterbalanced the first, and . 
the workers suffered overall. 
The introduction of a state scheme was yet another step in the setting 
up of an administrative legal process rather than a judicial one, a 
process observed in regard to other legislation in the period. The WC 
Comrnissioner adjudicated on all matters, and recourse to the courts for 
appeal could only be had on very limited grounds, i.e. 
a) on questions of interpretation of the law, 
b) on the question of whether the accident was due to the misconduct of 
the worker, 
c) on the quest ion whether the award was "unreasonably" large or srna 11, 
d) on the question of additional · compensation for negligence on the 
employer I s part. 
The powers of the Minister and WC Conmissioner were such that it was 
l. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1949, page 84. 
2. Dept Labour Annual R.eport, 1938, page 87. 
J. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 58. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Report, ' 1945, page 67. 
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suggested by the opposition in Parliament that a mo12 simple wording 
for the wordy Act, and one which would have embodied the same 
principles and procedure, would have been, 
11 A Workmens Compensation and a Commiss !oner sha 11 be 
appointed by the Union Government, who shall have 
discretion, which shall be final, to control and dic-
tate on matters relating to Workmens Compensation in 
respect of accidents or industrial diseases. 111 
This was not at all how labour had envisaged a state scheme. Their 
preference, as well as that of the FCI in 1934, had been rather that 
of a state mutual fund run by a board under a chairman who was a 
lawyer, and with equal representation of capital and labour. State-
run, for them, meant a type of self-government - with the emphasis 
on removal from the private sphere, rather than the institution of 
state authoritarianism and bureaucracy. 
The avoidance of litigation, and a supposedly paternalistic WC 
Commissioner, both aims of the new state Act, did not mean that all 
injured workers received compensation. The WC Commissioner continued 
to act on the principles established by the courts prior to 1941, and 
screened all cases thoroughly to see that they fell 1'within the four 
corners of the Law112 .. The WCA provided compensation for all"accidents 
arising out of or in the course of employment1'. Mavis Hill reports 
that these "ten words in the Workmens Compensation Act have been the 
subject of many hundreds of reported cases in about one-third of a 
century. 113 Although she wrote about the English situation, it would 
apply in South Africa, as "where a Union Act is passed in substantially 
the same terms as an Imperial Statute, and the latter has been autho-
ritatively construed by a Court of Appeal in England, the South African 
Courts will incline to adopt that construction. 114 South African 
courts would, on the whole, accept principles of interpretation laid 
down in English courts. The various judgments quoted below are un-
related and chosen rather arbitrarily. They do, however, provide some 
idea of the greyness of the definition of 1'accident 11 • 
1. HAD, 1941, col. 6810. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 68. 
3. Hill, 1938, page 79. 
4. H. Lawrence, in Introduction to Frank, 1940, page 2. 
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"It is quite hopeless to attempt · to reconcile the 
decisions in the various cases in which the meaning 
of the words 'arising out of and \n the course of 
employment' had been considered. 11 
" (These) words must mean ••• in the course of the 
work the man is employed to do and what is incident 
to it - in other words, in the course of his service. 
'(They) do not m'an 'during the currency of the time 
of engagement 1 1 
"All matters reasonably incidental to a man's employ-
ment should be considered to be part of it •113 
"It is not enough for the applicant to say:_ The acci-
dent would not have happened if I had not been engaged 
in this employment, or if I had not been in that parti• 
cular place. The applicant must go further and say: 
The accident arose because of something I was doing in 
the course of my employment and because I was exposed 4 by the nature of my employment to some peculiar danger. " 
"If there be no direct evidence as to how an accident 
happened and the facts proved leave it equally possible 
that it did not arise out of the employment, the bur-
den is not discharged. n5 
The last case, in particular, illuminates the very restrictive inter-
pretation often given by the courts: 
"· ••• hut we are all agreed that an accident has to be 
something of an exceptional nature, something which 
cannot be traced merely to the cumulative work of a 
6 dangerous process or place of work going on for years. 11 
This greyness of interpretation allowed capital, with the help of 
clever legal argument, to escape much of its responsibility prior to 
1941. But the 1941 Act did not make it any easier for labour. Table 
7.9 gives the statistics for 1945. In this year there were 119 883 
claims accepted, while 327 were rejected. The reasons for repudiation 
were such as to suggest that arguments similar to those used prior 
to 1941 still held strong sway, only now the grounds for appeal, 
always limited for the indigent worker, were even more restricted by 
statute. Of those that were rejected, the largest nuni>ers were 
rejected for reasons usually advanced in the courts prior to 1941, 
1. Sullivan,-1 in Hutchinson v Irish Electrical Company, 1935, 28 BWCC, 
Supp., in Frank, 1940, page 141. 
2. Lord Finlay, in Frank, · 1940, page 6. 
J. Slesser LJ, in Frank, 1940, : ~age 7. 
4. Cozens-·Hardy, -~n f'ra~,, · 1~40,- page 6. 
s. Collins"MR, in ,Dept ,Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 83. 
6. Kennedy LJ, in Dept Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 85. 
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the accident not having arisen out of the employment (32,7%), non-
satisfactory evidence of the accident (27,8%), and the accident not 
having been the cause of the disablement,(18,71.) . 
No. rejected Reason for rejection 
1--------- -------- - -- --- ------- - - ---+-- -
Unsatisfactory evidence of accident 
Medical evidence didn't support claim 
Accident not cause of diablement 
Accident not arisen out of employment 
Farm worker 
Wage more than £750 per annum 





















The workers would probably only succeed if they could show that they 
things they were doing at the time of the accident were 11natural to 
the worker, are not or will not be objected to by the employer, and 
do not to any significant extent interfere with the performance of 
the worker I s duty. 112 With this limited interpretation, even the 







Miners Phthisis differs from WC in that MPh is an industrial disease, 
while TB is a socio-economic disease, and neither of them are accidents 
as such. Any and every worker working the unhealthy atmosphere under-
ground is likely to contract the diseases, merely through being there. 
The seriousness of the state of affairs with regard to MPh on the mines 
was recognised very early in South African history. An investigation 
of the possibility of some sort of regulation was conducted as early 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 70. Own calculations. 
2. Kinnersly, 1975, page 276. 
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as 19oi1, with the first ineffective mining regulations being passed 
in 1905. 2 The second commission was in 1910, and reported that the 
adult death rate on the mines was six times that of the ordinary 
population. The following year, after a third conwnission, ·the first 
MPh legislation of the form of our period was passed. 
The MPh Act 3 provided for the compensation - both in money terms for 
all workers, and in alternative opportunities for white workers -
of silicotic and tuberculous workers and their families. A permanent 
Miners Phthisis Board was set up, whose job it was to assess claims, 
institute legal proceedings, and investigate, set up schemes, and 
help in any other way it could to find employment for those 
workers and their dependants. Parallel to this board was a Medical 
Bureau, whose job it was periodically to examine all miners, to 
present evidence to the board, and to assist in the research and 
compilation of statistics and a schedule of approved medical prac-
titioners. 
All workers, both "miners" (white) and "Natives11 , were to be examined 
before commencing work on the mines, and then periodically throughout 
their employment, for the detection of silicosis and/or TB. On de-
tection of either of these illnesses, the worker would either be 
restricted in his employment to certain jobs, or debarred from the 
mines altogether. According to the seriousness and nature of the 
disease, he would be awarded monetary compensation calculated on his 
prior earnings, and on the death of any miner diagnosed as resulting 
from silicosis, compensation would be paid out to the dependants. 
The money for the compensation was to be obtained from a fund contri-
buted to by all employers on scheduled mines, calculated on the basis 
of 30% proportionate to earnings on that mine, 50% proportionate to 
the silicosis rate, and 20% proportionate to tax paid. 
As with WC however, the extraction of the precious metals wa; more 
precious to the country than the 11cream of South Africa• s population, 
reduced by phthisis to a hopeless physical wrecks11 by work on the mines. 4 
r. HAD, 1925, col. 1496. 
2. Commission on Occupational Health, 1976, page 5. 
3. The 1925 Act forms the basis for this description. 
4. FORWARD, 8 October 1937, quoting Van Den Berg. 
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A min~ng engineer recently . confessed that ventilation directly affected 
the silicosis rate. The extent of ventilation provided, however, is 
a cost-benefit calculation. Costs of ventilation have to be weighed 
up against the increased benefits to the health of workers. 1 One can 
thus not see MPh " as simply the inevitable and lamentably unavoidable 
result of metalliferous mining in hard quartzite rock of the type found 
on ••• the Rand 11•2 The prevalence of MPh is a function of changes in 
the production process and thus of the prevalence of dust. · 
Nevertheless, MPh legislation and the various bodies set up did take 
steps to try and alleviate the danger inherent in the work, but the 
MPh legislation itself was basically one of provision for procedure 
after injury rather than curative or preventive. The 50% calculation 
on the silicosis rate of the individual mine, and pure self-interest, 
did encourage the mine owner to improve the conditions on the mine 
as much as was possible given the profit restraint. The dust content 
of underground air did drop from 4,9 mg/m3 in 1915 to 
1,1 ne,/m3 in 1924 and .0,8 in 1935, but the absolute annual number of 
silicotic cases continued to rise. 3 The graphs which follow show 
the rate per thousand for the different diseases and different colour 
groups. Absolute employment was, however, increasing all the time, 
and so was the absolute nunber of sufferers. As Munnik said in the 
1925 debates in Parliament, "Our legislation on this matter savours 
very much of closing the stable door after the horse has been stolen. 114 
5 The Diseases 
Silicosis, i.e. MPh without TB, is a disease of the lungs caused by 
breathing in minute particles of silica dust, the latter being almost 
the sole constituent of quartz and similar rocks and the Witwatersrand 
6 mines containing a very high percentage of free silica. This dust, 
of which the smallest particles are the most noxious, is caused mainly 
through drilling, the three main sources, in order of descending 
1. Pr iv ate informant. 
2. G. Burke & P. Richardson, "The Migration· of Miners Phthisis between 
Cornwall and the Transvaal", , History Workshop, 1978, page 7. 
3. MPH Prevention Committee, 1937, page 67; MPh Medical Board Report, 
1924, UG 46-1925. 
4. HAD, 1925, col. 1467. 
5. E. Katz, "A General Overview_of Silicosis: History Workshop, 1978. 
6. MPh Prevention Committee, 1937, page 32. 
FIG. 1. 
INCIDENCE OF- THE THREE COMPENSATABLE DISEASES AMONGST EUROPEAN 
MINERS ON THE SCHEDULED MINES OF THE WITWATERSRAND. 
1927-1928 to 1943:...1944. (In rates per 1,000 per annum). 
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importance, being blasting, impact and fraction, and evaporation. All 
of these, necessary in the wet drilling process most "efficient " on 
the Rand, contribute to the dust content, and affect the different 
workers according chiefly to their jobs,(and thus proximity to these 
processes),and to their prior health and thus general living conditions. 
The lungs are capable of ridding themselves of such dust until the 
quantity becomes too great. Thus after a few years, or with improved 
1 conditions, nineteen to twenty years, the lungs can no longer cope, 
they become inflamed, with resultant scar tissue and fibrous nodules. 
This then permanently affects the lungs• functioning. The worker 
proceeds through stages, from a situation where there is not necessarily 
a decreased ability to work but radiographically the disease is de-
tectable, to a stage where he is able to work at reduced capacity, and 
finally a stage where he is unable to work at all. 
The link between silicosis and TB is so close that MPh legislation 
covers both diseases. Silicosis is not contagious and is contracted 
from the air breathed in, but TB is contagiru s and is more prevalent 
where the individual is more susceptible due to lungs weakened by 
other respiratory diseases. In all stages of silicosis TB both accelerates 
the deterioration process and is itself more likely to be contracted 
due to the weakened resistance of the worker and the cold and wet 
conditions under which he works. Thus the MPh Medical Board reported 
that "it is ••• we 11 understood that while preventive measures 
against "Miners Phthisis" must be constantly directed to the production, 
dissemination and inhalation of dust, they must -also be no less con-
stantly· directed to the prevention, so far as may be possible of the 
production, dissemination and transmission of tuberculous infection 
amongst European and Native mine workers. 112 Tab le 7 .10 below shows that 
TB greatly increased the dangers of the disease. 
TABLE 7 .103 
RATE OF DEATH WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DIAGNOSIS OF DISEASE/S 
96/1 000 of simple silicotics 
350/1 000 of simple tuberculotics 
691/1 000 of tuberculotics and silicotics. ___ -::.::._--- ·----------- ------- -----------------
J. Gustav Freedman, in MINEWORKER, October . 1937. 
2. Report, 192_7, page 39. 
3. MPh Medical Board, 1924, page 12. 
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Inadequate changing houses, infer.ior housing and compounds, all 
increased the risk of infection with TB, and the seriousness of both 
1 
diseases. 
Silicosis was individually probably the most important and widespread 
2 of all strictly occupation diseases. Apart from mine workers, groups 
such as quarrymen, tunnel workers and masons, all those working 
with sandstone, granite, slate or flint, were at risk. It was, 
however, only on the mines, and even then only on certain scheduled 
mines, that MPh legislation applied, while silicosis only became a 
scheduled industrial disease under WC in 1941, and then only for 
excavation work. 3 This can be explained by the nature of the mine 
work force, their place in the social formation, and the importance of 
the mining industry in the economy as a whole. 
Conditions on the mines 
Numerous analyses of early mining have been attempted. What is stressed 
in the work of such as Davies4and Johnstone5 is the position of the 
white miners .in this sector, a position which developed ear lier and 
in a more exaggerated manner than in industry, but which laid the 
basis for the latter's developmental pattern. The white artisan was 
outnuubered by about 9:1 by the African workers, as opposed to a much 
lower ratio in the rest of industry. 6 In the former the whites also 
came more and more to play a supervisory and coordinating role, rather 
than a productive one, both because of the smaller proportion and 
for reasons such as the nature of the conmodity concerned and the 
need for a cheap labour force in the face of a set product price. 
1. Burke and Richardson, 1978, page 13. 
2. MPh Medical Board, 1935, page 9. · Kinnersley (1975, page 133) is 
of the opinion that dermatitis is the commonest industrial disease. This 
discrepancy could be due to changes over time, or in different areas, 
or to the fact that the classification of someone as suffering from 
dermatitis has a subjective element which is not easily verifiabl9. 
Kinnersley (page 139) provides additional information on silicosis. 
J. Act 30 of 1941, Schedule. 
4. R. Davies, CAPITAL, THE STATE AND WHITE WAGE-EARNERS, 1977. 
5. F .A •. Johnstone, CLASS, RACE AND GOLD, 1976. 
6. 54:36 in 1934/5; 58~42 in 1934/45,respectively in private industry. 
Chapter One, above, provides more detailed information on the different 
colour compositions of the sectors. 
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The white workers thus developed into what Poulantzas has termed 
1 the "new petty bourgeoisie". As such they were one of the groups 
most susceptible to be bribed into supporting capital and thus 
a group laying an important and influential role in such organisations 
2 as the Labour Party. 
Burke and Richardson compare the progress of. MPh and related legis-
lation in Cornwall and on the Rand. They explain the passing of 
legislation in 1911 in the latter areas by factors such as 
a) the al Uance of Het Volk with the Labour Party_. 
b) the militancy of the white miners, 
c) a decrease in the white:black ratio, which, with the discriminatory 
measures, meant a decrease in relative cost, 
d) the deskilling of whites, which meant that there were less white 
rock drillers at risk, 
3 e) the threat that the labour force would become a wasting asset. 
All these factors point to the specific place of the whites in the 




Within MPh legislation the differing remedies taken with regard to 
the different groups illustrate their different positions within the 
work situation and the social formation as a whole. The officials, 
all white, were estimated to have an advantage in respect of silicosis 
4 liability of about 10 to 15% , and in 1937 it was reported that "the 
European miner ••• is not so much exposed to machine dust as was his 
predecessor. The actual drilling is now done by Natives under the 
5 supervision of the European miner. 11 Nevertheless, the legislation 
benefitted the whites more than the blacks. 
1. Davies, 1977, for elaboration. 
2. D. 0 1 Meara, 11White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner 
Nationalism11 , SOtrrH AFRICAN LABOUR BULLETIN, I, 10, April, 1975. 
3. Burke and Richardson, 1978, page 17. 
4. l MPh Medical Bureau. 1935, page 3. 
5. MPh Prevention Committee, 1'The Prevention of Silicosis on the Mines 
of the Witwatersrand11 , June 1937, page 4. 
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The legislation with regard to white miners seemed, together with 
the obvious management objective of lowering the illness rate, and 
thus preserving their skilled workforce, to have been aimed at a 
genuine attempt to compensate the workers in some measure for their 
lot. The compensation came in the way of monetary benefits - pension 
and lump sum payments - and in the way of schemes to provide alterna-
tive employment for the maimed workers and their dependants. (The 
latter obviously also aided capital by reducing the compensation 
necessary). With regard to African workers, however, the aim was 
more that of excluding the sick or sending them off to the reserves 
upon discovery, thus both avoiding the payment of compensation and 
avoiding the spreading of infection. 
The discriminatory aim was facilitated and reinforced by the higher . 
proportion of TB, as well as, or rather than, pure silicosis among 
Africans. A situation where white and black miners suffered in 
the same proportions from compensatable TB and silicosis would have 
given figures of 1,00 in all columns in Table 7.11 below. Figures 
above 1,00 show relatively severe incidence of the particular 
disease among blacks. The actual figures in the table thus show 
that TB was relatively more prominent among black than white 
workers, while simple silicosis was less prominent. 
TABLE 7 .11
1 
RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF DIFFERENT DISEASES AMONG WHITE AND BLACK WORKERS ------- -- - - -- ---·--------------
Disease 1916/7 rate 1923/ 4 rate 
---· - - - ---- --- ---------- - -~-- --- -
Simple silicosis 0,009 0,017 
Simple TB 2,22 3,64 
TB and silicosis 0,2 1,06 
- ------·------·--·-----------~---------------'-
In 1928 the MPh Medical Bureau admitted that there were 1 200 cases 
of active TB among African workers on the mines2, and a report to 
the Mine Managers of the same year reported that 11 83% of compensatab le 
diseases in Natives are tuberculous; and more than half of the total 
are cases of active simple TB. 113 
1. MPh Medical Bureau, 1924, page 28. The figures are inaccurate be-
cause of discriminatory testing procedures, but ar·e intended more to 
convey an impression of a trend than to give an exact picture. 
2. MPh Medical Bureau, 1928, page 42. 
J. Gustav Freedman, in MINEWORKER, October 1937. 
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Table 7.10 above showed that TB greately increased the dangers of 
the disease, but the operative word in regard to Africans remained 
elimination from the workforce, rather than compensation or curing. 
1 The Act provided for quarterly examination of all African 
workers at the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, whereas 
othere workers were only examined every six months, and by the 
MPh Medical Board. The African examination was confined to a stetho-
scopic and weight check sufficient to detect TB in the late stages, 
that stage when it was most communicable and thus most deleterious 
for the industry. The procedure adoped is graphicaaly described 
in the WORKERS HERALD of 1927, 
"•• .Natives are periodically weighed, and when found to 
lose weight. they are sent to the WNLA Hospital for 
examination. In many cases it is found that the Native 
is just beginning or has gone well on the road to, 
phthisis. He is then marked as a TB patient and re-
patriated without any compensation;unless both lungs 
are affected, we understand, no compensation is given ••• 
nothing but a single ticket to the sure grave that awaits 
them at their homes!12 
The MPh Medical Board itself admitted that "it is the policy of the 
Native Labour Association to repatriate from the mines all cases of 
compensatable disease who are in a fit condition to proceed to their 
homes. "3 
For white miners, however, the "conditions of admission of miners to 
underground works are ••• more severe than the admission to the British 
army. 114 Non-Africans had a full radiographic examination. According 
to the Minister of Mines, only one third of the men who applied for 
5 underground work at the Bureau passed the tests. The exams were so 
effective and the sophistication of the test so improved that the 
incidence of disease among these miners dropped considerably. For 
Africans, however, the empirical picture was allegedly so poor and 
unclear that the Minister of Mines, although agreeing in principle to 
the question of pension payments to African MPh sufferers, did not 
feel free to introduce them because of the "lack of African life 
1. Section 44 of Act 35 of 1925. 
2. 12 January 1927. 
3. MPh Medical Board, 1926, page 13. 
4. HAD, 1925, col. 1454. 
5. FORWARD, 8 October 1937. 
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1 
tables on which to base actuarial calculations." By 1924 the MPh 
Medical Bureau had formed and collected radiographic records of only 
13 963 blacks, as opposed to 50 098 whites, despite the high black-
white ratio in the workforce. 2(It is not clear whe~here these 
blacks included Africans, as the latter were tested at the Witwaters-
· rand Native Labour Association Hospital). 
Meanwhile the blame for the incidence of TB among the black could not 
be removed from the mine owners. It is true that TB is not, in the 
strict sense, an occupational disease. 11The principal cause of the 
high incidence of TB is the rapid introduction of the non-European 
at a time when housing and nutrition are hopelessly inadequate. Over-
crowding in grossly unhygienic slums favours the .. spread of infection, 
and chronic malnutrition provides the soil upon which infection 
flourishes. 113 It is thus a socio-economic disease. But the African 
workers were all contract workers and thus housed and fed by the 
mines. In such a situation the disease can surely be called an 
occupational disease, and placed firmly at the feet of the capital 
which provided the accommodation. 
Compensation 
The 1925 Act, at first reading,does not appear to be too discriminatory 
in the compensation provided. African and non-African workers in 
the ante-primary and primary stages of the disease received lump 
sums calculated on the same basis. (These stages correspond roughly 
to those mentioned earlier, with the added provision that silicosis 
and TB together were regarded as secondary, whereas TB alone was 
regarded, as from 1925, as primary, as long as contracted within 
twelve months of working on the mines). It was only in the secondary 
stage that Africans still received a lump sum, while non-Africans 
4 received a monthly pension, but this was excusable on the grounds 
of the difficulty of the African, far off in the reserves, receiving 
such periodical payments. 
1. S. van der Horst in Ellen Hellman (ed), HANDBOOK CN RACE RELATIONS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1949, page 146. The two graphs above show the much 
faster decrease in white, as opposed to black, disease occurrence. 
2. MPh Medical Bureau, 1924, page 1. 
3. Gale in Hellman, 1949, page 41. 
4. Sections 22, 35; Schedules I, Ill, Act 35 of 1925. 
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There were, however, several factors rendering even the seemingly 
non-discriminatory provisions definitely biassed. 
1. The schedules were all based on wages. The average black wage 
was just over one tenth the size of the white wage, and the value of 
board and lodgings and all ex gratia payments to African workers were 
1 excluded in the calculation of wages. These two factors combined 
would have had a marked effect on the compensation paid. 
As a lower paid white worker complained, in a letter to the editor 
of FORWARD, 
"Do you consider it right that the man who receives the 
smallest wages should also get the least phthisis com-
pensation? Surely the man who was lucky enough to 
become an official or get a job with much bigger pay, 
than the daily paid man, has had a better chance to save 
something for the time when he will be laid off with 
phthisis. My idea of a Phthisis Bill is that every 
man as soon as he reaches a certain stage of the disease 
should be paid a small pension, and everyone paid the 
same amount according to the stage of the disease ••• n2 
In this regard the bl~k worker had much more room for complaint than 
even the lowest paid white. 
2. One must remember that in the first two stages of the disease 
the worker was able to continue to work, even if at reduced capacity 
as long as TB was not present He did thus not have to rely entirely 
on the lump sum payment. The 1925 Act listed among the functions 
of the MPh Board assistance in finding employment for diseased miners 
3 and their families and in setting up schemes for the same purpose, 
for the "advantage of early retirement" had been found to be "not 
very pronounced" (for the miners) in the case of simple silicosis 
4 sufferers. This job was taken seriously. From October 1916 to 
August 1929 alone, 3 875 individuals were placed in employment. (The 
6 119 jobs necessary for this purpose do not reflect favourably 
either on turnover or on the contlnued health and capacity of the 
workers).
5 
The work categories of banksmen, motor attendants, motor 
1. Average African wage was £30,4 in 1924/5, compared to £229,1 for 
whites. (Industrial Legislation Commission, 00 62- 1951, Table 37.) 
2. 13 March 1925. 
J. Section 4, Act 35 of 1925. 
4. MPh Medical Bureau 1924, pages 14, 21. 
5. OFFICAL LABOUR GAZETTE, September, 1930. 
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trolley drivers, meter house attendants, general (unskilled) surface 
workers, preparation and cartage of mining tiui>er, caretakers of 
single quarters, recreation hall and swim pool attendants, sorting sta-
tions when apart from crushers, ore loading and transport, jumpermen 
or drill sorts, surface sandfilling, reduction works assistant (un-
skilled), secretarial and time office work, firemen, stationery engine 
drivers, surface pump stations, compound guards, and watchmen, were 
all reserved for silicotics, giving a total of a thousand jobs in 
all if all became vacant. Whites could be appointed to these jobs, 
while Africans, as mentioned earlier, would get an "immediate 
1 discharge" as soon as TB was detected, and would be repatriated 
to the jobless reserves, so that their subsistence became instead 
a burden on the reserve 1 s resources. (The high proportion of African 
workers contracting TB before silicosis also acted against, them, as 
they would be repatriated as soon as the TB was first detected, while 
only receiving benefits if they managed to remain undetected until 
both lungs were affected, or they had both MPh and TB. Benefits 
for TB alone were only applicable if TB was diagnosed in Africans 
less than six months from the time of finishing work. 2) 
Even for those medically entitled to compensation there were diffi-
culties. Most Africans employed on the mines were contract, i.e. 
migrant, workers. It was difficult, if not impossible, to find 
medical practitioners in the reserves conversant with the mine 
diseases and listed in the Government Gazette as legally capable 
3 of issuing certificates and conducting examinations for MPh. A 
workers would thus return to the reserves after his, say nine 
months• work, and have been certified healthy on leaving. Although 
legally entitled to claim benefits if TB became detectable within 
six months, or twelve months if silicosis was also present, the 
absence of medical practitioners would make such detection, medically 
certified as required by the Board, unlikely, and would thus 
render compensation impossible. 
1. Section 44 of Act 35 of 1925. 
2. Section 35 of Act 35 of 1925. 




Section I of this chapter looked at the changes in the WC law upto the 
end of the period under discussion. From unlimited liability under 
coDlllon law, the position was gradually changed to provide compensation 
for "all" accidents at work, for industrial diseases, for compulsory 
insurance for all employers and medical aid, and finally, for a state-
administered scheme. As the scale of production increased, and thus 
the danger of large-scale accidents and large-scale liability for 
employers, the system of WC became institutionalised and rationalised 
to protect both sides - capital and labour - in a certain and 
predictable way. 
As in the case of all labour legislation, benefits and concessions 
for workers were granted grudgingly, and only as a result of strong 
organisation and demands on the part of workers. Where capital was 
forced to concede to these demands, however, the concessions were so 
adapted as to disadvantage it as little as possible, and in some cases 
positive benefits were actually derived. Thus, over time,compulsory 
insurance, a state-run scheme, and medical aid were introduced, as 
capital came to realise that these forms minimised the necessary 
costs and maximised the benefits of the compensation. 
Section II looked at the colour discrimination in the Act. The 
African workers were generally the unskilled workers. The pool of 
available African labour was also much larger than the white pool. 
Black workers were organised effectively much later in South African 
history. As such it was felt not to be as important to compensate 
them and insure their speedy return to the workplace as in the case 
of the scarcer (white) skilled workers. In the period 1924 tol945, 
however, the black workers gained in skill and organisation, and 
their loss consequently became more serious. Similarly, in WC 
legislation one finds a position developing where outright colour 
discrimination, as where Africans were covered by the Native Labour 
Regulation Act rather than the WCA, disappeared. Instead the discrimi--
nation inherent in the system and in the marketplace where their lower 
wages were decided, was allowed to determine the degree of discrimina-
tion. 
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Section Ill looked at the effects on compensation of the changes 
in the law. For the limited period for which statistics are available, 
the position did not appear to become more favourable for workers. A 
larger nunber of them received compensation, but then more also suffered 
in accidents. If anything, the individual worker's position deteriorated 
over the years. WC was intended more to ensure a speedy return of the 
worker to the workplace than to compensate him for the dangers of his 
work. 
1 Davies sees the WCA as being a concession to the white working 
class - legislation passed in a time of labour unrest (1914 Rand 
strikes) to cement their support for capital and the power bloc. The 
analysis of the Act presented above suggests that the concession 
was not a great one. The legislation was indeed passed at times of 
crisis - 1914, promised in 1924 with the PACT, 1934 after the 
Depression, and 1941 in the middle of the war. White workers did 
benefit more than black. But the latter benefit was a benefit inherent 
in the workplace. All workers benefitted little in comparison with 
the dangers they were exposed to. In Canada, where a similar law 
operated, it was estimated that only 6% of all accidents were serious 
enough to warrant WC claims. 2 And for those who did get compensation, 
this was not adequate. Cresswell described the position convincingly, 
"· •• put yourself in the position of a man who is suffering 
from a 20% disablement. He is looking for work in compe-
tition with three · or four able-bodied men. It is not 
20% of 301. he loses, but his ·chances of employment are 
diminished to a far greater extent. "3 
Compensation was nevertheless calculated only on the basis of 20"4 
of that applicable for total disability. 
For capital the scheme was rational. Firstly, the danger of common 
law litigation with its much higher potential damages was removed. 
Against this danger many larger employers might, in any event, have 
felt compelled to insure themselves. Secondly, as promised by the 
Minister, the new state scheme eventually developed did not mean 
increased premiums for capital. Rather they got more for their money. 
The 1944 SUD1Dary Report of the Department of Labour reported a £10,18 
1. Davies, 1977, page 30. 
2. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1949, page 84. 
3. HAD, 1934, col. 4623. 
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administration cost for every £80 paid out in compensation, a figure· 
expected to rise to £15 with the planned decentralisation and extra· 
service. especially in the way of speedier payments, to 
1 
workers. This ratio was maintained as a maximum in 1945. This 
was a great improvement for capital on the private insurance companies' 
rates. Thirdly, and perhaps, most importantly, the legislation assisted 
in keeping the workforce fit, protected and producing. Industrial 
protection schemes were initiated and discussed under the impetus of 
· the law; those partially injured were given the medical attention 
and monetary assistance necessary to help ensure their return to the 
workplace as soon as possible. As such, the legislation, with its 
medical aid and temporary disablement provisions, and its superior 
provisions for the skilled, more highly paid and scarcer workers, 
was a logical adjunct to the Factories Act and the increasing number 
of industrial accidents concomitant with expanding production. 
Sections IV and V examined the MPh Act insofar as it provided additional 
and differential compensation for TB and silicosis contacted on the 
mines. The main point to emerge was the different aims in respect 
of the African and white workers which, it was suggested, can be under-
stood by their respective place in the labour process and the social 
formation as a whole. MPh was an explosive issue among white mine-
workers. "Few Bills in the history of Parliament have caused such a 
2 stir." The stir was provoked each time MPh was discussed. In 
1925 Kentridge addressed a meeting of silicotic sufferers at the 
Johannesburg Trades Hall, where they were told that the only way to 
3 achieve anything was to organise. The following week a group of 
three to four hundred gathered in an attempt to implement his advice. 
In 1936 a new bill proposed by Duncan, Minister of Mines, had to be 
dropped after the miners objected. Hofmeyr and Duncan met with the 
South African Mine Workers Union and the Chamber of Mines in an attempt 
to keep the matter "outside the political arena" by offering a nego-
4 tiated sEC.tlement. The white milners were an important group among 
the enfranchised workers and MPh legislation was always passed at the 
1. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1949, page 84. 
2. SUNDAY TIMES political correspondent, quoted in AMBAC, May 1945 •• 
3. FCllWARD, 12 June l925J 19 June 1925. 
4. FCRWARD, 19 November 1937. 
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ti~ of an election in an apparent attempt to pacify these supporters 
of the dominant classes. As such, the compensation in South Africa 
was of a level that exceeded that paid anywhere in the British 
1 Empire. 
For black workers, however, the position was not so favourable. The 
Act discriminated against them, as did the various bodies set up 
under it. General conditions of service also placed them at a 
disadvantage in relation to the diseases. When Africans were affected 
they were usually dismissed rather than compensated. The Act dis-
played a bias which corresponded closely with the place of the white 
workers in the mining workforce in the society at large, and to their 
degree of organisation. 
However, even the white workers were not part of the dominant class. 
The compensation was good, but not adequate in terms of the diminished 
life expectancy and life enjoyment of the sufferers. Demands such as 
a) that workers be represented, on the MPh Board 2, or 
b) that all men, after seven years, be entitled to retire with £750, 
(This demand was based on the 8\ year average life of a mine worker), or 
c) that compensation be applied when a miner left South Africa~ and 
not only while he remained in the country, in analogy with dividends 
which could travel freely world wide, 
could all not be accepted. The aim of the legislation was to conserve 
the strength and health and support of these skilled workers so that 
they could continue to work, and to do this under a fimrly corltrolled 
scheme. It was not primarily to ensure a better life for the workers. 
As FCRWARD reported in 1937, 
"On various occasions the Government has told the world 
that the number of phthisis sufferers is decreasing so 
rapidly that it is almost negligible, but the moment 
they am asked for a pension for all miners phthisis 
sufferers, the burden itmnediately becomes so heavy 
that, according to the Minister of Mines, jo grant the 
demands would make the industry bankrupt." 
During the existence of the gold mines up until 1924 £850 million worth 
of gold had been produced, while compensation paid was £7 100 000. 
This constituted only about 4% of the distributed dividends of £177 000 000, 
l. HAD, 1925, col. 1471. 
2. GUARDIAN, 12 January 1939. 
3. 19 March 1937. 
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which, in turn, are ·only a portion of the surplus value expropriated 
1 
from these workers together with their health. 
Both WC and MPh legislation were introduced as a response to the 
dangers of the workplace and the resultant demands of the workers. 
The existence of both measures on the mines, and different conditions 
for black and white workers in the Acts are effects of the differing 
politicaJ,social and economic positions of these groups within the 
society. Though forced to introduce such legislation, capital was, 
however, quick to adapt it so as to derive the maximum benefit. 
Concessions were granted only when and where strictly necessary, and 
were not allowed to interfere with the continuance of production. 
At the same time the concessions were utilised in the struggle for 
concentration and centralisation of capital, and in the political 
struggle in which capital attempted to win the support of a 
section of the working class. 
1. Figures from HAD, 1925, col. 1458. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT WORLD WAR II 
With the outbreak of World War II the South African social formation 
entered a period of economic, political and ideological crisis, in which 
the "whole power of the state, reinforced by appeals to the workers' 
1 
patriotism" , was needed to ensure stability. As such additional labour 
legislation of a qualitatively different order was introduced, and the 
"ordinary" labour legislation was amended or added to. These differences 
justify a separate analysis being made of this period, to examine the 
ways in which the crisis affected labour legislation. The examination 
can obviously not be a complete one - such a task would entail a much 
longer study of its own - yet an analysis of labour legislation between 
1924 and 1945 would be incomplete if it did not take cognisance of 
a definite qualitative differencein this legislation caused by the 
outbreak and waging of war. 
Section I of the chapter will provide the political and economic back-
ground to this period. Section 11 will describe new labour legislation 
introduced during the war, as well as the ways in which the already 
existing labour legislation was adapted to meet the new demands. 
Section Ill will concentrate on the development of organisation over 
the period, as well as the measures taken to control it. 
In contrast to the earlier sections, which will concentrate primarily 
on the more repressive role of the state, Section IV will turn to 
measures involving amore conciliatory role, and attempt to explain 
the reasons for these. Finally, Section V will compare the war-time 
developments with those in the United Kingdom, and formulate some 
conclusions from the preceding description and analysis, both as to 
the effect of a crisis on labour legislation in general, and as to the 
specific effects occuring in the South African social formation. 
I 
Background to the period 
On the political scene the war brought major changes, which affected 
the course of legislation. Parliament split by 87 votes to 67 on the 
war issue. The former Smuts-Hertzog coalition was broken and Smuts, 
1. D.N. Pritt, EMPLOYERS, WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS, 1970, page 62. 
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the leader of the successful pro-war faction, became Prime Minister. 
The new regime, characterised by Simons and Simons as an "alliance 
1 
between the British mine owners and Afrikaner landlords" , was sup-
ported by the Dominion Party and by the bulk of the Labour Party, with 
the most vocal party political opposition being that of the Malanites 
in the "Purified National Party". 
The majority of white, or at least skilled, workers supported the 
war effort. The Labour Party was represented in the government and 
the important post of Minister of Labour went to their man, Walter 
Madeley. At its 1940 Conference the SATLC passed a vote in support 
of the propagation of the war. 2 The Communist Party originally 
opposed the war, seeing it as an inter-cJpitalist and inter-imperialist 
squabble. After Russia's entry into the war, however, as in almost 
all the Allied countries, the Communist International's directives 
were followed, and the policy changed to one of support for the war 
effort as a whole, and the format ion of a "United Front 11 , although 
criticism of South Africa's internal, "bread and butter" issues 
continued. 3 
The effects on black workers, as in the case of the less skilled 
and privileged whites, were more contradictory. The blacks began 
to interpret the anti-discriminatory propaganda of their oppressors 
with respect to German racism in relation to their own situation. 
The new government was, it has been claimed, even more racist than the pre-
4 war one, and the contradiction thus became more blatant. While 
many blacks supported the war effort and even enlisted, while the 
ANC was forced to support the same side as the government, and while 
workers were thus encouraged by many of their organisations to support 
the effort and enlist, other blacks continued to oppose the war and 
5 demand that domestic struggle come first. Government policy, in its 
differential treatment of black and white, both in the armed forces 
and in the labour force, did little to diminish this conflict. 
1. H.J. and R.E. Simons, CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1969, page 468. 
2. SATLC Annual Report, 1940. 
3. Cheryl Walker, Masters Thesis, 1978, pages 120, 125. 
4. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 489. 
5. Farieda Khan, Honours Thesis, 1976, on the attitudes of the Non-
European Unity Movement and related black organisations. 
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The economic effects of the war are described in the Department 
of Labour's Annual Report for 1945. 1 The demand for goods and 
services, especially those of a military nature, rose phenomenally. 
The national economy was forced to cope almost singlehanded with this 
demand because of the substantial reduction in available imports. 
These pressures greatly stimulated the economy. National income 
increased from £395 600 000 in 1939 to £666 300 000 in 19452, while the 
increased internal production of heavy machinery and other previously 
imported goods prevented the usual uneven development syndrome, where 
peripheral countries have economies which are almost totally based 
on primary production or light industry, and dependent on the 
metropole for the products of heavy industry.3 However, increased 
pressure also produced considerable inflation and increased the 
attempts by capital to cut down on all 11unnecessary11 costs. 
The recruitment of a large nunber of workers into the armed forces, 
together with the increase in production, also affected the labour 
force. The 1945 Report of the Department of Labour comments on the 
"two noteworthy features of wartime employment", namely 
a) "a notable shift of population from rural to urban areas", and 
b) "the employment fo women in war production and especially in the. 
4 
so-called •heavy industries• on a scale unprecedented in our experience." 
In a situation where white labour was scarce, black workers flocked to 
the towns and began to fill some of the more skilled positions which 
had been closed to them in earlier times. The percentage of Africans 
5 in urban areas increased from 18,4% in 1936 to 23,7% in 1946 , and 
many of these newcomers joined the industrial workforce. White women, 
likewise, began to be employed in new areas where men had previously 
worked. The war thus witnessed an expansion of industrial activity 
and organisation among these less-privileged workers. African trade 
union menbership, for example, increased from about 37 000 to 100 000 
between 1939 and 1945.6 The state attempted both to protect and 
1. Page 30. 
2. UNICN STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page S-3. 
3. The literature on this subject is too vast to be quoted here. 
4. Page 2. 
5. UNION STATISTICS FOR FIFTY YEARS, page A-10. 
6. I. Davies, quoted in Walker, 1978, page 157. Thfs figure is 
definitely on the very conservative side, as evidenced by a figure of 
158 600 for the Council of Non-European Trade Unions alone given 
in R. Barge et al, THE CASE FOR AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS, 1977, page 4. 
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and safeguard the interests of the absent white male workers and to 
keep industrial peace, to "ensure that the Home Front should not be 
1 
disturbed by industrial unrest in times of war." 
II 
Labour control measures during the war 
The existing labour legislation regulating wages and conditions of 
service, and the WCA, Miners Phthisis and Factories Acts, were not 
rescinded during the war. They were superceded or extended by 
2 proclamations and regulations under the War Measures Act. 
This Act, passed"···· to indemnify the government and persons acting 
under its authority, in respects of acts done in good faith in defence 
of the Union, the maintenance of public order and the prosecution of 
3 the war .... " , empowered the Governor-General, menbers of the Executive 
Committee of the Union or provinces, Defence force offieers, employees 
of the government, or any person 1'acting by the direction or with the 
consent of" any of the above, to make regulations and do certain acts, 
and precluded any legal action, civil or criminal, against any such 
individual '~y reason of any act in good faith advised, conmanded 
or done by him ••• with intent to provide for the defence of the union, 
to maintain public order, and to ensure the effective prosecution of 
4 the war•••" · The way was thus open for ful 1-scale regulation and 
control of any and every field of the economy and society where the 
authorities considered this necessary. 
Under this Act measures were introduced which limited the small degree 
of control over their conditions thus far won by workers. War Measure 6 
of 1941 provided for a Controller of Industrial Man Power, a post to 
which Ivan Walker, a Labourite, was appointed. In terms of Section 5 
of this measure, the Controller was empowered 11to take such action as 
he deems necessary to ensure that the resources of any controlled 
industry (resources include labour - DB) are used in the manner calculated 
1. CAPE TIMES~ 22 June 1940, quoting Ivan Walker. 
2. No 13 of 1940, plus amendments. 
3. Preanble . to Act 13 of 1940. 
4. Section 3, Act 13 of 1940. Emphasis added. 
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to yield the best results in the interests of the defence of the Union 
or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for the maintenance of 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community." To 
achieve these ends he could, among other controls, prohibit individuals 
1 from performing work of a specific type in a controlled industry, force 
2 them to do such work, prohibit the engagement, resignation or discharge 
3 of a specified worker or class of employee, lay down hours of work, 
4 5 wages, etc., determine disputes, terminate or suspend the employment 
6 of an individual in any particular establishment, transfer an individual 
7 from one industry or establishment to another, terminate or suspend a 
8 contract, and, finally, "with the approval of the Minister, do any 
act which in the opinion of the Minister is necessary for the purpose 
9 of carrying out his duties under these regulations." 
A much later amendment allowed the Controller to "prohibit or require 
the performance of any act ••• by any person who ••• could be employed 
in a controlled ••• or similar industry, or by any class of such 
persons ••• and to control and determine all matters relating to the 
occupation and employment, suspensions, resignation, discharge, transfer 
.10 and working conditions of such persons. In making any of the above 
regulations, the Controller was, as from 1941, entitled to differentiate 
between areas, classes of establishment, workers or employers on any 
basis he deemed advisable. 11 
Control under these measures was instituted early in the war. On 19 
March 1941 the Government Gazette carried a notice declaring the 
engineering industry a controlled industry~2 and on 29 August building 
was declared controlled~3 Later the same year the stevedoring industry 
1. Clause S(e), Act 13 of 1940. 
2. ibid.' clause S(d). 
3. ibid.' clause 5 (f). 
4. ibid.' clause 5 (h). 
5. ibid.' clause 5(1). 
6. ibid., clause 5 (j). 
7. ibid.' clause 5(k). 
8. ibid.' clause 5(1). 
9. ibid.' clause 5(n). 
10. Government Gazette, 17 March 1944, clause 6(a)(lv). 
11. Government Gazette, 10 July 1941. 
12. Government Notice 1226. 
13. Government Notice 403. 
-252-
was controlled, 1 2 as was the boot and shoe trade in Septeuber. 
Control measures within these industries were then passed regularly, 
varying from delimitation of minimum and maximum ordinary and overtime 
hours, 3 restriction of further employment of certain classes of workers,
4 
5 
restriction on the size of construct ion to be undertaken, to ful 1 
6 scale wage awards along the lines of a wage determination. In 1944 
7 
"some 40 000 employees were covered by awards under . the War Measures." 
Most of these measures were passed to further the war effort in the 
strict sense. Engineering and building, in particular, were pre-
sumably key industries in a war economy, and the boot and shoe trade 
was also connected with the war effort. It appears, however, that 
the measures were also used for labour control and repression with no 
direct relation to the war. The declaration of stevedoring in August 
was occasioned by a major wage strike among the togt labourers at 
8 Durban docks. The government notice placed the stevedoring industry 
of the country as a whole under control, but only laid down wages and 
conditions for Durban, where the strike had occurred. After a further 
9 strike in June 1942, involving 4 000 workers, yet another measure 
was passed, again only for this city, and specifying increased wages 
and overtime pay. Stevedores in Cape Town continued meanwhile to be 
governed by an IC, while Port Elizabeth and East London docks remained 
uncontrolled. The Department of Labour itself admitted that steve-
doring "was dee lared a controlled industry in August 1941 in order to 
10 enable the Controller to deal with a strike in Durban. 11 Documented 
unrest in engineering and building11 suggest that stevedoring was not 
the only industry where control was used in this way to put an end to 
"labour unrest" rather than in direct propagation of the war effort. 
1. Government Notice 1162. 
2. 24 Septea:ber 1941. 
3. E.g. Government Notice 859 for engineering. 
4. E.g. Government Notice 981 for engineering. 
5. E.g. Government Notice 969 for building. 
6. E.g. Government Notice 1163 for togt labour . in Durban. 
7. Dept Labour, Summarised Report, 1944, page 2. 
8. GUARDI1AN, 28 August 1941 for full description. 
9. GUARDIAN, 18 June 1942. 
10. Dept Labour, Summarised Report, 1944, page 2. 
11. OFFICIAL YEAR ·BOO~, 194lf 1.L. Walker and B. Weinbren, 2000 CASUAL-
TIES, 1961, page 372. 
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Department of Labour Reports appeared in abridged form or not at all 
for the major part of the war, and empirical evidence is thus 
difficult to find. In 1945, however, the only war year for which such 
information is available, of the total white workers involved ·in 
strikes (in all industries, not only the controlled ones), 135 were 
in the building industry, 482 in leather, 140 in footwear, 153 in baking 
1 and confectionery, 10 in furniture and six in fishing. The con-
centration of these incidents in those industries which were controlled 
suggests once again ~hat control, even when connected with the war 
effort, was not unconnected with straightforward control and suppression 
of labour unrest and orgnisation. 
While allegedly passed to control both labour and capital, it appears 
that the war measures were used more to restrict labour than to restrict 
capital, a bias illustrated by the case of the Walker award. 
In 1943 a dispute had developed between Clark, a building employer, and 
his employees. Walker was appointed as arbitrator and his award was 
published on 10 April, 1944. Protests resulted on both sides. The 
important objection from the employer's side was that the award declared 
that profits in excess of 5\1 should go into a wage stabilisation fund. 
In the Supreme Court it was held 11 ••• that the powers of the arbitrator 
were confined to making an award only in respect of such matters as 
for med the subject of the dispute ••• 11 He could lay down rates of wages 
but he could not lawfully fix a limit on annual profits. 2 Even the 
establishment Amalgamated Engineering Union stated, after this verdict, 
that it was "self-evident ••• that the national energies of this 
country have been directed towards the old established selfish paths 
3 of private money-making. 11 
While control of manpower thus granted increased powers to the state in 
relation to labour, other labour legislation was shown to be even 
more weak and ineffective than usual in controlling capital. The 
4 Department of Labour's Annual Report for 1939 affirmed that it was 
1. Dept Labour, Annual Report, 1945, page 24. 
2. Thomas Clark & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Justice and Minister of 
Labour, TPD, 1944, in SOUTH AFRICAN . LAW JOURNAL, LXI, 1945, page 249; 
Wa~ker and Weinbren, 1961, page 188. 
3. Walker and Weinbren, 1961, page 205. 
~. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1939, page 2. 
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"of the greatest importance that there should be no thought of curtailing 
depart~ntal activi t ies under the wage regulating measures which have 
brought about the present very satisfactory relations between employ-
ers and employees", and in 1944 there were 463 000 workers under WDs and 
1 156 701 under IC measures. The original war measure instituting 
control of manpower forbade the Minister from regulating those workers 
under !Cs, as a step which would conflict too openly with the policy 
of self-government for responsible industry. Yet these pre-war measures 
were not adequate. The CAPE TIMES reported in 19422 that a suggestion 
that industrial legislation should be brought up to date had received 
strong support from both workers and employers. "It is contended", 
it was reported, "that the existing machinery is too slow and tends 
to hamper negotiations because of the time taken to arrive at a 
settlement." In 1944 the powers of the Controller were extended to 
those workers under 1Cs3 , either because of this slowness of the _machinery 
or because of an increase in worker militancy. In 1945 alone, 43 
conciliation boards, usually considered to be measures of last resort, 
4 
still had to be appointed to deal with unresolved disputes. 
In other areas of labour legislation there were also inadequacies 
and reason for complaint. When there was a clash between the building 
restrictions and the Factories Act, the Mini.st er of Labour instructed 
the Divisional Inspectors "to avoid, wherever possible, compelling 
manufacturers to undertake structural alterations under present condi-
tions. 115 Increased exemptions under the Factories Act were granted 
6 in respect of night and female work, as were exemptions from the 
7 Wage Act. Analysis of the various Acts in previous chapters show 
that almost without exception the war years were slack ones in respect 
of observance and enforcement of labour legislation. The 1944 Report 
of the Department of Labour stated that "(e)nforcement of legislation 
has been difficult owing to the shortage of qualified industrial 
inspectors. 118In a crisis . ::he operation of the new and old legislation 
1. Dept Labour, Summarised Report, 1944, page 2. 
2. 20 October, 1942. 
3. Government Notice, 17 March, 1944. 
4. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 20. 
5. Walker and Weinbren, 1961, page 4. 
6. Dept Labour, Annual Reports, e.g. 1940, page 55. 
7. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 27. 
8. Dept Labour, Summarised Report, 1944, page 2. 
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tended more to control labour than capital. 
III 
Worker organisation during the war 
Table 8.1 provides the colour breakdown of mandays lost in strikes in 
the years 1938 to 1945. 
TABLE 8.1 1 
COLOUR BREAKDOWN OF STRIKES 1938 - 1945 
Year Total mandays lost White mandays 
1938 4 070 479 
1939 4 246 17 
1940 6 475 3 068 
1941 23 199 7 197 
1942 49 547 14 368 
1943 47 719 28 738 
1944 62 709 1 210 
1945 91 180 6 039 









--- - -- -
The war years saw a marked tendency towards increased and more 
intensive organisation, an organisation which was concentrated among 
the unprivileged work~rs. While whites continued to constitute a 
a significant proportion of the mandays lost, there appears to have been 
a shift in the incidence among white workers from the skilled to the 
semi- and unskilled, and also towards the women. In Chapter Three 
it was seen that the average wage of a striker decreased from £0,51 
per day in the 1931-5 period, to £0,32 in the 1941-5 period, despite 
the inflation in the later period. 2 The incre.ased ability of relatively 
well-paid workers to hold out for longer periods would also inflate 
percentages of mandays lost as in the table above. While the absence 
of full departmental reports for these years makes conclusive evidence 
a problem, both these factors suggest the trend towards the less 
privileged workers described above, with strikes concentrated among 
the unskilled and female workers, where the upsurge in organisation 
1. UNION STATISTICS FOR FITY YEARS, page G-18, own calculations. 
2. CHAPTER THREE, Table 3.2. 
• 
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was most most evident. 
To deal with potential strikes, "where considerations of national 
1 importance made it essential to adopt more speedy methods" than here-
to force, completely new measures were passed, which amplified and/or 
replaced the previous industrial bargaining procedures and which were 
used in all industries, whether connected with the war effort or 
not • 2 
War .Measure 9 of 19423 empowered the Minister to appoint an aribtrator 
for any industry and area where he though a dispute existed which could 
affect the ottcome of the war or the life of the community. The ar-
bitrator would then consult representative organisations of both 
employers and workers and make an award which could cover all the 
matters normally covered by other wage regulating measures. No strikes 
or lockouts were allowed from the time of appointment of the arbitrator 
until the end of the award. 
War Measure 1454 of the same year applied to al 1 "employees", defined 
5 here as all those not defined as employees in the ICAl i.e. mostly 
African workers. Here, yet again, the Minister could appoint an ar-
bitrator if he felt a dispute existed. In this case, however, the 
law stated that "no employee or other person shall initiate or take 
6 part in a strike or in the continuation of a strike, 11 whether arbi• 
tration was being employed in that industry at the time or not, i.e. 
it prohibited strikes at all times. 
Despite the enormous increase in strike incidence evidenced by the 
table above, the Department reported that "recourse (to Measures 9 and 
) . 7 145 had undoubtedly averted a considerable nunber of potential strikes," 
an assertion which suggests that the preconditions of even higher 
strike figures existed in the latter years of the war. Measure 145, 
1. Dept Labour, Annual Report, 1945, page 2. 
2. E.g., the Rand pressing industry, where a measure was applied by 
Government Notice 897 of 1945. 
3. Government Notice 21 of 1942. 
4. Government Notice 318 of 1942. 
5. Section 2. 
6. Sect ion 5. 
7. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 2. 
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for blaclil rather than white workers, was, however, a more obviously 
repressive and effective instrument. While only one award was made in 
1 
terms of the former, as against seven under the latter, it was the 
strike clause which was more important, allowing for easier prose-
cution of any and every striking African worker. (lt is interesting 
to note that, unlike most other war measures, Measure 145 was not 
discarded at the end of the war, but remained in force, and was later 
incorporated into Act 48 of 1953.) 
Both measures were ineffecitve in controlling the spread of strikes, 
despite the fact that about half of the delegates at the TLC conference 
had voted ·in favour of the measure. 2 11 Prosecution did not deter the 
3 workers". "Despite the prohib lt ion of strikes under the measures, 
stoppages of work occurred in various trades and industries, more 
4 particularly amongst Native employees." In some cases the sheer 
nuubers of wo~kers involved defeated the state. ln 1944, for 
example, a case against about six hundred striking African coal workers 
had to be dropped. The case was unmanageable as there was no place 
for all the accused to sit, and it had taken one and a half hours 
merely to ascertain that all the accused were present. In the end 
5 only Koza and Matau, the leaders, were charged. 
In overall terms, strikes increased over the war period. The number of 
mandays lost in 1944 and 1945 exceeded that for any previous year in 
6 the period 1924 - 1945, despite the increased inflation, while the 
7 8 nlUD)er of mandays lost in 1942 and 1943 was exceeded only in 1934. 
Trade union membership also increased during the war. Membership of 
registered trade unions increased from 179 412 in 1939 to 346 509 in 
19459 and the TLC noted that the increase was concentrated among the 
10 semi-skilled, rather than the skilled. Figures for unregistered 
1. Dept Labour, Summarised Report, 1944, page 2. 
2. TLC Annual Report, 1943. 
3. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page 19. 
4. ibid. 
5. GUARDIAN, 29 June 1944. 
6. 62 709 and 91 180 respectively for 1944 and 1945. 
7. 49 547 and 47 719 respectively for 1942 and 1943. 
8. UNION STATISTICS °FOR FIFTY YEARS, page G-18. 
9. Dept Labour Annual Reports. 
10. TLC Annual Report, 1941. 
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trade unions are usually estimates, but it is likely that the increase 
here was proportionately greater, with the growing organisation, for 
example, of the CNETU, which had a menbership of 158 600 in 119 different 
l trade unions by 1944. 
Control of organisation was thus also extended during the war beyond 
that described in Chapter Seven, where the restrictionso on freedom 
of speech, assembly, movement and affiliation in times of peace were 
examined. Freedom of expression was controlled by Section 10 of 
Proclamation 201 of 1939, which forbade the printing, publishing, 
or expression at a meeting of anything 
a) to subvert the government's or legislature's authority, 
b) to incite (part of) the public to resist/oppose officials, 
c) to engender or aggravate intersectional feelings of hostility, or 
d) to cause pub lie panic or alarm. 
War Measure 55 of 19422 allowed the seizure or banning of any book 
or publication and all future editions and continuations of such 
publication, even under another name. Meetings were controlled by 
Section 10 of Proclamation 201 of 1939, which empowered the Minister 
to prohibit any meeting, indoor or out, of more than twenty people, 
for any purpose other than religious, funeral, statutory, or any auction, 
game,theatre or wedding. To deal with individuals, emergency regulations 
provided for internment without trial. 
These measures were not used exclusively, or even chiefly, against the 
left. National Party, Ossewa-Brandwag and Stormjaer menbers, suspected 
of ties with Nazi Germnay, were seen as a major threat, and were so 
ruthlessly suppressed that the SATLC was able to report that the 
3 Emergency Regulations had had a 11sobering effect on Afrikaner organisation. " 
The left did not escape, however, despite restricting themselves to less 
violent means of protest than the sabotage undertaken by members of the 
Ossewa-Brandwag. Several Communist Pa~ty labour leaders and other 
leftist sympathisers - the Joffe brothers, Fritz Fellner, Latti, Max 
Gordon, E.J. Brown, and Burford, the latter two more leftist menbers 
4 
of the Labour Party - were interned as being "people of dangerous 
1. Barge et al, 1977, page 4. 
2. Government Notice 1390. 
3. Dept Labour Annua 1 Report, 1939. 
4. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 533. 
1 
char act er. ·11 
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The Communist Party meni>ers were released in 
September 1941, when the Party changed its stance towards the war, 
2 but others remained incarcerated. Seedat, a radical Indian leader, 
2 went to jail in April 1941, for subversion, while Dadoo, another 
Conununist Party leader, was charged and convicted in July 1940, also 
under Emergency Regulations, for the publication of a leaflet reading 
as f o.llows: 
"You are being asked to support the war for freedom, 
justice and democracy. Do you enjoy the fruits of 
freedom, justice and democracy? What you do enjoy 
is pass and poll-tax laws, segregation, white labour 
policy, low wages, high rents, poverty, unemployment, 
and vie ious colour-bar laws. 113 
He was also jailed in January 1941, for statements in the Benoni 
location, which the court deemed "calculated to incite the public to 
oppose the government. 114 
DIE WARE REPUBLIKEIN, the ColDIWnist Party publication in Afrikaans, 
became the first newspaper to be censored in February 1941. 
IV 
Concession to the working class 
Legislation during the war was not all directly and overtly anti-
worker, however. It was necessary to win the support of labour if war 
and its accompanying hardships were to be endured. This was particularly 
so in the case of white workers, who once again had representation in the 
government. 
There were several different ways in which the interests of the more 
privileged workers were further safeguarded during the war. In con-
trolled industries a Labour Control Board was established with equal 
representation of organised employers and workers (i.e. registered TUs), 
and this board assisted in the investigation, if not in the determination, 
1. E. Roux, TIME LONGE~ THAN ROPE, 1972, page 318. 
2. HAD, 1940, page 972. 
3. Simons and Simons, _1969, page 532. 
4. Roux, 1972, pages 316-17. 
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1 
of the measures passed. When under the Emergency Labour regulations 
provision was made for the "dilution" of skilled labour, discussion 
was again conducted with employers and workers from organised industry 
before these regulttions were gazetted. ln the interests of the 
skilled workers, it was agreed that unemployed artisans from other 
industries were to be considered first when there was a shortage in 
any industry, and it was only when the negligible level of u~mployment 
among such skilled workers rendered this safeguard· unnecessary that the 
employment of women was to be allowed, and then only for the duration 
of the war. 2 Emergency regulations passed e~rly in the war laid down 
that employers had to re-employ all workers on military service in 
3 their previous jobs for at least two months after dem~ilisation, and 
post-war competition for skilled workers was minimised by an agreement 
that the demobilisation of COTT (Central Organisation for Technical 
Training - an emergency technical training scheme in the army) trainees 
would be strictly controlled, and by the exclusion of all blacks from 
training centres for skilled and semi-skilled in the engineering, elec-
trical and motor industries. 4 ln the Defence Department, building 
. 5 
contracts were contracted on a civilised labour basis. In 1942 the 
Unemployment Benefit Act was extended so as to cover all industries, 
and not only those contained in the original schedule. 6 Th? differential 
treatment of black and white by Measures 145 and 9 ha-s already 
been noted above. 
These protective measures had the desired effect on an important section 
of the organised workers. The CFLU ORGAN stated in March 1941, that 
"We have consented to legislation recently which we must realise now 
can act as a boomerang in the future. We particularly refer to the 
establishment of the Control Office for Labour, whose functions are 
to marshall the labour force of this country systematically. We are 
7 in agreement with this ••• 11 The SATLC reported that a "more lenient 
1. See Government Gazette Extraordinary of 13 February 1941, clause 4~ 
2. Gazetted July, 1941; Dept Labour, Surrmarised Report, 1941, page 3. 
3. GUARDIAN, 3 January 1941. 
4. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 534. 
5. Dept Labour Annua 1 Report, 1940. 
6. Act 17 of 1942. 
7. SATLC Annual Report, 1943. 
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aspect on the implications of these War Measures is ••• mainly due 
to the fact that some of our affiliated unions have experienced 
l certain benefits therefrom during the last twelve months." As noted 
above, even the Communist Party, though claiming in July 19402 that 
the Labour Party was supporting the class enemies of the workers in 
a capitalist imperialist war, afterwards while criticising minor 
measures and matters, supported the war effort as a whole. The labour 
aristocrats were won over by concessions for the most part. They 
complained about minor matters, but had no "serious complaints" 
3 about the Control of Manpower, which was, after all, under one of their 
own men, Ivan Walker. Andrews reported that "it is interesting to note 
that in the debate on the attitude of the TLC to the war at the 1940 
Conference, it was the delegates from unions in the newer industries 
who generally spoke and voted against the policy of unconditional 
4 support of the government's war policy." These were, on the whole, 
the semi-skilled operatives in the machine-based industries. 
The mass of the workers, even though not a supportative class on the 
political scene, also had to be pacified, however. Increasing 
ubanisation and politicisation caused an upsurge in organisation 
among the black workers, which was reflected in trade union and 
strike figures. Black workers were also playing a much more important 
and substantial role in the workforce. 
On the one hand these developments brought forth repressive measures 
such as War Measure 145. The upsurge in organisation, on the other 
hand, also fired the black trade union debate, a debate which was 
a major topic of discussion among politicians, industrialists and 
workers at the time, and which envisaged the registration, either 
administrative, or legislative, of black trade unionism, rather than 
the mere exclusion of African workers from the ICA,as a more 
effective means of control.5 
1. SATLC Annual Report, 1941 
2. WARE REPUBLII<EIN, July, 1940. 
3. SATLC Annual Report, 1941. 
4. W.H. Andrews, CLASS STRUGGLES IN S<lJTH AFRICA, 1941, page 47. 
5. D. Lewis, AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS AND THE STATE, 1976. 
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Concessions were actually granted in certain areas where protest and 
organisation were particularly militant and threatening. In August 
1943, and again in November 1944, the people of Alexandra township 
staged bus boycotts to protest against rising bus fares. In the former 
case the forty to sixty thousand people walked the 18 miles daily for 
1 
nine days, and in the second for seven weeks. Pass campaigns and 
2 . 
conferences, such as the Communist Party and ANC Women's Anti-Pass 
3 4 Campaign in March 1944, and squatter unrest in 1944 also occasioned 
government action. The militancy of the black workers and the economy's 
need of them occasioned relatively conciliatory measures. The bus 
boycotts were successful in securing War Measure 89 of 7 November 
1944, which empowered the Minister of Native Affairs to order employers, 
including the government, to pay any rise in public transport fees 
occurring after 30 Septeni>er, 1944, in certain areas, while during 
the war pass laws were applied far more leninetly than at any period 
before or since, except perhaps the Sharpeville period. 
The cola (cost of living allowance), together with price control, was 
a more extensive and material concession. Inflation was rampant during 
the war, and it was recognised that "generally speaking, the advance 
of wage levels does not keep pace with the price trends.':; By 1941 
most organised workers already had colas provided for in their !Cs 6, and 
the CCI itself advocated that a cola for all workers become generalised 
in all industries. 7 War Measure 71 of 1941 8 introduced a cola for all 
workers earning under 74s per week, except those employed by the state 
in domestic work or in farming, while War Measure 27 of 1941 initiated 
price control under which the maximum price for everything from baby wool. 
to heavy steel equipment was subsequently controlled, on a very detailed 
specific product basis. 
The allowances were regularly amended as the Consumer Price Index rose, 
1. Simons and Simons, 1969, page 547. 
2. Roux, 1972, page 328. 
J. Walker, 1978, page 108. 
~. Simons· and Simons, 1969, page 547. 
5. Dept Labour Annual Report, 1945, page JO. 
6. CCI Annual Report, 1941, page 31. 
7. ibid. 
8. 31 July 1941. 
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although the GUARDIAN pointed out in 1941 that whereas at that stage 
the cola consisted of a six to ten per cent increase in wages, inflation 
1 was running at 15% or more. It was thus an improvement of many ·workers 
position, but had many inadequacies. The control of the steel price 
illustrates the fact that price control was not only introduced in 
the workers• interests. Steel was an input for industry, and control 
was intended also to lower capital's costs. As such it was logical 
that wages, another major cost for capital, should not be allowed to 
increase at too rapid a rate. 
The extent of the measures was also limited. The original measure 
2 applied only in the nine major urban centres, i.e. the bigger centres 
where worker protest would be more disruptive than elsewhere. Worker 
militancy again effected an improvement. Demonstrations and deputations 
3 
were organised by local "food coumittees" in many African areas. Later 
amendments extended the allow .. '!e to include areas . omitted before, 
until, by War Measure 49 of 18 June 1948, all workers, everywhere in 
the Union, in establishlllents of ten or more workers, were covered. 
However, War Measures 43 of 1942 excluded African mine labourers, 
while agricultural workers were excluded by the original measures, 
No 71 of 1941. The Gold Producers Committee did not consider it 
necessary to give a cola "because the families are in rural areas." 
Farmers claimed that ~s payment in kind was the general method of 
remuneration in agricultural enterprises, inflation did not affect 
their workers. In the case of domestic workers, the "Minister of 
Labour••• pointed out that it would be difficult for the government 
to include (them), as the whole workaday population (i.e. the labour 
4 aristocracy who employed them) would be up against them." 
The justification for the exclusion of domestic workers was obviously 
political. The justifications advanced in the case of the mine and 
agricultural workers were fallacious. The Institute of Race Relations 
noted that the cost of goods in the rural areas was higher than in the 
1. 1· August 1941. 
2. Section 7, War Measure 71 of 1941. 
J. Walker, 1978, page 110. 
4. SAT LC Annual Report, 1941. 
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1 towns and that actually very little was produced on the black land. 
Agricultural labour was at all times very badly paid, even in 
comparison with black labour in the rest of the economy. The cola 
was a concessions to workers, in that it raised the costs of capital, 
and it was thus granted on as limited a scale as possible. Th~ level 
of the allowance was kept down, while its coverage excluded the 
exclusively black employment sectors, and, in the beginning, excluded 
also other areas where organisation was not so militant or threatening. 
V 
Comparison with the Position in England and some Conclusions 
War-time developments in South Africa show markedly similar charac-
2 teristics to those in England in many important respects. There, 
too, a new parliamentary coalition was established after the out-
break of war, with Labour leaders Attlee and Greenwood in the War 
Cabinet, and Bevin, another from among Labour's ranks, as Minister 
of Labour. There, too, conscription caused a serious shortage of 
labour, which was concentrated among the skilled labourers, and 
which was partially offset by the training of unskilled workers, 
labour dilution, and the employment of women in traditionally male 
work. 
Emergency legislation in South Africa was also based on that of 
England. The War Measures Act was similar ~o the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act. In March 1941 an "Essential Work Order" imposed 
positive, as well as negative, controls on English labour, and the 
National Arbitration Tribunal rendered strikes illegal by Order 1305. 
Despite the similarities, however, there were important differences 
between the two countries. In the first place, England was more 
directly threatened by the war. This both increased the strains on 
the economy and increased the morale of the workers. South Africa, 
as a peripheral country both politically and economically, differed 
from England. The isolation from the metropole and the strain on the 
economy · 'provided the boost necessary to establish a significant increase 
1. RACE RELATIONS JOURNAL, X, page 70. 
2° See Henry Pelling, A HISTORY OF BRIT'ISH TRADE UNIONISM, 1963. 
The information which follows comes chiefly from this source. 
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in both the size of, and the nature of, industrial production. 
Distance from the war front and internal splits among the white group 
as to which side to support decreased support for the government among 
the working population in comparison with England. 
The second important difference was the composition of the population, 
and the workforce in particular. In South Africa the war years 
witnessed an increased participation of black workers in industry. 
Whereas both skilled and unskilled male workers were recruited in 
England, in South Africa it was mainly whites who were recruited, and 
the effect of shortage was thus even more concentrated among the 
skilled. Dilution of labour, training of unskilled workers, employ-
ment of women, all these were added to the normal process of deskilling 
which accompanies the development of machinofacture, and black men 
and.white women came to be employed more and more in positions which 
threatened those of the white males. Both women and black men displayed 
an awareness of their increased importance to the economy, an awareness 
reflected by an upsurge in organisation. The state showed its awareness 
of the differences by its differential treatment of the two groups, 
at the same time as it was forced to make certain concessions to black 
workers. 
In both England and South Africa the Labour Party, and the Communist 
Party after 1941, cooperated in the war effort. In the economic sphere 
England had its equivalent to the South Africa Labour Control Board 
in its Joint Consultative Committee. Due to the factors mentioned 
above, however, the control of the organisation of the workforce was 
not the same in the two countries. In England fewer working days were 
lost in 1940 than at any time in the previous twenty-five years. In 
the latter years of the war unofficial strikes increased, and in 1944 
more working days were lost than . in any year since 1932. In South 
Africa the trend was accentuated. In 1939 and 1940 the South African 
strike levels in terms of days lost (4 246 and 6 475 respectively) were 
low, but they had been even lowerearlier i "nthe period 1924 to 1940. 
From 1941 onwards the number of days lost increased phenomenally as 
seen above, and reached higher levels than ever before. South African 




Poulantzas describes the exceptional state, a state exemplified 
by that of the fascist state, but which has a wider application for 
all those social formations experiencing severe crisis. He describes 
the changes in these states in the relationship between the ideo-
logical and repressive stat.e apparatuses, and the blurring of the 
distinction between the "public" and "private" spheres, until all 
institutions appear to belong to the state. With this development, 
there is also a greater reliance on arbitrariness in the law, with 
far fewer limitations being placed on a nationalist leader's and 
government's powers. 
South Africa during the crisis of the war years exhibited many of 
these features, as indeed did England. The powers conferred by 
the War Measures Act of 1940 allowed the government far-ranging powers 
to regulate all aspects of society, powers which were not questionable 
by ordinary process of law. Measures introduced under this Act ex-
tended the state's contm 1 over areas previously regarded as private. 
Even legislation not enacted under this Act came to have a more ad-
ministrative and arbitrary form, amendments to the Factories and 
WC Acts in 1941, for example, both providing for much more regulation 
by the Minister than previously. All these laws attempted to extend 
the ability of .the state to preserve the status quo, by control of the 
conditions of production in an uncertain time. 
Such control had to rely to a certain extent on ideological dominan:e 
as well as mere repression. In a crisis situation the subjects of 
the state must be convinced to accept the role of the state as 
guarantor of the national integrity of the nation, and must be prepared 
to suffer some hardships for the sake of this national integrity. 
If this is not so, there is the danger of the major contradictions of 
the society coming to the force and interrupting the fight against 
internal forces. 
ln South Africa such ideological indoctrination was present to some 
extent. The established white labour organisations supported the war, 
and the state granted positive, as well as negative, controls to ensu~e 
this support. The less privilegfd workers, even within these orga-
nisations, were not as unanbivalent in their support. An important 
1. Nicos Poulantzas, FASCISM AND DICTATCRSHIP, 1974, pages 254ff; 314ff. 
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section of white workers supported the National Party and Ossewa-
Brandwag, and saw salvation in the establishment of a National 
Socialist Republic, which they hoped would protect white workers, both 
skilled and · unskilled, against both the capitalist and the black 
workers. Many black workers, while sympathetic to the sentiments of 
the Allies, did not find these se~timents reflected in the state's 
and society's treatment of them as workers. These two groups, and 
thel.r conflicting demands, were to ptt>ve important in the changes in 
the political economy of South Africa in the late 1940's. Within 
a year of the war's end, black worker demands erupted and surfaced 
in the massive mine workers strike of 1946. While the Labour Party 
in Britain triumphed in the 1945 General Election, in South Africa 
it was the National Party which triumphed just three years later. 
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CHAPTER NINE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined labour legislation in South Africa in the 
first two decades of the establishment of monopoly capitalism, i.e. 
1924 to 1945. The study attempted to develop analyses both of labour 
law in this stage of capitalism in general, and of such law in the 
stage of the South African social formation in particular. ..This 
final chapter will summarise the most important findings of each of 
the previous chapters (Section 1), and will then draw some general 
conclusions on the basis of these (Section II). The various laws 
analysed will be seen to have several couunon features which justify 
their being considered as one entity for the purposes of this thesis 
and serve to illuminate the role of South African labour legislation 
between 1924 and 1945. 
I 
Suumary 
Chapter One of the thesis set out the conceptual framework to be 
employed, as well as the socio-political setting of South Africa in 
the period under consideration. The important class and societal 
groups were described, with special attention being paid to the factors 
affecting labour legislation, for example the sectoral breakdown of 
capital and the various groupings in a skill and colour breakdown of 
the labour force. The main political and economic developments of the 
period were then sketched in so as to provide a setting for the timing 
of the various legislative measures. 
The study proper then couunenced with an examination of the law. The 
institutions of the law were examined with a view to establishing in 
what was the law itself, its categories, framing and administration, 
functioned in the development of capitalism and in the struggle between 
capital and labour. The bias and inequalities inherent in the legal 
system, traditionally conceived of as being neutral and impartial, were 
described, as evidenced both in the characteristics common to all 
capitalist societies, and in the peculiar form adopted by these 
institutions in South Africa. The form of the law itself, in positing 
single individuals, the legal persona, rather than the collective 
force of labour, tended to isolate workers in their struggle and diminish 
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their strength. 
The following five chapters then looked at particular statutes enacted 
and in operation through the period - the Industrial Conciliation 
Act (Chapter Three), the Wage Act (Chapter Four), the Factories Act 
(Chapter Five), the Riotous Assemblies Act and related political 
measures (Chapter Six), and industrial health legislation in the 
form of the Workmens Compensation and Miners Phthisis Acts (Chapter 
Seven). After a brief outline of the aDi>it of the relevant act, 
the clauses and provisions relevant in terms of the study were 
examined. The forces advocating and opposing the Act, the reasons 
for their attitudes 1 and the effects of the Act once promulgated 
were examined, as was the way in which the Act was administered. 
The chapter on the ICA discussed the measure as a response to the 
militant, skilled, white worker organisation of the first two decades 
of the century, and to the emergence of black organisation. Various 
forms of regulation and registration of trade unionism have been adopted 
in most capit~list countries to control such organisatton and to take 
advantage of the various conservative tendencies to which it is prone. 
In South Africa regulation was seen to have definite biases in terms 
of skill and colour. Registration and collective bargaining were 
restricted to the more privileged sections of the workforce. These 
~orkers .were enabled to win limited gains from capital in the form of 
better wages and working conditions and protection from competition by 
other workers. In return, however, capital won two important gains. 
Firstly, the workforce was divided and the -1Dajority were excluded from 
most rights under the Act. Secondly, those unions which were registered 
were subject to fairly strict control in such respects as strikes, 
and were also restricted to organisation along industrial lines. The 
limited channels, together with the knowledge that they were privileged, 
tended to confine their demands to levels acceptable to capital. 
The Wage Act was a necessary adjunct of the ICA. While the latter 
provided channels for the determination of wages and conditions for 
the more privileged workers, the former provided chiefly for the semi-
skilled and unskilled. This group's importance was increasing in the 
thirties with the advent of machinofacture and the increased unionisation 
of black men and white women. The Act was necessary to satisfy or 
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divert seine of their demands. 
At the same time, at least in the early years, the Wage Act was part 
of the "civilised labour" policy of the PACT government. Black wages 
were traditionally lower than those of similarly qualified or unquali-
fied blacks. In the absence of restraints capital would thus have 
been inclined to employ the cheaper blacks, rather than whites. By 
setting wages at "civilised", or white, levels, the Wage Board was 
able to avoid this possiblity, encourage white employment, and thus 
satisfy government supporters. Like the ICA, the Wage Act, by operating 
on industrial lines, served to encourage organisation along economistic 
lines rather than for more political demands. 
The chapter on the Factories Act discussed the provisions of this 
measure in regard to hours of work, 11welfare 11 , colour. discrimination, 
and accidents, as well as those for women and children. The conditions 
of the Factories Act were, on the whole, inferior to those laid down 
by ICs and the Wage Board, and often merely reflected the existent 
conditions in industry. Those workers with stronger political and 
ideological links with capital we~e covered by the other two acts and 
worker agitation in these groups was channelled in the directions 
suggested there. The general conditions for the rest of industry were 
not perceived as being too important, and served as a lowest common 
denominator. As with the other two acts, however, they did serve 
a purpose from the point of view of the development of capital as a 
whole. The larger enterprises tended, because of the larger capital 
investment and larger workforces, to be more "progressive" in terms of 
worker benefits. The setting of conditions at levels prevalent in these 
factories tended to squeeze out the smaller, less profitable capita ls, 
and thus accelerate the concentration and centralisation of capital. 
The section on women and children illustrated a second important 
aspect of the Act. The whole Act was aimed at protecting the workforce, 
in order to ensure its reproduction and continued availability. 
Restrictions on hours of work, 1'welf are" provisions and safety equipment 
all served this aim. In the case of women and children, however, this 
became even more important. These two groups constituted the source 
of reproduction and the future producers of the society. As such, 
while protection still did not interfere unduly with production and 
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exploitation, in this case the provisions were stricter and more 
effective. 
Chapter Six elaborated on the restrictions placed on worker agitatJon 
and .organisation by the ICA by looking at other, more overtly 11political" 
measures. The ~iotous Assemblies Act, in particular, was seen to place 
severe restrictions on the· freedom of asseubly and the right to strike. 
Several of the "Native" Acts and the Masters and Servants Act further 
restricted these rights by prohibiting free speech and asseubly and 
providing for the removal of "undesirables". The chapter cone luded 
with a look at several more general remedies used to control organisation. 
Institutions such as the press were seen to display bias without any 
explicit law being necessary to achieve this. Municipal, provincial 
and loca.regulation were all used at various times against the workers' 
organisations, as were both civil and criminal branches of the national 
law. The chapter was of necessity sketchy in such a broad area, but 
the various cases cited are suggestive as to the large range of weapons 
available to those opposed to effective or threatening labour organisation. 
Chapter Seven dealt with both Workmen, Compensation and Miners Phthisis, 
two circumstances covered by acts passed to compensate workers for 
some of the ill effects suffered as a result of exposure to danger in 
the production process. Workmens Compensation legislation provided 
for monetary compensation for those injured .in industrial accidents, 
and for those who contracted industrial diseases. The Miners Phthisis 
Act provided for alternative employment and/or monetary compensation 
for those affected by silicosis or tuberculosis while working on the 
mines. 
Comparison of the two measures illustrated important points of difference 
between the situation in industry, the chief area of application for 
Workmens Compensation, and the mines, the area for Miners Phthisis. 
The latter legislation was introduced much earlier than the former, 
reflecting the advanced state of organisation on the mines in the 
first two decades of the century, as well as the sevee incidence of 
phthisis. Differential application as between whites and blacks in 
the case of Miners Phthisis compensation illustrates the differing 
roles of the two sections of the workforce here, as well as their 
different political and organisational strengths. The whites were 
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predominantly skilled, well organised, politically privileged and 
few in nuni>er. Blacks were unskilled, closely controlled in a 
compound situation, and constituted the bulk of the labour force. 
The Act was thus highly discriminatory, reflecting these differences. 
Whites were subjected to strict medical tests, relatively well 
compensated, and provided with alternative jobs wherever possible. 
Africans were much more summarily checked, and dispatched to the 
!'reserves" as soon as disease was detected. Scales of compensation 
were also different. 
In the case of Workmens' Compensation the prevailing wage rates consti-
tuted the main source of discrimination. At some stages black rates 
were actually higher than white. The lower earnings of the blacks, 
as well as their ignorance of the law, nonetheless ensured that actual 
levels of compensation greatly favoured whites. This alternate form 
of discrimination nevertheless reflected a less strictly colour-divided 
workforce. 
The Workmens'Compensation Act and the debate on the form of insurance 
illustrate another point with respect t,o labour legislation in general. 
Capital, while in principle opposed to state intervention in the 
economy, was prepared to advocate this where it introduced the 
possibility of large-scale savings, for example in the form of state 
insurance. Workmens' Compensation was only introduced after a strong 
and concerted demand on the part of. labour. When forced to introduce 
it, however, capital quickly ensured that the form of legislation 
was such as to impose least constraints. Compensation was aimed at those 
workers potentially capable of further work in industry. Compensation 
to the totally disabled was less than that for the partially or temporarily 
disabled, despite the former•s greater suffering. The form of insurance 
was also speedily changed into that entailing the least cost. While 
Workmens'Compensation was ostensibly in the workers• interests, as with 
all industrial legisla~ion, the : form of compensation did not disregard 
the needs of capital. 
In all the acts analysed in the above chapters, the methods and effective-
ness of implementation and enforcement were considered as an important 
part of such legislation. In most cases such enforcement was seen to 
be lacking. State officials were badly overworked and unable to fulfil 
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their policing duties. Employ.ers were more likely to be able to 
put across their point of view effectively, .both in the informal 
situation of routine inspection and in the event of the matter 
reaching the formal procedure in a court of law. In the latter 
case, particularly, the ability to employ legal advisers opened up 
many possibilities of unpunished law avoidance and evasion. In most 
cases it was only strong worker organisation and action that could 
secure a fair degree of compliance with the various measures. In 
many cases strikes were the most effective last resort in forcing 
compliance, and the restrictions on this right mentioned above greatly 
diminished the general effectiveneness of all organisation. 
The penultimate chapter, rather than concentrating on one statute, 
as the previous chapters had done, focussed attention on a period -
that of the Second World War. As a time of crisis for the state 
itself, and one in which law of a significantly different nature 
was introduced, the period warranted separate and specific attention. 
War-time developments of the acts analysed earlier were included 
in the relevant chapters. This chapter focussed rather on the addi-
tional and extraordinary legislation passed specifically with regard 
to the war effort, and, briefly, at the effects on labour legislation 
and administration in general during a period of crisis for the state. 
Law of this period was characterised by a high degree of state 
11 interference" and regulation. Both capital, and particularly labour, 
were controlled as to place, nature, hours, conditions and wages of 
work. Organisation was subjected to even stronger controls than normal, 
with restrictions on strikes, freedom of speech, assembly and expression 
being even further increased• The development of large-scale industry 
was seen in the course of analysis of other measures to lead to an 
increased trend to administrative regulation, the state in this way 
regulating capital and ensuring its reproduction. The war period 
was a crisis characterised by a situation of short supply and large 
demand. This called forth an even greater administrative and bureau-
cratic bias in legislation, with control passing ever more beyond 
the individual entrepreneur or even the elected legislature. 
What Chapter Eight also demonstrated in stark form was the attitude 
of most of the official labour organisations to the state and law. 
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Throughout the period 1924 to 1945 the established white organisations 
tended to see the state in the form of a protector, and demands were 
thus restricted to particular issues and complaints, rather than a 
more generalised attack on the system. There were, however, more 
militant and far-reaching demands from the less privileged, such as 
the white female workers and blacks. During the war the ideology 
current was such as to strengthen the support of labour, with even the 
Communist Party supporting the government's war effort after 1941. 
Severe hardships in material conditions nevertheless introduced an 
opposing trend, and while the war effort was supported by the official 
organisation, the statistics for worker organisation and strikes showed 
an increase. Among blacks, in particular, both worker ·and general 
organisation showed a marked increase, which was reflected in the 
passing of new and amended legislation of both a restrictive and 
cmcessionary nature at an accelerated rate. 
II 
Conclusions 
Law and the state have, as their main function, the establishment and 
maintenance of the general conditions for the reproduction of capital 
and the maintenance of the hegemony of the power bloc and the 
domination of capital. In terms of labour legislation this means 
that the law must ensure the reproduction of the labour force, 
necessary for capital reproduction, as well as control of labour's 
strength, in order that political and eex> nomic stability may be main-
tained. This .latter aim entails the control and/or discouragement 
of effective worker organisation. 
The chapter by chapter summary presented above illustrates the overall 
aims of labour legislation in S~uth Africa. These aims are generally 
divisible under the two headings of (1) maintenance of the general 
conditions of production, and (2) maintenance of the hegemony of the 
ruling class. 
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1. General Conditions 
(a) Social versus individual capital : The interests of the individual 
capitalist were not always identical with those of social capital, 
i.e. capital as a whole. While the former was satisfied if he could 
continue expanding his capital in the immediate future, the latter had 
to ensure that the separate, uncoordinated, and to some extent chaotic 
individual processes did not deplete resources or in other ways affect 
the future viability of capital as a whole. Something, or someone, 
had to ensure the continued availability of all the inputs and 
conditions necessary for production. The state, as representative 
of th~ total social capital, was called upon to play this role and 
ensure that viable and profitably production possibilities continued 
to exist and that the form of the labour force was also maintained 
in that shape most conducive to capital's interests. Several of the 
laws analysed in this thesis can be seen to perform such a function. 
The Factories Act safeguarded the reproduction of the labour force, by 
protecting women and children, and thus the future producers, by limiting 
hours and thus conserving the energy and health of the present pro-
ducers, and by protection of health in the way of 11welfare" and accident 
contr.ol. Workmens Compensation and Miner.s Phthisis legislation also 
played their part in protecting the workers. With the threat of these 
acts and sanctions, individual capital itself was encouraged to take 
steps to minimise depletion of the workforce by accidents and disease. 
In the case of the main source of labour - the African population - the 
law concentrated on supply rather than demand. The "Native" laws 
sought to ensure the availability of this resource at all times. 
Restrictions on movement, residence, place of work and contract all 
acted to divide the labour market, not only along colour lines, but also 
on sectoral lines, to ensure tha labour was available when and where 
needed, in sufficient nu~ers so as not to extract a s~arcity payment, 
and yet not in such large nuubers as to be a drain on welfare and 
coD111unity services, or so as to provide a political threat. Workmens' 
Compensation, Miners Phthisis and Factories legislation provide 
a certain, if unequal, amount of protection for those African workers 
who were employed. 
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(b) . Bi_g versus small capital : The discrepancy between the illlllediate 
interests of individual capital and those of social capital was compounded 
by a divergm ce between the interests of smaller and bigger capital. 
Big capital was sometimes forced, by the very size of its production, 
and the large capital (both variable and invariable) employed, to 
implement measures to provide better wages and conditions, to preserve 
the workforce, and to insure themselves against their greater liabili-
ties. Larger groups of workers also, of course, tended to be stronger 
and easier to unite, and thus more able to enforce their demands. Inso-
far as these measures entailed extra costs for 
smaller employers had an unfair advantage over 
advantage bigger capital was loth to concede. 
these capitals, the 
the bigger ones• an 
This division of interests 
explains the sometimes contradictory sentiments expressed by capital. 
ln acts such as the Factories Act, Wage Act, ICA and Workmens Compensation 
Act, big capital was in favour of all employers being forced to incur 
expenses which they were in any event forced to make. Small capital, 
meanwhile, complained about incursions into their freedom, incursions 
which gravely limited their competitiveness. Where such laws were 
imposed, they encouraged the processes of concentration and centralisation 
of capital. Larger, more "progressive" employers were encouraged, 
while the smaller ones struggled and often disappeared or were taken over. 
(c) Predictability : With the development of the scale of capitalist 
production, the need for plannhg and coordination 
1 Predictability or foreseeability (prevision ) --was 
individual capitalist to survive. The increase 
became greater. 
necessary for the 
in the size and 
scale of production meant that disruptions, too, tended to be larger 
and more diaequilibrating. Widespread crisis conditions, such as the 
war, exacerbated the lack of certainty. It is in this light that one 
can understand the many measures of control instituted during the 
war, and that one must understand the increased administrative and 
bureaucratic power vested in the hands of cabinet ministers and other 
government officials in later versions of the Workmen, Compensation 
and Factories Acts, as well as the "Native" Acts. Both corresponded 
to increased possibilities of chaos and an increasing need of certainty 
and a certain amount of planning. 
1. Nicos A.Poulantzas, NATURE DES CHOSES ET DROIT:ESSAI SUR LA DIALEC-
TIQUE DU FAIT BT DE LA VALEUR, 1965. In this early work, his doctoral 
thesis, Poulantzas writes at length on the need for and importance of 
this 11prevision" . 
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2. Hegemony 
(a) Cooptation: In 1928 General Hertzog stated that 11 (t)he cooperation 
of Labour in the Government has removed the menace of Bolshevism and 
Coumunism which, in view of a large native population. would have been 
a disaster to South Africa. 111 In the following seventeen years labour 
legislation constituted a further link in the cooptation of white 
workers and the subsequent weakening of a coni>ined labour onslaught. 
In doing this, the historically created situation of an almost completely 
dominated, dispossessed and impoverished black population was exploited 
to the full, in that it was this group which was more heavily exploited 
so as to provide benefits for the more privileged white workers, and 
in that it was the group which capital and the state most feared. 
Within production itself. the lCA and Wage Act. by fixing a wage and 
outlawing discrimination on the basis of colour. removed the danger 
of undercutting by blacks. The Apprenticeship Act and differential 
education acted .to encourage the restriction of skills to the white 
workers and .safeguarded the scarcity value of those workers who were 
qualified, while also ensuring that they alone filled the new positions 
of supervisor and coordinators of the labour process. The necessity 
for separate facilities for white and black in terms of the Factories 
Act, and the extra costs this entailed, encouraged the formation of 
all-white factories. Capital was thus encouraged by "economic" factors 
as well as by such means as exhortation, to favour white labour. 
Discrimination between white and black went further, however. Most 
concessions granted to labour tended to favour the whites, whether 
explicitly or implicitly. In some cases the discrimination was 
based on differential access to external state insitutions such as 
education (for example, the Apprenticeship Act), in other the dis-
crimination stipulated different treatment for white and black (lCA 
and Miners Phthisis), while in others still discrimination operated 
purely on the basis of the different places occupied in the labour 
process and their accompanying wages and positions (Workmens1 Compensation 
and Wage Acts). 
During the period studied the form of the labour force changed. Blacks 
1. S.P. Bunting, IMPERIALISM »ID SOUTH AFRICA, 1928, page 41. 
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were absorbed into the workforce in increasing nuui>ers and came to 
occupy higher positions. The form of discrimination in labour 
legislation changed accordingly. The 1937 amendments to the Wage 
and Industrial Conciliation Acts both relate to the changing emphasis 
of these measures, with a greater coverage of black workers while 
. 
still not threatening the white workers' comparative privileges. The 
1941 changes to the Factories and Workmens'Compensation Acts also 
incorporated important changes in the respective treatment of white 
and black. Protection of white workers at the expense of black was 
a continuing theme, but one which necessitated changing methods in 
a changing society. The sectionalism of the white workers explains 
the striking similarities between the demands of organised capital and 
labour, evidenced in much of the available material. Organised 
capital wanted controlled production. Organised white labour wanted 
concessions and better conditions within a system where they were 
relatively privileged and to which they had been discouraged from 
envisaging any radical alternative. To the state "legislation 
1 for white workers is an insurance against industrial trouble." 
(b) C~ntroi: The state had not only to divide the workforce, and 
thus weaken its collective strength, but also to control the 
manifestations of this strength. Many of the laws encompassed this 
aim, and the periods of great legislative activity thus demonstrate 
a "clumping" in periods where labour unrest was most feared, with 
laws passed both to pacify workers and to control those who would 
not submit to pacification. These· periods, for example 1924, 1937 and 
1941, were all periods of accelerated economic growth, and thus 
increased demand for labour and increased worker strength. Other 
factors also increased the need for control. 1924 and 1941 were times 
of crisis for the state in that the former followed the near-revolutionary 
1922 strike on the Rand and 1941 was in the war. period,. when the 
National Party, Communist Party, and to some extent the--Labour Party -
all parties .. with labour followings - were still anbivalent about their 
attitude towards the war effort. 
Official recognition and regulation of trade unions is accepted as a 
method of controlling and strat~-jacketing the organisation of 
workers; while preserving the illusion of democracy. This tactic 
1. Bunting, 1928, page 41, quoting Roos. 
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was employed in the ICA of South . .Africa and .. effectively channelled 
the demands and actions of workers in these industries. In the less 
organised industries, where there was no easily coopted labour 
aristocracy and where the workforce was potentially more militant, other 
less ani>iguous measures were introduced. Wage determinations provided 
a formal channel for determination of wages and conditions and by .. 
instituting firmer external control, subdued conflict. For areas where 
a still greater threat was perceived, there was no pretence at demo-
cracy. Stronger control, bordering on outright illegalisation of many 
forms of struggle, was · instituted, in the form of Masters and Servants 
Acts for Africans, exclusion , of African and farm workers from the 
provisions of the ICA, and the latter from the Wage Act, and Measures 
9 and 145 during the war. 
Worker demand did not only relate directly to the workplace. For 
the wider and more •political" and "social" demands, the law employed 
the Riotous Assemblies Act, Native Administration Act and other minor 
instruments such as municipal and provincial bye-laws, to control and 
punish those felt to threaten the status quo. These measures were 
by their nature both ambiguous and potentially far-reaching. They 
could thus be applied when and where needed, while not interfering 
with that organisation perceived as socially acceptable to capital. 
(c) Diversion of struggle: This thesis has looked at the function 
of labour law in South Africa. It is thus rather odd to emphasise 
the non-centrality of the .. law in society. It was, however, precisely 
this non-centrality that was the basis of one of the important functions 
of the law - diversion of the class struggle. 
The state and law were of, by and for the capitalist class, as illus-
trated in Chapter Two. By creating allied and supportative classes 
and through the mirage of the law's impartiality, the impression was 
created, however, that the state and law could be used by all as an 
instrument to effect change, and that the effectiveness of this 
instrument depended only upon those in whose hands it lay. The belief 
in the power of the law acted to channel labour activities and organi-
sation to these tightly controlled and restricted avenues, thus 
diverting and weakening worker strength. White workers concentrated 
on winning parliamentary seats and cabinet posts, and in forming 
-280-
coalitions with the other parties. Some black groups, for example 
the ANC and African Peoples Organisation aimed at winning the vote 
so that they too could play this role, and concentrated the main 
thrust of their activities in this direction. Both groups believed, 
when in trouble, that the law could often save them by finding the 
"truth". In this regard it was the strength of the law in ideological 
terms, i.e. the belief in the all-powerfulness of the law, which 
played a role in .the class struggle. This trust was misplaced. Even 
where concessions were won and .laws implemented, they were administered 
leniently where employers were affected and strictly in the case of 
workers • . The state, even when allegedly one with worker i:epresentatives 
in charge of the apparatuses, usually only aided workers when this was 
not against the interests of capita 1. 
* * * * * * 
This thesis. in dealing with labour legislation in South African between 
1924 and 1945, was an attempt to add to an understanding of the social 
formation in this period. South Africa was seen to be a society with 
a firm capitalist basis, where the primary contradiction was one 
between labour and capital. The interests of capital and .. those of the 
mass of the workers were diametrically opposed. Profits could not 
ultimately increase except at the expense of wages, and these were 
the chief considerations in the control of the labour process. 'nle primary 
conclusions to be drawn from the thesis is that though small con-
cessions were won by workers, and production was, by the end of the 
period, generally more "civilised" in the way it treated workers than 
it had been in 1924, the changes in the law - both concessions and 
otherwise - were ultimately not such as to jeopardise production and 
reproduction of the system. 
A simplistic two-class analysis is not adequate, however. Firstly, 
there were important .. divisions in capital. . Different fractions of 
capital desired different measures, their demands being based on such 
factors as the sector in which they operated, and the size and nature 
of their production processes. Even more important, however, were 
the divisions in the working class. Here class, in .its strictly 
economic form of the place occupied in production, was seen to interact 
with colour, to form a complex interplay on all three levels of the 
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society - economic,. political and ideological. The law served to main-
tain and strengthen the divisions created by factors such as differential 
enfranchisement and differential access to better jobs, creating a 
significant white .. petty-bourgeoisie and a subordinate black working 
class proper. The purely 1'economic1' factors connected with the intro-
duction of machinofacture tended, 'to some extent, to break down this 
barrier, but the .. law served to maintain the divisions, and thus pre-
serve the split within the working class and the support of a large 
section of the white workers for capital and the state. 
The law cannot be seen purely as an instrument of repression. Worker 
organisation and militancy necessitated the passing of laws conceding 
benefits to large groups of workers. Yet while workers sometimes 
gained, in the long run capital did not lose. The law successfully 
fulfilled its functions of reproduction of the general conditions of 
production and maintenance of hegemony of the power bloc at all times. 
When forced to make concessions, capital was quick to turn these 
concessions to its own advantage. 
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l Laws Passed 
Apprenticeship (Am) 
* Industrial Conciliation 
. * Miners Phthisis 
* Miners Phthisis (Cons) 
Native Tax and Development 









PACT .. government - LP and NP 
Hertzog Prime Minister 
SA Association of Employees Orga-
nisations founded 
Wages and Economics Conunission 
1926 Masters and Servants (Am) 
Native Affairs (Am) 
26 Civilised Labour Policy started 
27 
Native Tax and Development(Am)28 
Mines and Works 25 
Hertzog Bills introduced 
1927 Native Administration 
Native Affairs (Am) 
Work Colonies 
38 ISCOR created 
15 
20 
1928 Liquor Act 30 Non-European Trade Union Federation 
founded 
1929 Native Administration (Am) 9 Depress ion 
LP split - Madeley out of cabinet 
1930 Apprenticeship (Am) 22 Depression 
* Industrial Conciliation (Am) 24 White women enfranchised 
1931 
* Miners Phthisis (Am) 38 
Native (Urban Areas) (Am) 25 
Riotous Assemblies (Am) 19 
* Wage netermination Validation 21 
* Wage (Am) 23 
* Factories (Am) 26 
Native Tax and Development(Am)34 
Workmens Compensation (Am)* 29 
Entertainments (Censorship)* 28 
. 1932 Native Service Contract 24 
White franchise qualifications 
abolished 
Depression 
Trades and Labour Council formed 
Depression 
Off gold standard 
1933 lmnigration (Am) 19 Fusion Government - United Party 
Industrial Conciliation {Am) 7 
i. Laws dealt with in sane detail in the thesis are marked with an 
asterisk. 
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1934 Liquor (Am) 41 Post-depression boom 
* Miners Phthisis 60 
* Workmen, Compensation 59 
* Entertainments (Censorshi~ Am) 6 
1935 Wage Determination Validation 16 Industrial Legislation Commission 
* 1936 Miners Phthisis (Am) 
Native Trust and Land 
* Workmens'Compensation (Am) 
23 All Africans off roll - separate 
18 representation 
38 
* 1937 Industrial Conciliation (Am) 36 
* Wage (Am) 44 
Unemployment Benefit 
* 1938 Miners Phthisis (Am) 
25 
.6 
Representation of Natives (Am) 23 
1939 Native Administration (Am) 
Native Taxation (Am) 
Native Trust and Land (Am) 
* Shops and Offices 
1940 War Measures * 
* War Measures (Am) 
* 1941 Miners Phthisis (Am) 
Factories, Maihinery & 
Building Work 
* Workmeni Compensation 
War Measures (Am) * 
1942 Native Administration (Am) 
9 Second World War 
25 Coalition Government - LP represented 
17 Smuts Prime Minister 
41 
13 Second World War 
32 




42 Second World War 
Unemployment Benefit (Am) 17 
* Wage (Am) 22 
1943 Native Administration (Am) 
1944 Apprenticeship 
Native Law (Am) 
21 Second World War 
37 Second World War 
36 
Soldier & War Worker Employment40 
1945 Native (Urban Areas) (Cons) 
Native (Urban Areas)(Am) 
* Workmens'Compensation 
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